Proof of Immortality, VII

[Mojo]

Dave,
- The materialist model would also assume that a perfect copy would not bring you back to life. In that sense of you (and who), we would have no idea who the new self would be -- are you just suggesting that we have no idea who you are either?

Jabba, please try to understand this: under the hypothesis you are supposed to be trying to disprove there is no such thing as a "self" in the way you are using the term. Consciousness is just something the brain does.

You can't use the concept of souls to make your existence unlikely if the hypothesis is true, because if the hypothesis is true souls don't exist.

 

[RoboTimbo]

Dave,
- The materialist model would also assume that a perfect copy would not bring you back to life. In that sense of you (and who), we would have no idea who the new self would be -- are you just suggesting that we have no idea who you are either?

JILpu (Jabba Immortal Lie per usual)

 

[JoeMorgue]

Jabba in one sentence what does "Materialism" mean?

 

[jond]

Dave,
- The materialist model would also assume that a perfect copy would not bring you back to life. In that sense of you (and who), we would have no idea who the new self would be -- are you just suggesting that we have no idea who you are either?

In the materialist model, where the self is a process, two identical processes would result in two identical people who self identify as Jabba. And it’s incredibly rude of you to continue to pretend this hasn’t been made very clear to you. There is no reincarnation or immortality because a process cannot continue when the parts that give rise to it cease functioning. You know this and agree with it, so why are you still pretending that you are right and the rest of us are wrong?

 

[Monza]

Dave,
- The materialist model would also assume that a perfect copy would not bring you back to life. In that sense of you (and who), we would have no idea who the new self would be -- are you just suggesting that we have no idea who you are either?

Jabba, you are wrong. First of all, you start off by stating there is a copy. By definition of copy there is no death and no "bringing back to life". There is a copy, plain and simple.

In the materialist model, we would know exactly who the copy would be. It would be a second (i.e. copy) of the original. By definition of copy, the second would be entirely indistinguishable from the first. If it was a copy of Jabba, it would be Jabba.

 

[halleyscomet]

Jabba, you are wrong. First of all, you start off by stating there is a copy. By definition of copy there is no death and no "bringing back to life". There is a copy, plain and simple.



In the materialist model, we would know exactly who the copy would be. It would be a second (i.e. copy) of the original. By definition of copy, the second would be entirely indistinguishable from the first. If it was a copy of Jabba, it would be Jabba.

Perhaps this is all an elaborate setup for a sci-fi story where a mad scientist is running experiments on twins by creating copies of Dr. Josef Mengele.

 

[JesseCuster]

Dave,
- The materialist model would also assume that a perfect copy would not bring you back to life. In that sense of you (and who), we would have no idea who the new self would be -- are you just suggesting that we have no idea who you are either?

There's absolutely no excuse for this.

You've been told so many times what's wrong with this idea that it's impossible to believe that it hasn't sunk in by now. It's not that you disagree with the position being put forth by others here, it's that you're repeatedly attributing this bizarre strawman to them.

There's simply no way you can have failed to read the actual position you're arguing against, or that you have failed to understand it, or that you haven't read and understood it being corrected too many times to count.

It has been explained and repeated by so many people so many times and in so many ways just what is wrong with this this strawman, that at this stage the only reasonable conclusion is that you are being wilfully dishonest when make statements like the post above I have quoted.

What other explanation for you repeating it so often despite being corrected so many times?

 

[Jabba]

As I said in the post you replied to, we would know who the knew self would be. It would be that one. The original would be this one. The word "who" literally means "what or which person or people". The original and the copy would be two separate people and we would know who each of them were.

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure. You accept that your particular sense of self would not be brought back to life by the perfect copy. So, in that sense, I'm saying that the new self would not be you. Also in that sense, I'm saying that we wouldn't have any idea who the new self would be.
- We seem to be passing in the night re "in that sense"...

 

[Belz...]

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure.

Stop insisting that there's a communication failure. Everything has been very clear.

You accept that your particular sense of self would not be brought back to life by the perfect copy.

Because the phrase makes no sense under H.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, you are wrong. First of all, you start off by stating there is a copy. By definition of copy there is no death and no "bringing back to life". There is a copy, plain and simple.

In the materialist model, we would know exactly who the copy would be. It would be a second (i.e. copy) of the original. By definition of copy, the second would be entirely indistinguishable from the first. If it was a copy of Jabba, it would be Jabba.

Monza,
- Does my last post to Dave help?

 

[jond]

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure. You accept that your particular sense of self would not be brought back to life by the perfect copy. So, in that sense, I'm saying that the new self would not be you. Also in that sense, I'm saying that we wouldn't have any idea who the new self would be.
- We seem to be passing in the night re "in that sense"...

Odd that you ignore the many posts, including Godless Dave's that indicate that we know exactly who the new self would be. An exact copy of Jabba would self identify as Jabba.

 

[godless dave]

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure. You accept that your particular sense of self would not be brought back to life by the perfect copy. So, in that sense, I'm saying that the new self would not be you. Also in that sense, I'm saying that we wouldn't have any idea who the new self would be.
- We seem to be passing in the night re "in that sense"...

Maybe you should explain what you mean by "in that sense".

Also it seems like you missed this:

Emergent properties aren't magical entities for which the concept of "copy" does not mean the same thing as it does for everything else. Everything about an emergent property is determined by the system it emerges from. Two identical systems under identical conditions will produce identical emergent properties.

 

[Dave Rogers]

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure.

Clearly it is, and equally clearly it's solely on your side. You have made a claim about what a group of people think, the response to it from everyone in that group has been to tell you that none of them thinks what you claim they think, and your response to them has been to repeat the claim that they think what you want them to think despite the fact that they have all denied that they think it. Has it occurred to you that there might be better ways of resolving a communication failure than this?

Dave

 

[Dave Rogers]

Monza,
- Does my last post to Dave help?

You've simply repeated a lie that you've been told many times is a lie. Why do you think that would have helped?

Dave

 

[Pixel42]

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure. You accept that your particular sense of self would not be brought back to life by the perfect copy.

Only because the phrase "brought back to life" is meaningless in this context. Processes cannot be "brought back to life".

So, in that sense, I'm saying that the new self would not be you.

It would be copy which differed from the original only in its spacetime co-ordinates.

Also in that sense, I'm saying that we wouldn't have any idea who the new self would be.

Why the hell not? Honestly, Jabba, you keep stating this as if it's obvious but it makes no sense whatsoever. We know exactly who the new self would be,

- We seem to be passing in the night re "in that sense"...

You seem to be ignoring everything that has been patiently explained to you for the last five years.

 

[jsfisher]

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure. You accept that your particular sense of self would not be brought back to life by the perfect copy.

The only person saying that is you. A particular sense of self is not a thing. It is meaningless to talk about it being brought back to life.

So, in that sense, I'm saying that the new self would not be you.

"You" is simply a pronoun meaning, in this case, Jabba. Jabba is not his sense of self. Jabba is a living entity with a functioning brain. Jabba's sense of self is a property of his functioning brain.

The copy of Jabba ("you") would be Jabba just as much as the original is Jabba.

Also in that sense, I'm saying that we wouldn't have any idea who the new self would be.

The new (sense of) self isn't a thing.

- We seem to be passing in the night re "in that sense"...

No, you continue to ignore the materialistic hypothesis.

 

[RoboTimbo]

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure. You accept that your particular sense of self would not be brought back to life by the perfect copy.

This lie won't be allowed to pass. There is no "particular" to the process of a sense of self in the materialist model, as you well know. You don't speak for the materialist model. You don't get to paste a soul onto the materialist model.

So, in that sense, I'm saying that the new self would not be you.

You can say it all you want to. You aren't allowed to paste your magical ideas onto the materialist model.

Also in that sense, I'm saying that we wouldn't have any idea who the new self would be.

The materialist model doesn't care in what sense you mean it. It doesn't apply to the materialist model, which is what you're trying to refute.

- We seem to be passing in the night re "in that sense"...

No, you seem to want to continue to lie "in that sense".

If you don't like your lies being pointed out each time, change your behavior as I've told you.

 

[zooterkin]

- This seems to be at least one of our points of communication failure. You accept that your particular sense of self would not be brought back to life by the perfect copy.

Jabba, by 'particular sense of self', you mean 'soul'. There are no souls in the materialistic view.

So, in that sense, I'm saying that the new self would not be you.

It would be identical, indistinguishable except by location.

Also in that sense, I'm saying that we wouldn't have any idea who the new self would be.

If by 'who' you again mean 'soul', it is again a meaningless statement. If you mean who the copy thinks they are, it will be the same as the original it is a copy of.

 

[jond]

The only person saying that is you. A particular sense of self is not a thing. It is meaningless to talk about it being brought back to life.



"You" is simply a pronoun meaning, in this case, Jabba. Jabba is not his sense of self. Jabba is a living entity with a functioning brain. Jabba's sense of self is a property of his functioning brain.

The copy of Jabba ("you") would be Jabba just as much as the original is Jabba.



The new (sense of) self isn't a thing.



No, you continue to ignore the materialistic hypothesis.

Jabba, read this post. It is not insulting, nor sarcastic. Try to understand it.

You've already acknowledged that in the materialistic model, the self is a process generated by a functioning brain. But your whole argument in this latest go-round of "particular sense of self" revolves around your insistence that the self is a separate entity, and not a process.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, please try to understand this: under the hypothesis you are supposed to be trying to disprove there is no such thing as a "self" in the way you are using the term. Consciousness is just something the brain does.

You can't use the concept of souls to make your existence unlikely if the hypothesis is true, because if the hypothesis is true souls don't exist.

Mojo,
- Again, this seems to me a failure to communicate.
- The current existence of my self is the "E" in my formula.
- My claim is that reincarnationists and materialists are referring to the same experience/process when they speak of the "self." They just disagree about the nature of this experience/process. Their models differ.
- Where in my formulation do I misrepresent the materialist model?