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Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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They are not competing hypotheses about how he came to exist. But now I understand how you've gotten to your argument and why you were trying to insert E in the likelihoods earlier. Refer back to my earlier example about my parents having met:

H is "my parents have met"
~H is "my parents have not met"
P(H) = P(~H)
E is "I exist" <- this is not where Jabba's argument fails
P(E|H) > P(E|~H) <- this is where his argument fails

Then (assuming I came to exist either through my parents having regular intercourse or my parents having used artificial insemination):
E n H = "I came to exist through my parents having regular intercourse"
E n ~H = "I came to exist through my parents having used artificial insemination"

The hypotheses about how I came to exist are E n H and E n ~H and not H or ~H. The latter are hypotheses about the universe in general (whether it is one where my parents have met or not) for which my existence is merely relevant.

Trivially P(E | E n H) = P(E | E n ~H) = 1, but that's neither relevant - it just says that the probability of an event conditioned on a subset is 1 - nor does "your own existence" have anything to do with it, since as you can see P(E | E n H) = P(E | E n ~H) for any events E and H.

Likewise in Jabba's argument the hypotheses are not about how he came to exist, but about the universe in general (whether it is one where our selves are mortal or not). But in his case his existence is not even relevant to them, which is, again, where it fails. You can see this by Jabba arguing that the likelihood of his existence under H is "virtually zero" and not "exactly 1".


I've explained a couple times why your argument is wrong. I think you've got a blind spot on this one. Jabba's observation that he exists is conditioned on his existence, so whether trivial or not, his conditional likelihood terms under both his hypotheses (regardless of the details) are 1. His saying they are not is due to his not recognizing that he has conditioned on his existence.
 
I've explained a couple times why your argument is wrong.

It isn't wrong. And you've not explained anything, you've merely made a bunch of assertions. Yours is wrong, though, and I have explained a couple of times why - even giving you a full counter-example.

Jabba's observation that he exists is conditioned on his existence

My observation that I exist is conditioned on my existence, hence I can't conclude anything about whether my parents have met? Is every observation of an event conditioned on the event? If yes, how is statistics even possible, if every likelihood is equal to 1 because every one of our observations of an event is conditioned on the event? If no, give an example of an observation of an event which is not conditioned on the event.
 
What I do find interesting in reading through the debate is that he never even acknowledges the very valid criticisms of his debating style.

That assumes he's willing to take an objective view of his performance. He has said he is here at ISF, in part, to explore (and ostensibly to instruct) the virtues of what he terms "effective debate." Now in reality he doesn't adhere to his own rules, and has shown he is ineffective even in a one-on-one debate where the rules presumably hold sway. But when you allege your prowess at debate as part of the question you're debating, you're just as liable to overlook flaws in that part of the argument as you are flaws in your argument over the merits of the question.

It's all rather odd and curious to me.

Odd and curious, but to me predictable. He has stated in no uncertain terms that he is strongly emotionally vested in one particular outcome of the debate over the immortal soul. It stands to reason he is similarly emotionally invested in the proposition that he is very knowledgeable and skilled at debate.
 
Is every observation of an event conditioned on the event? If yes, how is statistics even possible, if every likelihood is equal to 1 because every one of our observations of an event is conditioned on the event? If no, give an example of an observation of an event which is not conditioned on the event.


The fact that you are asking these questions indicates that you have utterly failed to understand my point, and I've explained it about as well as I can, but I'll try again: There is some prior probability that a penny found laying on the sidewalk was dropped by a pedestrian, and some prior probability that it was transported there from the planet Xenu using a transporter beam. Now I stumble across a penny. How does that observation alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from? It doesn't. Neither of my hypotheses predicted that I would find a penny in that spot. Indeed, the hypotheses that I would find a penny in that spot did not exist until I found a penny in that spot. Therefore, my finding a penny in that spot does nothing to alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from.

Likewise, Jabba finds himself existing. Neither of his hypotheses predicted a priori that he, specifically, would exist. In fact, no hypothesis predicting that Jabba would exist existed until Jabba existed. Therefore, Jabba observing he exists does nothing to alter the probabilities about how people come to exist.

In neither case does the observation discriminate between the hypotheses, because neither hypothesis predicted the specific observation. Instead, in both cases, the whole problem is sitting in a universe where the evidence must have occurred.
 
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There is some prior probability that a penny found laying on the sidewalk was dropped by a pedestrian, and some prior probability that it was transported there from the planet Xenu using a transporter beam. Now I stumble across a penny. How does that observation alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from? It doesn't. Neither of my hypotheses predicted that I would find a penny in that spot.

Both of them do - see highlight. Clarify your example, explicitly define the events involved.
 
The fact that you are asking these questions indicates that you have utterly failed to understand my point, and I've explained it about as well as I can, but I'll try again: There is some prior probability that a penny found laying on the sidewalk was dropped by a pedestrian, and some prior probability that it was transported there from the planet Xenu using a transporter beam. Now I stumble across a penny. How does that observation alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from? It doesn't. Neither of my hypotheses predicted that I would find a penny in that spot. Indeed, the hypotheses that I would find a penny in that spot did not exist until I found a penny in that spot. Therefore, my finding a penny in that spot does nothing to alter my probabilities about where pennies on the sidewalk come from.

Likewise, Jabba finds himself existing. Neither of his hypotheses predicted a priori that he, specifically, would exist. In fact, no hypothesis predicting that Jabba would exist existed until Jabba existed. Therefore, Jabba observing he exists does nothing to alter the probabilities about how people come to exist.

In neither case does the observation discriminate between the hypotheses, because neither hypothesis predicted the specific observation. Instead, in both cases, the whole problem is sitting in a universe where the evidence must have occurred.


And this, incidentally, is why when Jabba says "infinity" he means infinity and not just some Very Big Number. His method will only distinguish between a hypothesis under which his existence is possible and one under which it is impossible, not between two hypotheses under which his existence has different probabilities. The only way his method of argument can prove* immortality is by demonstrating that his existence is impossible under H. For that he needs to make its probability zero, and for that he needs his factor of one over infinity.


*That is, if we ignore its other flaws such as the false dilemma.
 
And this, incidentally, is why when Jabba says "infinity" he means infinity and not just some Very Big Number. His method will only distinguish between a hypothesis under which his existence is possible and one under which it is impossible, not between two hypotheses under which his existence has different probabilities. The only way his method of argument can prove* immortality is by demonstrating that his existence is impossible under H. For that he needs to make its probability zero, and for that he needs his factor of one over infinity.

Have you ever read a probability theory textbook?
 
We know exactly who will "come out". That person. Just like when we build a Volkswagen we know exactly which Volkswagen will come out, even if we already built 1000 just like it.

Under H, there is no separate identity property.
Dave,
- Again, what I'll be saying seems totally obvious to me -- which makes it quite difficult to explain...

1. Anyway, there is an aspect of the "self" that we can't begin to predict.
2. People who believe in H and people who don't believe in H perceive the same thing, process, illusion or delusion that you and I both call the "self."
3. This is the same perception that reincarnationists believe returns and that atheists believe does not.
4. And, you and I both believe that this part of what we call the "self" would not return, could not be brought back to life, through a perfect physical copy.
5. IOW, we do not have a formula for this aspect, part, version of what we both call the "self.
6. And that being so, the best we can do as to predicting the likelihood of one's current existence is the number of these current selves divided by the number of potential selves.
7. And, unfortunately, we don't know how many different types of things (humans, animals, vegetation, rocks, etc.) -- and, as Caveman suggested -- different worlds or universes, produce consciousness (and selves)...

- I claim that due to the emergent property of consciousness, we humans have what we call a "self," that volkswagons do not have such a thing and that it is this thing, this particular self-awareness, that we can't begin to predict.
 
Dave,
- Again, what I'll be saying seems totally obvious to me -- which makes it quite difficult to explain...

1. Anyway, there is an aspect of the "self" that we can't begin to predict.
2. People who believe in H and people who don't believe in H perceive the same thing, process, illusion or delusion that you and I both call the "self."
3. This is the same perception that reincarnationists believe returns and that atheists believe does not.
4. And, you and I both believe that this part of what we call the "self" would not return, could not be brought back to life, through a perfect physical copy.
5. IOW, we do not have a formula for this aspect, part, version of what we both call the "self.
6. And that being so, the best we can do as to predicting the likelihood of one's current existence is the number of these current selves divided by the number of potential selves.
7. And, unfortunately, we don't know how many different types of things (humans, animals, vegetation, rocks, etc.) -- and, as Caveman suggested -- different worlds or universes, produce consciousness (and selves)...

- I claim that due to the emergent property of consciousness, we humans have what we call a "self," that volkswagons do not have such a thing and that it is this thing, this particular self-awareness, that we can't begin to predict.

Rinse, repeat.

What's the point of responding to you at all if every post of yours will just be the exact same thing?
 
Dave,
- Again, what I'll be saying seems totally obvious to me -- which makes it quite difficult to explain...

1. Anyway, there is an aspect of the "self" that we can't begin to predict.
2. People who believe in H and people who don't believe in H perceive the same thing, process, illusion or delusion that you and I both call the "self."

The difference being that under H, we can predict it.

3. This is the same perception that reincarnationists believe returns and that atheists believe does not.
4. And, you and I both believe that this part of what we call the "self" would not return, could not be brought back to life, through a perfect physical copy.

Because, like literally everything else in the universe, a copy is separate from the original, even if it's exactly like it in every respect.

5. IOW, we do not have a formula for this aspect, part, version of what we both call the "self.

But we do have a formula for it. The formula for the brain is the formula for the self. They're the same thing.

If you could follow that formula twice, you would get two brains, not one. For exactly the same reason, you would get two selves, not one. And there would be no difference between the selves.

Let me ask you this. Is there a formula for the 2013 Volkswagen Beetle in my driveway? Not a formula for just any red 2013 Volkswagen Beetle, but that specific one?

Volkswagen has the design plans and build instructions for 2013 Volkswagen Beetles. It probably wouldn't be hard to retool one of their factories to produce them again. But could they ever build the same Volkswagen Beetle again?
 
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And here's today's morning reset. Forecast is for 70% chance of another one later this evening.

Again, what I'll be saying seems totally obvious to me --

What part of "effective debate" means simply repeating yourself over and over again and ignoring everything that anyone else has said? You seem to have mistaken this forum for a pulpit.

which makes it quite difficult to explain...

No. Things that are obvious are the easiest to explain. You're just begging the question.

Anyway, there is an aspect of the "self" that we can't begin to predict.

Under H there is just the sense of self, an emergent property of the functioning organism. There is no separate "aspect" of it that magically fits the description you seek.

People who believe in H and people who don't believe in H perceive the same thing, process, illusion or delusion that you and I both call the "self."

Yes, everyone has the same sense of self because everyone is an organism.

This is the same perception that reincarnationists believe returns and that atheists believe does not.

Stipulated with reservation, because we can't be sure you speak for recreationists (er, reincarnationists). Just say what you believe and quit dragging others into it who aren't party to the debate.

And, you and I both believe that this part of what we call the "self" would not return, could not be brought back to life, through a perfect physical copy.

Say what you believe. Don't try to say what Dave believes. You have a bad habit of putting words in other people's mouths pretending they agree with you. Stop that and let him speak for himself.

There is no separate "part" of the "self" under H. There is only the physical organism and the properties it exhibits.

IOW, we do not have a formula for this aspect, part, version of what we both call the "self.

Under H we do. If you reproduce the physical organism, it will reproduce the properties of the organism, including the sense of self. You have merely invented a new "self" not described in H and tried to pin it on H solely for the purpose of saying H does not explain it. It really doesn't get any more circular than that.

And that being so, the best we can do as to predicting the likelihood of one's current existence is the number of these current selves divided by the number of potential selves.

No, for the vast number of reasons you know all too well and simply choose not to face. There is no infinitely large set of "potential selves" under H that has the slightest bit to do with the actual likelihood of a person existing.

And, unfortunately, we don't know how many different types of things (humans, animals, vegetation, rocks, etc.) -- and, as Caveman suggested -- different worlds or universes, produce consciousness (and selves)...

That is only one of many ways your model lacks mathematical validity.

I claim that due to the emergent property of consciousness, we humans have what we call a "self," that volkswagons do not have such a thing...

Just a different flavor of the Texas sharpshooter fallacy. Volkswagens have different emergent properties, ones that humans don't have. Hence we can still apply your same model to Volkswagens and say they don't exist via your model. Reductio ad absurdum. You're trying to attribute magical significance to the property under H of the sense of self. Under H it has none.

...and that it is this thing, this particular self-awareness, that we can't begin to predict.

Just begging the same question you beg once or twice a day for years on end. Try to work out why it still seems obvious to you after so much discussion.
 
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Dave,
- Again, what I'll be saying seems totally obvious to me -- which makes it quite difficult to explain...

1. Anyway, there is an aspect of the "self" that we can't begin to predict.
2. People who believe in H and people who don't believe in H perceive the same thing, process, illusion or delusion that you and I both call the "self."
3. This is the same perception that reincarnationists believe returns and that atheists believe does not.
4. And, you and I both believe that this part of what we call the "self" would not return, could not be brought back to life, through a perfect physical copy.
5. IOW, we do not have a formula for this aspect, part, version of what we both call the "self.
6. And that being so, the best we can do as to predicting the likelihood of one's current existence is the number of these current selves divided by the number of potential selves.
7. And, unfortunately, we don't know how many different types of things (humans, animals, vegetation, rocks, etc.) -- and, as Caveman suggested -- different worlds or universes, produce consciousness (and selves)...

- I claim that due to the emergent property of consciousness, we humans have what we call a "self," that volkswagons do not have such a thing and that it is this thing, this particular self-awareness, that we can't begin to predict.


Jabba, if we could perfectly replicate your brain, including the "self" that the brain produces, who would you expect that self to be?

Who is the "self" that your brain produces?
 
Dave,
- Again, what I'll be saying seems totally obvious to me -- which makes it quite difficult to explain...

1. Anyway, there is an aspect of the "self" that we can't begin to predict.
2. People who believe in H and people who don't believe in H perceive the same thing, process, illusion or delusion that you and I both call the "self."
3. This is the same perception that reincarnationists believe returns and that atheists believe does not.
4. And, you and I both believe that this part of what we call the "self" would not return, could not be brought back to life, through a perfect physical copy.
5. IOW, we do not have a formula for this aspect, part, version of what we both call the "self.
6. And that being so, the best we can do as to predicting the likelihood of one's current existence is the number of these current selves divided by the number of potential selves.
7. And, unfortunately, we don't know how many different types of things (humans, animals, vegetation, rocks, etc.) -- and, as Caveman suggested -- different worlds or universes, produce consciousness (and selves)...

- I claim that due to the emergent property of consciousness, we humans have what we call a "self," that volkswagons do not have such a thing and that it is this thing, this particular self-awareness, that we can't begin to predict.

So, you are really just talking to yourself, here. Every post by other posters are merely ornamental to you?

Hans
 
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