Proof of Immortality, VI

[Mojo]

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life -- IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU. In that sense, the new self would not be identical to the old self.

No, the second Jabba wouldn't be you, it would be a second Jabba, identical to you. There would be two Jabbas, and they would be identical. You're equivocating again.

And you are still begging the question by assuming that souls exist.

 

[MRC_Hans]

I see that Jabba has actually changed. He has now abandoned any pretense of debating with others, and proceeds to just talk with himself.

I wonder if he will succeed to progress any further in that mode?

Hans

 

[John Jones]

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life -- IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU. In that sense, the new self would not be identical to the old self.

Yes it would.

 

[JayUtah]

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life --

The former is what materialism defines as the self. The latter is not a concept in materialism.

IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU.

Under materialism, WHO would it be? Do you realize that capitalizing a word doesn't magically convey a different meaning? Under materialism, the new copy would have to exhibit all the properties of the previous instance. That's what materialism means.

In that sense, the new self would not be identical to the old self.

"That sense" is simply a circular definition. You say the copy would not be legitimate because it would lack a certain key property. And what is this key property in your bastardization of materialism? Whatever wouldn't be reproduced in the copy. It's really amazing that you think anyone would be fooled by this.

 

[JayUtah]

I see that Jabba has actually changed. He has now abandoned any pretense of debating with others, and proceeds to just talk with himself.

And it's not even an interesting "conversation." It's just the same statement over and over again.

 

[RoboTimbo]

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life -- IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU. In that sense, the new self would not be identical to the old self.

What is your definition of "identical"? You seem to be using one only you are familiar with.

 

[JoeMorgue]

I see that Jabba has actually changed. He has now abandoned any pretense of debating with others, and proceeds to just talk with himself.

In Jabba's defense it's probably a lot easier to write his little passion play when his actors aren't constantly questioning his direction.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Jabba I'd love to hear how this works with your... creative concept of self.

How Conjoined Twins Are Making Scientists Question the Concept of Self

When they were about a year and a half,” says Felicia Hogan, “we got told it was impossible to separate them without harming or killing one.” Her eleven-year-old girls, Krista and Tatiana, are conjoined at the skull, making them craniopagus twins. Craniopagus twins are the rarest sort—only about 6 percent of conjoined people fall into that category. But the Hogan girls are rarer still because their skulls are not merely fused—instead, they form a single continuous cranium which houses four cerebral hemispheres.

https://thewalrus.ca/how-conjoined-twins-are-making-scientists-question-the-concept-of-self/

 

[SOdhner]

Jabba used to define these selves based on physical components, on their genetic makeup and things like that:

My basic claim here is that there are, indeed, potential combinations of sperm and ovum, and each of those *represents* a potential person/self.

But now he's saying that two people that are identical in every scientifically measurable way, down to the individual atoms, are still two different potential selves. This shows that he's basing this *purely* on the soul.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Again we established that this is all about some magical woo-woo God soul about 3 posts into this nightmare.

At this point we're just watching Jabba try to weasel his way out of it.

At this stage of the "debate" he's basically said everything and nothing so many times as to quite possibly have put himself in the (honestly very, very rare) situation of being
in a place he literally can't talk himself out of.

 

[JayUtah]

Again we established that this is all about some magical woo-woo God soul about 3 posts into this nightmare.

And Jabba confirmed it at least twice. He's told us that he's really talking about the soul, but he doesn't want to use the word lest he be seen to beg the question. Yes, he admitted right up front to that attempt at deception.

 

[Mojo]

Do you realize that capitalizing a word doesn't magically convey a different meaning?

He'll probably have to try underlining it next. Or maybe putting it in allcaps and italicised. Or maybe in eight sets of nested italics tags. Not that any of those worked when he tried them before.

Colours! He hasn't tried different colours yet!

 

[Mojo]

And Jabba confirmed it at least twice. He's told us that he's really talking about the soul, but he doesn't want to use the word lest he be seen to beg the question. Yes, he admitted right up front to that attempt at deception.

Here, for example: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=11256256#post11256256

 

[caveman1917]

I can field this one.

Because, as you correctly point out, the chance he would come to exist is zero, and he DOES exist, then the denominator must be wrong. There must be a finite number of souls.

<- click that

 

[Dave Rogers]

<- click that

What you've linked to is, in effect. Jabba's argument: if there is an infinite number of possible selves, then the probability of him having the specific self that he has is zero, therefore under any hypothesis in which the number of possible selves is infinite, he cannot exist. The rest of his argument is based on trying to justify that the number of potential selves is infinite in the materialist hypothesis but not in the complementary set of hypotheses. That's where it's a classic example of the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy, because it's based on the post hoc determination that his self is the correct choice. But, in fact, if one chooses a random number, while it is almost certain that one will not choose a number specified in advance, it is nevertheless certain that one will choose a number that can be known after the fact; Jabba has been trying all along to make the second case appear to be the first.

Dave

 

[Belz...]

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life -- IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU.

By what metric?

Again, if you go into cardiac arrest for a minute your "self" shuts down completely and is "recreated" a few moments later. It's just as different as your copy's "self".

 

[Belz...]

Jabba I'd love to hear how this works with your... creative concept of self.

How Conjoined Twins Are Making Scientists Question the Concept of Self

When they were about a year and a half,” says Felicia Hogan, “we got told it was impossible to separate them without harming or killing one.” Her eleven-year-old girls, Krista and Tatiana, are conjoined at the skull, making them craniopagus twins. Craniopagus twins are the rarest sort—only about 6 percent of conjoined people fall into that category. But the Hogan girls are rarer still because their skulls are not merely fused—instead, they form a single continuous cranium which houses four cerebral hemispheres.

https://thewalrus.ca/how-conjoined-twins-are-making-scientists-question-the-concept-of-self/

I wonder if they'll talk like Tomax and Xamot.

 

[Jabba]

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life -- IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU. In that sense, the new self would not be identical to the old self.

I don't see how it wouldn't be identical. A copy is always separate from the original. That's what "copy" means.

Dave,
- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge. I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

 

[MetalPig]

Dave,
- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge. I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

There is no "back to life". It's a copy. The original isn't gone.

The copy is not the original, but it is not different either.

 

[abaddon]

Dave,
- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge. I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

NO. You have no interest in identifying any divergence.