Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[godless dave]

Dave,
- I'm going to skip the first issue for now. I think we should focus on the second.
- I might actually agree with you here.
- I've already said that consciousness could be just another version of physical. I claim that it suggests/implies that not everything is physical, cause it seems different from anything else we call physical -- and then, if we go back to my original H (that we each have only one life to live (at most)), and you accepted that we were legitimate targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against us having only one life at most? (I changed H in an attempt to make it simpler, accepting that the new H required an additional logical step.)

No. It would only imply that we would have some reason to specify you as a target before you were born. That could imply some kind of predestination without implying reincarnation or multiple lives.

 

[jond]

Dave,
- I'm going to skip the first issue for now. I think we should focus on the second.
- I might actually agree with you here.
- I've already said that consciousness could be just another version of physical. I claim that it suggests/implies that not everything is physical, cause it seems different from anything else we call physical -- and then, if we go back to my original H (that we each have only one life to live (at most)), and you accepted that we were legitimate targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against us having only one life at most? (I changed H in an attempt to make it simpler, accepting that the new H required an additional logical step.)

No one agrees that we are legitimate targets. Further, you have been shown time and again that H is far more likely than your insistence on the self being a separate entity. Address that problem, please, Jabba.

 

[JayUtah]

I've already said that consciousness could be just another version of physical.

When reckoning P(E|H) in your model, you must do so as if the cause of E, your sense of self, were only physical. You must do this even if you don't believe it. This is essential to the type of model you say you're trying to create.

I claim that it suggests/implies that not everything is physical, cause it seems different from anything else we call physical --

First, under ~H you can do whatever you want. You can imagine whatever you want as the cause for the sense of self: a soul, demon possession, alien body snatchers, whatever. But can't when talking about P(E|H).

Second, "seems different" is just the same question-begging you've employed since Day One. You must have a soul because to you it feels like you do. Why would you think skeptics would entertain such an obviously broken argument?

and then, if we go back to my original H (that we each have only one life to live (at most))...

Your "original H" was a thing you foisted on your critics, the first in a string of straw men.

...and you accepted that we were legitimate targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against us having only one life at most?

"If you granted all my naked assertions, would you agree I had proven my case?"

Honestly, Jabba, this incessant groveling for agreement under foisted terms is really quite insulting.

 

[Belz...]

Dave,
- I'm going to skip the first issue for now. I think we should focus on the second.
- I might actually agree with you here.
- I've already said that consciousness could be just another version of physical. I claim that it suggests/implies that not everything is physical, cause it seems different from anything else we call physical -- and then, if we go back to my original H (that we each have only one life to live (at most)), and you accepted that we were legitimate targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against us having only one life at most? (I changed H in an attempt to make it simpler, accepting that the new H required an additional logical step.)

Stop defining stuff we already know and give your evidence for what I asked.

Where do you get the idea that there is a pool of potential selves?

 

[Hokulele]

- I've already said that consciousness could be just another version of physical. I claim that it suggests/implies that not everything is physical, cause it seems different from anything else we call physical -- and then, if we go back to my original H (that we each have only one life to live (at most)), and you accepted that we were legitimate targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against us having only one life at most? (I changed H in an attempt to make it simpler, accepting that the new H required an additional logical step.)

Pick an H, any H. Recklessly changing your definition of H means you will have to redo all of your priors, or your formula is simply garbage (well, it was already garbage, so this would be extra garbagy).

You are also begging the question. Again.

 

[godless dave]

I finally figured out how the multi-quote button works

Why is that what we'd get? Nothing about the self I experience suggests to me that it could look out of two sets of eyes. Nothing about my experience suggests that it can exist separately from my brain and the rest of my nervous system.

Dave,
- I'm going to skip the first issue for now. I think we should focus on the second.

Eventually we will have to get back to the first issue because it has to do with why P(E|H) is not some number over infinity and why the number of potential selves over all time is irrelevant to P(E|H).

 

[MRC_Hans]

Dave,
- I'm going to skip the first issue for now. I think we should focus on the second.
- I might actually agree with you here.
- I've already said that consciousness could be just another version of physical. I claim that it suggests/implies that not everything is physical, cause it seems different from anything else we call physical -- and then, if we go back to my original H (that we each have only one life to live (at most)), and you accepted that we were legitimate targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against us having only one life at most? (I changed H in an attempt to make it simpler, accepting that the new H required an additional logical step.)

Jabba, such claims are fine. And we can discuss this, no problem. But you can't put claims into a formula. Skip statistics, and we might discuss this.

Hans

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- I'm going to skip the first issue for now. I think we should focus on the second.
- I might actually agree with you here.
- I've already said that consciousness could be just another version of physical. I claim that it suggests/implies that not everything is physical, cause it seems different from anything else we call physical -- and then, if we go back to my original H (that we each have only one life to live (at most)), and you accepted that we were legitimate targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against us having only one life at most?

Jabba,
- if we take H as being the hypothesis that you have an immortal soul in addition to your body, do you think that your current existence is evidence against H?

 

[Loss Leader]

I've never heard of anyone besides you posit the existence of a self that could see through two sets of eyes.

Dave,
#1. If we were able to recreate the same person (self) while the person was still alive, that's what we'd get.

Jabba -

Prove it.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Dave,
- All that H claims is that there is nothing nonphysical. The self to which we are all referring is included by that "nothing."

No, it is included in "physical". It is not included in "nothing".

Hans

 

[jt512]

The glaring error in this and many other arguments in this thread is the claim that you can, in any sensible way, apply mathematics to this subject at all.

Hans

You can (and should) apply the logic of Bayes' Theorem to the problem. That is, look at the totality of the evidence, and ask how likely that evidence is there were such a thing as an immortal soul vs how likely that evidence is if there is not. In addition, I think you can base a prior odds of those hypotheses on their relative complexity. Jabba is, of course, doing nothing like this.

 

[jt512]

What makes you special?
Texas sharp-shooter: Fire the shot, then determine the target.

How were you defined before you were born?

Bingo! P(E|H, E) = 1 for any hypothesis, and cannot, therefore, discriminate between any two.

 

[Toontown]

It is quite possible to use one's existence to differentiate between two (or more) hypotheses.

If one's existence effectively rules out hypothesis A, but cannot rule out hypothesis B, then A and B are differentiated. A has been ruled out. B hasn't.

For an obvious hypothetical example, if a hypothesis predcts even s slight difference in any of the fundamental physical constants, the likely result would be a universe in which human life is ruled out. Thus, any observation of human life would quickly rule out that hypothesis.

And...no, I am not a fine-tuning creationist. However, unlike some ideologically driven scientists, creationists, skeptics, or whatnot, I have no problem with a randomly generated universe. Or an ensemble of them.

 

[Mojo]

If a hypothesis predicts values for fundamental constants that are other than they are observed to be, then it has problems even if we somehow failed to observe ourselves.

 

[Toontown]

If a hypothesis predicts values for fundamental constants that are other than they are observed to be, then it has problems even if we somehow failed to observe ourselves.

It was intended to be an obvious example, not a clever one. It was the first thing that popped into my head.

But it still works as an example. For example, we now have observational support for the value of the cosmological constant. But before that support came, the theoretical value was larger by 120 orders of magnitude.

Steven Weinberg later pointed out that if the cosmological constant were only one order of magnitude larger than its current observed value, the universe would suffer catastrophic inflation, which would preclude the formation of stars, and hence life.

But at the time of the erroneous theorizing, no one happened to notice the discrepancy between the theoretical value and their existence.

Yes, I know. Or the existence of stars. I'm aware that the observation of one's existence is often consistent with other observations. I try not to become concerned until inconsistencies arise.

 

[jt512]

It is quite possible to use one's existence to differentiate between two (or more) hypotheses.

Of course, when you haven't conditioned on the evidence itself.

 

[Mojo]

Of course, when you haven't conditioned on the evidence itself.

Be reasonable: how is Jabba supposed to know whether or not he exists without looking?

 

[Jabba]

Anyway, I think we've established that the self you're talking about is not the self described by H. So P(E|H) should not be based on that kind of self. P(E|H) should be based on the kind of self described by H.

Dave,
- I don't think that makes sense. H is simply, "Everything is physical." Everything includes what I experience as a sense of self. IOW, H includes my kind of self.

 

[Jabba]

No, it is included in "physical". It is not included in "nothing".

Hans

Hans,
- H is also, "Everything is physical." It is included in "everything."

 

[jsfisher]

Hans,
- H is also, "Everything is physical." It is included in "everything."

As others have mentioned, your H keeps changing. Even so, with this particular H, you have "at least one thing is non-physical" for ~H. How does that help you?