Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[Loss Leader]

2. Though you disagree with reincarnationists about the nature, and destiny of the self to which they're referring, I think that you you do know the meaning to which they're referring.

Jabba, to what are they refering? What are the characteristics of this "self" that transfers from one body to another? Are they memories? Loves? Fears? All of mine seem to be borne from experience - I remember getting bullied in second grade, loving my children, being afraid of doctors because they've been an ever-present evil in my life. What of that do I carry on?

If you can't even define it, how can it be real?

(And that's not to mention the continuing problem that whatever you're talking about has no business being on the materialist side of your equation.)

 

[Dancing David]

How is the self any different from the particular green of a leaf of grass?

It is 'going sixty'!

 

[Jabba]

I think what you're calling the "self" is entirely physical. As such, it cannot be physically repeated (in the sense of being brought back to life), just like everything else physical.

Dave,
- Afraid I'll have to invoke emergent property again.

1. Consciousness is an emergent property.
2. It naturally brings with it a "self."
3. A part of this self "undergoes subjective experiences and has a sense of personal identity."
4. As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random -- we have no idea as to how to reproduce it. I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

- Where do you disagree?

 

[Hokulele]

Dave,
- Afraid I'll have to invoke emergent property again.

1. Consciousness is an emergent property.
2. It naturally brings with it a "self."
3. A part of this self "undergoes subjective experiences and has a sense of personal identity."
4. As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random -- we have no idea as to how to reproduce it. I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

- Where do you disagree?

Step 2. Consciousness is the self. The self isn't a separate thing.

Step 3. It doesn't "undergo experiences" and it doesn't have "a sense of personal identity". Mostly because it doesn't exist the way you think it does.

Step 4. It isn't a thing, it isn't at all random, and we can theoretically reproduce it in the sense of making a copy identical to the first.

If, as you believe, the self is a separate thing that gets associated with a body, when do you think this happens?

Why is it impossible for you to answer this one question?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- Afraid I'll have to invoke emergent property again.

1. Consciousness is an emergent property.
2. It naturally brings with it a "self."
3. A part of this self "undergoes subjective experiences and has a sense of personal identity."
4. As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random -- we have no idea as to how to reproduce it. I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

- Where do you disagree?

I disagree with #2. Consciousness doesn't "bring" a self. A conscious brain feels a sense of self, perceives the body that produces it as separate from the things it observes with its senses. The self is not somehow separate from the brain or the consciousness.

I disagree with #4. A specific sense of personal identity is not random. Every functioning brain thinks of itself as "me". If you know all the events that resulted in the existence of that brain, then you know all the events that resulted in the existence of that brain's sense of self. My sense of self doesn't need some identity property to know which brain to be associated with. Every functioning brain considers itself "me" and everything not attached to it as external.

 

[JayUtah]

Afraid I'll have to invoke emergent property again.

No, not until you learn what the words actually mean.

Consciousness is an emergent property.

Under H, yes.

It naturally brings with it a "self."

Under H, no. There is no such separate "self" under H. And yes, we can see what you're trying to do. You're trying to give lip service to emergence and to the notion of a property by styling "consciousness" as that element. And then you're going off and inventing a whole different concept that you call the "self," which in your straw man is the placeholder entity for your soul concept.

There is no concept of a soul under H, or anything like unto it.

A part of this self "undergoes subjective experiences and has a sense of personal identity."

Under H, no. The self is the agglomeration of experiences. It is the sense of personal identity. It doesn't have those things; it is those things. As stated above, you're still trying to insist on a sense of self that is a "thing" that can itself have properties, not the proper definition under H: the sense of self is a property -- a property of the physical brain.

As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random --

Under H, no. Under H a specific sense of personal identity is the product of a specific brain.

...we have no idea as to how to reproduce it.

Under H, false. If you reproduce the brain exactly, the identical sense of self will be produced.

I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

Under H, false. If you physically reproduce the organism with perfect fidelity, all the properties the original exhibited will be indistinguishably exhibited by the copy. This is not a difficult concept.

Where do you disagree?

To discover that, why don't you read the responses you got since the last time you tried to foist this same garbage on your critics. It's bad enough that every day begins with you trying to reset the argument. It's intolerable when every post is a reset attempt.

 

[jond]

How do you imagine the emergent property will continue when the brain that gives rise to it ceases functioning?

 

[jsfisher]

Dave,
- Afraid I'll have to invoke emergent property again.

1. Consciousness is an emergent property.
2. It naturally brings with it a "self."
3. A part of this self "undergoes subjective experiences and has a sense of personal identity."
4. As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random -- we have no idea as to how to reproduce it. I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

- Where do you disagree?

Different shade of lipstick; same pig.

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- Afraid I'll have to invoke emergent property again.

1. Consciousness is an emergent property.

Under H, yes.

2. It naturally brings with it a "self."

Under H, no. If H is correct souls don't exist. Under your preferred hypothesis they do.

3. A part of this self "undergoes subjective experiences and has a sense of personal identity."

Under H there is no "self" with "parts", consciousness is just something the brain does.

4. As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random -- we have no idea as to how to reproduce it. I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

Again, this may be the situation under your preferred hypothesis, in which souls exist, but it is nothing to do with H, in which consciousness is the result of physical processes and souls don't exist.

- Where do you disagree?

Where you try to shoehorn the soul into H.

Souls can be considered when assessing the likelihood of your current existence under your preferred hypothesis, but not when assessing the likelihood of your current existence under H, because if H is correct they don't exist.

 

[JesseCuster]

4. As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random -- we have no idea as to how to reproduce it. I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

Not knowing something or being able to reproduce it does not mean that it is therefore random. Can you explain the actual logic behind this claim? It makes absolutely no sense to me at all.

 

[wollery]

Different shade of lipstick; same pig.

Are you sure it isn't an exact copy of the pig?

 

[Belz...]

Dave,
- Afraid I'll have to invoke emergent property again.

1. Consciousness is an emergent property.
2. It naturally brings with it a "self."
3. A part of this self "undergoes subjective experiences and has a sense of personal identity."
4. As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random -- we have no idea as to how to reproduce it. I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

- Where do you disagree?

Consciousness IS a self. It doesn't "bring" a self.

And we're been through all this before: there's nothing random about it. Why do you keep bringing that up after being shot down so many times?

 

[Loss Leader]

Different shade of lipstick; same pig.

You're completely wrong. It's exactly the same shade.

 

[Mojo]

Consciousness IS a self. It doesn't "bring" a self.

Remember, though, that Jabba isn't talking about consciousness or some aspect of it when he uses the term "self", or any of the other terms he has used in its place. When he says "self" he means "soul".

 

[jond]

Are you sure it isn't an exact copy of the pig?

Wait: pigs have four legs. Doesn't that mean it's a dog?

 

[Slowvehicle]

You're completely wrong. It's exactly the same shade.

...but on a different (identical) pig...

 

[carlitos]

Why do opponents of science seem compelled to introduce "random" to these types of arguments? I really don't understand it.

 

[Belz...]

Why do opponents of science seem compelled to introduce "random" to these types of arguments? I really don't understand it.

It comes with them not understanding what "science" is and what "random" means.

 

[John Jones]

Dave,
- Afraid I'll have to invoke emergent property again.

1. Consciousness is an emergent property.
2. It naturally brings with it a "self."
3. A part of this self "undergoes subjective experiences and has a sense of personal identity."
4. As far as we know, a specific sense of personal identity is random -- we have no idea as to how to reproduce it. I.e., we have no idea as to how to physically reproduce "you" or "me."

- Where do you disagree?

This whole post^ is an stubborn attempt at equivocation.

'nuff said.

 

[Jabba]

I disagree with #2. Consciousness doesn't "bring" a self. A conscious brain feels a sense of self, perceives the body that produces it as separate from the things it observes with its senses. The self is not somehow separate from the brain or the consciousness.

I disagree with #4. A specific sense of personal identity is not random. Every functioning brain thinks of itself as "me". If you know all the events that resulted in the existence of that brain, then you know all the events that resulted in the existence of that brain's sense of self. My sense of self doesn't need some identity property to know which brain to be associated with. Every functioning brain considers itself "me" and everything not attached to it as external.

Dave,

1. The word "self" has multiple meanings.
2. The meaning that I wish to address is the particular self that reincarnationists believe returns to life.
3. Even if the reincarnationists are wrong in their belief, they are referring to something real.

- So far, so good?