Proof of Immortality, VII

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Jabba said:
- To me, there is a sense of "who" or "identity" that we could not predict from your perfect copy -- and, in that sense, we wouldn't know who the new self would be. Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
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Only because you insist the self is a separate entity. If it's a process of the brain (which it is in the materialistic model) then the new self would be identical to the self that was copied at the instant of the copy being made. From that moment forward the two would diverge, but both would self identify as the original. You know this, as it's been pointed out thousands of times by multiple people, but you refuse to even acknowledge it.
 
Belz... said:
Yeah, except that materialism isn't the only way one can have only one finite life, so ~H includes quite a bit of other ways.
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Right, which is why he keeps changing these too. Previously it was M and ~M, where M would be materialism and ~M would be everything else (he used H and ~H as the variables). Now he's using R for "religious" and NR for "non-religious," as if that somehow serves as a reasonable proxy for immortality (however achieved) and non-immortality (however limited). His false dilemma keeps falling apart, so he has to recast it every year or so with different words.
 
- Good.
- I think that you agree that
1. Jingle bells
2. Jingle
- bells
3. Jingle all the way
4. Oh
5. What fun it is to ride
6. In a one-horse, open sleigh

- Where, exactly, do we run afoul?
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Hmmm?
 
Again we have to understand that to Jabba "Materialism" and "Emergent Property" are just magic words we're invoking to win the argument. He doesn't understand them and thinks he can win by just invoking them at will.
 
Jabba said:
- But, materialism does accept the process of selves.
- But, according to materialism, that process that you are currently enjoying will shortly cease, will never proceed again, never proceeded before and never had to proceed in the first place.
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not unless you define 'self' in a coherent fashion that does not involve reincarnation of solipsism
:)
 
Jabba said:
Dave,
- Mind-body dualism is not the concept I'm trying to convey. The non-religious hypothesis accepts the emergent property of consciousness and the "self" that consciousness naturally entails.
- If the NR hypothesis accepts that this particular sense of self never existed before, will never exist again, never had to exist in the first place and was not drawn from a pool of potential selves, any particular sense of self is brand new and came out of nowhere --
which is quite exciting.
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Not until you have a coherent definition of 'self' that does not involve reincarnation or solipsism
 
Jabba said:
- Good.
- I think that you agree that
1. Consciousness naturally entails a self,
2. A perfect copy of your body/brain would not reproduce your particular self -- there would be a difference between the two selves.
3. This difference would not be the result of body chemistry -- the chemistry of the two bodies would be exactly the same.
4. The bodily difference between the two would be in location and specific molecules.
5. We have no idea if, and how, these differences would determine "who" the new self would be.
6. The who/self to which I'm referring is the thing/process/experience that reincarnationists think returns.

- Where, exactly, do we run afoul?
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godless dave said:
We run afoul on #5. The only difference between the two selves would be their locations and the matter they are made of. That information is all we need to know who each one is.

In the materialist hypothesis, what makes me me is that I am this body. What makes you you is that you are that body. That's it. There's nothing additional required to establish an identity.
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Dave,
-The new body would be you, but it wouldn't bring you back to life?
 
Jabba said:
Dave,
-The new body would be you, but it wouldn't bring you back to life?
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You can't bring a process "back to life". That makes no sense under H.

Each iteration of the process is a new process. Each time you go to sleep "you" dies and a new "you" is born in the morning, etc.
 
Jabba said:
Dave,
-The new body would be you, but it wouldn't bring you back to life?
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What, exactly, would be the difference between a second person having all your thoughts and memories, who self identifies as you, and bringing you back to life?
 
Interesting dilemma, you have an identical copy made, you now have two people, same memories, same body same 'self' but in two slightly different spacial locations
So after being 'photocopied' they both emerge into a dark room, blunder around aimlessly for a while then come out

Who is the original- both have exactly the same memories of going into the copier, both have a full set of memories of their 'life' before, both remember getting into the machine and being copied- but as they are functionally identical, it would no longer be possible after 'mixing them up' in the dark room, to actually identify the 'original' at all-they would both have the identical same 'self' at this point

Of course, they would diverge from this point on, one goes off to become a male hooker in Thailand, the other becomes US president- obviously thier selves would differ wildly after a while, but at that point right after the 'photocopying' was done- both selves are functionally the same and would both self identify as the original 'them' and indeed jabbas 'self' would be in two bodies at once but as two individual and identical selves...

confusing
 
Jabba's back at the pretending distinct and different are the same thing.

"They can't be the same because there's two of them."
 
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