Proof of Immortality, VI

[godless dave]

- From 3634 in previous 'chapter.'
- I'm still not sure, but more specifically, this is why I think we don't have to worry about any Texas Sharp Shooter.
- There are 4 variables involved in the Bayesian approach: 2 prior probabilities, and 2 likelihoods.
- In the lottery situation, if the winner can't be set apart from the crowd, we accept that the prior probability of a rigged game is essentially zero, and the fact that the specific winner had just 1 chance in, say, 10 million, doesn't carry any weight.
- In my situation, I'm not limiting my claim to myself; I'm suggesting that we are all in the same boat. Consequently, I don't want to set myself apart from the rest of you guys, and the conclusion rests entirely upon the prior probabilities.

Just like last time, this does nothing to address the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. Each of our existences is one of many possibilities, all of which were unlikely before they happened.

If you hold several lotteries, and some of them have winners, there is no reason to think any of them are rigged.

 

[godless dave]

- Please say again why you would think that.

P(E|~H) depends on the details of each hypothesis that isn't H. We don't know those details so we can't estimate a probability. We don't know how ~H claims the nonphysical aspect of human consciousness starts to exist, so we don't know the likelihood of one existing, let alone the likelihood of one existing and being connected to a particular human body.

 

[JayUtah]

- No. But, it does have a bearing on P(H|E).

But that's not the problem godless dave is identifying in your argument. P(H|E) is the outcome of the inference. it relies upon terms that you have yet to compute correctly. The term we're looking at right now is P(E|H), which you must estimate as if H were true. It doesn't matter whether you believe H to be true or not. Until you properly understand P(E|H) you cannot assert that it affects P(H) -- your prior, and the proper place to express your belief in H -- in the way you say. The purpose of the statistical inference is to see how well that belief holds up in the face of new data. You're fudging that by assuming P(E|H) must be very small and cobbling up a pseudo-intellectual rationale for that assumption.

- Please say again why you would think that.

Because that's how statistical inference works. As I have explained at length, you rely upon a false dilemma. You manipulate H and ~H as if they were, at various times, singular hypotheses and you hide the excluded middle in whatever you assume that day is not the singular proposition. You purport to have computed P(H|E) where H is obviously just materialism, but you wrongly believe it's all hypotheses that leave us mortal. You do not get to say that all other hypotheses lead to immortality when H is only materialism. You do not get to say that the probability of immortality is 1 - P(H|E) when H is only materialism. The hypotheses within ~H that lead to immortality are a subset of ~H; the rest are those hypotheses that aren't materialism but which don't lead to immortality. They are specific hypotheses which you have decided not to describe or test, so you can say nothing about them -- either directly or via your brand of indirection. For the sake of argument we'll call the best one of them K. You must compute P(K|E) and show that it is greater than P(H|E). You have not done this. You have relied upon an inference across a false dilemma, which is easily seen to be invalid.

However we know that P(K) <= P(H) because incarnation as part of K would require the corporeal body, which is all that's required for H. You have yet to deal with this except to defer it to the indefinite future.

 

[JayUtah]

There are 4 variables involved in the Bayesian approach: 2 prior probabilities, and 2 likelihoods.

You already tried the "Bayes magically takes care of this" argument. It does not. You quoted from the last time you raised this argument, but you don't seem to have paid attention to the rebuttals that followed. Since you were willing to reach back and find your post, please reach back and find (and answer) the posts that followed. Do not simply keep trying the same failed argument over and over.

In the lottery situation...

The lottery analogy does not save you. In a lottery the tickets exist before the drawing. They are identified as targets by the people who chose the tickets and entered them into the lottery. All this happened prior to the drawing. You have not shown that people exist in any meaningful way before they exist. In fact, you frankly admitted they did not. You're trying to invent a new brand of semi-existence solely for the purpose of making your argument work. That's special pleading.

Further, all this philosophical wrangling comes under the auspices of trying to falsify H by showing that H is prohibitively impossible given that we observe some bit of data, E. You cannot do that by adding speculative things to E or H in order to fudge that estimation. You must assume H is true as others have formulated it, and H denies any form of pre-existence -- abstract, imaginary, or otherwise.

In my situation, I'm not limiting my claim to myself; I'm suggesting that we are all in the same boat.

Asked and answered. The essence of the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is not the number of bullets you fire, but the fact that you identify each bullet hole as the target after the bullet is fired.

 

[Hokulele]

Because that's how statistical inference works. As I have explained at length, you rely upon a false dilemma. You manipulate H and ~H as if they were, at various times, singular hypotheses and you hide the excluded middle in whatever you assume that day is not the singular proposition. You purport to have computed P(H|E) where H is obviously just materialism, but you wrongly believe it's all hypotheses that leave us mortal. You do not get to say that all other hypotheses lead to immortality when H is only materialism. You do not get to say that the probability of immortality is 1 - P(H|E) when H is only materialism. The hypotheses within ~H that lead to immortality are a subset of ~H; the rest are those hypotheses that aren't materialism but which don't lead to immortality. They are specific hypotheses which you have decided not to describe or test, so you can say nothing about them -- either directly or via your brand of indirection. For the sake of argument we'll call the best one of them K. You must compute P(K|E) and show that it is greater than P(H|E). You have not done this. You have relied upon an inference across a false dilemma, which is easily seen to be invalid.

Another point that should be stressed, is that Jabba seems to believe that if one hypothesis is unlikely, the opposite has to be likely. What he seems to miss (as did caveman), is that both hypotheses can be equally unlikely. Existence is not guaranteed by the sum of the probabilities. It isn't simply a case of "well, if I didn't exist under this hypothesis, I must exist under the other", when it could easily be "I had almost no chance of existing either way. Lucky me!"

 

[Mojo]

- From 3634 in previous 'chapter.'
- I'm still not sure, but more specifically, this is why I think we don't have to worry about any Texas Sharp Shooter.
- There are 4 variables involved in the Bayesian approach: 2 prior probabilities, and 2 likelihoods.
- In the lottery situation, if the winner can't be set apart from the crowd, we accept that the prior probability of a rigged game is essentially zero, and the fact that the specific winner had just 1 chance in, say, 10 million, doesn't carry any weight.
- In my situation, I'm not limiting my claim to myself; I'm suggesting that we are all in the same boat. Consequently, I don't want to set myself apart from the rest of you guys, and the conclusion rests entirely upon the prior probabilities.

Jabba, to avoid the Texas sharpshooter fallacy here you don't need to set yourself apart from "the rest of us guys", you need to set apart the observed result from all the other possible results that could have occurred.

If someone else existed in your place, and presented the same argument in favour of immortality as you are presenting, would their argument be valid?

 

[Belz...]

- From 3634 in previous 'chapter.'
- I'm still not sure, but more specifically, this is why I think we don't have to worry about any Texas Sharp Shooter.
- There are 4 variables involved in the Bayesian approach: 2 prior probabilities, and 2 likelihoods.
- In the lottery situation, if the winner can't be set apart from the crowd, we accept that the prior probability of a rigged game is essentially zero, and the fact that the specific winner had just 1 chance in, say, 10 million, doesn't carry any weight.
- In my situation, I'm not limiting my claim to myself; I'm suggesting that we are all in the same boat. Consequently, I don't want to set myself apart from the rest of you guys, and the conclusion rests entirely upon the prior probabilities.

You're been explained in detail why the fallacy applies, Jabba. There is no lottery situation. Especially under H.

 

[Jabba]

TreeBranch

I think that by using Bayesian statistics, I can virtually disprove the consensus scientific hypothesis that we each have only one, finite, life to live…

1. If something occurs that is unlikely to occur -- given a particular hypothesis -- the event is evidence against the hypothesis.
1. Untrue.
2. - True (You're right). I probably should have said something like, "The event is potential, significant, evidence against the hypothesis."
3. Still untrue.If a hypothesis predicts a wide variety of possible events, each of them individually unlikely, then one of those events happening is not evidence against the hypothesis and there is no reason to think it could potentially be evidence against the hypothesis.
The individual location of each grain of sand on a beach is very unlikely. That tells you nothing about any hypotheses about how beaches are formed.
4. - I think that's wrong.
- When an event is unlikely to happen given a particular hypothesis, it is potential evidence against the hypothesis, in that, it being evidence depends upon other conditions. Here, one of the conditions is that the "hypothesis predicts a wide variety of possible events, each of them individually unlikely."
5. I don't know of any approach to science or logic that views unlikelihood that way. You would only call a hypothesis into question if events happened more (or less) often than the hypothesis predicts.
In any case, the particular hypothesis under discussion does predict a wide variety of possible events, each of them individually unlikely, so we can both agree that in this case, an unlikely event happening is not evidence against the hypothesis.
6. - What if an hypothesis claimed that X should never occur, and X occurs?
7. Then the hypothesis is wrong.
8. - I think this is just an issue of finding the right words. Hopefully, the following will help.
- In re-evaluating an old hypothesis based on new info, the likelihood of the new info -- given the old hypothesis -- is a key variable. There are three (or,two) other variables -- so, whether it affects the probability of the hypothesis, and how it affects the probability, are indefinite. For instance, while an event could be very unlikely to occur -- given the hypothesis -- it could be even more unlikely -- given the complementary hypothesis.
9. - I should probably start all over.
- Being no expert in Bayesian Statistics, I’m having some difficulty appropriately introducing my claim…
- Obviously, new information can affect the probability of an old hypothesis. Bayesian Statistics is used to determine that effect.
- One of the variables used in the Bayesian formulas is the likelihood of an event – given the hypothesis that is being re-evaluated.
- Since there are other variables in the formulas however, the effect of that variable is indefinite – and, may be little or none. In fact, the effect can be “backwards” in the sense that an event that is unlikely to occur, given the particular hypothesis, can be much more unlikely to occur under any other hypothesis.


- So far, this is the first branch of my "tree." I like "tree" better than "map."
<snip>

Dave,
- I didn't start off very well, but think that #'s 8 and 9 express my first premise pretty well...

Edited by Loss Leader: 

Edited out reference to any other forum, board or blog

 

[Belz...]

I think that by using Bayesian statistics, I can virtually disprove the consensus scientific hypothesis that we each have only one, finite, life to live…

1. If something occurs that is unlikely to occur -- given a particular hypothesis -- the event is evidence against the hypothesis.
1. Untrue.

That should be the end of it, Jabba. Honestly, all you have is speculation and claims based on an ignorance of statistics, logic and science. No matter how hard you try, it will always be thus because it's been like that for five years and you have not changed your approach even when it has been demonstrated (clearly) to be wrong.

 

[JayUtah]

I didn't start off very well, but think that #'s 8 and 9 express my first premise pretty well...

Why are you starting over? You posted a comprehensive fringe reset in the first week of June. I and several others answered it promptly, and -- while acknowledging it -- you failed to respond to its content. You continue to ignore it, even though I and other posters have referred you to it. Last week you tried to restart the argument again. You were directed again to several existing rebuttals that addressed the few points you raised anew. Why today are you trying yet again to start over? Why do you ignore the answers you have received, which comprehensively refute your argument?

Being no expert in Bayesian Statistics, I’m having some difficulty appropriately introducing my claim...

The problem with your claim is not that it's being introduced improperly. The problem with your claim is that its proponent admits he lacks expertise in the foundational concepts that apply to it, and this has resulted in a completely nonsensical argument that has been properly analyzed by your critics.

What you desire to argue is clear. You simply don't get that it's wrong, that your critics are quite able to know that it's wrong, and that you've been told in spades why it's wrong. Rather than seeking some new way to conceal your errors, you should face up to them.

One of the variables used in the Bayesian formulas is the likelihood of an event – given the hypothesis that is being re-evaluated.

Not exactly. It is the likelihood of the event assuming that the hypothesis is true. This is the P(E|H) term you have so much trouble with, especially that last part. You have trouble with the notion of the assumption arguendo that H's explanation for E is what you're evaluating. You want E and H to be your own inventions, and to wrongly implicate P(H) in the P(E|H) term.

Again language like "old hypothesis" and "re-evaluated" suggest that H changes as you apply new data. It does not, and cannot in a valid model. More importantly, you cannot keep adding things to H to make it seem less likely -- but that is exactly what you're doing.

Since there are other variables in the formulas however, the effect of that variable is indefinite – and, may be little or none.

In a properly constrained model you can bound each of these influences. This reduces the degrees of freedom in the model and makes it valid. You simply make up values for all the values in your model, therefore it is underconstrained and worthless.

Further, the battle is between P(H|E) and P(K|E) where K is some particular hypothesis of immortality that you have yet to talk about. You allude in some cases to it being reincarnation, but backpedal from that whenever you are pinned down. You must pin down K and show that P(K|E) > P(H|E). Trying to infer that immortality is 1-P(H|E) commits the false-dilemma fallacy.

Oh, but we already showed that there can be no K that involves incarnation, for which P(K|E) > P(H|E). In fact, we proved that for any K that involves incarnation of a separately-existing soul, P(K) < P(H) necessarily. Just like the Texas sharpshooter fallacy, you seem to just want to set aside the problem and pretend it doesn't exist. I assure you it does.

 

[JayUtah]

Another point that should be stressed, is that Jabba seems to believe that if one hypothesis is unlikely, the opposite has to be likely. What he seems to miss (as did caveman), is that both hypotheses can be equally unlikely. Existence is not guaranteed by the sum of the probabilities. It isn't simply a case of "well, if I didn't exist under this hypothesis, I must exist under the other", when it could easily be "I had almost no chance of existing either way. Lucky me!"

P(H|E) + P(~H|E) = 1 for some event E, but that holds only as long as H and ~H are properly formulated as true complements -- which they most certainly are not in Jabba's model. Jabba's is a false dilemma, but it is by that false-dilemma logic he proposes to compute something else and infer from it that his own belief must therefore be true. <snip>

Take two singular hypotheses, K and L, from the universal hypothesis set, and you most certainly cannot say P(K|E) + P(L|E) = 1. This is what you seem to be trying to say, and what Jabba's model actually turns out to be.

Edited by Loss Leader: 

Edited for Rule 11

 

[RoboTimbo]

- What if an hypothesis claimed that X should never occur, and X occurs?

Which hypothesis claims that?

 

[JayUtah]

[/COLOR]6. - What if an hypothesis claimed that X should never occur, and X occurs?
7. Then the hypothesis is wrong.

You quoted godless dave's easy answer, but you sidestepped the discussion about how that abstract claim above relates to your proof. Let's try again.

First, the statement above holds for well-formed problems. Yours, as we've shown, is not well-formed. By quoting godless dave in a way that makes it seem like he vindicates you, you've begged the question of the well-formedness of your model and misrepresented his criticism of it. This is a hallmark of your argumentation. You pose questions in the abstract that have obvious correct answers, and then beg the question that your specific argument on some point is just an example of the abstract notion. It's as if I were to accuse you of murder without evidence, ask generally "What should be done with murderers?" and then apply the answer to you without first proving that you are a murderer who deserves what others say a murderer should get.

By well-formed we mean, in part, that X is an observation. That means objective information shorn of any attempt to explain it. In your model the data is the event E, which you have equivocated to mean not just the observation of self-awareness, but the notion that "a particular awareness" is a discrete entity. You talk about "particular selves" in connection with the observation, but that's an interpretation that tries to explain what's causing self-awareness. It's not an actual attribute of the observed phenomenon. You insist as part of E that the phenomenon you observe must occur in discrete, identifiable, enumerable quanta. Then you try to make H explain it, and conclude that it can't. You don't get to hide your assumptions by claiming they're part of the data.

Second, often what we're trying to test with a statistical inference is the purported connection between some hypothesis H and the data we observe X. When you estimate P(X|H), you do so according to certain presumptions about how H would go about explaining X. Those presumptions may not hold. If H is thought to preclude X, observing X doesn't mean necessarily that H is false, but possibly that your thinking is wrong on the point of the preclusion. Those are the cases when we can firmly establish priors and then use the likelihoods we assign to theories of causation to test the theory. Designing good empiricism relies heavily on this principle, and it is entirely missing from your thinking.

 

[caveman1917]

Oh, but we already showed that there can be no K that involves incarnation, for which P(K|E) > P(H|E). In fact, we proved that for any K that involves incarnation of a separately-existing soul, P(K) < P(H) necessarily. Just like the Texas sharpshooter fallacy, you seem to just want to set aside the problem and pretend it doesn't exist. I assure you it does.

You proved no such thing. Your pseudo-mathematical musings do not constitute proof of anything. They didn't the first time you made this, nor the second, nor the third, nor the however-many times you've simply repeated this incorrect assertion by now.

 

[godless dave]

Jabba, to avoid the Texas sharpshooter fallacy here you don't need to set yourself apart from "the rest of us guys", you need to set apart the observed result from all the other possible results that could have occurred.

This is what I was clumsily trying to say.

Shooting 7 billion bullets at a barn and then circling the bullet holes and saying "what are the odds I would hit these 7 billion targets?" is still the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.

 

[JayUtah]

I think that by using Bayesian statistics, I can virtually disprove the consensus scientific hypothesis that we each have only one, finite, life to live…

I note that you still continue to misstate your original proposition. You said you thought you could essentially prove immortality, not disprove some other thing. This is the second time you've tried to soften your proposition in the face of challenge. The first was when you admitted you couldn't prove immortality and suggested you should just prove "immateriality" instead, and the rest would somehow follow. Shall we consider that previous admission still operative?

In any case, you don't have your critics' leave to soften your proposition. You don't have their leave to change your affirmative case into a vague indirect negative one. Please stick to the original point, which is your proffered proof of immortality.

 

[Jabba]

TreeBranch2-TexasSharpshooter

5. For another thing, in many situations, the specific event is only one of NUMEROUS possible results (millions?) -- and for unlikelihood to be of consequence in such a case, the specific result has to be meaningfully set apart from most other possible results.
5.1. You never managed to set apart your existence from any of the other possible results.
5.2. - I don't set apart my existence from any of the possible results. I set apart my existence from most of the possible results.
5.3. And how do you do that?
5.4. - I'm a potential self that currently exists. Most potential selves do not currently exist (under modern science).
5.5. Before you existed, what set your potential self apart from the potential selves that didn't end up existing?
5.6. - Good question.
- I think that what really sets a result apart is there being a reasonable possibility that it wasn't the result of the hypothesis being evaluated -- and here, that applies to everyone who exists.
5.7. That doesn't help you avoid the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.
5.8. - In this case, all he had to do was hit the barn.
5.9. But he hasn't done that, he has just hit something, and painted a target round it.
That is all you have: one of the possible outcomes has occurred (as is inevitable), and you are claiming that it is special because it has occurred. It wasn't prespecified, and nothing sets it apart from all the other possible outcomes othe than the fact that it has occurred.

5.10. - My claim is that to be legitimate, a target does not need to be pre-specified. A legitimate target doesn't need red and white rings around it. Also, there are degrees of "targetness."
- I'm claiming that what makes a target legitimate is a reasonably possible alternative hypothesis to the hypothesis being evaluated -- and, the Bayesian formula accounts for that requirement with its prior probabilities...
- I'm saying that as soon as a result has a reasonably possible alternative explanation, we have a legitimate target.
- I think that's the answer because I can't find anything in the Bayesian instructions that refer to this issue. If you, or anyone else, can refer me to such a statement, I'll happily concede this claim.
- The Bayesian instructions seem to imply that the formula accounts for the Sharpshooter explanation.
5.11. - Can anyone provide a source that discusses the Sharp Shooter fallacy as it relates to any of the Bayesian formulas? Does the Sharp Shooter fallacy need to be considered when determining P(E|H)?
5.12. - I don't think that you ever responded to that claim. Can you provide a source contradicting my claim?
5.13. How about you provide a source supporting it?
5.14. - I can't. But, as I suggest above, the fact that I can't find anyone even talking about this issue suggests that the issue is accounted for by the Bayesian formula.
5.15. - I'm still not sure, but more specifically, this is why I think we don't have to worry about any Texas Sharp Shooter.
- There are 4 variables involved in the Bayesian approach: 2 prior probabilities, and 2 likelihoods.
- In the lottery situation, if the winner can't be set apart from the crowd, we accept that the prior probability of a rigged game is essentially zero, and the fact that the specific winner had just 1 chance in, say, 10 million, doesn't carry any weight.
- In my situation, I'm not limiting my claim to myself; I'm suggesting that we are all in the same boat. Consequently, I don't want to set myself apart from the rest of you guys, and the conclusion rests entirely upon the prior probabilities.
5.16 Just like last time, this does nothing to address the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. Each of our existences is one of many possibilities, all of which were unlikely before they happened.
If you hold several lotteries, and some of them have winners, there is no reason to think any of them are rigged.
5.17. Jabba, to avoid the Texas sharpshooter fallacy here you don't need to set yourself apart from "the rest of us guys", you need to set apart the observed result from all the other possible results that could have occurred.
5.18. Shooting 7 billion bullets at a barn and then circling the bullet holes and saying "what are the odds I would hit these 7 billion targets?" is still the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.
If someone else existed in your place, and presented the same argument in favour of immortality as you are presenting, would their argument be valid?

(To be continued)

 

[Toontown]

Jabba, to avoid the Texas sharpshooter fallacy here you don't need to set yourself apart from "the rest of us guys", you need to set apart the observed result from all the other possible results that could have occurred.

That seems simple enough.

The atoms that compose my brain form a significantly different result from those atoms being scattered about the universe in a giganogargantuan number of alternate random configurations. Which is what should have happened, given standard big bang theory. Any possible universe could have come out of the hot quantum stew of the Planck era.

This singular result is the only result I would be able to observe, (given Jabba's interpretation of H). That fact sets it apart, from the subjective perspective the formula takes, relative to Jabba's interpretation of H.

It's not a TS fallacy to be aware of that difference. One need only be aware of all the other possibilities that existed at the beginning of the Planck era. As long as all possibilies are considered, there is no fallacy.

OTC, it is fallacious to ignore the Planck era and it's gigagargantuan number of other possible universes, simply because you are aware of them only because a specific one of those possibilities emerged.

Awareness of all those other possibilities means, essentially, that standard big bang theory predicts that this particular brain should not exist, with a ridiculously high degree of certainty.

Jabba's interpretation of H is that this particular brain is the only thing that could ever be "me".

If someone else existed in your place, and presented the same argument in favour of immortality as you are presenting, would their argument be valid?

The fact that you ask this question suggests you may not grasp the subjective perspective of Jabba's formula.

Anyone can subjectively apply the formula to herself.

 

[Mojo]

I note that you still continue to misstate your original proposition. You said you thought you could essentially prove immortality, not disprove some other thing.

His argument is designed to 'disprove' pretty much anything it is applied to. If we define H as the hypothesis that Jabba has an immortal soul, it 'disproves' that.

 

[JayUtah]

I don't set apart my existence from any of the possible results. I set apart my existence from most of the possible results.

You don't set it apart at all. You define the thing you were searching for as the thing you found, after you found it. What "sets it apart" in your model is that it arose, not that you identified it before you arose.

I'm a potential self that currently exists. Most potential selves do not currently exist (under modern science).

No. "Modern science" has no such concept. Tacking those words onto the end of your ramblings doesn't make competing theories responsible for it.

Further, you can either be potential or actual. The terms are mutually exclusive.

- I think that what really sets a result apart is there being a reasonable possibility that it wasn't the result of the hypothesis being evaluated...

No. The presence of multiple options does not eliminate bias in choosing one of the options.

In this case, all he had to do was hit the barn.

No, you really don't understand what the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is. I've written extensively on it. Please pay attention.

My claim is that to be legitimate, a target does not need to be pre-specified.

Simply and obviously wrong. Declaring the sample that was drawn -- whether the target was the circle you drew around it or the barn you hit -- to be what is significant is exactly the Texas sharpshooter fallacy.

I'm claiming that what makes a target legitimate is a reasonably possible alternative hypothesis to the hypothesis being evaluated...

No. That there is a "rest of the barn" around the circle you drew around the bullet hole after you shot it is irrelevant. You are still committing the Texas sharpshooter fallacy.

...and, the Bayesian formula accounts for that requirement with its prior probabilities.

No, Bayes does not "magically" fix your argument. You are not an expert in Bayes while many of your critics have been. Listen to them.

I'm saying that as soon as a result has a reasonably possible alternative explanation, we have a legitimate target.

No. The essence of the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is not that you could have drawn the circle anywhere. It's that you drew the target (or decided it was the barn) after you fired the shot.

I think that's the answer because I can't find anything in the Bayesian instructions that refer to this issue.

Asked and answered. Statistical inference is not like reading the instructions and setting up your new HDTV. It is a field of expertise that requires considerable study and experience, both of which you admit you do not have.

If you, or anyone else, can refer me to such a statement, I'll happily concede this claim.

Asked and answered. Expecting the relevant literature in a field of study to specifically refute every which way it can be misused is irrational. It has been explained exactly why you are wrong, by people who understand the science. You refuse to concede.

The Bayesian instructions seem to imply that the formula accounts for the Sharpshooter explanation.

No.

I don't think that you ever responded to that claim. Can you provide a source contradicting my claim?

Reversing the burden of proof. Further, begs the question that a specific rebuttal to your error has already been written and published elsewhere. Again, you don't get to assume you are correct simply because the body of relevant literature does not refute your specific error. The judgment of error is based on diligent study and experience in the relevant sciences -- sciences you admit you are ignorant of. You have been shown that judgment and the rationale behind it. Do not try to dictate the only ways in which your critics can refute you.

(To be continued)

You have answered only some of your critics. Do you plan to address all the refutations you are given, or only the ones you think you can surmount? Correctness is determined by refuting the most damning of your critics, not the easiest.