Well, I for one do have a specific computer and a specific keyboard plugged into it. But fine, let's check. Those of us who have a specific computer and a specific keyboard plugged into it, please raise your hands... Ok, now those of us who have a specific computer and no keyboard, please raise your hands... See?
You're still addressing the wrong claim. This is not about the claim that the body and the soul existing are less probable than the body only existing; I clearly stated that I wasn't discussing that claim a couple of posts ago.
Jabba's claiming that the probability of his complete, current self existing is greater under the assumption that his complete current self comprises a body, which may be any one of all possible bodies (hence defining one probability space), and a soul, which may be one of all possible souls (hence defining a second probability space), associated with each other.
Under materialism, the self is a process of the body, so there is only a single probability space.
Now, you may argue that these are not directly comparable because they effectively require different universes. That's quite true; that's another failing of Jabba's. But they are, quite specifically, P(E|R) and P(E|H), and Jabba is claiming that the latter is the greater of the two. But in fact P(E|R) is at most P(E|H)*P(S|R), where P(E|H) is the probability of Jabba's body existing - the same in both universes - and P(S|R) that of Jabba's soul existing; there may also be a term for the probability of Jabba's specific soul inhabiting Jabba's specific body.
(Oh, and by the way, I'm typing this on a laptop.)
You're a physicist for ****'s sake, this stuff isn't difficult. None of the math in this thread has gone above "trivial" level.
It's not a problem with the complexity of the maths. It's a problem, actually, with following the fractured logic of Jabba's argument, which I'm not entirely surprised you can't do; it took me a long time to figure out what he thought he was claiming. I can see you're not there yet.
Invalid response. There is no many-to-many relationship between parts of different bodies. If it were possible to plug a used set of arms into a new body you might have a point; but in Jabba's mythology, the soul may associate with any body, and the body with any soul. The probabilities of specific instances of both co-existing are therefore independent, not dependent.
Dave