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Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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Why not N1 or N6?



I was going to ask the same thing. I had a coworker that used to do that with capital O's and zeros. It was really embarrassing, because at the time our client was Coca-Cola. Err, Coca-C0la.

Maybe this word "N0" has a unique definition like every other term in this train wreck of a thread.


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Well let's ask and find out.

Jabba, is "virtually zero" the same as "exactly zero"?


I predict Jabba won't answer for 2 reasons:

1) You're not one of his current Least Critical Interlocutors.
2) He doesn't like being pinned-down on definitions because it makes equivocation harder.
 
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Dave,

1. Each bit of consciousness feels a specific sense of self.
2. While theoretically, we might be able to physically reproduce a perfect copy of your sense of self (by reproducing a perfect copy of your brain), we cannot -- even theoretically -- reproduce your same sense of self.
3. And when considering the possibility of immortality, it is your same sense of self that we’re considering.
4. So, in other words, we don’t have a formula for the sense we’re considering; we can’t predict “who” our reproduction would be; and, the likelihood of the current existence of a particular who is a totally random function.
5. That being the case, the Bayesian likelihood of your current existence -- if everything is physical -- is virtually zero. (Virtually zero is not the same as zero. For some number over infinity, however, I prefer virtually zero rather than epsilon.)

- I keep largely repeating myself in the vague hope of better communication...
 
Dave,

1. Each bit of consciousness feels a specific sense of self.
2. While theoretically, we might be able to physically reproduce a perfect copy of your sense of self (by reproducing a perfect copy of your brain), we cannot -- even theoretically -- reproduce your same sense of self.

Of course not. So what?

3. And when considering the possibility of immortality, it is your same sense of self that we’re considering.

And that's one reason H doesn't allow for any kind of immortality. Once something is gone it can't come back.

4. So, in other words, we don’t have a formula for the sense we’re considering;

Yes, we do. The formula for the existence of a particular brain is the formula for that brain's sense of self.

we can’t predict “who” our reproduction would be;

We can predict exactly who it will be. It will be the reproduced brain's sense of self.

and, the likelihood of the current existence of a particular who is a totally random function.

Under H it is not the least bit random.

5. That being the case, the Bayesian likelihood of your current existence -- if everything is physical -- is virtually zero. (Virtually zero is not the same as zero. For some number over infinity, however, I prefer virtually zero rather than epsilon.)

"Virtually zero" has no mathematical meaning.

- I keep largely repeating myself in the vague hope of better communication...

Here's something that might lead to better communication: try reading the responses to your posts.
 
Each bit of consciousness feels a specific sense of self.

Under H, what it "feels like" doesn't matter. How it's produced, does.

While theoretically, we might be able to physically reproduce a perfect copy of your sense of self (by reproducing a perfect copy of your brain), we cannot -- even theoretically -- reproduce your same sense of self.

And you're back to equivocating over "same." Producing a perfect copy of the brain would produce an organism that has a sense of self identical to the original. Since that is a property and not a "thing" -- as you assiduously and wrongly insinuate -- trying to count it is meaningless.

And when considering the possibility of immortality, it is your same sense of self that we’re considering.

No. If you're reckoning P(E|H) you must use H, not ~H. This is basic.

So, in other words, we don’t have a formula for the sense we’re considering...

Under H we do. The formula is to (re)produce a functioning brain.

we can’t predict “who” our reproduction would be...

Under H we can. If the physical reproduction is exact, so would be the reproduction of the sense of self. We cannot predict some preselected arbitrary sense of self, but that is simply chaos theory, not the magic you propose. And to insist to do so is the Texas sharpshooter fallacy.

...the likelihood of the current existence of a particular who is a totally random function.

Under H it is not. It is fully determined by the factors attending the brain, which are complex but not random.

That being the case, the Bayesian likelihood of your current existence -- if everything is physical -- is virtually zero.

No, as has been patiently explained to you, you are using that model incorrectly. When you confess you yourself don't understand it, no further rebuttal along those lines is needed. Your claim fails.

Virtually zero is not the same as zero.

Correct, which is another reason your claim fails. You don't understand arithmetic in the extended real numbers.

For some number over infinity, however, I prefer virtually zero rather than epsilon.

Division by infinity, if it is defined at all, is defined as zero. Not "virtually" zero. You're making up your own mathematics.

I keep largely repeating myself in the vague hope of better communication...

No, the problem is not communication from you to us. Everyone knows what you're trying to argue. The problem is communication from us to you. You simply don't care what anyone else says and apparently haven't even remotely considered the possibility you may be wrong. You keep largely repeating yourself because that's all you apparently know how to do, a shining example of the most ineffective debate I have ever seen, including in Congress. Hence I repeat my question: why should a thinking person take you the least seriously?
 
Dave,

1. Each bit of consciousness feels a specific sense of self.


What does it feel it with?

2. While theoretically, we might be able to physically reproduce a perfect copy of your sense of self (by reproducing a perfect copy of your brain), we cannot -- even theoretically -- reproduce your same sense of self.


If you have two identical things, there are two of them, not one.

3. And when considering the possibility of immortality, it is your same sense of self that we’re considering.


No, the "sense of self" under H is not the soul.

4. So, in other words, we don’t have a formula for the sense we’re considering; we can’t predict “who” our reproduction would be; and, the likelihood of the current existence of a particular who is a totally random function.


If you could be perfectly replicated, the result would be a second person identical to you. Who do you think you are?

5. That being the case, the Bayesian likelihood of your current existence -- if everything is physical -- is virtually zero.


It isn't the case under H. It may be the case under your preferred hypothesis, but that is a problem for your hypothesis, not for H.

- I keep largely repeating myself in the vague hope of better communication...


Your argument isn't failing because your opponents have failed to understand it. It is failing because they understand that it is wrong.

Communication goes both ways, you know.
 
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Of course not. So what?



And that's one reason H doesn't allow for any kind of immortality. Once something is gone it can't come back.



Yes, we do. The formula for the existence of a particular brain is the formula for that brain's sense of self...
- But, you agree that it would not be the same sense of self. IOW, we don't have a formula for the same sense of self.
 
- But, you agree that it would not be the same sense of self. IOW, we don't have a formula for the same sense of self.


Under the hypothesis that consciousness, including its "sense of self", is produced by the brain, perfectly reproducing a brain would result in a second brain identical to the first, with a "sense of self" identical to that of the first one.

You are still trying to shoehorn the soul into H.
 
- But, you agree that it would not be the same sense of self.

Doubling-down on equivocating "same." It would be identical, indistinguishable. Since its a property, not a thing, trying to count it is meaningless. There would be two organisms, but their senses of self would be the same -- meaning identical.

IOW, we don't have a formula for the same sense of self.

Under H we do. If you reproduce the brain exactly, the sense of self will be reproduced exactly. Yes, there will be two organisms. You can't reproduce something without resulting in two of it, by definition.
 
If everybody agreed with Jabba, he still wouldn't be any farther ahead in proving that he has an immortal soul. Odd.
 
3. And when considering the possibility of immortality, it is your same sense of self that we’re considering.


Why?

I thought we were just trying to figure out the odds of a person existing in a material universe. Are we shifting away from Bayes to some sort of straight deduction? If so, your numbers and definitions will need to be precise.

So which is it?
 
2. While theoretically, we might be able to physically reproduce a perfect copy of your sense of self (by reproducing a perfect copy of your brain), we cannot -- even theoretically -- reproduce your same sense of self.

You just said it was a perfect copy.

5. That being the case, the Bayesian likelihood of your current existence -- if everything is physical -- is virtually zero.

You keep saying this but have not demonstrated it.
 
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