The Trials of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito: Part 25

[Bill Williams]

B/M wrote only once "maybe this occurred at some other time", but this can only be noted as one of the (many) contradictions in B/M's text.
But B/M also emphasided on multiple passages that it was proven that Knox was on the scene of crime when Meredith was killed.

It is true that B/M states one thing, and then some times also states the logical contrary.
But this does not make go away the fact that B/M states unequivocally some things. And B/M unequivocally states that Knox was there when Meredith was killed. B/M goes on explaining through whoe paragraphs how they agree with this, and with this and that of Nencini's findings. They also point out how further confirmation emerged that Knox was killed by multiple persons.

And the paragraph where B/M say that Knox washed her hands of Meredith's blood is unequivocal. You cannot interpret it in any possible other way. The only reservation expressed by B/M is a reference about the "reliability" of the attribution of biological traces (but there is actually no dispute about them in the trial evidence, not in B/M's motivations, nor in the defence recourse).

What is amazing is the claim that B/M is illogical and internally contradictory, and then quote it to make a case about a fact of the case.

The one thing that M/B is crystal clear about is the the claim she cleaned blood from her hands proves she was at the cottage at some time after the murder.

Your analysis, amongst other things, makes no sense.

 

[Stacyhs]

These are your opinions about the evidence the case.
We are not talking about the evidence of the case. We are talking about B/M's statements.



The topic I am talking about is what is actually written in B/M's report.

No, it is not my opinion that the vast majority of experts testified the murder could have been committed by one person. See their testimonies.

It is not my opinion that the only thing that places Knox at the cottage at the time of the murder is her retracted statement made during an unrecorded interrogation without a lawyer present. If there is evidence otherwise, please present it because I certainly haven't seen it in the last nine and a half years.

Do you dispute that it was logical for Knox, or anyone, to assume Kercher had been sexually assaulted under the circumstances?

What you are doing is avoiding answering the question: exactly what proof is there that Knox washed her hands of Meredith's blood?

 

[Bill Williams]

B/M wrote only once "maybe this occurred at some other time", but this can only be noted as one of the (many) contradictions in B/M's text.

For heaven's sake, the B/M court did not write "maybe".

Please let me quote to you yet again the conclusion that the M/B court wrote about the notion that Knox might have wiped blood from her hands. The conclusion of the court is inescapable - if one holds to the position that she wiped blood from her hands, this means that she came into contact with the blood after the crime occurred and in some other part of the house.

Nevertheless, even if attribution is certain, the trial element would not be unequivocal as a demonstration of posthumous contact with that blood, as a likely attempt to remove the most blatant traces of what had happened, perhaps to help someone or deflect suspicion from herself, without this entailing her certain direct involvement in the murder. Any further and more meaningful value would be, in fact, resisted by the fact - which is decisive - that no trace leading to her was found at the scene of the crime or on the victim’s body, so that - if all the above is accepted - her contact with the victim’s blood would have occurred after the crime and in another part of the house.​

There is no maybe about it. It is the final conclusion M/B comes to in discussing the claim. Even if the attibution of the claim is certain (which you say it is) that still does not convict the pair. It is revealing about "confirmation bias" that you would slip that word into the text (inserting "maybe" in quotes as if part of the text) hoping your bias would go unnoticed.

 

[Methos]

I wonder if Machiavelli realises that a 530.1 acquittal is only (in practical terms) possible if the defendant can PROVE his/her innocence, or if the court determines that actually no crime at all took place?

I wonder if Machiavelli therefore realises that someone in Italy was tried for a crime (for the sake of argument, let's imagine it was the case of a person shot dead from a distance which definitively precluded the possibility of suicide - and was therefore definitively the crime of murder), in which literally zero credible evidence pointing to guilt was presented to the court, but where the defendant was unable to PROVE his factual innocence, then that defendant would be acquitted under 530.2?

False.

530.1 only means that the incriminating evidence is disproven. Not that the defendant proves their innocence.

Second, you showing an embarassingly poor grasp of Italian law (really quite embarassing at this stage of your activism ) as you getting confused between the different types of acquittal formulas (there are five of them) and the evidence-based assessment (530.1/2). These are two different dimensions.
The distinction between 530.1 and 530.2 has nothing to do with whether the crime was committed or not.

Your confusion is embarassing.
Those reading should think about the credibility of this poster.

Just for the record:
Art. 530 CPP reads:

Art. 530 - Sentenza di assoluzione
1. Se il fatto non sussiste, se l'imputato non lo ha commesso, se il fatto non costituisce reato o non è previsto dalla legge come reato ovvero se il reato è stato commesso da persona non imputabile o non punibile per un'altra ragione, il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione indicandone la causa nel dispositivo.
2. Il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione anche quando manca, è insufficiente o è contraddittoria la prova che il fatto sussiste, che l'imputato lo ha commesso, che il fatto costituisce reato o che il reato è stato commesso da persona imputabile.
3. Se vi è la prova che il fatto è stato commesso in presenza di una causa di giustificazione o di una causa personale di non punibilità ovvero vi è dubbio sull'esistenza delle stesse, il giudice pronuncia sentenza di assoluzione a norma del comma 1.
4. Con la sentenza di assoluzione il giudice applica, nei casi previsti dalla legge, le misure di sicurezza.

 

[LondonJohn]

What is amazing is the claim that B/M is illogical and internally contradictory, and then quote it to make a case about a fact of the case.

The one thing that M/B is crystal clear about is the the claim she cleaned blood from her hands proves she was at the cottage at some time after the murder.

Your analysis, amongst other things, makes no sense.

And, Laydeez 'n' Gennelmen, why is it that the Marasca SC report even mentions this stuff in the first place?

Purely because it's mentioned in the prior SC report pertaining to Knox's criminal slander conviction.

(You know: the conviction that is likely to be shredded by the ECHR ruling....)

And it's clear beyond doubt that the Marasca SC MR made repeated careful and explicit efforts to make it fully compatible with (and utterly non-contradictory with) that prior SC MR.

And why, Laydeez 'n' Gennlemen, did they do that? Why, to ensure that both SC reports "harmonised". Had the Marasca MR stood in conflict with (or, worse, in contradiction with) the Knox criminal slander MR, the (metaphorical) alarm bells would all have sounded off. Steps would have had to have been taken to eradicate any conflict or contradiction. Possibly even involving revision trials.

Roll up! Roll up! All the (not at all) fun of the broken Italian criminal justice system!!

 

[Machiavelli]

(...)
I'd invite Machiavelli to take careful note of the word "absent" in 530.2. And then I'd invite him to think for himself about which commentator is more credible (and which provided the evidence to support his credibility, rather than angry unsupported words )

you embarass yourself. Let's look what you're doing.

I know the code, LJ. The fact is, that, I also know law & jurisprudence. You instead appear to know very little, therefore you seem to merely read one code article and then you make up yourself a jurisprudence with all the rest your imagination needs.

The truth is, you ust made a gross mistake by confusing the types of acquittal formulas with the paragraphs of art.530, and that mistake shows your profound ignorance.
The choice of paragraphs of art. 530 have nothing to do with whether the crime was committed or not. It is well possible to have 530.1 while the crime was committed. And without the defendant profing their innocence.

The fact that 530.2 includes the word absent, does not mean that cases where the proof is absent in jurisprudence will fall under 530.2. (the actual Italian text however says manca, is "lacking", not "absent"). In fact, a legal absence of proof does not even mean absence of evidence (by using the english term). But in the Knox / Sollecito verdict it is specified that evidence is not absent, while instead says that evidence is contradictory. It lists, in fact, a series of elements that calls evidence (and calls multiple times Knox & Sollecito "very suspicious").

 

[Bill Williams]

What you are doing is avoiding answering the question: exactly what proof is there that Knox washed her hands of Meredith's blood?

Every guilter who has been asked this question has failed to provide it. Machiavelli has referenced this "eloquent proof" a number of times, even claiming that M/B themselves subscribe to it.

All any of us have ever asked is to be provided with that eloquent proof.

Apparently, it does not exist.

 

[LondonJohn]

you embarass yourself. Let's look what you're doing.

I know the code, LJ. The fact is, that, I also know law & jurisprudence. You instead appear to know very little, therefore you seem to merely read one code article and then you make up yourself a jurisprudence with all the rest your imagination needs.

The truth is, you ust made a gross mistake by confusing the types of acquittal formulas with the paragraphs of art.530, and that mistake shows your profound ignorance.
The choice of paragraphs of art. 530 have nothing to do with whether the crime was committed or not. It is well possible to have 530.1 while the crime was committed. And without the defendant profing their innocence.

The fact that 530.2 includes the word absent, does not mean that cases where the proof is absent in jurisprudence will fall under 530.2. (the actual Italian text however says manca, is "lacking", not "absent"). In fact, a legal absence of proof does not even mean absence of evidence (by using the english term). But in the Knox / Sollecito verdict it is specified that evidence is not absent, while instead says that evidence is contradictory. It lists, in fact, a series of elements that calls evidence (and calls multiple times Knox & Sollecito "very suspicious").

You're wrong and I'm right.

(See how easy that was to make claims, assertions and denunciations in the total absence of actual supporting evidence!).

But well done on your "understanding" of law and jurisprudence, and my own ignorance of the same. I must try much harder to be intelligent!!

 

[Bill Williams]

Just for the record:
Art. 530 CPP reads:

For those of us who are Italian challenged, and English-blound, a machine translation of the code is:

Art. 530 - Judgment of Absolution

1. If the offense does not exist, if the defendant did not commit him or her, if the fact does not constitute a crime or is not provided for by law as a criminal offense or if the offense was committed by a person who is not imputable or not punishable for another reason , The court acquits an acquittal ruling indicating its cause in the device.

2. The judge also makes a judgment of acquittal even when absent, insufficient or contradictory evidence that the fact that the defendant has committed him is that the fact constitutes a criminal offense or that the offense was committed by a perpetrator.

3. If there is evidence that the matter has been committed in the presence of a cause of justification or of a personal cause of non-punishment or there is doubt as to the existence of the same, the court shall issue an acquittal pursuant to paragraph 1.

4. With the judgment of absolution, the court applies, in the cases provided for by law, security measures.​

A plain text, English rendering of 530.2 in English can be as follows:

2. The judge [should return] a judgment of acquittal even when [evidence is] absent, insufficient or contradictory - that the fact that the defendant has committed him is that the fact constitutes a criminal offense or that the offense was committed by a perpetrator.​

It is as plain as day that the intent of M/B's Section 9 is to demonstrate that evidence of Knox's or Sollecto's participation in the murder is wholly absent, or at the very best completely contradictory. Nonetheless, even if the more suspicious evidence is considered to be true, this still does not explain the insurmountable barrier, that no reliable presence of either of them can be found in the murder room.

M/B implies that all the "guilt-sounding" evidence does, is acquit them of the murder, because it places them at the cottage at a time after the murder and in another part of the cottage.

No one - repeat no one, denies that they were in the cottage after the murder and in places other than the murder room. No one.

 

[LondonJohn]

I wonder if Machiavelli, with his scholarly understanding of law and jurisprudence, would deign to address the second part of my original post (which he interestingly avoided in his first set of "responses"):

I wonder if Machiavelli therefore realises that someone in Italy was tried for a crime (for the sake of argument, let's imagine it was the case of a person shot dead from a distance which definitively precluded the possibility of suicide - and was therefore definitively the crime of murder), in which literally zero credible evidence pointing to guilt was presented to the court, but where the defendant was unable to PROVE his factual innocence, then that defendant would be acquitted under 530.2?

 

[Machiavelli]

(...)
There is no maybe about it. It is the final conclusion M/B comes to in discussing the claim. Even if the attibution of the claim is certain (which you say it is) that still does not convict the pair. It is revealing about "confirmation bias" that you would slip that word into the text (inserting "maybe" in quotes as if part of the text) hoping your bias would go unnoticed.

This is not the paragraph I was talking about.
This paragraph does not talk - at all - about the timing of Knox presence on the scene of crime with reference to Meredith's death.
This paragraph (which is an incorrect translation anyway) rather talks about Knox active participation to the killing action, that is, the timing of her touching the blood (not the timing of her being present on the scene).
B/M repeatedly says (in other paragraphs) that Knox was present at the scene of crime when Meredith was killed. It is repeated in multiple passages that it is a proven fact that Knox was there at that moment. B/M even bring up specific events related to that moment (the scream, sexual violence) as explains their point.

The fact is that B/M says Knox's presence at the time of the murder is proven, but not so her active participation.

B/M emphasizes the difference between presence and active participation, also as it points at these specific legal categories ("non punishable concurring" and "compliticy in crime committed by another person"). B/M raises legal categories that imply the presence of Knox at the time of the murder.
Disputes the proof of Knox's active participation to the killing action.
But does not dispute the presence of Knox at the moment of the crime.

 

[Bill Williams]

This is not the paragraph I was talking about.
This paragraph does not talk - at all - about the timing of Knox presence on the scene of crime with reference to Meredith's death.
This paragraph (which is an incorrect translation anyway) rather talks about Knox active participation to the killing action, that is, the timing of her touching the blood (not the timing of her being present on the scene).
B/M repeatedly says (in other paragraphs) that Knox was present at the scene of crime when Meredith was killed. It is repeated in multiple passages that it is a proven fact that Knox was there at that moment. B/M even bring up specific events related to that moment (the scream, sexual violence) as explains their point.

The fact is that B/M says Knox's presence at the time of the murder is proven, but not so her active participation.

B/M emphasizes the difference between presence and active participation, also as it points at these specific legal categories ("non punishable concurring" and "compliticy in crime committed by another person"). B/M raises legal categories that imply the presence of Knox at the time of the murder.
Disputes the proof of Knox's active participation to the killing action.
But does not dispute the presence of Knox at the moment of the crime.

I see your confusion. You have missed that M/B set all this up in Section 9.2, namely:

9.2 The aspects of the objectively contradictory nature [of evidence] can be, as shown below, illustrated for each defendant, in a synoptic presentation of the elements favourable to the hypothesis of guilt and of the elements against it, as they are shown, of course, by the text of the challenged ruling and of the previous ones.​

What follows is M/B's listing of the "facts" as accepted by Nencini's court:

1. Elements favourable to the hypothesis of guilt
2. Elements against (the hypothesis of guilt)
3. by the text of the challenged (Nencini) ruling.​

M/B are clear about what they are trying to accomplish by Section 9.2ff, which is as they explicitly write, to demonstrate the "objectively contradictory nature of the evidence," in front of Nencini. M/B is not talking about what they believe, they are writing about what is in the challenged ruling, the Nencini ruling.

That you skip over this part in making your own claims is revealing.

 

[Stacyhs]

This is not the paragraph I was talking about.
This paragraph does not talk - at all - about the timing of Knox presence on the scene of crime with reference to Meredith's death.
This paragraph (which is an incorrect translation anyway) rather talks about Knox active participation to the killing action, that is, the timing of her touching the blood (not the timing of her being present on the scene).
B/M repeatedly says (in other paragraphs) that Knox was present at the scene of crime when Meredith was killed. It is repeated in multiple passages that it is a proven fact that Knox was there at that moment. B/M even bring up specific events related to that moment (the scream, sexual violence) as explains their point.

The fact is that B/M says Knox's presence at the time of the murder is proven, but not so her active participation.

B/M emphasizes the difference between presence and active participation, also as it points at these specific legal categories ("non punishable concurring" and "compliticy in crime committed by another person"). B/M raises legal categories that imply the presence of Knox at the time of the murder.
Disputes the proof of Knox's active participation to the killing action.
But does not dispute the presence of Knox at the moment of the crime.[/QUOTE]

As has been said before, he had to harmonize the previous SC ruling regarding the calunnia as to avoid a conflict. No one has ever been able to present an example where a SC court has openly disagreed with a previous SC ruling concerning the same case. After all, once a SC court has ruled, it becomes set in stone. Imagine the legal ramifications if Supreme Courts started declaring a previous court was just wrong. Mama mia!

You cannot deny that no evidence was EVER presented which showed Knox washed her hands of Kercher's blood. None.

 

[Vixen]

And, Laydeez 'n' Gennelmen, why is it that the Marasca SC report even mentions this stuff in the first place?

Purely because it's mentioned in the prior SC report pertaining to Knox's criminal slander conviction.

(You know: the conviction that is likely to be shredded by the ECHR ruling....)

And it's clear beyond doubt that the Marasca SC MR made repeated careful and explicit efforts to make it fully compatible with (and utterly non-contradictory with) that prior SC MR.

And why, Laydeez 'n' Gennlemen, did they do that? Why, to ensure that both SC reports "harmonised". Had the Marasca MR stood in conflict with (or, worse, in contradiction with) the Knox criminal slander MR, the (metaphorical) alarm bells would all have sounded off. Steps would have had to have been taken to eradicate any conflict or contradiction. Possibly even involving revision trials.

Roll up! Roll up! All the (not at all) fun of the broken Italian criminal justice system!!

Stop embarrassing yourself.

The ECHR does not have the power 'to shred a conviction.' That is not its function, anyway.

As for the Court - hello? - agreeing with the Court (=an establishment) of course law has to be consistent.

If a law says XYZ is a crime, you cannot have a law contradicting it.

In contract law for example, a badly worded clause, which if contradictory, will repudiate the entire contract.

This is why 'internal contradictions' within a judgment is a discrete legal ground for appeal. AIUI in Italy, this is the most common ground used.

Therefore it follows a judge will ensure his or her written reasons are as water tight as possible.

No Marasca-Bruno did not hold an opinion whcih they did not share with another court. Law has nothing to do with personal opinion. As a judge, you do what the law tells you, whether you like it or not. It is quite irrelevant what Marasca-Bruno secretly thought. A judge's first duty is to the court.

So your belief Marasca-Bruno had their hands tied and they were somehow distressed by this, is misconceived and exhibits an appalling ignorance of how law works.

 

[Machiavelli]

I wonder if Machiavelli, with his scholarly understanding of law and jurisprudence, would deign to address the second part of my original post (which he interestingly avoided in his first set of "responses"):

I wonder if Machiavelli therefore realises that someone in Italy was tried for a crime (for the sake of argument, let's imagine it was the case of a person shot dead from a distance which definitively precluded the possibility of suicide - and was therefore definitively the crime of murder), in which literally zero credible evidence pointing to guilt was presented to the court, but where the defendant was unable to PROVE his factual innocence, then that defendant would be acquitted under 530.2?

I assume that you recognize your error, even if you avoid to state it explicitly. You made a gross confusion about the reasons of acquittal, since the choice between 1s and 2nd comma have nothing to do with whether the crime was actually committed or not.

What you say above is not correct. It more to be expected that an explicit mention of 530.1 would occur on a crime different from murder, because it usually occurs on preliminary stages, when less serious charges are decided. But the real occurrence is actually the explicit mention of 530.2, since that's what matters. A specification of §2 is what carries a rationale, because that's what matters. And if §2 is specified, the rationale is never the absence of evidence. 530.2 carries a legal consequence and brings a kind of stigma, itself has an aura of insufficient proof.

But the real anomaly here, is that 530.2 is never pronounced by the Supreme Court. I have never heared SC a verdict where 530.2 is mentioned explicitly in a Cassazione dispositivo. Never. It's unheared of. Untile this time. It would make no sense to see an explicit mention of 530.2 in a ruling of the Supreme Court. This is only about courts who deal with evidence, most typically is by preliminary judges "it's not enough, I can't go on". But for a court of legitimacy, this is crazy. Itself it makes the verdict laughable.

 

[Bill Williams]

But the real anomaly here, is that 530.2 is never pronounced by the Supreme Court. I have never heared SC a verdict where 530.2 is mentioned explicitly in a Cassazione dispositivo. Never. It's unheared of. Untile this time. It would make no sense to see an explicit mention of 530.2 in a ruling of the Supreme Court. This is only about courts who deal with evidence, most typically is by preliminary judges "it's not enough, I can't go on". But for a court of legitimacy, this is crazy. Itself it makes the verdict laughable.

Serious request. Can you link to any other source, other than your own claim, which states that:

530.2 is never pronounced by the Supreme Court.​

I request this seriously, because as you may guess, I have no reason to trust your assessment of this, and none of my local Italian-language sources are in a position to authoritatively comment.

Surely there is some other, more reputable source for this claim and if you can provide it, you'd be doing this thread a service.

 

[Vixen]

I wonder if Machiavelli, with his scholarly understanding of law and jurisprudence, would deign to address the second part of my original post (which he interestingly avoided in his first set of "responses"):

I wonder if Machiavelli therefore realises that someone in Italy was tried for a crime (for the sake of argument, let's imagine it was the case of a person shot dead from a distance which definitively precluded the possibility of suicide - and was therefore definitively the crime of murder), in which literally zero credible evidence pointing to guilt was presented to the court, but where the defendant was unable to PROVE his factual innocence, then that defendant would be acquitted under 530.2?

That would be ascertained at the merits trial. By the time it gets to the Supreme Court, all it is looking at is whether the correct legal principles were followed.

This is what makes Marasca so illogical as neither the merits court or the appeal court found the pair 'not guilty'.

It didn't have the jurisdiction to contradict this. It should have sent the matter back down if there was a legal issue.

The claim 'they are 'not guilty due to insufficient evidence' is absurd against the context of the court having to concur that (a) there were multiple attackers, as successfully proven in a trial, (b) Knox did wash Mez' blood from her hand, as established by the fact-finding court, (c) she did cover up for Rudy and that (d) she did hear Meredith scream.

 

[Machiavelli]

As has been said before, he had to harmonize the previous SC ruling regarding the calunnia as to avoid a conflict. No one has ever been able to present an example where a SC court has openly disagreed with a previous SC ruling concerning the same case. After all, once a SC court has ruled, it becomes set in stone. Imagine the legal ramifications if Supreme Courts started declaring a previous court was just wrong. Mama mia!
(...)

As said before, no, all this is false. You talk the contrary of reality.
This is a desperate rationalization, but it is surreal as for as much it flies in the face of what is actually written in B/M's verdict.

First let's note the B/M verdict does not harmonize at all with the previous, definitive and still valid, Chieffi ruling.
This in fact is an example of court who openly disagrees with a previous SC ruling.

The calunnia verdict has nothing to do with all this. Also because B/M verdict had nothing to decide about the calunnia case. But anyway, even on this point, B/M, despite they had no legal necessity of doing this, they emphasize their agreement with the previous findings, and then they go further assessing how a liar Knox is (on their own initiative) and they anticipate that even a ECHR ruling fiding some procedural violation would have zero effect on the evidence of the calunnia case.
But that was not the point of discussion.

The fact is that the B/M court - while it disagrees with the SC on the same case (1) on points of law - it says they instead agree with the judge of merits in this case (Nencini). They don't say "we agree with other findings of the SC". No no. What they say instead is: "the previous findings in Guede's case are a piece of circumstantial evidence, but they are not binding on this case", then they go on saying "but you know what? the fact is that in the trial against Knox and Sollecito, Nencini found there was further evidence that the crime was committed by multiple perpetrators, and we, Bruno & Marasca, agree completely with Nencini". This is what B/M say.
They don't say "we agree with a SC verdict". Not at all. They say "other trials don't matter: we agree with Nencini".

 

[Machiavelli]

What follows is M/B's listing of the "facts" as accepted by Nencini's court:

(...)

No, no no. In 9.2 para B/M does not say "accepted by Nencini" and does not put any quotation comma on the wor "facts". B/M says that there are findings that are contradictory, some pointing to guilt and some "opposing" it, but calls those findings objective.
They are not "accepted by", there is not going to be a list of points of view. Those facts are objective, this the word that B/M uses in 9.2.

 

[Stacyhs]

Vixen, you earlier claimed Raffaele drives a red Ferrari. You are mistaken. A picture was taken of him getting into a red Ferrari in 2014 after leaving a TV interview but nowhere in that article was it said it belonged to him. Nor are there any other articles or photos of him owning or driving a red Ferrari at any other time.

In an Oct. 2015 Corriere della Sera interview he said:

Appointment at the McDonald's in Bisceglie, [Sollecito] arrives in a black Porsche. "It belongs to a lawyer, a family friend: I borrowed it because my Abarth 500 is in a workshop."
An Abarth 500 is a long way from a Ferrari.