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Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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Jabba said:
- No, I'm not. I'm just saying that "limited pool" is not nearly the same as "unlimited pool,' and that the word "pool" by itself, implies (to me) "limited pool." And, while I think that there is no limited pool of potential selves, I do think there is an unlimited pool of potential selves. I'll cease using the word "pool" by itself.
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Also "pool" implies there are selves existing somewhere waiting to be born, whereas the reality is that "self" developes with the organic brain.

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Mycroft said:
Also "pool" implies there are selves existing somewhere waiting to be born, whereas the reality is that "self" developes with the organic brain.
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It's one of the most bizarre flaws in Jabba's argument: it assumes that under H, which says that there are no immaterial souls, there are an infinite number of immaterial souls competing for his body, while under his preferred hypothesis, in which immaterial souls exist forever, hanging around waiting for a body, it is "a given" that Jabba's particular soul will get lucky and inhabit his body.
 
Jabba said:
Argumemnon,
- If there were two of me right now, I'd be looking out two sets of eyes.
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Nope.

If you were perfectly replicated, then then you would no more be looking out 2 sets of eyes than you would be occupying 2 positions in space. There would simply be 2 identical copies of you, each with its own physical presence, properties, self, etc.

How can you not agree with this, given that you've already agreed that your self is an emergent property of your brain? A perfect duplicate of you would have its own self, looking out its own eyes.
 
Mojo said:
It's one of the most bizarre flaws in Jabba's argument: it assumes that under H, which says that there are no immaterial souls, there are an infinite number of immaterial souls competing for his body, while under his preferred hypothesis, in which immaterial souls exist forever, hanging around waiting for a body, it is "a given" that Jabba's particular soul will get lucky and inhabit his body.
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And because us humans don't have a "formula" for recreating a functioning brain, it should be taken that the potential self that a functioning brain gets populated with is completely random.

So under Jabba's formulation of H, when a functioning brain comes into existence, it gets populated at random from an infinitely sized pool of potential selves. The odds of this happening are 1/infinity, which is "virtually zero" (whatever that means).

Because the odds of this happening are 1/infinity or "virtually zero" (whatever this means), Jabba has concluded that H is therefore wrong, and therefore we have immortal souls.

It's hard to imagine that he doesn't know exactly what's wrong with this argument. It's just awful in every way possible.

I've repeatedly asked Jabba a simple question that he won't answer - are there infinitely sized pools of potential Xs, where X are things/processes/properties other than selves?

I'm asking because I wonder if he's willing to actually hold to his own logic and conclude that just about everything you can imagine is immortal because he thinks it is plucked from an infinitely sized pool of potential existence.
 
Mojo said:
[Jabba's argument] assumes that under H, which says that there are no immaterial souls, there are an infinite number of immaterial souls competing for his body...
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Yes, but apparently only in the most abstract sense. He's said this set of "potential selves" doesn't exist in any operative way. Leaving aside how he's able to count these non-existent selves, the infinite number of them he says exist cannot be any different -- in this purely abstract fashion -- than potential Volkswagens. This is a point that's been made several times to him, and which he can answer only by claiming that potential "selves" are so qualitatively different from potential anything-elses as to disqualify the comparison -- a bold claim to make for an argument that admits they don't exist in any traditional sense. Jabba has to invent his own mode of existence in order to make his argument work, a mode of existence that magically provides all the attributes his argument requires and none of the attributes that would damage it.

...while under his preferred hypothesis, in which immaterial souls exist forever, hanging around waiting for a body, it is "a given" that Jabba's particular soul will get lucky and inhabit his body.
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Indeed, Jabba's attempt at proof begs several questions, this one most egregiously. As have done many before him, Jabba is trying to hide these begged questions in the inner mechanics of Bayesian inference. He's willing to grant as given certain things in ~H, the analogues of which in H suddenly become wholly probabilistic, and of a low order of probability.
 
JayUtah said:
Yes, but apparently only in the most abstract sense. He's said this set of "potential selves" doesn't exist in any operative way. Leaving aside how he's able to count these non-existent selves, the infinite number of them he says exist cannot be any different -- in this purely abstract fashion -- than potential Volkswagens. This is a point that's been made several times to him, and which he can answer only by claiming that potential "selves" are so qualitatively different from potential anything-elses as to disqualify the comparison -- a bold claim to make for an argument that admits they don't exist in any traditional sense. Jabba has to invent his own mode of existence in order to make his argument work, a mode of existence that magically provides all the attributes his argument requires and none of the attributes that would damage it.
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Meanwhile, I'm still trying to figure out how Jabba thinks he can count sperm and ovum of potential selves which never existed...
 
jond said:
Meanwhile, I'm still trying to figure out how Jabba thinks he can count sperm and ovum of potential selves which never existed...
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Indeed, the notion of "potential selves" is no part of H for so many reasons, not the least of which is its impracticality. The best reason, of course, is still parsimony. There is nothing in H that needs this highly abstract and problematic concept. Science doesn't contemplate causes for which there is no effect.

Argumemnon's and my fervor notwithstanding, the debate over whether "potential selves" come in pools, sets, buckets, or tote bags is really quite moot. Whatever collective language Jabba wants to apply, and whatever torturous line of reasoning leads from "no pools" to "infinite number," there simply is none of this in H, and attempts to reckon P(E|H) cannot validly include it.
 
Jabba said:
- B is a "given" part of the conditional. We don't need to worry about its probability.
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Even if it's "a given", its probability cannot be more than 1.

Multiplying a number by a number that is less than or equal to 1 cannot result in a number bigger than the original number.
 
Jabba said:
jond,
- My self is more likely to exist now if not all things are physical. If not all things are physical, my self may not depend upon my specific brain.
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On what does the self depend? Why does that make your "self's" existence more likely than if it were physical?

It would appear to me that the only answer to these questions is "God," but you're very careful never to use that word.
 
Loss Leader said:
On what does the self depend? Why does that make your "self's" existence more likely than if it were physical?

It would appear to me that the only answer to these questions is "God," but you're very careful never to use that word.
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LL,
- You're leaving out the key word -- "current."
- Doesn't that make a critical difference?
 
- Could be that I don't really understand what "a" and "b" are... Help?
 
Jabba said:
- Could be that I don't really understand what "a" and "b" are... Help?
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In my abstract illustration they aren't anything specific or concrete. They're simply two independent events.

If one outcome depends on one event only, but another outcome depends on both events, how can the second outcome ever be more probable than the first? One outcome requires only one event to occur. The other outcome requires both events to occur. And Bayes has nothing to do with this illustration, so don't think about trying to interpolate it again.

Re-read this until you understand it.
 
Jabba said:
Keep in mind that I've tried to explain this numerous times.
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Your explanation was refuted. You have no response to the refutation other than to mindlessly repeat the same failed claim.

But, I'll be back, and try again.
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Nobody wants you to try again. They want you to follow the previous try to its logical conclusion and accept it. This discussion persists for years for one reason only: you don't listen to your critics.
 
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