Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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There is something different about this perfect copy. A different kind of 'thing' -- but different, nevertheless.

Jabba is this a game to you? Are you just intentionally ignoring people until finally one of them snaps and tells you off so you can walk away the moral victor?
 
Jabba is this a game to you? Are you just intentionally ignoring people until finally one of them snaps and tells you off so you can walk away the moral victor?

Yes.

In his prior threads he has made exactly that argument. He has interpreted the flounces of frustrated critics as victories for him. In his interpretation he has expertly confounded his critics and they don't wish to debate him anymore, hence he must be right.

This is why I keep asking Jabba why he thinks any serious critic should engage him. He addresses only those people who defer to him, and answers only those posts that seem to agree with him. He rudely ignores anyone he thinks is "unfriendly" or writes posts that are too long or too complicated for him to read. When he's not berating his critics for being too "analytical" to understand the inherent beauty and truth of his arguments, he's trying various linguistic swindles to trick people into seeming to agree with him.

No serious critic should be obliged to wallow in that. If one leaves, Jabba considers it's only because the critic was defeated. If one never engages, Jabba considers it's because he knows he will lose. It's the same hamster wheel that so many fringe arguments fall into. Jabba simply does not put on the table the hypothesis that he may be wrong.
 
- So, I will assume that your answer is, "Yes. There is a 'thing,' or process, that is exhibited in me that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of me." That will be my first premise in arguing for an infinity of potential selves. I'll call this process a "particular self-awareness."

Whatever Dave might say, this is false. A perfect copy would exhibit an identical process.

- I will also use this premise to try to explain the difference between you (or me) and Mt Rainier -- the basic idea being that your particular self-awareness is not at all cause and effect traceable and is therefore infinitely unlikely according to Bayesian statistics. Whereas, Mt Rainier is quite traceable.

False. The self-awareness is cause and effect traceable.

- In my next post -- with a little bit of luck -- I'll try again to explain why the combining of one of Dad's sperm cells with one of Cleopatra's ova (and numerous other current impossibilities) does represent a potential self.

It will need more than a little bit of luck. An impossible combination is not a potential combination: If you don't play the lottery, you are not a potential winner.

Hans
 
Dave,
- But in an earlier dialog,
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236

239- IOW,
- There is something different about this perfect copy. A different kind of 'thing' -- but different, nevertheless.

No. There is nothing different about a perfect copy. But it is not the same copy.

Hans
 
No. There is nothing different about a perfect copy. But it is not the same copy.

Hans

Indeed, Jabba is equivocating between "different" (separate) and "different" (non-identical). His critics know very clearly which one they intend when they talk about an identical process being exhibited by an identical copy. But because Jabba is also conflating "process" and "thing" he doesn't grasp that "separate" has no meaning for processes.
 
It's a little bit like an obsessed stalker. The woman says to his face, no, I hate you, I will never ever want anything to do with you ever. Then the stalker tells himself, well that one time 6 months ago, she took 2 extra seconds to hang up the phone, that must mean she loves me.
 
Indeed, Jabba is equivocating between "different" (separate) and "different" (non-identical). His critics know very clearly which one they intend when they talk about an identical process being exhibited by an identical copy. But because Jabba is also conflating "process" and "thing" he doesn't grasp that "separate" has no meaning for processes.

Oh, he understands very well. He just chooses to ignore it to keep his boat floating. There is no limit to the dishonesty.

Hans
 
Is a car a "thing" or an "emergent property"? When you get down to it, the only "things" are elementary particles. A car is then an emergent property of a set of things (elementary particles) with specific relations between them (ie relative position, energy, etc).
 
Is a car a "thing" or an "emergent property"? When you get down to it, the only "things" are elementary particles. A car is then an emergent property of a set of things (elementary particles) with specific relations between them (ie relative position, energy, etc).

No, no, no we are not going down this road again.

This is another "Gotcha" that gets dropped into esoteric discussions; that a "thing" isn't a "thing" if it can be separated into smaller discreet "things" and that science is somehow admitting something if it discusses "things" which are collective.

Yes "Joe Bentley" both the organic entity and the ongoing conscious process can be separated into smaller unique conceptual ideas, which in turn can broken down into smaller conceptual ideas for many, many layers.

But that doesn't mean "Joe Bentley" isn't a thing we can talk about. A collective thing is still a thing. But some reason Woo Slingers and Woo Apologist just latch onto this idea as if it proves or means something. At no point in the rule or spirit of scientific thinking does looking at a collective thing or collective process become invalid or unreasonable.

And yet again for the umpteenth time this is all semantics. Our language developed to discuss things on a practical, real world, day to day level. "Joe Bentley" is a concept because the ongoing process of consciousness inhabiting this organic entity is just a useful concept to apply a label to in everyday life. The mitochondria in my cells don't give a toss about "Joe Bentley" and neither does the ongoing heat death of the universe but my mortgage company does. It matters to me on the level I operate and I am 100% perfectly okay with that.

Me acknowledging that the concept of "me" is just a handy shorthand for the level of the universe I operate on most of the time isn't some admission of anything sinister or backhanded. It just is.

You don't have to embrace Woo to talk about things other then subatomic particles and energy transfer.
 
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In scientific models for consciousness, it is exactly as traceable as the cause and effect that led to a particular brain existing, because they are the same thing. My particular brain can never exist again. If you somehow made an exact copy of my brain, It would exhibit an exact copy of my consciousness.

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- But, it wouldn't exhibit your particular self-awareness. "You" would not be reincarnated.

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For exactly the same reason it wouldn't be my particular brain. It would be a copy.
If two separate brains could produce the same self-awareness that would mean the scientific explanation for self-awareness is wrong.
Dave,
- In the above, you seem to be agreeing with me that a perfect copy of your brain would not exhibit your "particular self-awareness." Am I misunderstanding?
 
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232In the above, you seem to be agreeing with me that a perfect copy of your brain would not exhibit your "particular self-awareness." Am I misunderstanding?

No you are not misunderstanding. You are purposely, intentionally, dishonestly, and insultingly misconstruing.
 
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236

239Dave,
- In the above, you seem to be agreeing with me that a perfect copy of your brain would not exhibit your "particular self-awareness." Am I misunderstanding?

Would a perfect copy of my brain be my brain?

No, it wouldn't.

And for exactly the same reason, a copy of my self-awareness would not be my self-awareness. Because two is more than one.
 
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In the above, you seem to be agreeing with me that a perfect copy of your brain would not exhibit your "particular self-awareness." Am I misunderstanding?

Yes. In the scientific model there is no such thing as a "particular self-awareness." Self-awareness is a property, not a thing or set of things. A property is not discretely quantizable, or discrete at all.

As I told you before and must tell you again (and again and again and again), your misunderstanding is really that you are trying to foist onto the scientific model a notion that is an entirely different kind of concept from what the model actually holds. Your misunderstanding is at a very, very fundamental level.

But it appears you're not ready to discuss that level of error. You're still stuck on trying to trick Dave into seeming to agree with you, or pretend he already has.
 
Dave,
- No.
- But mostly, I'm trying to see if I can use "particular self-awareness" for referring to what's missing in the copy. Can I?

No, because it's no more "missing" than any other part of the original. You could just as accurately say the original brain is missing, because a copy is separate from the original. It would be misleading to single out one part of the copy and say "This is different from the original" when everything about the copy is separate from the original.
 
Oh for the love of...

Attempt 456th to explain this in a way you'll understand.

A person is two things, both a physical biological entity and an ongoing neurological process that is dependent on the biological entity. The "mind" is a process that the "brain" creates.

The "mind" process is continually and constantly changing to account for outside influences and stimulus. Your mind is not the same as it was 5 minutes ago, to say nothing of 5 days, 5 weeks, 5 months or 5 years. It's a process. This has been explained to you more times then is necessary.

If you could somehow split this process into two identical processes they would be different but identical process until outside stimuli changed them.

So if some magical duplication ray hit you and split you into two identical "Jabbas" each Jabba would be no more or less the "real" Jabba then the other since there is no "One True" Jabba but each Jabba would immediately start differing as they experienced new stimuli.

So the "Is it the same" pleading is meaningless, a semantic distinction without difference.
 
Dave,
- No.
- But mostly, I'm trying to see if I can use "particular self-awareness" for referring to what's missing in the copy. Can I?

Nothing is missing from the copy. The brain is there. The process is there. It's all there. Nothing is missing.

"Something is missing" is the proposition you are trying to prove. You can't prove it by assuming it's true. Four years ago, I would have thought your argument was ignorant. Now I just assume it's dishonest.
 
But mostly, I'm trying to see if I can use "particular self-awareness" for referring to what's missing in the copy. Can I?

No. Under the scientific model there's nothing missing in the copy. If the brain is copied exactly, then all the properties of the copy will manifest exactly in the copy, subject of course to subsequent dispersion since part of the process that creates the sense of self is the response to ongoing stimulus. This ongoing response property seems to stick in your craw, and you don't seem to want to answer any questions about it. Perhaps that's because it tends to undermine your notion of the sense of self-awareness as a "thing" that can have an existence -- however abstract -- apart from the organism that exhibits it.

But in any case you're still conflating "different" (separate) with "different" (non-identical). Until you clear that up and start using more precise terminology you're going to continue "misunderstanding." As this problematic equivocation has now been explained to you at least twice, is there an ETA for when you'll start paying attention to it?
 
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