Mojo
Mostly harmless
Even Jabba understands this, which is why he keeps trying to include the existence of his specific soul (whatever he calls it) as a condition for his existence under H.
Proof of Immortality, VII
- Thread starter abaddon
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Even Jabba understands this, which is why he keeps trying to include the existence of his specific soul (whatever he calls it) as a condition for his existence under H.
Dabop
Master Poster
I am in a similar position, I had 5 keyboards and 5 computers, but currently 2 have no keyboards at all and 2 have 2 keyboards and 1 has 1....
(my two laptops both have external keyboards plugged in as I simply hate those stupid flat scrabble tile key keyboards with a vengeance!)
Belz...
Fiend God
Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
The whole computer/keyboard thing is quite a useful analogy on which to demonstrate exactly how Jabba is employing the conjunction fallacy, the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy, the false Bayesian inference, and equivocation between different conditions.
Suppose we have two hypothetical universes. In universe A, the desktop, or any computer with a separate keyboard, was never invented; all computers have keyboards integrated with the processor. In universe B, the laptop, or any other integrated computer, was never invented; all computers have separate keyboards. In each universe there are 1010 computers, and all computers (and all keyboards in universe B) have unique serial numbers.
Firstly, what are the odds, in each universe, of picking at random a specific combination of computer and keyboard?
In universe A, it's 10-10. Simples. The computer serial number is the only piece of information needed.
In universe B, it's not actually clear. If serial numbers are randomly assigned, then it's 10-20, but that's not usually how they're assigned. If each computer is assigned a single keyboard and none is ever changed, it's 10-10, but again that seems unlikely. What we can be certain of is that it can't be greater than 10-10. To claim otherwise would be to commit the conjunction fallacy. This is equivalent to Jabba's claim that his current existence is more likely under I, the immortal soul hypothesis, than under H, the materialistic hypothesis. [1]
However, what we can also be sure of is that, whatever serial number we find on the computer (and keyboard in universe B) in front of us, there's nothing particularly surprising that it has that particular serial number. To claim otherwise would be to commit the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. This is equivalent to Jabba's claim that he is somehow special, and set apart.
And what we can also be sure of is that none of this tells us whether the existence of universe A is more or less likely than the existence of universe B. To claim either would be to invent a Bayesian inference where in fact none exists. This is equivalent to Jabba's claim that he can virtually prove that the existence of an immortal soul is more probable than its nonexistence.
And, finally, what would be utterly absurd would be to claim that universes A and B are the only possible universes that could exist. To claim this would be equivalent to Jabba's repeated claim by implication that the immortal soul hypothesis and the logical complement of the materialistic hypothesis are identical.
Dave
[1] A bit of background on this. Jabba has clearly stated that there is some part of what defines himself that is immortal, and that this part may be reincarnated in different bodies. There is therefore a one-to-many relationship between souls and bodies in his mythology. He has also stated that, if an exact duplicate of his body were created, we would be unable to tell who it was; thiis therefore establishes a many-to-one relationship. There is clearly therefore a many-to-many relationship between souls and bodies in Jabba's mythology; any of a number of souls may inhabit any of a number of bodies, just as any of a number of keyboards may connect to any of a number of computer processors in universe B.
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I don't actually have anything to add, I just wanted to say thank you for the really nice summary.
Jabba, you should read this. Like, actually read it. Maybe even try to comprehend it.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
It is a good summary. We tried something similar with VINs on the Volkswagens, but it wasn't as good. Nevertheless Jabba admitted he had been wrong and conceded. Oh wait, that's the universe in which Jabba actually cared about the mathematical validity of his argument and not just seeing whether he can trick some skeptic into agreeing that Jabba is a mathematical genius.
A more appropriate use of Bayes would be to test the relative likelihood of two hypotheses: M = Jabba is a mathematical genius, and T = Jabba is trolling. Each of his posts would be data. For each post, we would compute P(E|M), the likelihood that post E would be written if Jabba were a mathematical genius, and P(E|T), the probability that post E would be written if Jabba were trolling. That's more akin to how we use Bayes theorem in my work.
A more appropriate use of Bayes would be to test the relative likelihood of two hypotheses: M = Jabba is a mathematical genius, and T = Jabba is trolling. Each of his posts would be data. For each post, we would compute P(E|M), the likelihood that post E would be written if Jabba were a mathematical genius, and P(E|T), the probability that post E would be written if Jabba were trolling. That's more akin to how we use Bayes theorem in my work.
Jabba
Philosopher
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Dave,
- How and where have I misrepresented the non-religious hypothesis?
Belz...
Fiend God
Haven't you gotten the answer to that dozens of times already? Why do you keep asking?
RoboTimbo
Hostile Nanobacon
Like I said, even your questions are lies.
Jabba
Philosopher
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- Feb 23, 2012
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- 5,613
- Here's the latest version of my syllogism.
THE MATH OF MORTALITY
New information may affect the probability of an existing hypothesis (H).
An old event may be new info if it hasn’t already been considered in the current probability of H.
If an event is unlikely – given a particular hypothesis (H) – but the event occurs, the occurrence will tend to have a negative effect upon the probability of H — but, it need not.
For instance, it could be that given the complementary hypothesis – the event would be even more unlikely.
Or, it could be that all possible events – given H – are equally unlikely (e.g. a fair lottery) — if so, the particular event needs to be “set apart” in a way that is relevant to the hypothesis in order to impact the hypothesis.
If – given H – an event is impossible, but does occur, H must be wrong.
Otherwise, what we call Bayesian statistics is used to evaluate the effect of a new and relevant event upon the probability of H.
I claim that by using my own current existence as the new info, Bayesian Statistics, virtually proves that we humans are not mortal.
Here’s how it works.
The likelihood of drawing a particular sample from a particular population has mathematical implications re the likelihood that a particular sample was, in fact, drawn from that population… You might want to read that again…
Or, in other words, the probability of a hypothesis being true is affected by the likelihood of samples actually drawn from the involved population — given that hypothesis.
The thing is, we have the mathematical right to apply this logic to our own expected mortality (the hypothesis)…
According to the typical, non-religious model of reality, each of us is temporary and singular — at best. If we ever live, we won’t live long, and we’ll do it only once.
By “we,” I mean we “selves” or senses of self” or “specific self-awarenesses” (SSA) or even “souls” (if “soul’ isn’t defined as immortal) — in other words, what reincarnationists think keep coming back to life.
If we are only temporary, however, the probability of me ever existing is teensy-weensy, or vanishingly small. I’m damned lucky to ever be here.
And as now happens to be now, I’m even luckier than that.
But then, is my current SSA “set apart” from all the other SSAs?
Here’s why I think it is.
My SSA is the only thing or process that I know exists — the rest could be my imagination.
If it didn’t ever exist, it would be as if nothing ever existed — and the likelihood of it ever existing is less than 1/10100.
If it didn’t currently exist, it would be as if nothing currently existed, and the likelihood of it currently existing is even (much) less than the likelihood of it ever existing…
That gives enormous significance to my current, personal SSA.
And, the thing is, every current SSA has the same reason to believe that OOFLam is wrong — and that she or he is not mortal.
“So? However unlikely, those things are, they do happen now and then.” (Or something similar.) is the usual response.
And every once in a while, someone gets a poker hand of 4 aces. You’re right, those things happen. But, in the poker case, if you have any existing suspicions about the dealer and your opponent (setting the specific event apart from the other possibilities), those suspicions will take a decided turn for the worse if your opponent turns over 4 aces at a particularly convenient time.
In other words, if you have a plausible hypothesis other than the ‘null
hypothesis’ and you get results you wouldn’t expect given that the null hypothesis were correct, you can be justifiably suspicious of your null hypothesis (in our case, the non-religious hypothesis). It’s simply, which hypothesis – over all, adding the new info – is the most probable. No problem.
It’s only when you have no other plausible hypothesis that you’re stuck with the null hypothesis.
So, the question is, do I have available another plausible hypothesis for my current existence?
I can think of at least four that seem plausible.
And further, I can lump these four together (along with all other plausible hypotheses) in the complement to the null hypothesis and say something concrete and definite about the probability of the null hypothesis – the non-religious hypothesis – being true, given my current existence.
So, given
…k = all background knowledge
…P = the probability of
…H = Only one Finite Life at most (OOFLam)
…| = given
…E = my current existence
…~H = Complement of OOFLam
The formula for this probability is
…P(H|E & k) = P(E|H)P(H|k) / (P(E|H)P(H|k) + P(E|~H)P(~H|k)).
Re P(H) and P(~H): I won’t argue the point for now, but would guess that most scientist would not be entirely sure that H is true, so I’ll estimate that P(H) should be no more than .99, and P(~H) should be no less than .01.
Re P(E|~H):
The probability (“likelihood”) of E given ~H, involves several specific hypothetical possibilities.
That only some of us have but one finite life.
That we each have numerous finite lives.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives.
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives.
That we each have an infinite life.
That only some of us have an infinite life.
That time isn’t what we think it is.
Some other explanation.
Now I must estimate (roughly) the prior probability (rounded off to three decimal places) of each more specific possibility (hypothesis), given ~H.
That only some of us have but one finite life: .000
That we each have numerous finite lives: .2.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .000.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives; .2
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: 000.
That we each have an infinite life: .2
That only some of us have an infinite life: .000
That time isn’t what we think it is: .2
Some other explanation: .2
And now, I must estimate the likelihood of my own current existence given the different specific hypotheses under ~H.
That only some of us have but one finite life: .10.
That we each have numerous finite lives: .10.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .25.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives; 1.00
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: .50.
That we each have an infinite life: 1.00.
That only some of us have an infinite life: .50
That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained): .50
Some other explanation: .50
And now, I must multiply each of the prior probabilities of ~H above by the likelihoods of my current existence, given each specific hypothesis, and add up their products. And, the total likelihood of my current existence given ~H:
P(E|~H) = (0*.5) + (.2*.10) + (0*.25) + (.2*1.0) + (0*.5) + (1*.2) + (0*.5) + (.2*.5) + (.2*.5), or
P(E|~H) = 0 + .02 + 0 +.2 + 0 + .2+ 0 + .1 + .1, or
P(E|~H) = .62. And,
P(H|E) = 0*.99/(0*.99 + .62*.01) = (0/.0062) = 0.
P(H|E) = 0.
THE MATH OF MORTALITY
New information may affect the probability of an existing hypothesis (H).
An old event may be new info if it hasn’t already been considered in the current probability of H.
If an event is unlikely – given a particular hypothesis (H) – but the event occurs, the occurrence will tend to have a negative effect upon the probability of H — but, it need not.
For instance, it could be that given the complementary hypothesis – the event would be even more unlikely.
Or, it could be that all possible events – given H – are equally unlikely (e.g. a fair lottery) — if so, the particular event needs to be “set apart” in a way that is relevant to the hypothesis in order to impact the hypothesis.
If – given H – an event is impossible, but does occur, H must be wrong.
Otherwise, what we call Bayesian statistics is used to evaluate the effect of a new and relevant event upon the probability of H.
I claim that by using my own current existence as the new info, Bayesian Statistics, virtually proves that we humans are not mortal.
Here’s how it works.
The likelihood of drawing a particular sample from a particular population has mathematical implications re the likelihood that a particular sample was, in fact, drawn from that population… You might want to read that again…
Or, in other words, the probability of a hypothesis being true is affected by the likelihood of samples actually drawn from the involved population — given that hypothesis.
The thing is, we have the mathematical right to apply this logic to our own expected mortality (the hypothesis)…
According to the typical, non-religious model of reality, each of us is temporary and singular — at best. If we ever live, we won’t live long, and we’ll do it only once.
By “we,” I mean we “selves” or senses of self” or “specific self-awarenesses” (SSA) or even “souls” (if “soul’ isn’t defined as immortal) — in other words, what reincarnationists think keep coming back to life.
If we are only temporary, however, the probability of me ever existing is teensy-weensy, or vanishingly small. I’m damned lucky to ever be here.
And as now happens to be now, I’m even luckier than that.
But then, is my current SSA “set apart” from all the other SSAs?
Here’s why I think it is.
My SSA is the only thing or process that I know exists — the rest could be my imagination.
If it didn’t ever exist, it would be as if nothing ever existed — and the likelihood of it ever existing is less than 1/10100.
If it didn’t currently exist, it would be as if nothing currently existed, and the likelihood of it currently existing is even (much) less than the likelihood of it ever existing…
That gives enormous significance to my current, personal SSA.
And, the thing is, every current SSA has the same reason to believe that OOFLam is wrong — and that she or he is not mortal.
“So? However unlikely, those things are, they do happen now and then.” (Or something similar.) is the usual response.
And every once in a while, someone gets a poker hand of 4 aces. You’re right, those things happen. But, in the poker case, if you have any existing suspicions about the dealer and your opponent (setting the specific event apart from the other possibilities), those suspicions will take a decided turn for the worse if your opponent turns over 4 aces at a particularly convenient time.
In other words, if you have a plausible hypothesis other than the ‘null
hypothesis’ and you get results you wouldn’t expect given that the null hypothesis were correct, you can be justifiably suspicious of your null hypothesis (in our case, the non-religious hypothesis). It’s simply, which hypothesis – over all, adding the new info – is the most probable. No problem.
It’s only when you have no other plausible hypothesis that you’re stuck with the null hypothesis.
So, the question is, do I have available another plausible hypothesis for my current existence?
I can think of at least four that seem plausible.
And further, I can lump these four together (along with all other plausible hypotheses) in the complement to the null hypothesis and say something concrete and definite about the probability of the null hypothesis – the non-religious hypothesis – being true, given my current existence.
So, given
…k = all background knowledge
…P = the probability of
…H = Only one Finite Life at most (OOFLam)
…| = given
…E = my current existence
…~H = Complement of OOFLam
The formula for this probability is
…P(H|E & k) = P(E|H)P(H|k) / (P(E|H)P(H|k) + P(E|~H)P(~H|k)).
Re P(H) and P(~H): I won’t argue the point for now, but would guess that most scientist would not be entirely sure that H is true, so I’ll estimate that P(H) should be no more than .99, and P(~H) should be no less than .01.
Re P(E|~H):
The probability (“likelihood”) of E given ~H, involves several specific hypothetical possibilities.
That only some of us have but one finite life.
That we each have numerous finite lives.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives.
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives.
That we each have an infinite life.
That only some of us have an infinite life.
That time isn’t what we think it is.
Some other explanation.
Now I must estimate (roughly) the prior probability (rounded off to three decimal places) of each more specific possibility (hypothesis), given ~H.
That only some of us have but one finite life: .000
That we each have numerous finite lives: .2.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .000.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives; .2
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: 000.
That we each have an infinite life: .2
That only some of us have an infinite life: .000
That time isn’t what we think it is: .2
Some other explanation: .2
And now, I must estimate the likelihood of my own current existence given the different specific hypotheses under ~H.
That only some of us have but one finite life: .10.
That we each have numerous finite lives: .10.
That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .25.
That we each have an infinity of finite lives; 1.00
That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: .50.
That we each have an infinite life: 1.00.
That only some of us have an infinite life: .50
That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained): .50
Some other explanation: .50
And now, I must multiply each of the prior probabilities of ~H above by the likelihoods of my current existence, given each specific hypothesis, and add up their products. And, the total likelihood of my current existence given ~H:
P(E|~H) = (0*.5) + (.2*.10) + (0*.25) + (.2*1.0) + (0*.5) + (1*.2) + (0*.5) + (.2*.5) + (.2*.5), or
P(E|~H) = 0 + .02 + 0 +.2 + 0 + .2+ 0 + .1 + .1, or
P(E|~H) = .62. And,
P(H|E) = 0*.99/(0*.99 + .62*.01) = (0/.0062) = 0.
P(H|E) = 0.
Belz...
Fiend God
Fringe reset!
And with no indication that you've taken any of the criticism into consideration.
And with no indication that you've taken any of the criticism into consideration.
halleyscomet
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
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Clearly, whoever currently owns Jabba's old domain, http://shrouddebates.com, agrees with your assessment.
godless dave
Great Dalmuti
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Do you not remember the whole discussion about this we had just a couple days ago?
Here's yet another example from your most recent post:
The non-religious hypothesis about human senses of self does not involve drawing samples from a population.
Pixel42
Schrödinger's cat
The probability that you exist in a universe in which you can be surprised by your existence is 1, no matter how temporary that existence is.
The probability that you exist at a time during which you can be surprised by your existence is 1, no matter how temporary that existence is.
Note that your existence is never new information for any hypothesis you form. It's always a given.
Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
And here are all the bits of it that are valid, relevant and persuasive.
HTH.
Dave
The Sparrow
Graduate Poster
Jabba, I started reading your post, then decided it was too long, so I skipped the rest.
HA! How does it FEEL!!!
HA! How does it FEEL!!!
RoboTimbo
Hostile Nanobacon
Where is your reply to JayUtah's list of fatal flaws?
caveman1917
Philosopher
- Joined
- Feb 26, 2015
- Messages
- 8,143
This is plain nonsense.
You only get one probability space which must contain all outcomes. In actual math E is a set, an element of a specific sigma algebra. In your magic math, what is E? A set that is half in one probability space and half in another in the first case, and then in even yet another probability space in the second case?
GOTO first chapter probability theory
ETA: you understand that in these expressions, like "P(H|E) / P(~H|E) = (P(H) / P(~H)) * (P(E|H) / P(E|~H))", the symbol "E" denotes the same set throughout the expression?
That is very true, because in order for that to exist you'd have to be educable.
Yawn. For wollery's computers: P(E|~H) = 2 * P(E|H). Since twice as many computers exist with a keyboard than without one, for any specific computer it is twice as likely to exist if it has a keyboard than if it doesn't, for basically the same reason that you're twice as likely to win a lottery if two winning numbers get drawn rather than one.
It's not just that your grasp of probability theory is appallingly bad, but it's just plain boring. Read a probability theory textbook and try again afterwards.
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