Proof of Immortality, VI

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Jabba,

Let's say one day someone makes you a loaf of bread using a specific recipe. And you really like it. It's great bread.

So the next day they make another loaf of bread using the same recipe. And they make a loaf of bread that tastes exactly the same as the first loaf.

Do you spit it out in disgust because it's "not the same?" When told it's the same loaf of bread do you go "No! It's not the same" and assign some quality to the loaf that is only identifiable via it not being the original loaf of bread? That even though this loaf of bread tastes the same as the first loaf it's not "the one true loaf?"

You're stuck in this loop of refusing to acknowledge that two things can be different in that they are two separate things that exist in distinct points in space and time but identical in that they have no measurable qualities that aren't the same.

An identical copy of you would just mean there are now two "yous." Neither one would be any more or less "You" than the other one because that's what "identical copy" means.

You are hiding "a soul" in pretending you don't understand the difference between "identical" and "same," a distinction which has been explained to you... so very many times.
 
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- So, pulling those together, you accept that a perfect copy of your brain would not bring your self back to life because the copy would be separate from the original. Right?
- Here, once again, I'm just trying to make sure that you and I are talking about the same concept when we talk about the "self." It's the thing, process or illusion that apparently ceases when our brains die -- never to return. It's the same concept that reincarnationists think returns over and over again.
- That's the concept I'm talking about. I think that you're talking about the same concept.

You forgot the 'looking out of two sets of eyes' idiocy, and the preposterous 'brought back to life' rejoinder.

When are we going to get to your proof of immortality after these 5 years?

Aren't you due for another fringe reset? (Wait for it...)
 
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So, pulling those together, you accept that a perfect copy of your brain would not bring your self back to life...

No, those words don't appear anywhere in his response. Don't try to rewrite your critics posts to make them say what you need them to say.

Here, once again, I'm just trying to make sure that you and I are talking about the same concept...

No, you're not. You're trying to make everything sound like it fits your model by whatever means you can muster, including putting words in your critics' mouths.

It's the thing, process or illusion...

No, it's not a thing. It's a process, which is very different than a thing. That process creates the illusion of something that some people call the self in a metaphysical sense. In materialism it's just the operation of the brain.

...that apparently ceases when our brains die -- never to return.

No, it will return any time the physical body returns. Hypothetically if you could recreate the physical body, the property of consciousness and the resulting sense of self would return under materialism. By the definition of materialism that we're using here, it would have to return. While you have argued that there's something special that wouldn't return, you have no argument in favor of such a thing in materialism except blatant special pleading. You're borrowing that from your concept of a soul and trying various dishonest word games to back-door that into materialism.

It's the same concept that reincarnationists think returns over and over again.

No. Most emphatically it is not. That would have to be an entity separate from the physical body. The sense of self in materialism is a property of the physical body. It does not -- and cannot -- have a separate existence. You know this.

That's the concept I'm talking about. I think that you're talking about the same concept.

No. No one except you has been talking about that concept for five years. At this late stage are you seriously once again just trying to cram words in people's mouths and claim agreement? Shame on you, Jabba. This is ground we've covered over and over again. You insult your critics when you ignore what they say and write your own script for them.
 
Thanks for answering. I know that looks like a silly question but this should help move the discussion forward.


Following the same recipe twice will result in two loaves of bread. Even if I bake one loaf, eat it, then make another one, the second loaf is not the first loaf brought back to existence.

Would you say there is a difference between the two loaves?
Dave,
- There would be a difference -- in that the atoms of the two loaves would be separate atoms. In that sense, they would not be the same atoms -- they would be the same kind of atoms. They would have the same characteristics.
 
Dave,
- There would be a difference -- in that the atoms of the two loaves would be separate atoms. In that sense, they would not be the same atoms -- they would be the same kind of atoms. They would have the same characteristics.

So even though I followed the same recipe, I got a different loaf of bread, not the same loaf of bread.

Does this mean the second loaf of bread is brand new and came out of nowhere?
 
Does this mean the second loaf of bread is brand new and came out of nowhere?

Or even more to the point, is the second loaf of bread somehow degenerate or inferior to the first, just by its having been made second? Sure the individual atoms in the second loaf won't be the same atoms as in the first. That's just an inevitable consequence of there being two different entities, and something Jabba has desperately tried to invoke to argument a salient difference. But is there any property appropriate to bread that would be missing in the second loaf just because it wasn't the first one made?

In the thought experiment, Jabba insists that only the first time his organism is made viable is the only time it will have the appropriate sense of self. He insists on discretizing properties.

You've show the absurdity of a loaf of bread looking out through two sets of eyes. We can also use this analogy to show the absurdity of the second loaf failing to bring the first loaf back to life. The second loaf exhibits all the properties of breadedness, the same as the first loaf. Indistinguishably so.
 
Dave,
- There would be a difference -- in that the atoms of the two loaves would be separate atoms. In that sense, they would not be the same atoms -- they would be the same kind of atoms. They would have the same characteristics.

What characteristics does a soul have?
 
- Here, once again, I'm just trying to make sure that you and I are talking about the same concept when we talk about the "self." It's the thing, process or illusion that apparently ceases when our brains die -- never to return.


Jabba -

Would you label a watermelon a "mandible, fruit or plant"?

Would you label a volkswagen an "elephant, car or automobile"?

Why not? Is it because "mandible" and "elephant" have nothing whatsoever to do with watermelons or volkswagens? You have again slipped "thing" into your definition of the self when it is not. It isn't. It doesn't behave like a discrete object. It is testably not a thing.

Understand that.



It's the same concept that reincarnationists think returns over and over again.


No, Jabba, that is not a definition. There are many types of reincarnationists, many of whom disagree. Furthermore, you have done zero research into what the beliefs of Hindus, Buddhists or anybody else might be - zero. In the same amount of time you take to post here, you could just go to one of the many message boards where religious people congregate and asked them to explain their beliefs. You didn't, though I have begged you to. You took time off from this board and used that time to do absolutely nothing.

So, let me ask you: What do you mean by the "concept that reincarnationists think returns over and over again"? How do you understand that concept? You keep asking people to endlessly define their terms. I'm asking you to give me the same courtesy you demand of people here. What do you believe that term means?


That's the concept I'm talking about. I think that you're talking about the same concept.


No. Nobody is other than you. And even you aren't actually talking about a concept because you refuse to define it.
 
Then it's not a perfect copy, because the properties "location" and "time" were not copied.

The point of the thought exercise is not whether the two copies are identical under every possible quibble but whether there is a basis for one being identified as the original and the other as the copy. This is striking at Jabba's hollow chestnut, "It wouldn't be ME."

If the replication process does not expose which is which during the cloning, then asking which is ME afterwards is not a meaningful question.
 
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- So, pulling those together, you accept that a perfect copy of your brain would not bring your self back to life because the copy would be separate from the original. Right?

Who's "you"?

- Here, once again, I'm just trying to make sure that you and I are talking about the same concept when we talk about the "self."

Oh, we're talking about the same thing. We're talking about a soul. Those don't exist in materialism.

It's the thing, process or illusion that apparently ceases when our brains die -- never to return.

How about that 60 mph?

- That's the concept I'm talking about.

Sounds stupid to argue that the soul is less likely to exist in materialism, but there you have it.
 
Dave,
- There would be a difference -- in that the atoms of the two loaves would be separate atoms. In that sense, they would not be the same atoms -- they would be the same kind of atoms. They would have the same characteristics.

The atoms in your body now are not the same as those 20 years ago. Are you not you anymore?
 
I literally never knew so many grown people had a problem with the concept of "copy."
 
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