- My current summary:
1. New information may affect the probability of an existing hypothesis (H).
2. An old event may be new info if it hasn’t already been considered in the current probability of H.
3. If an event is unlikely – given a particular hypothesis (H) – but the event occurs, the occurrence will tend to have a negative effect upon the probability of H — but, it need not.
4. It could be that given the complementary hypothesis – the event would be even more unlikely.
5. Or, it could be that all possible events – given H – are equally unlikely (e.g. a fair lottery) -- if so, the particular event needs to be "set apart" in a way that is relevant to the hypothesis in order to impact the hypothesis.
6. If – given H – an event is impossible, but does occur, H must be wrong.
7. Otherwise, what we call Bayesian statistics is used to evaluate the effect of a new and relevant event upon the probability of H.
8. I claim that by using my own current existence as the new info, Bayesian Statistics, virtually proves that we humans are not mortal.
9. Here’s how it works.
10. The likelihood of drawing a particular sample from a particular population has mathematical implications re the likelihood that a particular sample was, in fact, drawn from that population… You might want to read that again…
11. Or, in other words, the probability of a hypothesis being true is affected by the likelihood of samples actually drawn from the involved population — given that hypothesis.
12. The thing is, we have the mathematical right to apply this logic to our own expected mortality (the hypothesis)…
13. According to the typical, non-religious model of reality, each of us is temporary and singular — at best. If we ever live, we won’t live long, and we’ll do it only once.
14. By "we," I mean we "selves" or senses of self" or "specific self-awarenesses" (SSA) or even "souls" (if "soul' isn't defined as immortal) -- in other words, what reincarnationists think keep coming back to life.
15. If that is indeed the case, however, the probability of me existing right now is teensy-weensy, or vanishingly small. I’m damned lucky to be here, and damned lucky that now is now.
16. “So? Those things happen.” (or something similar) … is the usual response.
17. And every once in a while, someone gets a poker hand of 4 aces. You’re
right, those things happen. But, in the poker case, if you have any existing suspicions about the dealer and your opponent (that set the specific event apart from the other possibilities), those suspicions will take a decided turn for the worse if your opponent turns over 4 aces at a particularly convenient time.
18. In other words, if you have a plausible hypothesis other than the ‘null
hypothesis’ and you get results you wouldn’t expect given that the null hypothesis were correct, you can be justifiably suspicious of your null hypothesis (in our case, the non-religious hypothesis). It’s simply, which hypothesis – over all, adding the new info – is the most probable. No problem.
19. It’s only when you have no other plausible hypothesis that you’re stuck with the null hypothesis.
20. So, the question is, do I have available another plausible hypothesis for my current existence?
21. I can think of at least four that seem plausible.
22. And further, I can lump these four together (along with all other plausible hypotheses) in the complement to the null hypothesis and say something concrete and definite about the probability of the null hypothesis – the non-religious hypothesis – being true, given my current existence.
23. So, given
…k = all background knowledge
…P = the probability of
…NR = Non-Religious hypothesis
…| = given
…me = me (my current existence)
…R = Religious hypothesis.
24. The formula for this probability is
…P(NR|me & k) = P(me|NR)P(NR|k) / (P(me|NR)P(NR|k) + P(me|R)P(R|k)).
25. Since P(me|R) is simply indefinable (it isn’t zero or vanishingly small), we can substitute any positive value that we think is reasonable (.01 for instance), and given that value, the probability of the Non-Religious Hypothesis -- also given my current existence and all background knowledge (P(NR|me & k) becomes P(me|NR)P(NR|k) / (P(me|NR)P(NR|k) + .01P(R|k)).
26. If I then assign the subjective probabilities of .99 to P(NR|k) and .01 to P(R|k), P(NR|me&k) = (1/10100) times .99, divided by .01 times .1 = vanishingly small.
27. Since I do currently exist, the probability of me being temporary and singular ("mortal") is vanishingly small.
28. (I forgot to include that I do claim to be set apart in a relevant way, and why I do. I'll save that for another post.)