Proof of Immortality, VI

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SOdhner,
- So far, everyone else seems to accept that a perfect copy would not bring me back to life, nor have me seeing out of two sets of eyes. But, they also claim that there would be no difference between my self and its copy. To me, that doesn't make sense.

You don't think two identical things can exist? If there are two things, there has to be a difference between them?

Dave,
- So far, I still assume that two identical things can exist -- but these days, I'm not even sure of that...
- Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy. I can't understand why you don't see my point -- and consequently, I'm ready to move on.
 
We do see your point, Jabba. The problem is it is based on a fundamental misconception as to what consciousness actually is. As long as you continue to make that mistake no progress is possible, so we cannot move on.
 
Dave,
- So far, I still assume that two identical things can exist -- but these days, I'm not even sure of that...
- Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy. I can't understand why you don't see my point -- and consequently, I'm ready to move on.

What is that difference? Unless you can articulate it, the assumption will be that there isn't one.

Choosing to move on means you concede the point.
 
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- Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy. I can't understand why you don't see my point

Then explain your point: what is the difference?



ETA: Not seeing through both set of eyes isn't a difference. Not bringing you back to life is not a difference.
 
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We do see your point, Jabba. The problem is it is based on a fundamental misconception as to what consciousness actually is. As long as you continue to make that mistake no progress is possible, so we cannot move on.

You misspelled "willful and dishonest misrepresentation"
 
Dave,

- So far, I still assume that two identical things can exist -- but these days, I'm not even sure of that...

- Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy. I can't understand why you don't see my point -- and consequently, I'm ready to move on.


We get your point Jabba, you assume a soul exists, and cannot see beyond that assumption. In the absence of a soul there is absolutely no difference between you and an identical copy of you.

As an analogy, suppose we were to take the computer you are using right now and make a perfect copy of it, from the scratches on the casing to the programs it runs and the files you have saved.

There would be no way for you to tell the two computers apart.

Has the copy computer brought the original computer back to life? Is there one computer seeing out of two webcams?

No, of course not, there are just two computers that are identical.

In this analogy for the materialist model you are a computer.
You have no soul.
You have nothing that can be "brought back to life".
Each instance of you looks out through its own set of eyes.

If you cannot understand how this works then you should give up the debate right now. You should give up because if you can't understand the opposing argument you cannot hope to defeat it.
 
Dave,
- So far, I still assume that two identical things can exist -- but these days, I'm not even sure of that...
- Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy.

You just contradicted yourself. If two identical things can exist, then two identical selves should be able to exist. There would be no difference between them even though there are two of them. That's what it means for two identical things to exist.
 
Dave,
- So far, I still assume that two identical things can exist -- but these days, I'm not even sure of that...
- Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy. I can't understand why you don't see my point -- and consequently, I'm ready to move on.

More equivocation.

The identical copy would be indistinguishable from the 'you' that existed before, and would experience the same way that you would have done, because it would be identical. In that sense, 'you' would have been brought back to life. And, if you were still alive, you could say the same 'you' was looking out of two pairs of eyes. However, there would be no connection between the two 'you's, they would not be connected by one soul or whatever term you've chosen to use this week to avoid saying 'soul'. Each copy would be seeing only what the pair of eyes belonging to the body containing the brain which was producing the 'you' could see.
 
So far, I still assume that two identical things can exist -- but these days, I'm not even sure of that...

Quit trying to befuddle your way out of a legitimate rebuttal.

Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy.

Asked and answered. Those statement are meaningless twaddle. Life under materialism is just another emergent property, one that encompasses consciousness in more complex organisms. Duplicating the organism duplicates its property of being alive the same way two cars get to exhibit the property of going 60 mph. Life in this respect is not individualized, but insofar as the metaphysical aspects of life -- memory, etc. -- reside in the organism, they would also be duplicated exactly.

"Looking out," such as through a set of eyes, is obviously the concept of incarnation rendered in language apparently designed to obscure it. Incarnation is not the model for materialism. Nothing -- not the "self" or anything else -- enters into or binds to the organism to enliven it. On the contrary, in materialism all we can attribute to life and consciousness "comes out" of the organism as manifest properties.

You're simply not open-minded enough in this debate to conceive of anything other than your notion of incarnation. The 14-year-old you can be forgiven for that. The 70-year-old you, who chides his critics for their supposed deficiency and rigidity of thought, cannot. Of course you think you can prove this mathematically. In the worldview from which your argument has arisen, nothing else exists even conceptually, so it "must" be mathematically provable.

I can't understand why you don't see my point

It's not for lack of explanation. Your point is based on blatantly begging the question that even under materialism there would be a soul that could "bring a body back to life" or "look out through a set of eyes." Your critics are rightly not letting you beg that question while discussing P(E|H). You need to expand your understanding, as the problem is with your limited understanding and not with the point being made.

and consequently, I'm ready to move on.

"Move on?" You can't answer your critics' rebuttal. That means your argument fails, not that you get to skip over the problematic parts of your argument and advance to the part where you win your medal. "No, Your Honor, I can't explain how my client's fingerprints and DNA are all over the murder weapon. But let's move on."

You really don't get how a debate works, do you? You have effectively conceded yet another major premise of your argument, yet you stumble blindly ahead as if this had no consequence.
 
SOdhner,
- So far, everyone else seems to accept that a perfect copy would not bring me back to life, nor have me seeing out of two sets of eyes. But, they also claim that there would be no difference between my self and its copy. To me, that doesn't make sense.

1. Part of the debate is what is meant by "me" when you talk about "bring me back to life". If you have a soul (or whatever you want to call it) then that's easy, "me" is the soul. But since we're trying to refer to materialism, that's not going to work. From the materialist point of view there's no soul, so the 'me' should be defined in that way. This isn't a new problem, most of the people here have had essentially this debate at one point or another (usually involving Star Trek teleporters). Honestly, the answer isn't very satisfying and I don't think you would like it. I know I don't. If we define that "me" the way that many of us do, then people "die" every time they get a good night's sleep. Like I said, I know that's not a satisfying answer but sometimes the truth isn't satisfying. The fact remains that until you can prove the existence of a soul this is the model you have to work with.

2. Seeing out of two sets of eyes would require some sort of instantaneous high bandwidth connection between the two copies, something that couldn't be explained by materialism. So again, you can't claim that until you can prove the existence of a soul (and then also prove that souls work that way).

3. Let's say the two of us go on some whirlwind adventure around the world, and we have an awesome time. At the end of the trip, I buy you a souvenir from the gift shop at a little bar in Hawaii. This souvenir has sentimental value to you. Now someone else from this conversation - zooterkin maybe - buys one of those souvenirs on eBay. He didn't even go to the gift shop in person. I think we can agree that while the two are identical, only yours holds sentimental value for you. But what if you bump into him and you both drop your identical Hula Girl statues? They get mixed up, and now you can't tell which is which! Does only one of them have sentimental value? Do you now value both equally? If you take home the one that zooterkin bought on eBay does your sentimental value transfer over?

This is the problem you're having with the "two identical Jabbas" problem. They can be identical and both can have their own consciousness, and each would feel like the real one to themselves. You're concerned because you feel like one is the original and has some intangible quality that the copy wouldn't, something that would make them different.

But it's exactly like the sentimental value you might place in that hypothetical Hula Girl. It's not a tangible thing.
 
...
- Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy. I can't understand why you don't see my point -- and consequently, I'm ready to move on.

You do accept that there can be more than one consciousness out there right?

Like your and my conciousness are 2 separate distinct processes. You agree right?

Good now all you have to do is modify the ATTRIBUTES of each conciousness until they are the same.

Then you would have 2 IDENTICAL IN ATTRIBUTES but DISTINCE AND SEPARATE conciousnesses.

I'll assume you agree with this.
 
Jabba you will ignore this. You will ignore because you don't have an answer for it that doesn't break your fantasy world.

So far, I still assume that two identical things can exist -- but these days, I'm not even sure of that.

What are you possibly having trouble with in this concept?

Here, if my identical copy didn't either bring me back to life, or have me seeing out two sets of eyes, there would be an obvious, and critical, difference between me and my copy. I can't understand why you don't see my point -- and consequently, I'm ready to move on.

We see your point we just don't agree with it. The "me" and "two sets of eyes" are not valid conceptual distinctions.
 
1. Part of the debate is what is meant by "me" when you talk about "bring me back to life". If you have a soul (or whatever you want to call it) then that's easy, "me" is the soul. But since we're trying to refer to materialism, that's not going to work. From the materialist point of view there's no soul, so the 'me' should be defined in that way. This isn't a new problem, most of the people here have had essentially this debate at one point or another (usually involving Star Trek teleporters). Honestly, the answer isn't very satisfying and I don't think you would like it. I know I don't. If we define that "me" the way that many of us do, then people "die" every time they get a good night's sleep. Like I said, I know that's not a satisfying answer but sometimes the truth isn't satisfying. The fact remains that until you can prove the existence of a soul this is the model you have to work with...
SOdhner,
- It's interesting how difficult it is to make sure that we're all talking about the same thing here.
- I think that you do experience what I'm calling a "sense of self" -- and, that you do know/understand which shared experience it is that I'm referring to. You and I just disagree about its nature.
- Do you accept that conclusion?
 
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- It's interesting how difficult it is to make sure that we're all talking about the same thing here.

Oh, we're all talking about the same thing. You just don't like where it leads.

- I think that you experience what I'm calling a "sense of self" -- and, that you do know/understand which experience it is that I'm referring to. You and I just disagree about its nature.

No, the nature you're talking about is incompatible with the system you're trying to argue from i.e. materialism. You are contradicting yourself with the very basics of your argument.
 
It's interesting how difficult it is to make sure that we're all talking about the same thing here.

Not really. You are being intentionally obtuse because "Awesome Debate Skills" is a trait you checked on your character sheet for this gaming session and the only way you can maintain that facade is to pretend we "just aren't getting."

I think that you do experience what I'm calling a "sense of self" -- and, that you do know/understand which shared experience it is that I'm referring to. You and I just disagree about its nature.

You think "Sense of self" requires a giant invisible sky wizard to put Woo-woo souls into people that exist after we die so you can go hang with Jesus in heaven or get reincarnated into a butterfly or whatever.

We think "Sense of self" is a perfectly understandable, every changing but continuous result of a functioning perfectly natural and materialistic nervous system.

You've spent the last 5 years pretending you don't get that and arguing everything but anything approaching evidence or even an internally consistent argument for your opinion.
 
- It's interesting how difficult it is to make sure that we're all talking about the same thing here.
It's neither interesting, nor difficult, nor the same thing.
- I think that you do experience what I'm calling a "sense of self" -- and, that you do know/understand which shared experience it is that I'm referring to. You and I just disagree about its nature.
- Do you accept that conclusion?
I don't accept the conclusion, because I know you are equivocating between the experience and its nature. Your conclusion depends on replacing the experience with your idea of its nature, as soon as someone agrees about the experience. Which is to say, your argument is circular.
 
It's interesting how difficult it is to make sure that we're all talking about the same thing here.

There's no difficulty. Which is to say, it's not a matter of two reasonable parties groping for common ground. It's a matter of you constantly trying to foist your predetermined beliefs as if they were facts that others had to explain, and a subsequent matter of your critics correctly not letting you do it. You seem to think your critics can't see the rather obvious game you're trying to play here.

I think that you do experience what I'm calling a "sense of self"

Yes, self-aware beings are self-aware. But you insist on ambiguous language rather than precise language, so that you can equivocate agreement to one facet as agreement to all the nonsense you read into it. Not gonna happen, so stop insulting everyone by trying. Every time you try this, all your critics catch you, every time. It's high time you gave your critics their due for having successfully refuted your proof -- several times over.

and, that you do know/understand which shared experience it is that I'm referring to.

Yes, self-aware beings are identically self-aware, regardless of what cause they attribute that self-awareness to.

In a statistical inference, E is the same data for hypothesis H as it is for ~H, or for some other hypothesis K. E must be formulated as an observation, such that it doesn't involve disagreements about its nature or cause. You are unable to do this. You have formulated E so that it contains conjectural causes from ~H, and it is those causes that you want H to explain, not the observation. You simply don't know how to correctly formulate a statistical inference and are not interested in learning.

You and I just disagree about its nature.

Equivocation. "Nature" can mean either the holistic view of something's observable behavior, or it can mean its underlying cause. Since those nuances live on both sides of the gap in this argument, you don't get to insist on it to fuel your equivocal strategy. We stipulate that each person subjectively experiences self-awareness in substantially the same way as everyone else. That aspect of its "nature" is agreeable.

We vehemently disagree that the underlying cause of it under materialism is anything like the soul you're frantically trying to cram into the materialist model. In materialism, self-awareness is an emergent property of a functioning brain. You've already conceded that your version of materialism in your P(E|H) estimate is not actually materialism. Why you're still flogging a conceded argument and groveling for agreement after proudly admitting to a straw-man approach is beyond anyone's comprehension.

Do you accept that conclusion?

Not if that conclusion means accepting your ongoing attempts to make self-awareness equivalent to a soul. Which it almost certainly does, so no I don't accept your conclusion. Please stop asking people to agree to your conclusion as a prerequisite for having the debate.

Your inability to separate the different elements of a statistical inference is one of several individually fatal flaws I've identified in your argument, and which you clearly have no interest in thinking about. Explain again why anyone should take you seriously.
 
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