5. For another thing, in many situations, the specific event is only one of NUMEROUS possible results (millions?) -- and for unlikelihood to be of consequence in such a case, the specific result has to be meaningfully set apart from most other possible results.
5.1. You never managed to set apart your existence from any of the other possible results.
5.2. - I don't set apart my existence from any of the possible results. I set apart my existence from most of the possible results.
5.3. And how do you do that?
5.4. - I'm a potential self that currently exists. Most potential selves do not currently exist (under modern science).
5.5. Before you existed, what set your potential self apart from the potential selves that didn't end up existing?
5.6. - Good question.
- I think that what really sets a result apart is there being a reasonable possibility that it wasn't the result of the hypothesis being evaluated -- and here, that applies to everyone who exists.
5.7. That doesn't help you avoid the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.
5.8. - In this case, all he had to do was hit the barn.
5.9. But he hasn't done that, he has just hit something, and painted a target round it.
That is all you have: one of the possible outcomes has occurred (as is inevitable), and you are claiming that it is special because it has occurred. It wasn't prespecified, and nothing sets it apart from all the other possible outcomes othe than the fact that it has occurred.
5.10. - My claim is that to be legitimate, a target does not need to be pre-specified. A legitimate target doesn't need red and white rings around it. Also, there are degrees of "targetness."
- I'm claiming that what makes a target legitimate is a reasonably possible alternative hypothesis to the hypothesis being evaluated -- and, the Bayesian formula accounts for that requirement with its prior probabilities...
- I'm saying that as soon as a result has a reasonably possible alternative explanation, we have a legitimate target.
- I think that's the answer because I can't find anything in the Bayesian instructions that refer to this issue. If you, or anyone else, can refer me to such a statement, I'll happily concede this claim.
- The Bayesian instructions seem to imply that the formula accounts for the Sharpshooter explanation.
5.11. - Can anyone provide a source that discusses the Sharp Shooter fallacy as it relates to any of the Bayesian formulas? Does the Sharp Shooter fallacy need to be considered when determining P(E|H)?
5.12. - I don't think that you ever responded to that claim. Can you provide a source contradicting my claim?
5.13. How about you provide a source supporting it?
5.14. - I can't. But, as I suggest above, the fact that I can't find anyone even talking about this issue suggests that the issue is accounted for by the Bayesian formula.
5.15. - I'm still not sure, but more specifically, this is why I think we don't have to worry about any Texas Sharp Shooter.
- There are 4 variables involved in the Bayesian approach: 2 prior probabilities, and 2 likelihoods.
- In the lottery situation, if the winner can't be set apart from the crowd, we accept that the prior probability of a rigged game is essentially zero, and the fact that the specific winner had just 1 chance in, say, 10 million, doesn't carry any weight.
- In my situation, I'm not limiting my claim to myself; I'm suggesting that we are all in the same boat. Consequently, I don't want to set myself apart from the rest of you guys, and the conclusion rests entirely upon the prior probabilities.
5.16 Just like last time, this does nothing to address the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. Each of our existences is one of many possibilities, all of which were unlikely before they happened.
If you hold several lotteries, and some of them have winners, there is no reason to think any of them are rigged.
5.17. Jabba, to avoid the Texas sharpshooter fallacy here you don't need to set yourself apart from "the rest of us guys", you need to set apart the observed result from all the other possible results that could have occurred.
5.18. Shooting 7 billion bullets at a barn and then circling the bullet holes and saying "what are the odds I would hit these 7 billion targets?" is still the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.
If someone else existed in your place, and presented the same argument in favour of immortality as you are presenting, would their argument be valid?
(To be continued)