(....)
Again to be fair to Mach, he sees the luminol in the context of a wider cleaning supported by additional corroborating evidence. The reality of the case however, is there was no cleaning, and no evidence to support a cleaning. In fact, the killer was quite messy and left blood and prints all over the apartment, none of which showed any signs of being cleaned. There were no relevant cleaning materials found at the crime scene, nor witness reports of cleanups or cleaner smells etc.
So it seems to be the conclusion is the luminol evidence can't be shown to be relevant to the crime, and the prosecutions chance to prove relevance with additional testing, failed, and actually favored the defense. There's really not much more to the luminol evidence.
I think it's useless for Mach and Vixen and any other PGP to talk about the forensic evidence, because it isn't the core of the case to them. They think Amanda is guilty because she looks and acts guilty. They should leave it at that, since is it the core of how they feel anyway, and it doesn't muddy the discussion with the false impression that this is a case about forensics.
There is one false thing and one true thing in this statement.
The true thing is that this is not a case about forensics - it has never been, it has not been so to the guilters, and it has never been so to the courts - and it is not supposed to be so. Forensics has indeed a fundamental role in establishing guilt in this case, but it is meant as forensic whole documentation, not laboratory forensics about a single physical detail (the focus on a few details is the defence frame).
The false thing is that I think Knox is guilty because of what "I feel". This is absolutely false: "feelings" have no place. This is not a case built on feelings, this is a case built on circumstantial evidence.
It is the paradigm of circumstantial evidence, that idea that indirect information has the logical power to draw to conclusion beyond reasonable doubt - it's not a problem if each of the single pieces of information have a degree of incompleteness if you parcel them out. Circumstantial evidence is something that the pro-Knoxes apply only to Guede, but in a warped, fuzzy and prejudicial way, inventing information that doesn't exist and ignoring inconsistencies and gaps - while at the same time they draw an equally nebuolus curtain on the evidence against Knox and Sollecito throug the same method.
This connects to another point: to understand that the concept of piece of evidence is that of an object of logical nature. It is a piece of logic, a piece of reasoning, an inference, a relation between findings, not a physical object. And so it is defined by Italian jurisprudence.
As for the code, evidence is not "brought in" or "brought at" the trial, but it is "formed" within the trial - the investigators only collect and bring "elements", and then it is the magistrates and the judge, the court, who make inference about the whole elements to form the evidence.
(This also implies the interesting - imho - concept that evidence may not be immediately obvious and self-evident to everyone)
Another point, is that in Italian proecedure code and jurisprudence, there is no concept of the "admissibility" of a piece of evidence. Or better, there is a concept of "usability" but it is merely on procedural grounds, about specific circumstances about the evidence that are made explicit by the code (there can be no concept of "usability" regarding the
content or the nature of evidence).