caveman1917
Philosopher
- Joined
- Feb 26, 2015
- Messages
- 8,143
The individual is a process of a working neurosystem. It is the physical thing. An uploaded emulator is a process of a working computer. It's not the person, though it might believe it is.
Here's a thought experiment: Imagine we are able to upload an exact map of a person's brain into a computer or, heck, into a clone of that person. Bob goes in, gets strapped down, spends twenty minutes with electrodes on his head, and then a clone is ready. What happens to Bob?
He's still alive. He's still making more memories. The clone may think it's Bob, but the consciousness of Bob wasn't divided or diluted. His consciousness resides in himself and, when he dies, it's gone forever.
Here's another thought experiment: Suppose it were revealed to you that we live in a simulation, would you instantly stop having your sense of self?
Any other answer requires a rejection of materialism.
This is false.
And there is no evidence on which to base a belief in anything else.
There's no evidence for materialism either, not that it's relevant.
So, I reject your call for evidence. If you believe consciousness can be transferred or uploaded, then show evidence that it is anything other than a materialistic process. You are making the positive claim. I disbelieve consciousness can be transferred absent evidence to the contrary.
Physical systems can be simulated. So if you argue that the sense of self can not be simulated, then you are arguing that the sense of self includes more than a physical system, thereby making a positive claim and incurring a burden of proof.