Proof of Immortality, VII

[Jabba]

Jabba, in the materialist model, what makes me me is the same thing that makes my body my body - it's made of this matter.

- But, even in the materialist model, in the sense of "you" that would not be brought back to life, the new "you" would be someone else. The new VW has no analogue in the materialist model.

 

[JayUtah]

- But, even in the materialist model, in the sense of "you" that would not be brought back to life, the new "you" would be someone else.

No, that's the opposite of what materialism says, despite your insistence on vague language that your critics have repeatedly corrected.

The new VW has no analogue in the materialist model.

You've simply made up your own version of materialism where people have souls and Volkswagens don't. You're misrepresenting materialism. Deliberately.

 

[Dave Rogers]

- But, even in the materialist model, in the sense of "you" that would not be brought back to life, the new "you" would be someone else. The new VW has no analogue in the materialist model.

We really need that system I just proposed; this must be at least the tenth time you've ignored everybody's replies to this point and posted it yet again. The only difference between the sense of self of the original "you" and the copy of "you" would be location, just as in the case of the new VW. And nobody, including both selves, would be able to tell which was which.

Dave

 

[godless dave]

- But, even in the materialist model, in the sense of "you" that would not be brought back to life, the new "you" would be someone else. The new VW has no analogue in the materialist model.

The copy of me would be "someone else" in exactly the same way a new Volkswagen is a new Volkswagen.

 

[JayUtah]

...this must be at least the tenth time you've ignored everybody's replies to this point and posted it yet again.

As he said a few days ago, objections just get in the way and cause distraction when Jabba knows he's right.

 

[Belz...]

- But, even in the materialist model, in the sense of "you" that would not be brought back to life,

No, in the materialist model, "brought back to life" has no meaning unless you were in cardiac arrest and someone managed to start your heart again.

The new VW has no analogue in the materialist model.

Of course it does. Its "going at 60 mph" wouldn't be brought back to life!

 

[The Sparrow]

- But, even in the materialist model, in the sense of "you" that would not be brought back to life, the new "you" would be someone else. The new VW has no analogue in the materialist model.

Yes it would. The going 60 mph. They could each go 60 mph. The "going" processes would be identical for both cars in all attributes, but there would be 2 of them occurring. Just like there would be 2 conciousness processes going on, each believing they are the real Jabba.

Why do you keep repeating this, then ignoring all the virtually identical objections we are all making, then repeating it again.

You were asked how many going 60 mph are there probably several hundred times, and you ignored it several hundred times only to repeat the claim. How is this "debate"?

 

[Jabba]

- The sense of self-awareness may be the result of different location and molecules, but the VW has no sense of self-awareness nor analogous result.

OK? So what?

- There are three differences between you and your copy. There are only two differences between the VW and its copy.

 

[godless dave]

- There are three differences between you and your copy. There are only two differences between the VW and its copy.

In the materialist model there are exactly the same number of differences.

 

[Belz...]

- There are three differences between you and your copy. There are only two differences between the VW and its copy.

The third difference you claim exists is only a difference if you're talking about a soul, which doesn't exist under materialism.

Any difference in the VW has analogues in "you", and vice-versa. You don't get to change that by insisting that there's something else.

STOP PRETENDING THAT THE SELF IS SPECIAL.

 

[Jabba]

The copy of me would be "someone else" in exactly the same way a new Volkswagen is a new Volkswagen.

- This is where we're stuck. No -- it wouldn't,

 

[JayUtah]

- There are three differences between you and your copy. There are only two differences between the VW and its copy.

No, that's not how materialism works.

 

[godless dave]

- This is where we're stuck. No -- it wouldn't,

In the materialist model it would. You must be talking about some other model.

 

[Belz...]

- This is where we're stuck. No -- it wouldn't,

We're only stuck because you insist that the "self" is special and different from other emergent properties.

I've asked you to support that insistence. Do so now: how is the self different from "going at 60 mph"?

 

[Jabba]

In the materialist model there are exactly the same number of differences.

- How many differences?

 

[Dave Rogers]

- There are three differences between you and your copy. There are only two differences between the VW and its copy.

Perhaps you'd like to explain what the third one is. The third difference between two identical people, both with identical personalities and memories, both believing themselves to be the same person, is: <Insert difference here>.

Dave

 

[Jabba]

- Called to lunch...

 

[Belz...]

- How many differences?

One: spacetime coordinates.

Now, once again: what is it about the self that's different from other emergent processes?

 

[JayUtah]

This is where we're stuck.

You're stuck because you're obviously foisting a straw man, and your critics rightly won't let you.

Your attempt to claim that materialism is false simply invents elements that are not part of materialism.

You already conceded you can't answer this. Therefor your argument fails for this reason, among others.

 

[Belz...]

- Called to lunch...

Argument lock! Eject! Eject!