Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[theprestige]

Dave,
- A ways above, you say that the "identity" I was alluding to doesn't sound like anything that exists under H. I then asked if H recognizes the "identity" to which I was alluding. My claim is that if H recognizes that identity, that identity is something that exists under H.
- I don't see how the immediately above answers that objection.

H recognizes identity as an effect. H disagrees with you about the cause of the effect.

Under H the cause of identity is a materialistic process.

You contend that the cause of identity is an immaterial soul.

Getting people to agree about the effect doesn't get you agreement about the cause. It also doesn't advance your argument about the cause.

 

[JayUtah]

LL,
- How about an infinity of, or an infinite life, or "now" isn't what we think it is, or...?

Yes, you can speculate all you want. However you don't get to prove immortality by begging skeptics to accept your speculation as a necessary premise. Skeptics are perfectly open to the notion that many things are possible. But proof means you can show us what actually is the case.

Also keep in mind that the opposite of "one finite life" is not "infinite life."

 

[JayUtah]

A ways above, you say that the "identity" I was alluding to doesn't sound like anything that exists under H.

Yes, and the answer was that what you refer to as "identity" borrows concepts from ~H and tries to include them as part of the observation.

I then asked if H recognizes the "identity" to which I was alluding.

Yes, you introduced "recognized" as a new ambiguous concept in this discussion. Without confirming or denying the attempt at equivocation, each of us -- Dave and I -- in our own way explained in precise language the relationship of H to the concept of identity.

You ignored most of it and are now simply trying to pose the question again. Nice try, but equivocating via "recognized" is not going to change the argument.

My claim is that if H recognizes that identity, that identity is something that exists under H.

The proposed separation of consciousness and identity doesn't exist under H. You're trying to take concepts from ~H and squeeze them into the observation, E, solely to say that H does or doesn't account for them.

I don't see how the immediately above answers that objection.

Then you should re-read the answers. Anthology posts like this one prove that you're both capable and willing (at least when it serves your needs) to go back and review the thread. It is most unfriendly of you to refuse to do that when it serves your critics' needs. The answers you seek are in the recent portions of the thread you surveyed to write this post.

 

[JayUtah]

Why do you distinguish the Volk's emergent properties from yours?

In Jabbaspeke, "emergent property" is just another word for soul. When we say "The sense of self is just an emergent property of the organism," Jabba takes that to mean some sort of magical quality. He has written at length about the proposed nobility of the human soul and the profound feelings of identity he feels. He is trying to paste something together out of these subjective feelings and make that be what materialism must mean by "emergent property," and thereby make H responsible for explaining all the subjective magic in the same terms as ~H does. Under H the sense of self is no more noble than the notion that a VW has a color. That it may be subjectively profound simply doesn't factor into anything in H.

 

[JayUtah]

And after just repeating yesterday's discussion, he's gone.

Indeed, we ended yesterday's discussion by not falling for the latest equivocation: "Does H 'recognize' my concept of identity?" Everyone saw the attempt for what it was and bypassed it, giving an accurate expostulation of H, and the difference between it and ~H in the proper respects, without latching onto the ambiguity. So Jabba tried again today, again unsuccessfully. Dollars to donuts, he'll try once more tomorrow to foist a new wibbly-wobbly ("This is where our language fails us" and "This is hard to parse") set of vague terminology. Proof by vigorous underlining, I suppose.

Jabba, you've played these silly word games for years. They never work. Why are you so rudely wasting everyone's time by them?

 

[Jabba]

This is the identity that doesn't exist under H:



This is the identity that does:

- Seems to me that the identity that doesn't exist under H is the ~H interpretation of the experience. H and ~H are referring to the same experience, they just interpret it differently. Here, we're trying to determine which is interpreting correctly.

 

[godless dave]

- Seems to me that the identity that doesn't exist under H is the ~H interpretation of the experience. H and ~H are referring to the same experience, they just interpret it differently. Here, we're trying to determine which is interpreting correctly.

Under H the thing having that experience, a human brain, can theoretically be duplicated, and the duplicate wouldn't be missing anything. The duplicate would have an identical experience.

 

[Jabba]

H recognizes identity as an effect. H disagrees with you about the cause of the effect.

Under H the cause of identity is a materialistic process.

You contend that the cause of identity is an immaterial soul.

Getting people to agree about the effect doesn't get you agreement about the cause. It also doesn't advance your argument about the cause.

Prestige,
- So, you agree with me that the identity we're dealing with does exist under H?

 

[JimOfAllTrades]

- Seems to me that the identity that doesn't exist under H is the ~H interpretation of the experience. H and ~H are referring to the same experience, they just interpret it differently. Here, we're trying to determine which is interpreting correctly.

Close, what is different under the two is the cause of the experience.

Under H it's caused by purely materialistic means, meaning that if you have a properly functioning brain a sense of self will emerge. All of the ~H scenarios you've alluded to still require the functioning brain, plus a bunch of other stuff for which there is no good evidence.

 

[Jabba]

Under H the thing having that experience, a human brain, can theoretically be duplicated, and the duplicate wouldn't be missing anything. The duplicate would have an identical experience.

- But H and ~H are talking about the same experience. They just interpret the experience differently. IOW, the experience does exist under H.

 

[JayUtah]

- Seems to me that the identity that doesn't exist under H is the ~H interpretation of the experience. H and ~H are referring to the same experience, they just interpret it differently. Here, we're trying to determine which is interpreting correctly.

Pure equivocation. "Interpret" in this context means "Try to determine what's causing it."

You have a sense of self. That observation is E.

H theorizes it is an emergent property of a functioning brain.
~H theorizes it is an immortal soul at work.

There is no need to complicate the terminology beyond that.

 

[JayUtah]

- But H and ~H are talking about the same experience. They just interpret the experience differently. IOW, the experience does exist under H.

You are trying to include elements of ~H in your description of E, the "experience." Do not simply keep trying to do so after having been told not to.

 

[Jabba]

Close, what is different under the two is the cause of the experience.

Under H it's caused by purely materialistic means, meaning that if you have a properly functioning brain a sense of self will emerge. All of the ~H scenarios you've alluded to still require the functioning brain, plus a bunch of other stuff for which there is no proof.

Jim,
- I basically agree...
- I'm not sure about what the other "bunch of stuff" is, but I do agree that I can't prove ~H.
- That's misleading, cause I do still think that I can virtually prove ~H -- but then again, I must admit that I'm not quite as sure of myself as I was...

 

[JayUtah]

Prestige,
- So, you agree with me that the identity we're dealing with does exist under H?

As has everyone else speaking to you today and tomorrow, theprestige has recognized and stepped around your latest attempt at equivocation and ambiguity. He has given a precise description of how materialism and your theory individually and differently account for H. Do not insult him and us by ignoring their precision and simply groveling as usual for agreement to your ambiguity, which you can then spin in your typical fashion to pretend someone has agreed with your conclusion.

It's very unfriendly when you quote people but ignore what they say.

 

[The Norseman]

What about the minute before and the minute after your child is born?

Ooohh! Nice one!



So, how about it, Jabba? What about being polite and answering my question?

 

[JimOfAllTrades]

- But H and ~H are talking about the same experience. They just interpret the experience differently. IOW, the experience does exist under H.

When just about everybody here uses the terms H and ~H, they are talking about the same experience, i.e. the sense of self. However, you seem to always try to add things to your description of the experience.

For example, when you say "consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity", that is wrong under H. The "particular identity" is not a separate thing that comes from somewhere else, it's just a part of the emergent property of consciousness, just as the yellowness of a VW is a property. There is no extra ineffable something to be accounted for. Under H your experience of a sense of self is caused by purely materialistic means.

So a sense of self using your description does not exist under H. But the experience of a sense of self without the "extras" that don't apply to H certainly does exist.

 

[JayUtah]

I'm not sure about what the other "bunch of stuff" is...

Since it has been described to you at length, in detail, several times, I don't buy this. Since you have today expressed your willingness to survey the thread and refer to several posts that form a line of reasoning, I suggest you survey the thread once again looking especially for responses to your arguments where people tell you, in effect, "That's not part of H." What they're responding to will be one of the "bunch of other stuff" you seem unclear about. Conversely, where people say, in effect, "Under H this would happen" is where you inappropriately try to place limits to conditions on H. That would also quality as part of that "bunch of other stuff."

It would be polite to refrain from pushing the discussion further until you have remediated your failure to attend to prior explanations you now seem to realize you need.

That's misleading, cause I do still think that I can virtually prove ~H --

"Virtual proof" is not a thing.

but then again, I must admit that I'm not quite as sure of myself as I was...

Good. Let's see if that translates into realizing you have prematurely dismissed valuable criticism on flimsy grounds.

 

[Loss Leader]

LL,
- How about an infinity of, or an infinite life, or "now" isn't what we think it is, or...?

You can't have an infinity of anything. Its mathematical concept. It has no physical application.

Sent from my SM-G930V using Tapatalk

 

[JimOfAllTrades]

Jim,
- I'm not sure about what the other "bunch of stuff" is, but I do agree that I can't prove ~H.

The other stuff is the immortal piece (or soul), a way for that part to connect to the brain, disconnect and connect with another brain, and background environment that those entities exist in and from which communicate with our environment.

 

[godless dave]

- But H and ~H are talking about the same experience. They just interpret the experience differently. IOW, the experience does exist under H.

I know. I've already said that several times and so have others.

What doesn't exist under H is some kind of identity that can't be duplicated.