Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[godless dave]

- It's a given. But H isn't.

Right, we're testing H against ~H.

And if the existence of your physical brain is a given, then P(E|H) is 1.

 

[Hokulele]

No, it provides a ratio of likelihood that an event will occur under one hypothesis versus another hypothesis. In this case, a physical brain is a given in both H and ~H. H requires only a physical brain, whereas ~H requires that same physical brain plus "something more." You insist -- without evidence -- that the likelihood ratio in this case favors ~H when, in fact, it cannot.

As I said, you're still wallowing in the very basics of proper formulation. This isn't a matter of you being a master at Bayesian inference. You admitted you didn't understand it. This isn't a matter of Bayesian statistics being some magical, obscure branch of study that none of your critics knows about. This is a very simple and straightforward case of you not having the faintest clue what you're doing.

Don't pretend your critics cannot confidently see just how very and obviously wrong your argument is.

Jabba is also dragging a hint of the gambler's fallacy into his argument. He is essentially claiming that if his existence is on its own unlikely, having more chances at it makes a specific instance of it more likely. It is kind of like claiming that because this particular coin flip landed heads, it is more likely I flipped it an infinite number of times to get this one heads, than I just flipped it once.

The problem is, as has been noted ad nauseum, it doesn't matter how likely or unlikely something is after the fact.

 

[JayUtah]

- It's a given. But H isn't.

But H follows almost directly from the premise of a physical brain without any further machination. If the physical brain is a given, then under H you have all you need to explain the self. Under ~H you have the brain, but you also need something else.

 

[jond]

But H follows almost directly from the premise of a physical brain without any further machination. If the physical brain is a given, then under H you have all you need to explain the self. Under ~H you have the brain, but you also need something else.

It's almost like he's desperate to avoid any acknowledgement of this basic fact.

 

[Belz...]

- I do think that there are (in a sense) potential selves -- so if there is no limited pool of potential selves, there must be (in a sense) an unlimited pool of potential selves.

WHY do you think there are potential selves?

This is my question. Stop dodging it.

 

[Jabba]

Why do you think there is an infinite pool of selves?

Argumemnon,
- Keep in mind that I think there is an infinite pool of potential selves -- and also, that there is no limited pool of potential selves. If there is no limited pool of potential selves, each self is brand new -- and, there is no limit on brand new. They come out of nowhere...

Argumemnon asked why you think that.

- No, he didn't. He asked why I think there is an infinite pool of selves -- not potential selves.

 

[Jabba]

WHY do you think there are potential selves?

This is my question. Stop dodging it.

- New selves are being conceived every second. The ones conceived 10 seconds from now are currently potential.

 

[jond]

See above.

 

[godless dave]

- New selves are being conceived every second. The ones conceived 10 seconds from now are currently potential.

And the Volkswagens that will be built 10 seconds from now are currently potential.

 

[JayUtah]

- I think I forgot...

I'll refresh your memory.

It was a feeble pseudo-philosophical handwave followed by some clearly erroneous arithemetic. First, without any rationale, you discretized the sense of self. Since under H the sense of self is a property, discretizing it makes no sense -- like asking how many "going 60 mph" there are. Then you elicited a concession that, if discretized, there was no inherent limit on the number of them that could arise. You then leaped from that to a claim that an unlimited number of them must now exist in some undefined "potential" form. And your final leap was to claim that this number, however tenuously derived, must somehow govern the probability that any one such sense of self could arise.

I do think that there are (in a sense) potential selves--

But you cannot say in what actual sense this occurs. You just demand that it must somehow be in a sense that creates something countable.

When people rightly point out that the only sense in which a "potential self" could exist would give rise to potential everythings, you pull out your magical thinking and declare the "self" to be a special thing, the only such thing that can have countable potentiality.

You're just making this up. And worse, the only way this has any role in your argument is if all this were part of H. It specifically is not. All this nonsense about potential selves is a gigantic red herring.

 

[JayUtah]

- No, he didn't. He asked why I think there is an infinite pool of selves -- not potential selves.

The intent of the question is clear. You're simply evading it.

 

[JayUtah]

- New selves are being conceived every second. The ones conceived 10 seconds from now are currently potential.

Under H the sense of self is not "conceived." It emerges as a property of a sufficiently developed organism -- a property it shares with every other such organism.

1. For a sense of self that will arise in 10 seconds, in what exact form does that "potential self" exist? If you cannot say in what form it exists, then by what rationale do you claim it can be counted?

2. If a sense of self is something that exists in some potential form prior to actually coming into existence, then by what line of reasoning should this not be extended to all things that come into existence? Then by what line of reasoning should this method of reckoning the probability of coming into existence not hold for all things?

 

[Belz...]

- New selves are being conceived every second. The ones conceived 10 seconds from now are currently potential.

You know, for someone who used the lack of "potential" in my previous question to avoid answering it, you're quite fond of not quite answering the question even when it's properly worded.

I asked you why you think there is an infinite pool of potential selves. You respond that there are potential selves. It doesn't say why the pool is infinite or why you think a self coming into being somehow draws from that pool.

In short you, again, have not answered.

 

[Hokulele]

- New selves are being conceived every second. The ones conceived 10 seconds from now are currently potential.

What about identical twins? Does the single fertilized egg actually contain two "selves"?

 

[Jabba]

And the Volkswagens that will be built 10 seconds from now are currently potential.

- I think that I agree.

 

[Jabba]

What about identical twins? Does the single fertilized egg actually contain two "selves"?

- Either two selves, or two potential selves.

 

[Hokulele]

- Either two selves, or two potential selves.

How does it know it needs two?

 

[godless dave]

- I think that I agree.

So are there an infinite number of potential Volkswagens?

 

[JayUtah]

I think that I agree.

How then does that affect the probability that a Volkswagen will arise?

 

[JayUtah]

How does it know it needs two?

Specifically, how under H would it know to need two?

Or, to bring the red herring home to roost -- assuming herrings can roost -- how, under H, does a single fertilized cell have a sense of self? We're letting the language drift quite close to Jabba's desire to foist the "sense of self" as identical to a soul, even when talking about H.

A single fertilized cell, under H, does not have a sense of self. Selfness under H does not occur at conception because it cannot arise until the brain has developed sufficiently.