Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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You know someone is desperate when they start questioning the very fundamentals.

It's like on the Simpsons when lawyer Lionel Hutz says "But what is the truth, really? (if you follow me ;) )"
"Facts are meaningless. You could use facts to prove anything that's even remotely true!" --Homer Simpson
 
I misunderstood.

No, you tried to equivocate that "experience of a sense of self" included your theories about what causes that experience and what attributes that cause might have. And you got caught. After five years of being caught every time you try this stunt, one wonders why you still try.
 
And anyway, who has proven that the resulting sense of identity is not more than a process?

It's the null hypothesis in your proof. In any case, whether it's proven or not and whether you believe it or not, you have to reckon P(E|H) as if it were true. You don't get to say P(E|H) must be very low because you subjectively feel that P(H) is very low. That's not how your chosen method of inference works.
 
- A process is a "thing." It just isn't an "object."
- It can also be a very meaningful thing. Being a process doesn't mean it isn't real, nor that the particular identity resulting from a process couldn't return.


No. Under H, the "particular identity", "sense of self", or whatever you are going to call it does not "result from" a process, it is the process.

- And anyway, who has proven that the resulting sense of identity is not more than a process?


Doesn't matter. If H is true there are no immaterial souls, so you don't get to factor them into expressions of likelihood under H.
 
Dave,
- I want you guys to admit that H does address the experience we all have of self. H just posits that -- because everything is physical -- each specific self can have only one finite life at most.

OK. Let's see where H does address it. Jabba. "The experience we all have of self. "

Where is your argument that science recognizes souls? You've been talking nonsense for 5 years,
 
Dave,
- I want you guys to admit that H does address the experience we all have of self. H just posits that -- because everything is physical -- each specific self can have only one finite life at most.

pos·it
assume as a fact; put forward as a basis of argument.

If the self is an emergent process of the physical brain (per H), the self ceases to exist when the brain ceases functioning.

This is not a "posit" of H.
 
- And anyway, who has proven that the resulting sense of identity is not more than a process?


Jabba, you still haven't answered this:

Incidentally, Jabba, there's a question, first posted a few pages back, that you still haven't answered:

Say we have a six-sided die. We throw it, and it comes up as a 3 (event E). I form the hypothesis (H) that all six sides of the die have a 3 on them. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1, right?

You have an alternative hypothesis (let's call it J), that the six sides are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The likelihood of the observed event under this hypothesis is 1/6.

Then you pick up the die, and demonstrate that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

What is the likelihood of the the observed event if H is true?

Mojo,
- Couple of problems here.
- The die could be loaded.
- But I have already proven that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6...

And even then it wouldn't change the likelihood of Jabba's existence under H.

Jabba, can you answer the question about the die, please?

Mojo,
- Sorry, I was thinking that I had answered your question -- but apparently, I had gotten distracted and didn't quite finish...
- I have already proven that H is true, so I don't know that "likelihood" is an appropriate term in this case. If it is appropriate, I assume that the likelihood is 1.00.

Actually, in the hypothetical situation that the question was about you had demonstrated that H was false. H was the hypothesis that each side of the die had a three on it, and you had demonstrated that they were, in fact, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Do you agree that the likelihood of the observed event (throwing a 3) under H is 1.00 for this scenario?


If you can honestly provide the simple answer to this simpłe question, without ducking it by changing the scenario, you should be able to see why your question, "who has proven that the resulting sense of identity is not more than a process" is irrelevant to the calculation of likelihoods under H.
 
jond,
- I disagree. Science accepts that condoms and birth control pills prevent potential selves from becoming actual selves.

You are no legitimate spokesperson for the discipline of science. You're not a scientist. You are renowned for smearing scientists as liars and incompetents.
 
Mark,
- To me, it's obvious that by "we," scientists are referring to what we would call our "sense of self" or" identity." Most scientists seem to believe that everything is physical, including our identities, so they don't think that such identities can exist more than once, apiece. OOFLam is their hypothesis about our experience of identity that so many people think is non-physical and even returnable.

Nothing like lacking evidence to deter belief is there?
 
Dave,
- I want you guys to admit that H does address the experience we all have of self. H just posits that -- because everything is physical -- each specific self can have only one finite life at most.

And that that sense of self is an illusion, it is a faulty belief, it is phantom that does not exist.

The actual self is a body and the attendant processes are transitory and ephemeral.

Do you think that the smooth motion of a movie theater screen presentation is real? Or is it an illusion?

Don't even get me started on the blind spot...
 
Should that be "persistently dishonest behaviour?"

"Persistent, dishonest behaviour," doesn't look right either.

You know what I mean, I think
 
- A process is a "thing." It just isn't an "object."



Is 'going sixty' a thing!


- It can also be a very meaningful thing. Being a process doesn't mean it isn't real, nor that the particular identity resulting from a process couldn't return.
If it is a process then how can you say it is the self is the same each moment?
Is someone with Alzheimer's the same 'self' they were before Alzheimer's
- And anyway, who has proven that the resulting sense of identity is not more than a process?

Burden of proof on you to show that is is more than a brain process.
 
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