The Trials of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito: Part 25

[Stacyhs]

The last person to be executed in Ireland was 1954.

The Irish made clear their intention to abolish by law the death penalty as far back as 1964. One of the main reasons cited was Ireland was fed up of its executed political prisoners turned into hero-worshipped martyrs.

Various bills came up for discussion to abolish it by law in 1980.

William Pringle was convicted with two others of the aggravated murder to two gardai (police officers) during a botched INLA (terrorist organisation-sponsored) robbery. (=Note the 'political' element.)

The death penalty was abolished in law 1981.

On paper, as I said, in theory - note the word 'in theory' - for things such as treason, military disobedience and killing gardai were listed as exceptions.

A government declaration that commuted all death penalties for these remaining categories to 40 years without parole was made. However, there is some question over the legality of this, as Pringle and his fellow death-sentencers never had their sentences commuted by the Supreme Court.

Pringle got his conviction overturned - as is so common - on a technicality of some sort, claiming he had been rolling drunk at the time, so could not have done it (or something) in 1995.As Ireland did not even have a trained executioner, you can see from this, that at no point was Pringle ever in any remotest danger of being executed by the State.

Compare and contract to 'Sunny Cloudy' Jacobs in the USA where, if you get a death sentence you can expect to be topped, albeit with fifteen attempts at appeal (which includes confessing your crime and showing remorse for it) and a long delay in some States.


Well spotted.

If the Irish government had no intention whatsoever of executing Pringle, then why did the court even bother to sentence him to death? Why not just sentence him to the maximum prison time in the first place?

That he was never in any danger of execution is your opinion, not a fact. Stop conflating the two.

Pringle's conviction was not quashed on a technicality:

His June 8, 1981, hanging was commuted by the Irish president and the conviction was quashed after evidence emerged showing his 'confession' was written before he'd even been interviewed about the killings.

(Daily Mail, 22 Nov 2011)

Acting pro se Pringle filed a lawsuit in 1992 for a discovery order for access to the police files in his case. Several years later he was provided with the files and Pringle discovered his alleged confession had actually been written down in a police officer's notebook prior to Pringle's interrogation about the killings. Based on that new evidence Pringle's conviction was quashed and a retrial was ordered. The prosecution declined to retry him, and he was released in 1995.

http://justicedenied.org/db/Pringle--Peter-.html

How odd for his "confession" to be written down by the police before he was even interrogated by them. Maybe they were just psychic?

 

[Numbers]

The Italian Cort d'Assise (first-instance court for major crimes) and Cort d'Assise d'Appello (appeals court for major crimes) do not have juries, and there are no juries in the Italian court system. The Massei court was a Cort d'Assise and the Hellmann and Nencini courts were each a Cort d'Assise d'Appello.

The tribunal (panel of judges) on a Cort d'Assise or Cort d'Assise d'Appello consists of two (2) professional judges (that is, they are public officials who are members of the judiciary) and six (6) "popular" (meaning, of the people) or"lay" judges (who are Italian citizens, and who, unlike US jurors, are not subject to a pretrial examination for opinions or objectivity on the case). The popular (lay) judges convene with the professonal judges in passing judgment, thus, contrary to the verdict of a US jury, they do not come to a verdict independently.

Upthread the inaccurate statement was made that there are 15 jurors in an Italian trial. This is false on three counts: 1) there is no jury (in the US or UK sense) in any Italian trial; 2) the lay (popular) judges are not jurors, and 3) there are only 6 lay (popular) judges in a Cort d'Assise or a Cort d'Assise d'Appello.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Code_of_Criminal_Procedure#Judges_of_the_trial
Section: Judges of the trial

 

[Stacyhs]

The Italian Cort d'Assise (first-instance court for major crimes) and Cort d'Assise d'Appello (appeals court for major crimes) do not have juries, and there are no juries in the Italian court system. The Massei court was a Cort d'Assise and the Hellmann and Nencini courts were each a Cort d'Assise d'Appello.

The tribunal (panel of judges) on a Cort d'Assise or Cort d'Assise d'Appello consists of two (2) professional judges (that is, they are public officials who are members of the judiciary) and six (6) "popular" (meaning, of the people) or"lay" judges (who are Italian citizens, and who, unlike US jurors, are not subject to a pretrial examination for opinions or objectivity on the case). The popular (lay) judges convene with the professonal judges in passing judgment, thus, contrary to the verdict of a US jury, they do not come to a verdict independently.

Upthread the inaccurate statement was made that there are 15 jurors in an Italian trial. This is false on three counts: 1) there is no jury (in the US or UK sense) in any Italian trial; 2) the lay (popular) judges are not jurors, and 3) there are only 6 lay (popular) judges in a Cort d'Assise or a Cort d'Assise d'Appello.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Code_of_Criminal_Procedure#Judges_of_the_trial
Section: Judges of the trial

What I find astounding and disturbing is that there is no pre-trial questioning of the lay judges about existing opinions/bias of the case. Couple that with no rules against reading about or discussing the case with anyone during the trial and you have a situation ripe for misinformation, confusion, and prejudice. Nencini said some of the lay judges in this case questioned the judges about things they had heard outside the courtroom:

And then, I must be honest, the overexposure of this case, which has not benefited. The jurors returned home and were bombarded with information. And when we saw them, they wanted to know, "President, but in TV they said in another way. How did it really?"

http://www.ilmessaggero.it/UMBRIA/a...cesso_intervista_giudice/notizie/491474.shtml

 

[Stacyhs]

Vixen, since you have had ample time to provide the quote and citation that "Peter Gill says secondary transfer can only take place within 24 hours" and have failed to do so, we can only conclude that he never said it at all.

But we kind of knew that anyway.

 

[Mike1711]

I take it that you mean Cassation, because in Italy there is something denoted an "appeal court" which is (in their system) the middle level of a three-level "trial".

Hellmann's and Nencini's were "appeal" courts in their sense. Cassation can be appealed to, but (is it not true that) it is not an appeal's court in the sense used in other jurisdictions?

You may be correct bill. In SA there are tiers of appeal court. The first there are three judges, the second there are five judges and the final is the Constitional Court having 11 judges. Each appeal, if granted, works the way up the system.

I guess a rose by any name...

 

[Bill Williams]

Vixen, since you have had ample time to provide the quote and citation that "Peter Gill says secondary transfer can only take place within 24 hours" and have failed to do so, we can only conclude that he never said it at all.

But we kind of knew that anyway.

Lince and I are in here somewhere.

I am waiting for the "elegant proof" of Knox wiping the victim's blood from her hands. I can take it, then, that since this proof has not been forthcoming that it, similarly, is bollocks.

But we kind of knew that anyway.

I am also waiting for one, at least one, forensic-DNA expert who'll come out of the weeds - and be cited by Vixen - in support of Stefanoni's original crime-scene forensics. I can take it, then, that since this has not been forthcoming that it, similarly, is bollocks.

But we kind of knew that anyway.

 

[Bill Williams]

You may be correct bill. In SA there are tiers of appeal court. The first there are three judges, the second there are five judges and the final is the Constitional Court having 11 judges. Each appeal, if granted, works the way up the system.

I guess a rose by any name...

My apologies. I was trying to get in touch with my inner-Grinder....

 

[Numbers]

I take it that you mean Cassation, because in Italy there is something denoted an "appeal court" which is (in their system) the middle level of a three-level "trial".

Hellmann's and Nencini's were "appeal" courts in their sense. Cassation can be appealed to, but (is it not true that) it is not an appeal's court in the sense used in other jurisdictions?

Thanks for providing a rather confusing sentence to comment on.

The Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione, CSC) is the highest-level appeals court in Italy and consists of about 400 judges, who are divided into civil and criminal divisions of about 200 judges each. Each division is divided into a number of sections, each of which specializes in one branch of civil or criminal law. A CSC tribunal consists of a panel of five judges from a section. There are "United Sections" aka "Joint Chambers" (Sezioni Unite) panels of nine judges for the really tough cases, such as those that may involve a judicial conflict; these apparently are rarely used.

The CSC does not hear new evidence, but contrary to the statements in some posts from PIP or PGP, it is by law (CPP Article 606.1E*) authorized to review the evidence and interpretation of evidence as documented in the records of the appealed judgment when the appellant or counter-appellant seeks such review on the basis that the grounds of the judgment are lacking (absent or missing), contradictory, or manifestly illogical (lacking in validity).

The CSC also is authorized to review the interpretation and application of Italian law in the appealed judgment, if that is a grounds for appeal by the appellant or counter-appellant.

*CPP Article 606

Casi di ricorso
1. Il ricorso per cassazione può essere proposto per i seguenti motivi:
e) mancanza**, contraddittorietà o manifesta illogicità della motivazione, quando il vizio risulta dal testo del provvedimento impugnato ovvero da altri atti del processo specificamente indicati nei motivi di gravame.

Google translation:

Cases of appeal
1. The appeal may be lodged for the following reasons:
(E) lack, contradiction or manifest lack of validity {"manifest illogic"} of the statement of reasons where the defect results from the wording of the contested measure or from other procedural acts specifically indicated in the grounds of the charge.

**mancanza = lack, absence, miss [from Collins reverso]
Example sentence:

La mancanza di tale termine massimo comporterebbe un'incertezza giuridica.
The absence of any such maximum period would lead to legal uncertainty.

Source for Italian text of CPP Article 606.1E:
http://www.leggeonline.info/leggi/procedurapenale/art606/casi_di_ricorso/

 

[Bill Williams]

Thanks for providing a rather confusing sentence to comment on.

It seemed straight-forward at the time!

My bad.

 

[Numbers]

It seemed straight-forward at the time!

My bad.

Well, not so much bad, but let us say thought-provoking.

 

[Numbers]

Recently the CSC delivered a final judgment denying Raffaele Sollecito compensation for unfair detention; acquitted persons are generally entitled to such compensation under CPP Article 314. According to a media report quoting his lawyer, Raffaele may bring a case before the ECHR claiming that this denial of compensation was a violation of his Convention rights by Italy.

This post gives some information on ECHR case-law that may apply to that potential case.

A first consideration is that the final judgment denying the compensation may be arbitrary and insufficiently reasoned. Arbitrary reasoning in a judgment which denies someone a deserved benefit or results in a criminal conviction is a violation of Convention Article 6.1 (case law includes, for example, Grădinar v. Moldova 7170/02 and Genov v. Bulgaria 7202/09). Another aspect of this approach is whether the CSC used "judicial facts" that were not supported by real facts, or were based on statements generated in an interrogation of a suspect who was denied a lawyer or subjected to coercion.

But a second approach relies on claiming a violation of Convention Article 6.2, the presumption of innocence. After an acquittal, the former accused continues to be considered innocent of the charges for which he was acquitted, and compensation hearings are tied to the acquittal decision under Italian law and are thus considered an extension of the criminal trial by the ECHR, and the presumption of innocence must therefore be preserved. This approach is outlined in the following excerpt from Allen v. the United Kingdom 25424/09 12/07/2013 (inline references deleted); of particular interest are paragraphs 98 b, c, and d, 100, and 102 - 107. As a further point, the scope of "presumption of innocence" may be of interest to some (paragraphs 93 and 94):

(i) Introduction

92. The object and purpose of the Convention, as an instrument for the protection of human beings, requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. The Court has expressly stated that this applies to the right enshrined in Article 6 § 2.

93. Article 6 § 2 safeguards the right to be “presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”. Viewed as a procedural guarantee in the context of a criminal trial itself, the presumption of innocence imposes requirements in respect of, inter alia, the burden of proof; legal presumptions of fact and law; the privilege against self-incrimination; pre-trial publicity; and premature expressions, by the trial court or by other public officials, of a defendant’s guilt.
94. However, in keeping with the need to ensure that the right guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 is practical and effective, the presumption of innocence also has another aspect. Its general aim, in this second aspect, is to protect individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence charged. In these cases, the presumption of innocence has already operated, through the application at trial of the various requirements inherent in the procedural guarantee it affords, to prevent an unfair criminal conviction being imposed. Without protection to ensure respect for the acquittal or the discontinuation decision in any other proceedings, the fair-trial guarantees of Article 6 § 2 could risk becoming theoretical and illusory. What is also at stake once the criminal proceedings have concluded is the person’s reputation and the way in which that person is perceived by the public. To a certain extent, the protection afforded under Article 6 § 2 in this respect may overlap with the protection afforded by Article 8.
(ii) Applicability of Article 6 § 2

95. As expressly stated in the terms of the Article itself, Article 6 § 2 applies where a person is “charged with a criminal offence”. The Court has repeatedly emphasised that this is an autonomous concept and must be interpreted according to the three criteria set out in its case-law, namely the classification of the proceedings in domestic law, their essential nature, and the degree of severity of the potential penalty. To evaluate any complaint under Article 6 § 2 arising in the context of judicial proceedings, it is first of all necessary to ascertain whether the impugned proceedings involved the determination of a criminal charge, within the meaning of the Court’s case-law.

96. However, in cases involving the second aspect of the protection afforded by Article 6 § 2, which arises when criminal proceedings have terminated, it is clear that the application of the foregoing test is inappropriate. In these cases, the criminal proceedings have, by necessity, been concluded and unless the subsequent judicial proceedings give rise to a new criminal charge within the Convention’s autonomous meaning, if Article 6 § 2 is engaged, it must be engaged on different grounds.

97. The parties did not suggest that the compensation proceedings brought by the applicant gave rise to a “criminal charge”, within the autonomous meaning of the Convention. It is therefore the second aspect of the protection afforded by Article 6 § 2 which is in play in the present case; and the Court will accordingly examine how it has approached the applicability of Article 6 § 2 to subsequent judicial proceedings in such cases.

98. The Court has in the past been called upon to consider the application of Article 6 § 2 to judicial decisions taken following the conclusion of criminal proceedings, either by way of discontinuation or after an acquittal, in proceedings concerning, inter alia:(a) a former accused’s obligation to bear court costs and prosecution costs;
(b) a former accused’s request for compensation for detention on remand or other inconvenience caused by the criminal proceedings; (c) a former accused’s request for defence costs; (d) a former accused’s request for compensation for damage caused by an unlawful or wrongful investigation or prosecution;(e) the imposition of civil liability to pay compensation to the victim;
(f) the refusal of civil claims lodged by the applicant against insurers;
(g) the maintenance in force of a child care order, after the prosecution decided not to bring charges against the parent for child abuse;
(h) disciplinary or dismissal issues; and
(i) the revocation of the applicant’s right to social housing.

99. In a number of these cases, the Court found in favour of the applicability of Article 6 § 2. Explaining why Article 6 § 2 applied despite the absence of a pending criminal charge in a trio of early cases, the Court said that the rulings on the applicants’ entitlement to costs and compensation were “consequences and necessary concomitants of”, or “a direct sequel to”, the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. Similarly, in a later series of cases, the Court concluded that Austrian legislation and practice “link[ed] the two questions – the criminal responsibility of the accused and the right to compensation – to such a degree that the decision on the latter issue could be regarded as a consequence and, to some extent, the concomitant of the decision on the former”, resulting in the applicability of Article 6 § 2 to the compensation proceedings.

100. Developing this idea in subsequent cases, the Court found that the applicants’ compensation claim “not only followed the criminal proceedings in time, but was also tied to those proceedings in legislation and practice, with regard to both jurisdiction and subject matter”, creating a link between the two sets of proceedings with the result that Article 6 § 2 was applicable.
101. In cases concerning the victim’s right to compensation from the applicant, who had previously been found not guilty of the criminal charge, the Court held that where the decision on civil compensation contained a statement imputing criminal liability, this would create a link between the two proceedings such as to engage Article 6 § 2 in respect of the judgment on the compensation claim.

102. More recently, the Court has expressed the view that following discontinuation of criminal proceedings the presumption of innocence requires that the lack of a person’s criminal conviction be preserved in any other proceedings of whatever nature. It has also indicated that the operative part of an acquittal judgment must be respected by any authority referring directly or indirectly to the criminal responsibility of the interested party.
(iii) Conclusion

103. ... the Court would formulate the principle of the presumption of innocence in this context as follows: the presumption of innocence means that where there has been a criminal charge and criminal proceedings have ended in an acquittal, the person who was the subject of the criminal proceedings is innocent in the eyes of the law and must be treated in a manner consistent with that innocence. To this extent, therefore, the presumption of innocence will remain after the conclusion of criminal proceedings in order to ensure that, as regards any charge which was not proven, the innocence of the person in question is respected. This overriding concern lies at the root of the Court’s approach to the applicability of Article 6 § 2 in these cases. 104. Whenever the question of the applicability of Article 6 § 2 arises in the context of subsequent proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate the existence of a link, as referred to above, between the concluded criminal proceedings and the subsequent proceedings. Such a link is likely to be present, for example, where the subsequent proceedings require examination of the outcome of the prior criminal proceedings and, in particular, where they oblige the court to analyse the criminal judgment, to engage in a review or evaluation of the evidence in the criminal file, to assess the applicant’s participation in some or all of the events leading to the criminal charge, or to comment on the subsisting indications of the applicant’s possible guilt.….
(b) Application of the general principles to the facts of the case
….
107. The Court’s task at this stage of its analysis is therefore to examine whether there was a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and the compensation proceedings, having regard to the relevant considerations set out above (see paragraph 104 above). ….

 

[Bill Williams]

Correct me if I am wrong.....

This whole broo-ha-ha about the legal significance of an acquittal based on 530.1 vs. 530.2 began when PIP assumed (back in March 2015) that it had to have been a 530.1 acquittal because M/B had said preliminarily that "they did not commit the act".

Then the motivations report came out in Sept 2015, and it specifically said it had been a 530.2 acquittal.

Among others, Grinder wanted to know why PIP had jumped all over 530.1 5 months' previous and seemed to be "switching tunes" to the equivalency between 530.1 and 530.2 when they'd been so glad it had seemed to have been 530.1 initially.

(How am I doing so far? Does anyone really care at this point?)

I've been passed a weblink to brocardi.it, which gives a summary (a slight modification of the machine language from Italian to English is my own) of what 530.2 represents:

2. The judge also gives a judgment of acquittal ... when (evidence) is absent, insufficient or contradictory ... that the fact that the defendant has committed him is that the fact constitutes a criminal offense or that the offense was committed by an imputable person​

But look what the end-note of the bricardi.it page says:

The inability to reach a finding of guilt leads to the pronouncement of a formula that corresponds to a positive finding of innocence: this follows from the requirement to announce the cause of absolution in the device as foreseen in paragraph 1​

So it seems that the free and liberal use of the word "innocent" in relation to someone acquitted by virtue of Section 530.2 has some legal basis in Italy, as per at least one on-line legal opinion..... why? Because in Italy they simply do not just announce "not guilty", as we do in N.A., they actually announce "a cause of the absolution" - such cause a part of the verdict, not just in the reason for that verdict, which allows a shift from a negative description (we know what they are not), to a positive one (we now know what they are).

...... for what that is worth.

 

[Numbers]

Correct me if I am wrong.....

This whole broo-ha-ha about the legal significance of an acquittal based on 530.1 vs. 530.2 began when PIP assumed (back in March 2015) that it had to have been a 530.1 acquittal because M/B had said preliminarily that "they did not commit the act".

Then the motivations report came out in Sept 2015, and it specifically said it had been a 530.2 acquittal.

Among others, Grinder wanted to know why PIP had jumped all over 530.1 5 months' previous and seemed to be "switching tunes" to the equivalency between 530.1 and 530.2 when they'd been so glad it had seemed to have been 530.1 initially.

(How am I doing so far? Does anyone really care at this point?)

I've been passed a weblink to brocardi.it, which gives a summary (a slight modification of the machine language from Italian to English is my own) of what 530.2 represents:

​

But look what the end-note of the bricardi.it page says:

​

So it seems that the free and liberal use of the word "innocent" in relation to someone acquitted by virtue of Section 530.2 has some legal basis in Italy, as per at least one on-line legal opinion..... why? Because in Italy they simply do not just announce "not guilty", as we do in N.A., they actually announce "a cause of the absolution" - such cause a part of the verdict, not just in the reason for that verdict, which allows a shift from a negative description (we know what they are not), to a positive one (we now know what they are).

...... for what that is worth.

This is mostly correct, but I will produce a quibble.

The acquittal specification is not always that "the accused did not commit the act". It can be "the act did not occur" or the "accused committed the act but cannot be held responsible under law (due to mental incapacity)" or "the accused committed the act but it was done as part of an official duty" or "the act is no longer an offense under law" {I am approximating the wording on the last three.}

Every formerly accused who receives an acquittal or other dismissal maintains the presumption of innocence, in accordance with Italian law (Italian Constitution) and ECHR case-law (the European Convention on Human Rights). Some acquittals under CPP Article 530.1 and 530.2 are given even though the accused has committed the act - but there is some reason for the acquittal.

The wording under either CPP Article 530.1 or 530.2, or CPP Article 605 (given in a court of appeal verdict) specifying that "Perché l'imputato non lo ha commesso" or "the accused did not commit the act" means precisely that - that the person did not commit the action of the crime, and thus is innocent in that sense.

In contrast, for example, a police officer who killed an armed person who was trying to kill that police officer or some other person could be acquitted under the same CPP Articles 530.1, 530.2, or 605, but the specification would be different: "Perché il fatto non costituisce reato" or "The act did not constitute a crime (because the accused had a legal justification to commit the act)".

See, for more accurate wording, at least in the Italian*:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Code_of_Criminal_Procedure
Verdicts; Not Guilty (non colpevole); Acquittal (assoluzione)

*The English translations in the article do not precisely match the Italian in some instances.

 

[Bill Williams]

This is mostly correct, but I will produce a quibble.

The acquittal specification is not always that "the accused did not commit the act". It can be "the act did not occur" or the "accused committed the act but cannot be held responsible under law (due to mental incapacity)" or "the accused committed the act but it was done as part of an official duty" or "the act is no longer an offense under law" {I am approximating the wording on the last three.}

Not a quibble at all. I'm no expert and can't be bothered going for a citation to back it up....

..... but there's a lingering sense that judges at Cassation have wide latitude to say what they want in relation for the "specification" in relation to the use of Section 530 as the basis of an acquittal.

Meaning: they are not limited by the legislation with regard to the specification - for instance, Section 530.2 makes explicit mention of that section referring to 1) lack of evidence, 2) insufficient, and/or 3) contradictory evidence.....

But it does not look like they are bound by choosing one or more of those specifications. Substituting "did not commit the act" doesn't seem to raise many eyebrows, except for maybe Machiavelli's and Vixen's here......

 

[Numbers]

Not a quibble at all. I'm no expert and can't be bothered going for a citation to back it up....

..... but there's a lingering sense that judges at Cassation have wide latitude to say what they want in relation for the "specification" in relation to the use of Section 530 as the basis of an acquittal.

Meaning: they are not limited by the legislation with regard to the specification - for instance, Section 530.2 makes explicit mention of that section referring to 1) lack of evidence, 2) insufficient, and/or 3) contradictory evidence.....

But it does not look like they are bound by choosing one or more of those specifications. Substituting "did not commit the act" doesn't seem to raise many eyebrows, except for maybe Machiavelli's and Vixen's here......

Now I believe you are getting this wrong. The CSC panels (Chieffi, Marasca) are strictly following some of the laws. In particular, the Marasca CSC panel strictly followed CPP Article 530.1 in delivering the verdict under CPP Article 530.2. Article CPP 530.1 absolutely requires that a specification of the reason for the acquittal - which must relate to the alleged act of the crime and/or the accused and/or the law - must be included in the "dispositivo" (the disposition, or short-form [and operative] verdict, which is issued at the conclusion of the deliberation after the trial and is placed at the end of the Motivation Report). Hellmann strictly followed CPP Article 530.1 in delivering the verdict under CPP Article 605.

Part of the confusion about the law is the assumption that a court citing one paragraph of one article means only that individual paragraph of the article of law applies. Read CPP Article 530 as a whole (including where the Italian word for "also" ("anche") appears and it is clear that CPP Article 530.2, on the basis of that word, refers back to CPP Article 530.1. CPP Article 530.3 refers back explicitly to CPP Article 530.1 as "paragraph 1" ("comma 1). The point is, every acquittal in Italy must be accompanied, by law, with a specification which is one that is called out in CPP Article 530, and those specifications DO NOT include, for example, "the accused is acquitted because the evidence was absent, insufficient or contradictory". That explanation is left to the text of the motivation report. The short-form verdict or disposition (dispositivo, PQM) in an acquittal must always include one of the specific reasons for the acquittal as listed in CPP Article 530, even if the acquittal is granted under CPP Article 605.

The CSC judges do not get to pick any words from CPP Article 530 that they wish to include in the short-form verdict (dispositivo), only one or more of the causes relating to the alleged act of the crime and/or the accused and/or the law. The state of the evidence is discussed in the body of the Motivation Report and is not summarized in the short-form verdict.

Here is the full text in Italian of CPP Article 530:

Art. 530 - Sentenza di assoluzione

1. Se il fatto non sussiste, se l'imputato non lo ha commesso, se il fatto non costituisce reato o non è previsto dalla legge come reato ovvero se il reato è stato commesso da persona non imputabile o non punibile per un'altra ragione, il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione indicandone la causa nel dispositivo.

2. Il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione anche quando manca, è insufficiente o è contraddittoria la prova che il fatto sussiste, che l'imputato lo ha commesso, che il fatto costituisce reato o che il reato è stato commesso da persona imputabile.

3. Se vi è la prova che il fatto è stato commesso in presenza di una causa di giustificazione o di una causa personale di non punibilità ovvero vi è dubbio sull'esistenza delle stesse, il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione a norma del comma 1.

4. Con la sentenza di assoluzione il giudice applica, nei casi previsti dalla legge, le misure di sicurezza.

Google translation, with my assistance:

Art. 530 - Judgment of acquittal

1. If the offense does not exist, if the accused (the defendant) did not commit it, if the fact does not constitute a crime or is not provided by law as a criminal offense or if the offense is not attributable to or not punishable for another reason, the court will issue an acquittal ruling indicating the cause in the short-form verdict.

2. The judge also delivers a verdict of acquittal if the evidence {= la prova} is absent, insufficient or contradictory that the act (of the crime) occurred, that the accused has committed the act, that the fact constitutes a crime or that the offense was committed by a chargeable {responsible} person.

3. If there is evidence that the fact has been committed in the presence of a cause of justification or of a personal justification for non-punishment or there is doubt as to the existence of the same, the court shall issue a judgment of acquittal pursuant to paragraph 1.

4. With the judgment of acquittal, the judge applies, in the cases provided for by law, security measures.

 

[Bill Williams]

Now I believe you are getting this wrong. The CSC panels (Chieffi, Marasca) are strictly following some of the laws. In particular, the Marasca CSC panel strictly followed CPP Article 530.1 in delivering the verdict under CPP Article 530.2. Hellmann strictly followed CPP Article 530.1 in delivering the verdict under CPP Article 605.

Part of the confusion about the law is the assumption that a court citing one paragraph of one article means only that individual paragraph of the article of law applies. Read CPP Article 530 as a whole (including where the Italian word for "also" ("anche") appears and it is clear that CPP Article 530.2, on the basis of that word, refers back to CPP Article 530.1. CPP Article 530.3 refers back explicitly to CPP Article 530.1 as "paragraph 1" ("comma 1). The point is, every acquittal in Italy must be accompanied, by law, with a specification which is one that is called out in CPP Article 530, and those specifications DO NOT include, for example, "the accused is acquitted because the evidence was absent, insufficient or contradictory". That explanation is left to the text of the motivation report. The short-form verdict or disposition (dispositivo, PQM) in an acquittal must always include one of the specific reasons for the acquittal as listed in CPP Article 530, even if the acquittal is granted under CPP Article 605.

Here is the full text in Italian of CPP Article 530:

Art. 530 - Sentenza di assoluzione

1. Se il fatto non sussiste, se l'imputato non lo ha commesso, se il fatto non costituisce reato o non è previsto dalla legge come reato ovvero se il reato è stato commesso da persona non imputabile o non punibile per un'altra ragione, il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione indicandone la causa nel dispositivo.

2. Il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione anche quando manca, è insufficiente o è contraddittoria la prova che il fatto sussiste, che l'imputato lo ha commesso, che il fatto costituisce reato o che il reato è stato commesso da persona imputabile.

3. Se vi è la prova che il fatto è stato commesso in presenza di una causa di giustificazione o di una causa personale di non punibilità ovvero vi è dubbio sull'esistenza delle stesse, il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione a norma del comma 1.

4. Con la sentenza di assoluzione il giudice applica, nei casi previsti dalla legge, le misure di sicurezza.

Google translation, with my assistance:

Art. 530 - Judgment of acquittal

1. If the offense does not exist, if the accused (the defendant) did not commit it, if the fact does not constitute a crime or is not provided by law as a criminal offense or if the offense is not attributable to or not punishable for another reason, the court will issue an acquittal ruling indicating the cause in the short-form verdict.

2. The judge also delivers a verdict of acquittal if the evidence {= la prova} is absent, insufficient or contradictory that the act (of the crime) occurred, that the accused has committed the act, that the fact constitutes a crime or that the offense was committed by a chargeable {responsible} person.

3. If there is evidence that the fact has been committed in the presence of a cause of justification or of a personal justification for non-punishment or there is doubt as to the existence of the same, the court shall issue a judgment of acquittal pursuant to paragraph 1.

4. With the judgment of acquittal, the judge applies, in the cases provided for by law, security measures.

I don't follow any of this, but that's an indictment of me, not you.

 

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I don't follow any of this, but that's an indictment of me, not you.

The purpose of the specification is to inform the public, the victim, and the judiciary of why there has been an acquittal. The specification is part of the "dispositivo" (disposition, short-term verdict) which is issued immediately after the deliberation that concludes the trial. There are differing consequences for differing specifications in terms of civil action and "security measures".

For example, if someone were acquitted because he or she were not responsible (lacked sufficient mental capacity) but had actually committed a criminal act, that person would, as I understand Italian law, remain liable to provide civil damages to the victim, and could be ordered confined in a mental-health treatment facility.

CPP Article 652 lists only three of the specifications for acquittal (including only the criminal act did not occur, the accused did not commit it, or the act was carried out to perform a duty or legal right) as cancelling the civil liability of the accused who has been acquitted.

 

[Stacyhs]

Not a quibble at all. I'm no expert and can't be bothered going for a citation to back it up....

..... but there's a lingering sense that judges at Cassation have wide latitude to say what they want in relation for the "specification" in relation to the use of Section 530 as the basis of an acquittal.

Meaning: they are not limited by the legislation with regard to the specification - for instance, Section 530.2 makes explicit mention of that section referring to 1) lack of evidence, 2) insufficient, and/or 3) contradictory evidence.....

But it does not look like they are bound by choosing one or more of those specifications. Substituting "did not commit the act" doesn't seem to raise many eyebrows, except for maybe Machiavelli's and Vixen's here......

It would be interesting to see if other motivations reports for acquittals found under 530.2 use the " did not commit the act" phrase. It would prove that M/B's use of it was not just a mistake, a typo, etc. etc. etc.

 

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The purpose of the specification is to inform the public, the victim, and the judiciary of why there has been an acquittal. The specification is part of the "dispositivo" (disposition, short-term verdict) which is issued immediately after the deliberation that concludes the trial. There are differing consequences for differing specifications in terms of civil action and "security measures".

For example, if someone were acquitted because he or she were not responsible (lacked sufficient mental capacity) but had actually committed a criminal act, that person would, as I understand Italian law, remain liable to provide civil damages to the victim, and could be ordered confined in a mental-health treatment facility.

CPP Article 652 lists only three of the specifications for acquittal (including only the criminal act did not occur, the accused did not commit it, or the act was carried out to perform a duty or legal right) as cancelling the civil liability of the accused who has been acquitted.

It may help to see CPP Article 652 in its Italian text and in translation; the highlighted words are three of the "official" specifications which are also found among those in CPP Article 530:

Art. 652 - Efficacia della sentenza penale di assoluzione nel giudizio civile o amministrativo di danno

1. La sentenza penale irrevocabile di assoluzione pronunciata in seguito a dibattimento ha efficacia di giudicato, quanto all'accertamento che il fatto non sussiste o che l'imputato non lo ha commesso o che il fatto è stato compiuto nell'adempimento di un dovere o nell'esercizio di una facoltà legittima, nel giudizio civile o amministrativo per le restituzioni e il risarcimento del danno promosso dal danneggiato o nell'interesse dello stesso, sempre che il danneggiato si sia costituito o sia stato posto in condizione di costituirsi parte civile, salvo che il danneggiato dal reato abbia esercitato l'azione in sede civile a norma dell'articolo 75, comma 2.

2. La stessa efficacia ha la sentenza irrevocabile di assoluzione pronunciata a norma dell'articolo 442, se la parte civile ha accettato il rito abbreviato.

Google translation, with my assistance and help from Gialuz et al.:

Article 652 - Effectiveness of the criminal judgment of acquittal in civil or administrative damages

1. The irrevocable (final) sentence of acquittal pronounced after a trial shall have binding effect, with respect to ascertaining that the act (of the crime) does not exist or that the accused (the defendant) did not commit it or that the act was carried out in the performance of a duty or in the exercise of a legal right, in the civil or administrative trial judgment for the restitution and compensation of the damages claimed by the injured party or in the interest of the same, provided that the injured party has joined the (criminal trial) proceedings or has been given the possibility of joining the proceedings, unless the injured party had already brought the action in a civil court under CPP Article 75, paragraph 2.

2. The irrevocable (final) judgment of acquittal pronounced in accordance with Article 442 shall have the same effects, provided that the civil party has accepted the abbreviated (fast-track) trial.

 

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It would be interesting to see if other motivations reports for acquittals found under 530.2 use the " did not commit the act" phrase. It would prove that M/B's use of it was not just a mistake, a typo, etc. etc. etc.

I think one can see this point by looking at the Boninsegna court verdict. This is the translation (from amandaknoxcase.com); note that the paragraph of CPP Article 530 is not cited, but from the text of the motivation report, which reviews the evidence, it must be a 530.2 acquittal:

For These Reasons

Pursuant to article 530 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure,

acquits Knox Amanda Marie for the charge under letter a), because the facts do not exist, and for the charge under letter b), because the facts do not exist and because the act does not constitute an offense, as regards the accusations addressed to Dr. Giuliano Mignini.

The specifications are summarizing statements and relate to the the act of the alleged crime and/or the accused and/or the law. They are detailed in CPP Article 530. Every acquittal must have the reason(s) for the acquittal listed in the short-form verdict, according to CPP Article 530. And these reasons are listed in CPP Article 530.

Here's the Italian text of the PQM:

Visto l' art. 530 cpp,
assolve Knox Amanda Marie dal reato attribuitole al capo a), perché i fatti non sussistono, e dal reato attribuitole al capo b), perché i fatti non sussistono e perché il fatto non costituisce reato, quanto alle accuse rivolte al dr. Giuliano Mignini.