Proof of Immortality, VI

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- Sure. And H is OOFLam. And the likelihood of E (the current existence of my self) -- given OOFLam -- is unimaginably small.

As small as the current existence of Mount Rainier. Because under H, people, including their senses if self, and mountains are made of matter.
 
Effective debating style, there.

It's not a debating style. The first is a dismissal of incoherent ramblings which do no more than show off JoeBentley's ignorance of the subject. The second is a dismissal of people going back and forth between "under H only your body exists" and "under H you can also have an immortal soul in addition to your body" whenever it suits them.
 
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- Sure. And H is OOFLam.

No, H is materialism, which doesn't include the concept of "dimensions" of properties. "OOFLam" is a straw man you made up. Nor do the "dimensions" of properties exist inherently in the data, E. You are really trying hard to argue that such a thing exists, but it's just another easily-detected attempt to exalt certain things arbitrarily so that they become the soul. You are begging the question, as usual. The properties that you say should be evaluated along this other "dimension" are functionality equivalent in your model to a soul.

And the likelihood of E (the current existence of my self) -- given OOFLam -- is unimaginably small.

Dave was not asking you to repeat your argument. He was asking whether you understood your own argument. Clearly you don't, and we've talked about this many times before. P(E|H) may employ concepts only found in H. If ~H wants to evaluate E according to a dimensional hierarchy of perceived importance or significance then bully for it. H does no such thing. So you try to beg the question that those dimensions are inherently part of E, which they are not. Your argument boils down to "H is unlikely to properly explain E because it can't explain all the made-up crap I've borrowed from ~H and tried to tack onto E."

Sorry to be blunt, but you really suck at this, Jabba. Statistical reasoning, or formal reasoning in general, can be difficult to learn to do and difficult to evaluate. But it can be learned. The problem is that you think you already know it, when clearly you don't. You admitted you really didn't understand it, but you aren't letting the consequences of that admission come home properly to roost. You don't understand how to formulate a Bayesian inference correctly, and it just doesn't seem like you're the least bit interested in learning why. You just want applause for having -- in your mind -- bested those nasty skeptics.
 
It's not a debating style. The first is a dismissal of incoherent ramblings which do no more than show off JoeBentley's ignorance of the subject. The second is a dismissal of people going back and forth between "under H only your body exists" and "under H you can also have an immortal soul in addition to your body" whenever it suits them.

Yes, I was using a rhetorical technique known as "sarcasm", caveman. I know you're not actually debating anything here.


But while we're on the subject, could you provide at least two examples of the latter argument (highlighted)?
 
It's not a debating style. The first is a dismissal of incoherent ramblings which do no more than show off JoeBentley's ignorance of the subject. The second is a dismissal of people going back and forth between "under H only your body exists" and "under H you can also have an immortal soul in addition to your body" whenever it suits them.


You're not doing it right: it's only supposed to apply to the post that starts with "So..."
 
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- Sure. And H is OOFLam. And the likelihood of E (the current existence of my self) -- given OOFLam -- is unimaginably small.

As small as the current existence of Mount Rainier. Because under H, people, including their senses if self, and mountains are made of matter.
Dave,
- I don't see any disagreement here.

- I think you're trying to show that I'm misrepresenting H in my formula. But here, I think you're only saying that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as ME. And the thing is, my formula acknowledges that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as me...
- Where my formula diverges from yours is that my formula implies that I am set apart from other humans, whereas Mt Rainier is not set apart from other mountains. The formula that you're suggesting implies that Mt Rainier is set apart from other mountains. If I solve the Texas Sharpshooter problem, so does Mt Rainier.

- So far, I think that's the only place we really disagree...
 
- I don't see any disagreement here.

Then you agree that the self does not increase the unlikelihood of you existing compared to a mountain. That's literally what Dave said, and which you just agreed to.

- I think you're trying to show that I'm misrepresenting H in my formula. But here, I think you're only saying that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as ME. And the thing is, my formula acknowledges that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as me...

Good. So under H your unhikelihood, being equivalent to that of a mountain or an apple or a box of cereals, cannot be used to argue against H. Under H, your argument that you're incredibly unlikely in order to show that H is wrong is nonsensical.
 
Dave,
- I don't see any disagreement here.

- I think you're trying to show that I'm misrepresenting H in my formula. But here, I think you're only saying that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as ME. And the thing is, my formula acknowledges that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as me...
- Where my formula diverges from yours is that my formula implies that I am set apart from other humans, whereas Mt Rainier is not set apart from other mountains. The formula that you're suggesting implies that Mt Rainier is set apart from other mountains. If I solve the Texas Sharpshooter problem, so does Mt Rainier.

- So far, I think that's the only place we really disagree...

You have, up until yesterday, INSISTED that you are different from Mt Rainer in H. You have INSISTED that H includes something other than an emergent property of a brain.

Now that you acknowledge that the probability of your brain existing is the same as the probability of your self existing, how do you plan to get around the fact that this CANNOT be less likely than your brain existing and your self existing as a separate entity?
 
Where my formula diverges from yours is that my formula implies that I am set apart from other humans...

No, your model requires that you be set apart from other humans prior to selection such that the selection has significance. You just declare that this has happened. More precisely, you invent a framework that lets you believe you can retrospectively assign significance to data based solely on the fact that it was selected. In short, you do a lot of fancy (but wrong) footwork to try to show that the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is not a fallacy in your case.

...whereas Mt Rainier is not set apart from other mountains.

It is set apart from other mountains in exactly the same way you are set apart from other humans in your model.

If I solve the Texas Sharpshooter problem, so does Mt Rainier.

You argue that some handwavy mumbo-jumbo sets you apart as a post-selected human, but then you just declare that the same mumbo-jumbo could not possibly apply to Mt Ranier as a post-selected mountain. That is textbook special pleading.

So far, I think that's the only place we really disagree...

You persist in deliberately lying. We can prove you know this post exists. How will that sit with your hypothetical "jury?" Being caught red-handed lying on the witness stand does not tend to impress such juries.
 
Dave,
- I don't see any disagreement here.

- I think you're trying to show that I'm misrepresenting H in my formula. But here, I think you're only saying that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as ME. And the thing is, my formula acknowledges that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as me...
- Where my formula diverges from yours is that my formula implies that I am set apart from other humans, whereas Mt Rainier is not set apart from other mountains.

If that's what your formula is doing then you are misrepresenting H in your formula. Under H you are no more set apart from other humans than Mount Rainier is set apart from other mountains.
 
No, your model requires that you be set apart from other humans prior to selection such that the selection has significance. You just declare that this has happened. More precisely, you invent a framework that lets you believe you can retrospectively assign significance to data based solely on the fact that it was selected. In short, you do a lot of fancy (but wrong) footwork to try to show that the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is not a fallacy in your case.

Special pleading texas sharpshooter!
 
As small as the current existence of Mount Rainier. Because under H, people, including their senses if self, and mountains are made of matter.

All well and good, but Jabba's E is not his existence. Although Jabba keeps phrasing it as the likelihood of his existence, it is his sense of self that is under consideration.

The likelihood of Jabba's sense of self is very high, not very low as he's convinced himself, under the materialism hypothesis.
 
All well and good, but Jabba's E is not his existence. Although Jabba keeps phrasing it as the likelihood of his existence, it is his sense of self that is under consideration.

The likelihood of Jabba's sense of self is very high, not very low as he's convinced himself, under the materialism hypothesis.

Indeed, it is almost exactly 1. (There is some chance his brain could malfunction and not produce a sense of self or some other brain related malady could impact his sense of self). Nevertheless under H, his sense of self is the only one it could be. (He has, of course, ignored it every time the many posters here have pointed out that the sense of self is an ongoing process fed by every experience one has.)
 
All well and good, but Jabba's E is not his existence. Although Jabba keeps phrasing it as the likelihood of his existence, it is his sense of self that is under consideration.

The likelihood of Jabba's sense of self is very high, not very low as he's convinced himself, under the materialism hypothesis.

Yeah, we have two options.

1. We're talking about the likelihood of his physical body under materialism, which is low but not significantly lower than any specific clump of matter such as rocks, or

2. We're talking about the likelihood that his physical form would come with a sense of self, in which case it's essentially guaranteed as his physical self is a functioning human body with a living brain.

Either way his argument is silly.

Of course, when it comes to his stance that his sense of self is special somehow, I've explained what's going on to him several times and he always conveniently ignores that part of my posts even when I literally beg him to address them.
 
Dave,
- I don't see any disagreement here.

- I think you're trying to show that I'm misrepresenting H in my formula. But here, I think you're only saying that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as ME. And the thing is, my formula acknowledges that Mt Rainier is just as unlikely as me...
- Where my formula diverges from yours is that my formula implies that I am set apart from other humans, whereas Mt Rainier is not set apart from other mountains. The formula that you're suggesting implies that Mt Rainier is set apart from other mountains. If I solve the Texas Sharpshooter problem, so does Mt Rainier.

- So far, I think that's the only place we really disagree...

If that's what your formula is doing then you are misrepresenting H in your formula. Under H you are no more set apart from other humans than Mount Rainier is set apart from other mountains.
Dave,
- I think that I finally see your point; fortunately, I also think that I see my answers.
- For one thing, if I'm misrepresenting H, it's because I am not set apart. In other words, I'm committing the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy... That's still the only issue.
- But more importantly, OOFLam (H) is actually noncommittal re set apart, and by inserting my current existence as E in the formula, the formula assumes that I am set apart. It is saying that if I am, in fact, set apart, this is the posterior probability of H.
- Let's see where that takes us.
 
- For one thing, if I'm misrepresenting H, it's because I am not set apart. In other words, I'm committing the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy... That's still the only issue.


Nope. You are misrepresenting H because you persist in factoring immaterial souls into your calculation of P(E|H). The Texas sharpshooter fallacy is a different issue.

- But more importantly, OOFLam (H) is actually noncommittal re set apart, and by inserting my current existence as E in the formula, the formula assumes that I am set apart.


And it is in making that assumption that you are committing the fallacy.

Another poster has repeatedly asked you to post an explanation, in your own words, of what the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is. I second that request.
 
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Dave,
- I think that I finally see your point; fortunately, I also think that I see my answers.
- For one thing, if I'm misrepresenting H, it's because I am not set apart. In other words, I'm committing the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy... That's still the only issue.
- But more importantly, OOFLam (H) is actually noncommittal re set apart, and by inserting my current existence as E in the formula, the formula assumes that I am set apart. It is saying that if I am, in fact, set apart, this is the posterior probability of H.
- Let's see where that takes us.
Nope. P(E|H) is the probability of your existence if you're not set apart.

Also the sharpshooter is only one of many fatal issues with your argument.

This signature is intended to irradiate people.
 
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