If it is the American Bar Association Rule 6.1, then it means an attorney can be disciplined if someone complains under this rule. In effect, it is a duty = an obligation.
The quoted post provides a very strange reading or interpretation of the original document. I will discuss that issue briefly and, since Vixen has brought up ABA Rules, I will present some ABA Standards that are actually relevant to the Knox - Sollecito case, and could be considered in evaluation of alleged violations of Convention Article 6 (equality of arms, providing adequate facilities for defense) by Italy in a judgment of the ECRH.
The American Bar Association writes:
"Public Service
Rule 6.1 Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:
(a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:
(1) persons of limited means or
(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and ...."
Source: http://www.americanbar.org/groups/p...e_6_1_voluntary_pro_bono_publico_service.html
As Stachys and London John have pointed out previously, this Rule 6.1 is described in its titlw as "voluntary" and indicates in its body that "a lawyer should aspire to render" pro bono services consisting of a certain number of hours per year.
I will not speculate to excess as to the reason for the distortion in meaning of the Rule, claiming that it is "In effect, a duty = an obligation" - as posted by Vixen. Perhaps Vixen did not see the important words "voluntary" or "should aspire", or perhaps Vixen misapprehends the meaning of the use of the word "Rule". But I can provide assurance that no attorney or other person in the US can be disciplined for not following a voluntary rule, even if someone complains. I have checked the Rules for Professional Conduct for Lawyers for one state as adopted by that state's Supreme Court (the state was chosen at random out of the 50), and the voluntary nature of Rule 6.1 was maintained. That may not represent the position of every state.
More relevant to the Knox - Sollecito case are the Criminal Justice Standards of the ABA (http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards.html).
While some may argue that these ABA standards only apply in the US, that is not necessarily completely accurate. The ECHR in judging cases will sometimes rely upon comparative law of the various Council of Europe states as well as the law or practice in the US and Canada. It tends to do this if the law or practice in the Respondent State is vague or lacking, in the opinion of the ECHR. Thus, ABA Standards may be considered by the ECHR when it develops its case law.
Examples of potentially relevant ABA Standards (the DNA Standards may be of interest if the larger case is reviewed by the ECHR' highlighted text represents areas in which the Italian authorities were especially deficient in the Knox - Sollecito case):
Standard 11-2.1 Prosecutorial disclosure
(a) The prosecution should, within a specified and reasonable time prior to trial, disclose to the defense the following information and material and permit inspection, copying, testing, and photographing of disclosed documents or tangible objects: ....
(viii) Any material or information within the prosecutor’s possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the defendant.
....
Standard 2.5 Manner of collecting and preserving DNA evidence
(a) DNA evidence should be collected and preserved in a manner designed to document its identity, ensure its integrity, and, whenever possible, ensure its availability for testing and retesting. Specifically:
(i) the evidence should be properly handled, packaged, labeled, and stored; and
(ii) the location where and the place or thing from which the evidence was collected or the person from whom or the entity from which it was collected, the date and time it was collected, the identity of the person who collected it, and the manner in which it was collected and preserved should be documented. ....
Standard 4.1 Disclosure
(a) The prosecutor should be required, within a specified and reasonable time prior to trial, to make available to the defense the following information and material relating to DNA evidence:
(i) laboratory reports as provided in Standard 3.3;
(ii) if different from or not contained in any laboratory report, a written description of the substance of the proposed testimony of each expert, the expert’s opinion, and the underlying basis of that opinion;
(iii) the laboratory case file and case notes;
(iv) a curriculum vitae for each testifying expert and for each person involved in the testing;
(v) the written material specified in Standard 3.1(a);
(vi) reports of all proficiency examinations of each testifying expert and each person involved in the testing, with further information on proficiency testing discoverable on a showing of particularized need;
(vii) the chain of custody documents specified in Standard 2.5;
(viii) all raw electronic data produced during testing; (ix) reports of laboratory contamination and other laboratory problems affecting testing procedures or results relevant to the evaluation of the procedures and test results obtained in the case and corrective actions taken in response; and
(x) a list of collected items that there is reason to believe contained DNA evidence but have been destroyed or lost, or have otherwise become unavailable;
(xi) material or information within the prosecutor’s possession or control, including laboratory information or material, that would tend to negate the guilt of the defendant or reduce the punishment of the defendant.
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