Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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#1. Yes. But, That's the point. Such a self would probably require something non-physical.
#2. If you accepted that you and I are valid targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against everything being physical?

What is a valid target?

Hans
 
People, because we have souls, where cars and mountain do not.

Nope, no begging the question, here!


I thought Jabba's existence was a valid target because he had somehow managed to specify it as an event before it had happened.

And if he could do that, he must have an immaterial soul that existed before his body did.
 
I thought Jabba's existence was a valid target because he had somehow managed to specify it as an event before it had happened.

He tried, but his E is that he observes that he has a sense of self. That introspection is important because simply observing the existence of a human organism is not the introspective observation of self. And since the observation cannot occur unless he exists, it's the same as saying no spot on the barn wall can be chosen unless it has a bullet hole in it.
 
Perhaps you might change your post slightly based on his few latest 'ideas', thusly:

Follow:
1. under H, the lielihood of your brain existing = X
2. under Jabba's ~H, the lielihood of your brain existing = X, the likelihood of some sort of transmitter existing and transmitting 'soul'-like stuff = y; the likelihood of your brain being a receiver of this undetectable transmission and receive the correct signal = z
x + y + z is always going to be more than x alone.

I understand what Joe Bentley was trying to say here, but he failed to say it.

The analysis would make somewhat more sense if x, y, and z were expressed as 'odds against', but even then it's wrong to just add them like that.

The correct way to show what he tried to show is to make those "likelihoods" probabilities, and then multiply them, resulting in a smaller probability than x alone.

Anyhow, I am willing, in the interest of harmony, to change my question to Joe Bentley from:

1. How do I know you're not the anti-intellectual?

to:

1. How do I know your opinion of my post, or your opinions on this thread subject in general, are worth bothering myself about?
 
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I understand what Joe Bentley was trying to say here, but he failed to say it.

The analysis would make somewhat more sense if x, y, and z were expressed as 'odds against', but even then it's wrong to just add them like that.

The correct way to show what he tried to show is to make those "likelihoods" probabilities, and then multiply them, resulting in a smaller probability than x alone.

It's just the latest in this string of pseudo-mathematical musings. The argument was expressed earlier in better form as thus:

Let M be that we have a brain. Let S be that we have a brain and soul (and connection between these). S is a subset of M. Then the argument went: given that S is a subset of M therefor for any probability function P it is true that P(M) >= P(S). So they conclude that it is more likely that you don't have a soul than that you do. I'm sure you can find the glaring error in that argument.
 
It's just the latest in this string of pseudo-mathematical musings. The argument was expressed earlier in better form as thus:

Let M be that we have a brain. Let S be that we have a brain and soul (and connection between these). S is a subset of M. Then the argument went: given that S is a subset of M therefor for any probability function P it is true that P(M) >= P(S). So they conclude that it is more likely that you don't have a soul than that you do. I'm sure you can find the glaring error in that argument.


No, we're (or at least I am - I can't really speak for anyone else) arguing that if Jabba's statistical argument against materialism is valid then it is also an argument against his own position.
 
#1. Yes. But, That's the point. Such a self would probably require something non-physical.
#2. If you accepted that you and I are valid targets, would you agree that our current existence is evidence against everything being physical?

1) Since there's no evidence such selves exist, we have no reason to suspect the existence of something nonphysical.
2) I don't accept that we're valid targets. We are two of a huge number of possible outcomes. I don't see how our current existence is evidence against everything being physical.
Dave,
#1. There is evidence -- you just don't think that it's worth anything. There are plenty of apparently intelligent people who disagree with you.
#2. But, you didn't answer the question. I asked, if you agreed with proposition A, would you agree with proposition B?
 
Dave,
#1. There is evidence -- you just don't think that it's worth anything. There are plenty of apparently intelligent people who disagree with you.
#2. But, you didn't answer the question. I asked, if you agreed with proposition A, would you agree with proposition B?

Jabba,
- Do you think that your and Dave's current existence is evidence against the existence of souls?
 
The problem isn't going to go away by your continued ignoring it.

Also, the evidence you've provided thus far in no way supports the existence of souls. Remember where we left off? I do.
 
Dave,
#1. There is evidence -- you just don't think that it's worth anything. There are plenty of apparently intelligent people who disagree with you.

I've never heard of anyone besides you posit the existence of a self that could see through two sets of eyes.

#2. But, you didn't answer the question. I asked, if you agreed with proposition A, would you agree with proposition B?

No because proposition A is far too vague.
 
There is evidence...

No, there isn't.

...you just don't think that it's worth anything.

It has been shown not to be worth anything. You have an established style where you demand that non-evidence be taken at face value, ignoring the reasons given why it is not evidence. It should be obvious by now that it will no longer work.

You have been asked to show evidence or observation that a materialist explanation cannot account for. Not only have you failed to do so, you have admitted you cannot. You attempt to soothe that admission by speculating that there are observations science cannot yet see and, were they visible, they would be explicable only via some non-material cause. That is the nadir of wishful thinking.

There are plenty of apparently intelligent people who disagree with you.

Irrelevant, as the question has been settled on an evidentiary basis and conceded as such by you. Do not attempt to reopen closed debates on no greater basis than ad hominem rehabilitation. If the basis of your attempt at rehabilitation is the separate thread you started with a different question than this, I suggest you refresh your memory about how that thread turned out.

But, you didn't answer the question.

I don't have time to find the mocking dog GIF, so just pretend it's here.
 
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I understand what Joe Bentley was trying to say here, but he failed to say it.
That was actually jond's post I was changing, not Joe Bentley. My bad; these days I usually post once when responding to multiple people, rather than one post per person.


The analysis would make somewhat more sense if x, y, and z were expressed as 'odds against', but even then it's wrong to just add them like that.

The correct way to show what he tried to show is to make those "likelihoods" probabilities, and then multiply them, resulting in a smaller probability than x alone.
And yes, from what I recall, you're right — they do not add, they multiply. I just wanted to change the focus from 'souls' to 'brain-is-a-radio' since that's the (or one of the) last things Jabba had tried to put forth.


Anyhow, I am willing, in the interest of harmony, to change my question to Joe Bentley from:

1. How do I know you're not the anti-intellectual?

to:

1. How do I know your opinion of my post, or your opinions on this thread subject in general, are worth bothering myself about?
Are you intending them to be rhetorical questions? It seems that only you could reasonably answer that last question. Unless you'll take my word for it.
 
It's just the latest in this string of pseudo-mathematical musings. The argument was expressed earlier in better form as thus:

Let M be that we have a brain. Let S be that we have a brain and soul (and connection between these). S is a subset of M. Then the argument went: given that S is a subset of M therefor for any probability function P it is true that P(M) >= P(S). So they conclude that it is more likely that you don't have a soul than that you do. I'm sure you can find the glaring error in that argument.

Yeah, circular argument. But I trust this was disposed of quickly.
 
Dave,
#1. There is evidence -- you just don't think that it's worth anything. There are plenty of apparently intelligent people who disagree with you.
#2. But, you didn't answer the question. I asked, if you agreed with proposition A, would you agree with proposition B?

My Dear Mr. Savage:

Argument from authority? Really? To avoid derail, PM this list of "plenty" of apparently intelligent people...TY

Have you the vaguest concept of how many of MY, and others', questions you have not answered? Bit of cheek, ¿no?

I remain, undeterredly yours &ct.
 
Yeah, circular argument. But I trust this was disposed of quickly.

Not exactly circular, and it's still making the rounds.

Problem is that M is not "we only have a brain" but "we have a brain (and may or may not have a soul as well)". P(M) >= P(S) does not say anything about whether P(M \ S) is smaller or greater than P(S), yet in the conclusion they switch from P(M) >= P(S) to P(M \ S) >= P(S) (ie using the subset/superset thing to conclude that it is more likely that we do not have a soul, ie M \ S, than that we do, ie S). The problem is a switcheroo between P(M) and P(M \ S).
 
#1. There is evidence -- you just don't think that it's worth anything. There are plenty of apparently intelligent people who disagree with you.

Plenty of evidence you haven't presented. And do you think that reality is a popularity contest? Who cares how many people agree with you?
 
Not exactly circular, and it's still making the rounds.

Problem is that M is not "we only have a brain" but "we have a brain (and may or may not have a soul as well)". P(M) >= P(S) does not say anything about whether P(M \ S) is smaller or greater than P(S), yet in the conclusion they switch from P(M) >= P(S) to P(M \ S) >= P(S) (ie using the subset/superset thing to conclude that it is more likely that we do not have a soul, ie M \ S, than that we do, ie S). The problem is a switcheroo between P(M) and P(M \ S).

OK, I see what they did. It's not exactly circular, but I'm counting two subsets of M

M \ S and S

And no way to establish which subset is larger. So they pulled the old switcheroo, if I'm understanding your explanation correctly.

They will do anything to prove there is no soul.

Actually, I favor the conclusion, but definitely not the way it was arrived at.
 
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