When you decide that no possible response to your claims can invalidate them, you've stepped rather a long way outside the realm of rational skepticism, don't you think?
Dave
Look, it's very simple. There are these things called theorems, and generally you either provide a proof for them or a counter-example. [ETA: well, strictly speaking it wouldn't be a theorem if you got a counter-example, but its negation would then be a theorem.]
If a proof is provided then you don't just get to incessantly repeat "Nah, I think the theorem is, like, false dude." Well I guess you get to do whatever you want, but you shouldn't expect others to pay attention. You have to actually
address and invalidate the proof. Similarly, if a counter-example is provided then you don't just get to incessantly repeat "Nah, I think the theorem is, like, true dude." You have to actually address and invalidate the counter-example.
In this particular instance "addressing and invalidating the counter-example" would entail formalizing the claim, formalizing the counter-example, and showing them to not be formally equivalent. You know, thereby invalidating it as being a counter-example.
And the people in this thread who
can define a probability space and properly do math in it have by now probably done so and realized their error, and the ones who can't do that, well, it's not like they're going to do that. So it's not so much that "no possible response to my claims can invalidate them" but that I have no interest in wasting my time with endless "[insert nonsense] and so I claim that it is mathematically impossible for ~H to be more likely than H". If that's all they got then as far as I'm concerned they can loop between 1892 and 2297 for as long as it takes them to reach the exit condition (which is designed so as to force them to address the counter-example).
And if you think "[insert nonsense] and so I claim that..." is not a fair characterization, just look at it:
{H is defined by the possibilities:}
1. This specific body exists.
2. This specific body doesn't exist.
See the problem already?
That is, by definition, the universe.
P ∨ ¬
P? You might have heard of it sometime? But then of course, if H is the universe then, again by definition, ~H is the empty set. Yet here we get ~H:
1. This specific body exists and this specific soul exists and they're linked.
2. This specific body exists and this specific soul exists but they aren't linked.
3. This specific body doesn't exist, but this specific soul does.
4. This specific body does exist, but this specific soul doesn't.
Does that look like the empty set to you? It doesn't look like that to me at least. And then after this we simply get the latest iteration of the endless repetition of the same-old same-old claim:
For either of these Jabba would be looking at the likelihood of option #1, and for either of those we need to figure out how likely the existence of this specific body is (setting aside the fact that we're talking about someone we already know to exist and so obviously the answer is 100%). This is going to be the same regardless of the existence of a soul.
So then on the second one we *also* need to figure out how likely it is he'd have the same soul (or as he calls it, [INSERT RANDOM WORD]) which isn't going to be 100% according to Jabba. Therefore the odds of #1 under H will always be better than under ~H.
So I repeat: What criticism? I just see "[nonsense] and so I claim that the theorem is, like, true dude."