Why Hitler Declared War On The United States

Dave Rogers said:
And, most remarkably, then paid off war reparations in full and within the agreed deadline. Very few nations could have extricated themselves from such a bad situation with such grace.
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In 1871, France, paid off the war indemnity within two years instead of the agreed four years.
 
ddt said:
No it wasn't. Barbarossa came to a halt before the gates of Leningrad in the winter of 1941, and after that, Hitler deliberately decided not to try to take the city but to besiege and starve it.
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And the Finns on occasion cooperated with the Germans to prevent relief from reaching the besieged city, by attacking Soviet supply convoys on Lake Ladoga for example.
Lieutenant General Paavo Talvela and Colonel Järvinen, the commander of the Finnish Coastal Brigade responsible for Ladoga, proposed to the German headquarters the blocking of Soviet convoys on Lake Ladoga. The German command formed the 'international' naval detachment (which also included the Italian XII Squadriglia MAS) under Finnish command and the Einsatzstab Fähre Ost under German command. These naval units operated against the supply route in the summer and autumn of 1942, the only period the units were able to operate as freezing waters then forced the lightly equipped units to be moved away​
 
ddt said:
No it wasn't. Barbarossa came to a halt before the gates of Leningrad in the winter of 1941, and after that, Hitler deliberately decided not to try to take the city but to besiege and starve it.
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Actually it was around Moscow where Barbarossa fell apart, thanks to a combination of overextended supply lines, horrific winter conditions, and a massive Soviet counter offensive on Dec. 5, 1941.:thumbsup:

Stalingrad was actually a part of the 1942 operations, which was code-named Case Blue (or Fall Blau in German). And I think we all know how that ended...:D
 
carlvs said:
Actually it was around Moscow where Barbarossa fell apart, thanks to a combination of overextended supply lines, horrific winter conditions, and a massive Soviet counter offensive on Dec. 5, 1941.:thumbsup:
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And lack of winter clothes. You're absolutely right.

carlvs said:
Stalingrad was actually a part of the 1942 operations, which was code-named Case Blue (or Fall Blau in German). And I think we all know how that ended...:D
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Yep.

It wasn't my intention to say that Barbarossa fell apart at the gates of Leningrad. But in 1941, the Nazis did advance on Leningrad - and came even closer to it than to Moscow - with the intention to capture the city. After the Soviet winter offensive of 1941/42, Hitler decided to not even try to capture Leningrad, but just to keep besieging it and starve it. That decision was taken a half to a whole year before the Battle of Stalingrad. That was in response to this post:
Vixen said:
The only reason Operation Barbarossa in the north was an eventual disaster for the Germans, was because of the shock sensational defeat at Stalingrad in the south.
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which is patently false.
 
carlvs said:
Actually it was around Moscow where Barbarossa fell apart, thanks to a combination of overextended supply lines, horrific winter conditions, and a massive Soviet counter offensive on Dec. 5, 1941.:thumbsup:

Stalingrad was actually a part of the 1942 operations, which was code-named Case Blue (or Fall Blau in German). And I think we all know how that ended...:D
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Here is a very interesting article written back in 2010 that examines many different historians' view of the turning point of WW2. It is three pages long (TL;DR for some), but for anyone who is at all interested in WW2 history, it is well worth the time taken to read it.

http://www.historynet.com/what-was-the-turning-point-of-world-war-ii.htm

The author pins his conclusions down to a specific date... October 16, 1941 and something that was all set to happen, but didn't. Its an interesting idea.
 
The effect of the winter on Bararossa was vastly overstated after the fact. The simple fact is that the German generals grossly underestimated the Russian people's will to fight and the administrative capabilities of the USSR's leadership. They were absolutely shocked when reinforcements of over a million men appeared as if from nowhere at the siege of Moscow. They thought they had practically annihilated the entire Russian army. That's when it all started to fall apart.
 
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TubbaBlubba said:
The effect of the winter on Bararossa was vastly overstated after the fact. The simple fact is that the German generals grossly underestimated the Russian people's will to fight and the administrative capabilities of the USSR's leadership. They were absolutely shocked when reinforcements of over a million men appeared as if from nowhere at the siege of Moscow. They thought they had practically annihilated the entire Russian army. That's when it all started to fall apart.
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And they were not the only ones who underestimated the Russians...(from the link I referenced earlier)

It’s only with hindsight that we see the decision to invade the Soviet Union as the act of a madman. In fact, “smart” opinion at the time was exactly the opposite.

“The best opinion I can get,” wrote William F. Knox, secretary of the navy, to President Roosevelt on June 23, 1941, “is that it will take anywhere from six weeks to two months for Hitler to clean up on Russia.” While in Britain the War Office told the BBC that they should not give the impression that the Soviets could hold out for longer than six weeks. The prevailing informed wisdom was summed up by Hugh Dalton, a member of the British cabinet, who wrote in his diary on June 22, 1941, “I am mentally preparing myself for the headlong collapse of the Red Army and Air Force.”
 
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smartcooky said:
And they were not the only ones who underestimated the Russians...(from the link I referenced earlier)

It’s only with hindsight that we see the decision to invade the Soviet Union as the act of a madman. In fact, “smart” opinion at the time was exactly the opposite.

“The best opinion I can get,” wrote William F. Knox, secretary of the navy, to President Roosevelt on June 23, 1941, “is that it will take anywhere from six weeks to two months for Hitler to clean up on Russia.” While in Britain the War Office told the BBC that they should not give the impression that the Soviets could hold out for longer than six weeks. The prevailing informed wisdom was summed up by Hugh Dalton, a member of the British cabinet, who wrote in his diary on June 22, 1941, “I am mentally preparing myself for the headlong collapse of the Red Army and Air Force.”
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It was WW1 doctrine. Take the enemy's capital, make them sign a treaty, you've won! But the problem with starting a war of annihilation is that people just won't stop fighting you.
 
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Trebuchet said:
Certainly the turning point of the Pacific war, but not of the war in general. Japan was screwed from the moment the first bomb fell. Germany, not so much.
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I disagree. America is, basically, an island. We boarder two countries, both of whom are both friendly and very large. We had the ability to project power all the way into Germany. They had no such ability. The Germans did control the Atlantic. However once America woke up, they were doomed.

Had Hitler cared about the German people - had he attempted to alleviate starvation, or had he not thrown young boys and old men into the bulge - the war would have been even shorter.
 
Germany was always fighting an ultimately unwinnable wars. There were simply put no well defined objectives. Even without as extensive support as the lend-lease, the USSR would likely have been able to push Germany back outside its borders. Yes, the Lend-lease was massive and some parts, like grain and trucks, were vital. But the Soviet union could have survived with far fewer tanks had they needed to build more trucks. Grain was harder since Germany occupied so much arable land, though. But what people tend to forget is that while U.S. industry was in a class of its own, Soviet industrial capacity still dwarfed that of Germany.

Above the division level, Soviet combat doctrine was also lightyears ahead of German. The Germans were frequently shocked by the speed with which Soviet batallions could move and conduct carefully coordinated operations.
 
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TubbaBlubba said:
Germany was always fighting an ultimately unwinnable wars. There were simply put no well defined objectives. Even without as extensive support as the lend-lease, the USSR would likely have been able to push Germany back outside its borders. Yes, the Lend-lease was massive and some parts, like grain and trucks, were vital. But the Soviet union could have survived with far fewer tanks had they needed to build more trucks. Grain was harder since Germany occupied so much arable land, though. But what people tend to forget is that while U.S. industry was in a class of its own, Soviet industrial capacity still dwarfed that of Germany.

Above the division level, Soviet combat doctrine was also lightyears ahead of German. The Germans were frequently shocked by the speed with which Soviet batallions could move and conduct carefully coordinated operations.
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Much of that was down to the Soviet's T-34 tank. IMO, it was superior and far more versatile than any of the German tanks of the time.
 
smartcooky said:
And they were not the only ones who underestimated the Russians...(from the link I referenced earlier)

It’s only with hindsight that we see the decision to invade the Soviet Union as the act of a madman. In fact, “smart” opinion at the time was exactly the opposite.

“The best opinion I can get,” wrote William F. Knox, secretary of the navy, to President Roosevelt on June 23, 1941, “is that it will take anywhere from six weeks to two months for Hitler to clean up on Russia.” While in Britain the War Office told the BBC that they should not give the impression that the Soviets could hold out for longer than six weeks. The prevailing informed wisdom was summed up by Hugh Dalton, a member of the British cabinet, who wrote in his diary on June 22, 1941, “I am mentally preparing myself for the headlong collapse of the Red Army and Air Force.”
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I have the impression that these estimates have also been influenced by the impression that the fast collapse of France left behind.

The author in that piece makes an interesting case for 16 October 1941. Personally, I stick with December 1941: primarily the start of the Soviet counteroffensive before Moscow, secondarily Pearl Harbor.
 
TubbaBlubba said:
It was WW1 doctrine. Take the enemy's capital, make them sign a treaty, you've won! But the problem with starting a war of annihilation is that people just won't stop fighting you.
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Except it didn't work in WW1 either.
The Belgians never surrendered, and neither did the Serbs.
And of those that did, I don't think any of them actually had their capitals occupied.

I'm not sure it was actually "doctrine" since Napoleon, and it never worked for him either.

TubbaBlubba said:
The effect of the winter on Bararossa was vastly overstated after the fact. The simple fact is that the German generals grossly underestimated the Russian people's will to fight and the administrative capabilities of the USSR's leadership. They were absolutely shocked when reinforcements of over a million men appeared as if from nowhere at the siege of Moscow. They thought they had practically annihilated the entire Russian army. That's when it all started to fall apart.
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German intelligence throughout the war was woeful.
In 1941 they wiped out the Soviet army 2 or 3 times over, from what they had expected to encounter. As they were to do with the US, they drastically underestimated the Soviet ability to produce stuff, and in the Soviet case to replace whole armies.
 
TubbaBlubba said:
The effect of the winter on Bararossa was vastly overstated after the fact. The simple fact is that the German generals grossly underestimated the Russian people's will to fight and the administrative capabilities of the USSR's leadership. They were absolutely shocked when reinforcements of over a million men appeared as if from nowhere at the siege of Moscow. They thought they had practically annihilated the entire Russian army. That's when it all started to fall apart.
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In addition to grossly overestimating their own capabilities.

It is classic way to fail.
 
Tolls said:
I'm not sure it was actually "doctrine" since Napoleon, and it never worked for him either.
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That's a very good point. I suppose it might be an unholy marriage of Nazi superiority complex and Prussian military chauvinism - at some point the enemy will surely recognize how superior the Germans are, and like Napoleon III mopingly sign a humiliating treaty.
 
The Wehrmacht suffers from a kind of Spartan mirage - they were exceptionally good at one very important thing (unit- and soldier-level infantry doctrine for the Wehrmach, formation drills för the Spartans) and military supremacy was a huge part of their image, leading to gross overestimations of them. Furthermore, Germany had a short-term advantage in that their nihilistic worldview and goals allowed them to fight with aggression, brutality and disregard for civilians and ethos that had never been seen before. With no concern for anything but raw power, the German advance had a massive shock value.

It was an insane way of waging war - pointless aggression and murder for the sake of aggression and murder with no remotely rational justification. In such a situation, the defender has a MASSIVE initial disadvantage.

IMO military historians and amateur enthusiasts often fail to contextualize warfare properly. No matter how effectively you butcher people, if the war you are waging is pointless in terms of gain. a diplomatic cataclysm, and has ill-defined objectives, then the way you are fighting is moronic. War is the continuation of policy by other means, only someone with the cartoonishly manichean nihilism of Hitler could see it as an end in itself.
 
TubbaBlubba said:
That's a very good point. I suppose it might be an unholy marriage of Nazi superiority complex and Prussian military chauvinism - at some point the enemy will surely recognize how superior the Germans are, and like Napoleon III mopingly sign a humiliating treaty.
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I recently browsed the archives of some local, pre-WW1 paper in the far west of Germany, which was a Zentrum party outlet and much a fan of the Kaiser. One article stated, matter of fact, that no one at all today doubts that the German army is by far the best in the world - except some dirty foreigners :D

Sent from mobile phone through Tapatalk
 
smartcooky said:
Much of that was down to the Soviet's T-34 tank. IMO, it was superior and far more versatile than any of the German tanks of the time.
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And of course, Germany's answer to the T-34 was a self-immolating, overtaxed & overrated pig of a tank that ended up being a waste or resources.
 
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