Proof of Immortality, VII

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Dave (Godless),
- Way back when, when I was first claiming how unlikely I was -- given OOFLam -- and, how that reflected on OOFLam, you brought up the unlikelihood of Mt Rainier, suggesting that if I was correct about my existence and immortality, it must be either that Mt Rainier is immortal, or just that the existence of Mt Rainier defied science (I can't remember which).

I cannot believe that that part of the discussion left you with the impression that mountains are either immortal or supernatural was godless dave's position on the matter.

- Ultimately, I claimed that I was "set apart,"whereas Rainier was not (which would explain why the same logic wouldn't apply to Rainier) -- and further that I (my particular self-awareness) was not scientifically traceable, whereas Rainier was.
- Since then, we've addressed the same issue regarding VWs and loaves of bread, with similar results, and I've presented my, likely, best arguments re "set apart" and "scientifically traceable" for each sub-issue. Whatever, for now, I'll leave those arguments as my closing statements for those issues and sub-issues.

Emergent properties can and do arise from complex physical systems. Mountains have emergent properties that differ from people's emergent properties. And VW's. And bread's.

Mountains can't ponder their own existence and you can't gather snow in your shady spots that lasts into summer. In that sense, you can say that you are set apart from a mountain.

The unsupported assertion that our conciousnesses are somehow "set apart" in some vague way has no meaningful bearing on materialism. Calling this whimsical notion your best argument, refusing to support it, and declaring that it must stand, unassailable, as the cornerstone of your argument can only be interpreted as a victory by virulent use of circular reasoning.

- And then, you claimed that my resistance to the sperm+ovum explanation for particular self-awarenesses was misguided, but seemed to be accepting my explanation when you accepted that a perfect copy of my brain, or my sperm+ovum, would not bring ME back to life.

Brains, the gray matter between our ears, are a product of their genetics AND environmental influence. Sperm+ovum+circumstance.

Minds, the emergent properties of brains, also called conciousnesses, are a product of brains AND environmental influence. Brain+environment+circumstances beyond our control.

Nature and nurture make us what we are. This is the materialistic worldview.
 
- Obviously, I disagree. I think that a neutral jury would generally disagree also. And could be that Caveman and Toon agree with those two conclusions of mine -- though, I doubt that they like my arguments.

A neutral jury wouldn't be swayed by vacuous statements.


- Would a perfect copy of my brain bring my particular self-awareness back to life?

When you wake up from your nap have you been brought back to life?
 
Jabba, is it really so difficult to understand that two identical things are two things, not one?

If it was possible to duplicate you, then there would be two yous. Both of them would believe themselves to be the original you. Nobody would be able to tell the difference between the two identical yous. As the two yous cannot occupy the same point in space, the two yous would begin to diverge. But even as they diverge, they would still both believe themselves to be the original Jabba.

Consciousness is a process. There is no such thing as a specific or a particular consciousness. Every person feels that they are an unique and unchangeable self, but this is an illusion. I am not the same person that I was a minute ago, an hour ago, a year ago, a decade or 54 years ago. I think that I am the same, but I'm really not.

'Bringing me back to life' is as meaningless as bringing the same 60mph back in the case of a vehicle, or the same green in the case of a chameleon. Emergent properties don't 'come back'; they arise as a natural result of the organism. There is no soul.

By the way, my great-aunt has just celebrated her 106th birthday and her mind is as sharp as a tack. Anyone in their 70s who feels befuddled needs to visit their doctor - being forgetful is not a natural consequence of ageing.
 
When talking about the materialist model of reality, there is no possible scenario where making a copy of something would result in that something being in two places at once.
- Agreed. But, in this case, we can't predict "who" the specific new self-awareness will be.
 
- Agreed. But, in this case, we can't predict "who" the specific new self-awareness will be.

Sure we can: it'll be an exact copy of you at the time of the copy.

Two distinct but identical "selves".

Does it bring the first one "back"? No. But then, you're not immortal.
 
- Agreed. But, in this case, we can't predict "who" the specific new self-awareness will be.

You just said "It's the same but it wouldn't be the saaaaaame." for the billionth time.

Jabba if something is "the same" IT'S THE EVER LOVING BLOODY SAME!
 
- Agreed. But, in this case, we can't predict "who" the specific new self-awareness will be.


No, we can't predict it because the very concept is complete nonsense. There is no "specific new" self-awareness just like there is no "specific, new' going 60 miles per hour.

But by all means, keep typing the same garbage over and over. Maybe save time by programming a macro.
 
- Agreed. But, in this case, we can't predict "who" the specific new self-awareness will be.

In the materialist model we can. Knowing which brain it is tells us who it is. Each specific brain produces a specific self.
 
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- Agreed. But, in this case, we can't predict "who" the specific new self-awareness will be.

In the materialist model, where the process of self-awareness is (in principle, in some sense) determined exactly by the composition of the brain, yes we can; it will be the same "who" as the brain that was duplicated. If you construct an exact copy of me, with the same composition to the last degree, and hence the same knowledge, memories and personality traits, that copy will be as much me as I am; neither of us will be able to distinguish which is the original and which the copy. Your belief that the two of them will somehow be distinguishable is opposed to materialism. If you want to derive results from materialism for comparison with your own beliefs, you need to use materialism as it is rather than how you would like it to be. You cannot mix a part of your own beliefs into materialism and pretend it's still materialism.

Dave
 
- Agreed. But, in this case, we can't predict "who" the specific new self-awareness will be.

Absolute nonsense. In the materialism model, every instance must be you. Underlining and quoting words doesn't somehow endow them magical properties that thwart your critics.
 
Jabba 50 pages from now:

"Yes I agree that a totally perfect exact copy of my brain would be the same but it wouldn't be ( < { [R="DarkRed"] THE SAAAAAAAAAAMMMMME [/COLOR][/U][/I][/B ] } ] > ) "
 
- Agreed. But, in this case, we can't predict "who" the specific new self-awareness will be.

It's actually easy-peasy to do. If it's a copy of Jabba, then the copy would be another Jabba. See how I just predicted "who" what you've called a process would be?
 
In the materialist model we can. Knowing which brain it is tells us who it is. Each specific brain produces a specific self.
- Assuming that "specific self" and "specific self-awareness" mean the same thing, we have no idea who the next one will be.
 
- Assuming that "specific self" and "specific self-awareness" mean the same thing, we have no idea who the next one will be.

Yes, we do. It will be the same as the self arising from the brain that was copied. It will have the same name, memories, personality traits, preferences, moods and cognitive biases as the self arising from the original brain, provided the copy is perfect. It will be who the original self is. That's materialism. We all know, since you've made it clear ad nauseam, that you don't agree that the materialist view is correct; you need to learn to understand that your disagreement with it does not make materialism something other than it is.

Dave
 
Assuming that "specific self" and "specific self-awareness" mean the same thing...

The concept of specificity you're trying to foist does not exist in materialism.

...we have no idea who the next one will be.

Under materialism every instance of the material must exhibit the properties. Switching from quoting to underlining does not create a new ambiguous meaning that you can fool people into resolving to your benefit.
 
- Assuming that "specific self" and "specific self-awareness" mean the same thing, we have no idea who the next one will be.


Jabba,

Your misunderstanding is that in the materialist model, the "specific self" / "specific self-awareness" is a process. It is not a thing and it is not static. If a brain is copied, the processes that arise from that brain are also copied, by definition. This means if the Jabba brain was copied, both would be Jabba. As they diverge they would no longer be identical, but both would still be Jabba.

This is similar to comparing the 10-year-old Jabba brain to the 50-year-old Jabba brain. They are not identical yet both are considered Jabba.
 
- Assuming that "specific self" and "specific self-awareness" mean the same thing, we have no idea who the next one will be.

Of course we do: the specific self is the one generated by the specific brain. You keep imagining that the self is a separate entity, and you really need to stop doing that.
 
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