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Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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Argumemnon,
- What I really think/suspect is that consciousness exists and is infinitely divisible.
- I think that for all the reasons I've already given. One of those reasons is that there are many more selves now than there used to be. In other words, Napoleon might currently exist in more than one person.


Jabba -

Define "consciousness" in a manner consistent with your ideas. What is it? What are its likes and dislikes? What are its memories? What differentiates one consciousness from another?
 
Argumemnon,
- What I really think/suspect is that consciousness exists and is infinitely divisible.
What does that even mean?
- I think that for all the reasons I've already given. One of those reasons is that there are many more selves now than there used to be. In other words, Napoleon might currently exist in more than one person.

Is Napoleon currently looking out of multiple sets of eyes?

 
The fact that you are asking these questions indicates that you have utterly failed to understand my point, and I've explained it about as well as I can, but I'll try again: There is some prior probability that a penny found laying on the sidewalk was dropped by a pedestrian, and some prior probability that it was transported there from the planet Xenu using a transporter beam. Now I stumble across a penny. How does that observation alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from? It doesn't. Neither of my hypotheses predicted that I would find a penny in that spot. Indeed, the hypotheses that I would find a penny in that spot did not exist until I found a penny in that spot. Therefore, my finding a penny in that spot does nothing to alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from.

Likewise, Jabba finds himself existing. Neither of his hypotheses predicted a priori that he, specifically, would exist. In fact, no hypothesis predicting that Jabba would exist existed until Jabba existed. Therefore, Jabba observing he exists does nothing to alter the probabilities about how people come to exist.

In neither case does the observation discriminate between the hypotheses, because neither hypothesis predicted the specific observation. Instead, in both cases, the whole problem is sitting in a universe where the evidence must have occurred.

jt,
- I still don't follow. If we were comparing OOFLam to we-each-have-an-infinity-of-finite-lives, wouldn't my current existence favor the latter hypothesis in terms of likelihood?

Jabba, I used analogy of a found-penny-on-the-street because it easier to reason about evidence when the evidence isn't ones own existence. But the problems are otherwise analogous.

If you want to understand why the likelihoods of your hypothesis are each 1, set aside those hypotheses for now, and concentrate on understanding the penny problem. First, make sure you understand the problem; then see if you can understand why the likelihoods are each 1. Then, and only then, try and see the similarity between the penny problem and your problem.

Hypothesizing after the results are known is a fallacy because, after observing the evidence, you change they hypothesis from the original, general hypothesis to a specific hypothesis that "just happens to" predict precisely the observed evidence.

One more analogy, which I've used before. Joe is told that a deck of cards sitting face-down on a table has a 50-50 chance of having either been shuffled or intentionally set in some order. Joe turns over the cards and observes the sequence: 6S, AH, 2D, 9D, ...., and he reasons as follows. If the cards had been shuffled, the probability of their winding up in this sequence would be about 1 in 10^68. However, if the cards had been stacked in this order, then the chance that they would be in this order would be 1. Therefore, the cards were almost certainly stacked.

A person who reasoned this way would always guess that the cards were stacked, but, based on the 50-50 prior odds, he would be wrong half the time. Therefore, there must be some error in his reasoning. Do you see it? Joe changed the hypothesis after he saw the sequence of the cards. Before seeing the sequence, the "stacked" hypothesis was H1 that the "cards care stacked in some sequence." After he saw the sequence the hypothesis became H2 the "cards are in this sequence." The original hypothesis did not predict the observed evidence; rather, hypothesis was altered so that it perfectly fit the observation.
 
If you want to understand why the likelihoods of your hypothesis are each 1, set aside those hypotheses for now, and concentrate on understanding the penny problem. First, make sure you understand the problem; then see if you can understand why the likelihoods are each 1. Then, and only then, try and see the similarity between the penny problem and your problem.

Minor point: the likelihoods aren't both 1, they are just equal to each other.

One more analogy, which I've used before. Joe is told that a deck of cards sitting face-down on a table has a 50-50 chance of having either been shuffled or intentionally set in some order.

Likewise the likelihoods here aren't both 1, they are both 1 / 52!
 
If it has already happened, the likelihood is 1. As in the case of a penny that was already present, or Jabba's observation of his existence.

No. The likelihood for a particular sequence of cards given that the deck has been shuffled is 1 / 52! and not 1.

ETA: let's make this into a betting game. I have shuffled a deck of cards, and can assure you that the shuffling has already happened. Now what is the likelihood that the sequence of cards is in order? (ie 1H, 2H, ...) Given that the shuffling has already happened the likelihood is 1, you say? Want to bet on it?
 
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jt,
- I still don't follow. If we were comparing OOFLam to we-each-have-an-infinity-of-finite-lives, wouldn't my current existence favor the latter hypothesis in terms of likelihood?

Well, perhaps. But what use is that? Look at this:

Premise: I have a piece of gold.

Hypothesis A: Gold is a rare substance.
Hypothesis B: Gold is a very common substance.

If you run a Bayesian analysis on that, you would conclude that B is the most probable. But it isn't. Or at least it isn't true.

This only works if you can and do assign reasonable probabilities. You cannot just invent some scenarios that have probabilities that suit your desired result.

Hans
 
No. The likelihood for a particular sequence of cards given that the deck has been shuffled is 1 / 52! and not 1.

ETA: let's make this into a betting game. I have shuffled a deck of cards, and can assure you that the shuffling has already happened. Now what is the likelihood that the sequence of cards is in order? (ie 1H, 2H, ...) Given that the shuffling has already happened the likelihood is 1, you say? Want to bet on it?

No, that is not what we are saying. We are saying that if the deck has been shuffled, one card drawn, and that card asks: "How likely is it that I'm here?" Then the probability is 1.

Hans
 
No. The likelihood for a particular sequence of cards given that the deck has been shuffled is 1 / 52! and not 1.

ETA: let's make this into a betting game. I have shuffled a deck of cards, and can assure you that the shuffling has already happened. Now what is the likelihood that the sequence of cards is in order? (ie 1H, 2H, ...) Given that the shuffling has already happened the likelihood is 1, you say? Want to bet on it?


No, the situation is whether or not the deck is shuffled, not what the sequence is. If the deck has been shuffled, the probability that it is shuffled is 1.
 
I've explained a couple times why your argument is wrong. I think you've got a blind spot on this one. Jabba's observation that he exists is conditioned on his existence, so whether trivial or not, his conditional likelihood terms under both his hypotheses (regardless of the details) are 1. His saying they are not is due to his not recognizing that he has conditioned on his existence.

The fact that you are asking these questions indicates that you have utterly failed to understand my point, and I've explained it about as well as I can, but I'll try again: There is some prior probability that a penny found laying on the sidewalk was dropped by a pedestrian, and some prior probability that it was transported there from the planet Xenu using a transporter beam. Now I stumble across a penny. How does that observation alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from? It doesn't. Neither of my hypotheses predicted that I would find a penny in that spot. Indeed, the hypotheses that I would find a penny in that spot did not exist until I found a penny in that spot. Therefore, my finding a penny in that spot does nothing to alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from.

Likewise, Jabba finds himself existing. Neither of his hypotheses predicted a priori that he, specifically, would exist. In fact, no hypothesis predicting that Jabba would exist existed until Jabba existed. Therefore, Jabba observing he exists does nothing to alter the probabilities about how people come to exist.

In neither case does the observation discriminate between the hypotheses, because neither hypothesis predicted the specific observation. Instead, in both cases, the whole problem is sitting in a universe where the evidence must have occurred.

jt,
- I still don't follow. If we were comparing OOFLam to we-each-have-an-infinity-of-finite-lives, wouldn't my current existence favor the latter hypothesis in terms of likelihood?

Jabba, I used analogy of a found-penny-on-the-street because it easier to reason about evidence when the evidence isn't ones own existence. But the problems are otherwise analogous.

If you want to understand why the likelihoods of your hypothesis are each 1, set aside those hypotheses for now, and concentrate on understanding the penny problem. First, make sure you understand the problem; then see if you can understand why the likelihoods are each 1. Then, and only then, try and see the similarity between the penny problem and your problem.

Hypothesizing after the results are known is a fallacy because, after observing the evidence, you change they hypothesis from the original, general hypothesis to a specific hypothesis that "just happens to" predict precisely the observed evidence.

One more analogy, which I've used before. Joe is told that a deck of cards sitting face-down on a table has a 50-50 chance of having either been shuffled or intentionally set in some order. Joe turns over the cards and observes the sequence: 6S, AH, 2D, 9D, ...., and he reasons as follows. If the cards had been shuffled, the probability of their winding up in this sequence would be about 1 in 10^68. However, if the cards had been stacked in this order, then the chance that they would be in this order would be 1. Therefore, the cards were almost certainly stacked.

A person who reasoned this way would always guess that the cards were stacked, but, based on the 50-50 prior odds, he would be wrong half the time. Therefore, there must be some error in his reasoning. Do you see it? Joe changed the hypothesis after he saw the sequence of the cards. Before seeing the sequence, the "stacked" hypothesis was H1 that the "cards care stacked in some sequence." After he saw the sequence the hypothesis became H2 the "cards are in this sequence." The original hypothesis did not predict the observed evidence; rather, hypothesis was altered so that it perfectly fit the observation.
jt,

- This is sort of long, but the first half should cover much of my approach to this issue: http://messiahornot.com/ACT2Scene1.php.

- I don't think that your example is analogous.
- To make the penny example analogous to my issue ... I find a penny lying on a street; one hypothesis would be that in the whole world there is only one penny lying on a street, while the other hypothesis is that in the whole world, there are numerous pennies lying on streets. That I happened to find one on my particular street, is much more likely given the second hypothesis.
 
jt,

- This is sort of long, but the first half should cover much of my approach to this issue: http://messiahornot.com/ACT2Scene1.php.

- I don't think that your example is analogous.
- To make the penny example analogous to my issue ... I find a penny lying on a street; one hypothesis would be that in the whole world there is only one penny lying on a street, while the other hypothesis is that in the whole world, there are numerous pennies lying on streets. That I happened to find one on my particular street, is much more likely given the second hypothesis.

And yet your existence is much more likely given H (in which your brain generates your sense of self).
 
This is sort of long, but the first half should cover much of my approach to this issue...

A lot of well-meaning but clueless authors spell out perfectly valid statistics arguments in an example, and then try very hard to shoehorn a proof of their beliefs into it. That is what you're doing. Look at all the stuff you have to purely make up and try to tack onto the materialist hypothesis to make it seem like it fits your model.

I find a penny lying on a street; one hypothesis would be that in the whole world there is only one penny lying on a street, while the other hypothesis is that in the whole world, there are numerous pennies lying on streets. That I happened to find one on my particular street, is much more likely given the second hypothesis.

As opposed to all the pennies that have ever existed over time in all the banks, pockets, and gumball machines in the universe? Not just the ones that are in the street? Not just the ones you find in the street? You still can't figure out what's wrong with your sampling strategy. Instead of trying to change your opponents' arguments to fit your script, why don't you listen very carefully to what they're trying to tell you.
 
jt,

- This is sort of long, but the first half should cover much of my approach to this issue: http://messiahornot.com/ACT2Scene1.php.

- I don't think that your example is analogous.
- To make the penny example analogous to my issue ... I find a penny lying on a street; one hypothesis would be that in the whole world there is only one penny lying on a street, while the other hypothesis is that in the whole world, there are numerous pennies lying on streets. That I happened to find one on my particular street, is much more likely given the second hypothesis.


So, rather than respond to a specific argument, you just quote your own scripture. I get it now. You are hopeless. I officially give up on you.
 
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When a potential self is instantiated in an actual human being, is it removed form the pool?

Also, I would like some advice on how to turn my pool of potential pennies into a small fortune.
 
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