Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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The individual is a process of a working neurosystem. It is the physical thing. An uploaded emulator is a process of a working computer. It's not the person, though it might believe it is.

Here's a thought experiment: Imagine we are able to upload an exact map of a person's brain into a computer or, heck, into a clone of that person. Bob goes in, gets strapped down, spends twenty minutes with electrodes on his head, and then a clone is ready. What happens to Bob?

He's still alive. He's still making more memories. The clone may think it's Bob, but the consciousness of Bob wasn't divided or diluted. His consciousness resides in himself and, when he dies, it's gone forever.

Here's another thought experiment: Suppose it were revealed to you that we live in a simulation, would you instantly stop having your sense of self?

Any other answer requires a rejection of materialism.

This is false.

And there is no evidence on which to base a belief in anything else.

There's no evidence for materialism either, not that it's relevant.

So, I reject your call for evidence. If you believe consciousness can be transferred or uploaded, then show evidence that it is anything other than a materialistic process. You are making the positive claim. I disbelieve consciousness can be transferred absent evidence to the contrary.

Physical systems can be simulated. So if you argue that the sense of self can not be simulated, then you are arguing that the sense of self includes more than a physical system, thereby making a positive claim and incurring a burden of proof.
 
Dave,
- The following was my understanding of what you had accepted after our preceding discussion. Where was I mistaken?
Let's see:
1. There must be an infinite number of potential, different, personal identities (Human).

Here.

There mustn't. There's a finite number of arrangements of particles that could constitute a human being. It's an almost unimaginably large number, but, nevertheless, it is not infinite.
 
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Dave,
- The following was my understanding of what you had accepted after our preceding discussion. Where was I mistaken?

1. There must be an infinite number of potential, different, personal identities (Human). 2. Personal identities are not physically reducible or re-creatible. 3. The likelihood of their current existence, therefor, can be treated as random. 4. The likelihood of the current existence of your personal identity is therefor analogous to you winning the lottery. 5. There are about 7 billion current examples of personal, human, identities.6. And the likelihood of the current existence of your personal identity is therefor about 7 billion over infinity.


Jabba, is your "personal identity" currently occupying your body?
 
I may be slow, but I just realized an implication of Jabba's argument.

"No, your honor. I cannot be guilty of murder. The deceased is not really dead. His sense of self is just pining for the fjords returned to the infinite pool of selves. He will return just as soon as he feels like it, or wins the lottery, or something."

Jabba should be out there reforming the legal system
 
Dave,
- The following was my understanding of what you had accepted after our preceding discussion. Where was I mistaken?

1. There must be an infinite number of potential, different, personal identities (Human). 2. Personal identities are not physically reducible or re-creatible. 3. The likelihood of their current existence, therefor, can be treated as random. 4. The likelihood of the current existence of your personal identity is therefor analogous to you winning the lottery. 5. There are about 7 billion current examples of personal, human, identities.6. And the likelihood of the current existence of your personal identity is therefor about 7 billion over infinity.

2, 3, 4, 5, and in 1 "different" means "separate", not "unique".

Dave,
- I accept the "separate" part for #1.
- For #2, how about dropping "reducible," and defining "re-creatible" as ability for the same identity (sense of self) to be returned to existence (life)?
 
Dave,
- I accept the "separate" part for #1.
- For #2, how about dropping "reducible," and defining "re-creatible" as ability for the same identity (sense of self) to be returned to existence (life)?

If I create an exact copy of a Ming vase that was destroyed, is it the same Ming vase, or a copy? Has the original vase been returned to existence?
 
Dave,
- I accept the "separate" part for #1.
- For #2, how about dropping "reducible," and defining "re-creatible" as ability for the same identity (sense of self) to be returned to existence (life)?

For #2, it's the "not physically reducible" part I disagree with. I have no problem with agreeing that the same sense of self can never exist again, since that is the case for everything in existence. Once a flame burns out it, it can never exist again. Once a snowflake melts, the same snowflake will never exist again. The same is true for Volkswagens, mountains, and blades of grass.
 
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Dave,
- The following was my understanding of what you had accepted after our preceding discussion. Where was I mistaken?

1. There must be an infinite number of potential, different, personal identities (Human). 2. Personal identities are not physically reducible or re-creatible. 3. The likelihood of their current existence, therefor, can be treated as random. 4. The likelihood of the current existence of your personal identity is therefor analogous to you winning the lottery. 5. There are about 7 billion current examples of personal, human, identities.6. And the likelihood of the current existence of your personal identity is therefor about 7 billion over infinity.

2, 3, 4, 5, and in 1 "different" means "separate", not "unique".

Dave,
- I accept the "separate" part for #1.
- For #2, how about dropping "reducible," and defining "re-creatible" as ability for the same identity (sense of self) to be returned to existence (life)?

For #2, it's the "not physically reducible" part I disagree with. I have no problem with agreeing that the same sense of self can never exist again, since that is the case for everything in existence. Once a flame burns out it, it can never exist again. Once a snowflake melts, the same snowflake will never exist again. The same is true for Volkswagens, mountains, and blades of grass.
- Can we therefor treat this aspect of self (the specific sense of self) as random?
 
No. Because it's physically reducible. It's no more random than the brain that produces it.
- Try this. The self is composed of two types of aspects: characteristics and awareness. The specific characteristics are cause and effect traceble. But, the specific awareness (singular) is not. We have no idea as to how to recreate the specific "host." The right words are hard to find...
 
- Try this. The self is composed of two types of aspects: characteristics and awareness. The specific characteristics are cause and effect traceble. But, the specific awareness (singular) is not. We have no idea as to how to recreate the specific "host." The right words are hard to find...

What do you mean "try this"? Is there any support for this speculation?

How about you stop making stuff up, including what other people think, and just admit that you're wrong?
 
- Try this. The self is composed of two types of aspects: characteristics and awareness. The specific characteristics are cause and effect traceble. But, the specific awareness (singular) is not. We have no idea as to how to recreate the specific "host." The right words are hard to find...

Try this: the self is not an actual entity. It is a process that the brain does. The right words are easy to find.
 
- Try this. The self is composed of two types of aspects: characteristics and awareness. The specific characteristics are cause and effect traceble. But, the specific awareness (singular) is not. We have no idea as to how to recreate the specific "host." The right words are hard to find...

That does not describe the self under H. Under H, the awareness is as "cause and effect traceable" as every other part of the self. The brain is physical. The brain is what's aware.
 
- Try this. The self is composed of two types of aspects: characteristics and awareness. The specific characteristics are cause and effect traceble.

For your theory of an immortal soul you can make up whatever you want. However, under H there is no such division. All aspects of the self are cause-and-effect traceable to the functioning of a human brain. As usual, you're simply making up new concepts and trying to foist them onto H for the sole purpose of declaring them to be something H can't explain.

Straw man.

But, the specific awareness (singular) is not. We have no idea as to how to recreate the specific "host." The right words are hard to find...

Of course the right words are hard for you to find. When your argument is nothing but obfuscation and equivocation, you'll soon run out of words as people pin down their meanings and thwart you.

Under H if you were able to duplicate the brain, you'd duplicate its sense of self to the same fidelity. It's very easy to express.
 
- Try this. The self is composed of two types of aspects: characteristics and awareness. The specific characteristics are cause and effect traceble. But, the specific awareness (singular) is not. We have no idea as to how to recreate the specific "host." The right words are hard to find...


When do those two aspects become associated with each other? At conception? At birth?

Once again, your attempt to foist a soul onto H is obvious, and generates more questions than it answers.
 
That does not describe the self under H. Under H, the awareness is as "cause and effect traceable" as every other part of the self. The brain is physical. The brain is what's aware.
Dave,
Is the personal identity, sense of self, re-creatible?
 
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