Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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theprestige said:
I'm pretty sure that at this point, Jabba takes every critique of his method as a blueprint for dishonestly extending the debate.
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Except he's no longer satisfied with simply stonewalling to extend the debate. He's making another "map" like he did with the Shroud debate.

The parallels are striking. In that thread he proposed to prove via Bayes that it was statistically unlikely for the Shroud of Turin to be a medieval forgery. He dismissed hard evidence such as the radiocarbon dating in favor of statistical inference across a false dilemma (not-medieval doesn't mean it belonged to Jeebus). He finally admitted his "defenses were breached," but kept at the debate for years. The tenor of the debate turned toward his contention that he'd been beaten unfairly: his closed-minded critics had refused to accept speculation as evidence, and a better audience would have crowned him the winner. His argument insisted on redefining "support" and "circumstantial" and other words, and keeping his answers ambiguous. Then he refused to answer anyone who didn't accept his non-evidence as evidence as a condition of the debate. But all along there was his "map," a Wordpress blog under his own domain name in which he copypasted an abridgement of the debate that simply left out all the parts that made Jabba's claims look foolish.

That's Jabba's (Non-)Effective Debate technique. This thread is following the same pattern. We've heard the same admission of defeat undercut by the same assertion to still be right. We've seen the same stonewalling and selective attention. We've seen the same obsession with inference over fact. And we've seen words redefined or left undefined. And we've been promised the "map."
 
Waterman said:
Jabba
You will have to expand further. It is not clear to me HOW your response addresses the question I asked. How would these differences make themselves known? 1)Would Xaterman who is an identical but separate entity from Waterman have different preferences, memories, habits or personality? 2)Would his intelligent, observant and loving wife be none the wiser for the switch?

You have continued to make the claim that a perfect replica would… wait a minute... what ARE you claiming. Could you clarify please?

I have Waterman and Xaterman the perfect clone which under YOUR scenario are somehow connected in some way. I place Waterman in a Blue Room and Xaterman in a Red Room. I ask each what color room they are in. Under H the answer is obvious. 3) Under YOUR scenario what do they each say?
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Waterman,
#1. No
#2. No.
#3.
- Keep in mind that I believe that a perfect physical copy would not bring me back to life if I were dead, nor have me looking out two pairs of eyes if I were still alive. In other words, I believe that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy. And consequently, in 'my scenario' Waterman would say, "blue," and Xaterman would say, "red."
- If I believed that they were connected in some way (that a physically perfect copy would be a totally perfect copy), I would expect them each to say, "blue and red."
 
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Jabba said:
Waterman,
- Keep in mind that I believe that a perfect physical copy would not bring me back to life if I were dead, nor have me looking out two pairs of eyes if I were still alive. In other words, I believe that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy. And consequently, in 'my scenario' Waterman would say, "blue," and Xaterman would say, "red."
- If I believed that they were connected in some way (that a physically perfect copy would be a totally perfect copy), I would expect them each to say, "blue and red."
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Under H they are not connected in any way if one is a perfect copy of the other. They are two identical people, with identical consciousnesses.
 
Jabba said:
Keep in mind that I believe that a perfect physical copy would not bring me back to life if I were dead...
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Keep in mind that this belief has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on E or H, which are not yours to contaminate with your beliefs, nor upon P(E|H), which must be reckoned as if H were true regardless of whether you believe it or not. Under H a perfect physical copy with be indistinguishable in all respects -- including the sense of self -- from the first instance.

I believe that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.
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But under H it would be.

You keep forgetting what you're trying to do. You're trying to falsify H. You're trying to do that by saying P(E|H)/P(E|~H) must be astronomically small because the numerator is small and the denominator is large. But your argument for P(E|H) being very small is predicated entirely on assuming that H can't explain all the soully nonsense you're trying to insist must be part of E. You've polluted E with what you "believe" and what you "claim," and your critics are entirely correct to point out that in so doing you've begged the question.
 
Jabba said:
- Keep in mind that I believe that a perfect physical copy would not bring me back to life if I were dead, nor have me looking out two pairs of eyes if I were still alive. In other words, I believe that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.
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Usually when we use the phrase "in other words", we express the same meaning with different words.

In this case, you said one thing:

Jabba said:
I believe that a perfect physical copy would not bring me back to life if I were dead, nor have me looking out two pairs of eyes if I were still alive.
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And then you said "in other words" followed by this:

Jabba said:
In other words, I believe that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.
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Which does not mean the same thing at all.

Under H, a totally perfect copy of you would not bring you back to life or have you looking out two pairs of eyes because a copy would be a copy. 1+1=2.

If you have trouble understanding this I suggest referring to the illustration I linked to in an earlier post.
 
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Jabba said:
Waterman,
-snip-
- Keep in mind that I believe that a perfect physical copy would not bring me back to life if I were dead, nor have me looking out two pairs of eyes if I were still alive. In other words, I believe that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy. And consequently, in 'my scenario' Waterman would say, "blue," and Xaterman would say, "red."
- If I believed that they were connected in some way (that a physically perfect copy would be a totally perfect copy), I would expect them each to say, "blue and red."
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So we are in agreement that:
1: A perfect clone would have no awareness of its status as copy
2: Those that knew the original would be unable to detect any change
3: There is no nonphysical connection between the original and clone each would have its independent existence.

I am merely restating if I have made any error please let me know.

The root of our disagreement seems to be:

that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy
So please explain to me what this missing non-physical difference is and how are you aware of its existance?

Please recall you stated above:

Jabba said:
- My claim doesn't presuppose a soul, it argues for a soul.
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MRC_Hans said:
The copy would bring YOU back to life. There would be no way (expect by observation of the copy process) to distinguish YOU before and YOU after.
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MRC_Hans said:
Take care not to smoke near your strawmen.
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Your no smoking rule does not alter the fact that we are talking about one ME (the original), and one copy of ME. The original would still be ME, and the copy would be somebody the original ME would never know or experience.

Irrespective of the collective ignorance of all the other observers, including the copy.

Here's how you can figure this out: which ME are you referring to in the highlighted part above? That could only be THIS me. The copy is hypothetical, and would exist in a hypothetical future, presumably after THIS me has died.

And THIS me, the only ME you can be referring to, will not be brought back to life if a copy is later made.
 
Jabba said:
I believe that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.
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Yes it would.

Remember, it's a copy. That means that all its properties, emergent or otherwise, are copies of your properties.

The fact that a perfect copy of you would have a perfect copy of your sense of self instead of some weird situation where your sense of self can see through 2 sets of eyes does not mean that its not a perfect copy.

Of course a perfect copy of you is going to have perfect copies of all your properties, including your sense of self. How could it possibly work any other way? The fact that that's not what you wish to happen if you were duplicated or the fact that you've imagined up some weird scenario involving duplicate people seeing out through multiple sets of eyes does not make a perfect copy of you any less than perfect.
 
Argumemnon said:
Who cares what you believe? Stop stating your beliefs. This is a forum for discussing argument of fact and evidence. You have none.
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Argumemnon,
- You're getting too harsh. If you really want me to read your stuff and respond, you need to pretend some respect ... and, it won't work if it looks too much like sarcasm...
 
Jabba said:
Argumemnon,
- You're getting too harsh. If you really want me to read your stuff and respond, you need to pretend some respect ... and, it won't work if it looks too much like sarcasm...
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Considering how little respect you give anyone here by ignoring their points, misrepresenting their statements and repeating claims rather than support them, you don't get to tell me how to act. You don't own this thread nor do you have any standing to command posters here. Shall I tell you where you can stick the respect you expect from me?
 
Jabba said:
Waterman,
#1. No
#2. No.
#3.
- Keep in mind that I believe that a perfect physical copy would not bring me back to life if I were dead, nor have me looking out two pairs of eyes if I were still alive. In other words, I believe that a physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy. And consequently, in 'my scenario' Waterman would say, "blue," and Xaterman would say, "red."
- If I believed that they were connected in some way (that a physically perfect copy would be a totally perfect copy), I would expect them each to say, "blue and red."
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godless dave said:
Usually when we use the phrase "in other words", we express the same meaning with different words.
In this case, you said one thing:
And then you said "in other words" followed by this:
Which does not mean the same thing at all.
Under H, a totally perfect copy of you would not bring you back to life or have you looking out two pairs of eyes because a copy would be a copy. 1+1=2.
If you have trouble understanding this I suggest referring to the illustration I linked to in an earlier post.
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- But, H recognizes what I'm experiencing and agrees that this particular experience would not return. IOW, H recognizes a difference between the original and the copy.
 
Jabba said:
- But, H recognizes what I'm experiencing and agrees that this particular experience would not return.
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Yes, the spacetime coordinates occupied by the copy are not the ones occupied by the original, so they are not the same instance of consciousness.

IOW, H recognizes a difference between the original and the copy.
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No. Under H, they are identical instances of consciousness. There is no difference between them. This is the point where you assume what you're trying to prove: that there is something unique about a particular instance of consciousness (i.e. a soul) that distinguishes it from another, identical, instance.
 
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Jabba said:
- But, H recognizes what I'm experiencing and agrees that this particular experience would not return. IOW, H recognizes a difference between the original and the copy.
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Different meaning distinct, not different meaning not identical. At this stage, when you use the words 'same' and 'different', it's starting to sound like you're deliberately equivocating on the meanings of those words.

Anyway, so what?
 
Jabba said:
- But, H recognizes what I'm experiencing and agrees that this particular experience would not return. IOW, H recognizes a difference between the original and the copy.
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No.

You're simply not getting what "difference" means here. They are distinct, but not different at all.
 
Jabba said:
- But, H recognizes what I'm experiencing and agrees that this particular experience would not return. IOW, H recognizes a difference between the original and the copy.
Click to expand...

Again, your statement after "in other words" has a different meaning than the statement before it.
 
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