Proof of Immortality, VII

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Jabba: What literature on reincarnation?

There's literature on tarnation, too. I doubt you could make much use of it.
 
Jabba said:
The sense of self I'm referring to is the thing/process/experience that reincarnationists think returns (but that materialists think "exists" for only one finite time at most).
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That has nothing to do with materialism. You can't model it that way if you are trying to reckon P(E|H).

The sense of self builds up a library of memories, likes and dislikes and (hopefully) moral characteristics.
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Memories and predilections are demonstrably stored in the brain and are thus part of the physical organism. Whether you believe this or not, it is a tenet of materialism and you must follow that when reckoning P(E|H). You may not assert, as a premise of reckoning P(E|H), that memories are stored in some ineffable side entity. Moral agency is merely cognition. That's clearly a function of the brain.

...that does seem suggested by the literature on reincarnation.
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You presented that information and I analyzed it in depth. You declined even to acknowledge that such an analysis occurred. If you are unwilling to defend your purported science, you don't get to keep alluding to it.
 
Jabba said:
js,
- I don't mean to equate "self" and "existence."
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Ok, then stick to just one term, the sense of self.

- The sense of self I'm referring to is the thing/process/experience that reincarnationists think returns (but that materialists think "exists" for only one finite time at most).
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I have no idea what that would mean. Operational characteristics are what I am after.

- "I think therefore I am" does relate to the heart of the term.
- The sense of self builds up a library of memories, likes and dislikes and (hopefully) moral characteristics.
- If the sense of self does exist more than once, it must bring with it few, if any, memories. Perhaps, it does bring some likes, dislikes and moral characteristics -- that does seem suggested by the literature on reincarnation.
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Well, that is better than simply saying it is what the reincarnationists think, but doesn't it give you pause to have no good idea what immortality might mean? I don't mean a full and complete definition, just some firm functional characteristics would be nice.

You have no recollection of any former life. That should put a serious damper on this immortality thing for you. And if there is no continuation of memory (or anything else that would be quantifiable and testable) immortality is indistinguishable from that other thing, mortality.

If mortality and immortality have no difference, which so far under your definitions there isn't one, you have no way to show one is more likely than the other.
 
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Jabba said:
- Good.
- I think that you agree that
1. Consciousness naturally entails a self,
2. A perfect copy of your body/brain would not reproduce your particular self -- there would be a difference between the two selves.
3. This difference would not be the result of body chemistry -- the chemistry of the two bodies would be exactly the same.
4. The bodily difference between the two would be in location and specific molecules.
5. We have no idea if, and how, these differences would determine "who" the new self would be.
6. The who/self to which I'm referring is the thing/process/experience that reincarnationists think returns.

- Where, exactly, do we run afoul?
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godless dave said:
We run afoul on #5. The only difference between the two selves would be their locations and the matter they are made of. That information is all we need to know who each one is.

In the materialist hypothesis, what makes me me is that I am this body. What makes you you is that you are that body. That's it. There's nothing additional required to establish an identity.
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- To me, there is a sense of "who" or "identity" that we could not predict from your perfect copy -- and, in that sense, we wouldn't know who the new self would be. Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
 
Jabba said:
- To me, there is a sense of "who" or "identity" that we could not predict from your perfect copy -- and, in that sense, we wouldn't know who the new self would be. Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
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No, we would not.
 
Jabba said:
- To me, there is a sense of "who" or "identity" that we could not predict from your perfect copy -- and, in that sense, we wouldn't know who the new self would be. Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
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Don't you agree that the materialist model says that the "who" is generated by the "what"? A duplicate person would generate a duplicate process.

You do agree that under materialism, the "self" as you equivocally call it, is a process?
 
Jabba said:
- To me, there is a sense of "who" or "identity" that we could not predict from your perfect copy -- and, in that sense, we wouldn't know who the new self would be. Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
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No, as materialists have been telling you for five years, we uniformly and unanimously do not agree with that. And you've read these responses, telling you quite unequivocally that we do not agree with that. The only possible construction to be placed on your continued claim that we agree with it are that you are deliberately lying or insane.

Dave
 
jsfisher said:
I don't mean a full and complete definition, just some firm functional characteristics would be nice.
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I agree it would be. Jabba sets up materialism as H and thus "everything else" becomes ~H, and Jabba wants to pretend that the tiny number he envisions as the posterior probability P(H) amounts to a giant certainty for P(~H), which includes all possible ways in which he could be immortal -- among other things. That's where Jabba thinks the strength of his argument lies. He wants to think he's proven that it's a "virtual certainty" that he is immortal in some way.

Forcing him to nail down one particular mode of immortality would tend to put the onus back on him to prove a particular affirmative claim, which he knows he cannot do. That would deny him the indirect proof he is attempting. While I respect Jabba's desire to avoid a straw-man scenario, his proof simply doesn't work as long as all it computes is P(everything except materialism).

You have no recollection of any former life.
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He has claimed others do. He has provided what he considers "scientific" evidence of such recollection. He obviously didn't read any of it. I did, and I provided a detailed analysis addressing each of the citations in the bibliography provided. Needless to say there were serious methodology flaws in all of them. For example, "verification" of a supposedly cross-incarnation memory consisted in most cases of verbal confirmation from a parent. Jabba declined to acknowledge this.

Jabba may be trying (once again) to shift the discussion toward whether reincarnation occurs or not. That is, as we say, settled law.

If mortality and immortality have no difference, which so far under your definitions there isn't one, you have no way to show one is more likely than the other.
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Or indeed that they are effectively dissimilar propositions. Mootness is funny that way.
 
Jabba said:
Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
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No.

How many times must we answer this question for you before it dawns on you that you can't keep lying about it? Under materialism all that is attributable to the object is a property of its material only and any process that material undergoes. Under materialism the sense of self exhibited by the copy must be identical to the sense of self exhibited by the original. This is a central premise of materialism.
 
JayUtah said:
I agree it would be. Jabba sets up materialism as H and thus "everything else" becomes ~H, and Jabba wants to pretend that the tiny number he envisions as the posterior probability P(H) amounts to a giant certainty for P(~H), which includes all possible ways in which he could be immortal -- among other things.
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Yeah, except that materialism isn't the only way one can have only one finite life, so ~H includes quite a bit of other ways.
 
Jabba said:
- To me, there is a sense of "who" or "identity" that we could not predict from your perfect copy -- and, in that sense, we wouldn't know who the new self would be. Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
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No.

Jabba, here's another thought experiment for you. Consider if we made a perfect copy of a body so that they are perfect replicas of each other. Now we make a perfect copy of a soul and impart one into each body. There you have it. Two people and we know exactly who each is. Each has a perfectly identical (though separate) soul/identity/sense of self.
 
Jabba said:
- Good.
- I think that you agree that
1. Consciousness naturally entails a self,
2. A perfect copy of your body/brain would not reproduce your particular self -- there would be a difference between the two selves.
3. This difference would not be the result of body chemistry -- the chemistry of the two bodies would be exactly the same.
4. The bodily difference between the two would be in location and specific molecules.
5. We have no idea if, and how, these differences would determine "who" the new self would be.
6. The who/self to which I'm referring is the thing/process/experience that reincarnationists think returns.

- Where, exactly, do we run afoul?
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Numbers 1 to 5 are a pack of lies, and number 6 equivocates and fails to adequately define its terms.
 
Jabba said:
- To me, there is a sense of "who" or "identity" that we could not predict from your perfect copy -- and, in that sense, we wouldn't know who the new self would be. Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
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NO THEY WOULDN'T!
 
Jabba said:
js,
- I don't mean to equate "self" and "existence."
- The sense of self I'm referring to is the thing/process/experience that reincarnationists think returns (but that materialists think "exists" for only one finite time at most).
- "I think therefore I am" does relate to the heart of the term.
- The sense of self builds up a library of memories, likes and dislikes and (hopefully) moral characteristics.
- If the sense of self does exist more than once, it must bring with it few, if any, memories. Perhaps, it does bring some likes, dislikes and moral characteristics -- that does seem suggested by the literature on reincarnation.
Click to expand...

- And yet your formula is based on your current existence. So which is it?

- Also, all of these: library of memories, likes and dislikes, and moral characteristics are explained by brain functions, whether or not you have a soul. All of them can be altered by altering your brain, physically or chemically.

- Which means, when trying to figure out how likely your current existence is, you need to account for the existence of your brain under the NR or R explanation for your current existence.
 
Jabba said:
- To me, there is a sense of "who" or "identity" that we could not predict from your perfect copy -- and, in that sense, we wouldn't know who the new self would be. Wouldn't materialists agree with that?
Click to expand...

SOUL. You're yet again trying to say there would be a soul that the copy wouldn't have.

How do we get it through that skull of yours that you aren't going to trick us into agreeing with you by putting quotes around a common noun or pronoun.

Jabba the problem isn't that we agree with you just don't realize it.

This pompous, pretentious attitude you have that we all obviously agree with you just won't admit it amazingly insulting.

STOP LYING. Stop telling your opponents that they just have to be agreeing with you.
 
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