Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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Jabba has bases upon which to form or recognize the existence of competing hypotheses, does so, and argues that he expects to observe nothing if H is true...


Trouble is, it is impossible that Jabba would observe nothing.
 
It's the Texas Sharpshooter's Fallacy. "What are the chances of me being here to observe things, if I weren't in some way special?"

Spray a machine gun at the side of a barn, then draw a circle around the bullet hole nearest the edge. "What are the chances of this hole being so near the edge, if it weren't special in some way?"
 
It's the Texas Sharpshooter's Fallacy. "What are the chances of me being here to observe things, if I weren't in some way special?"

that doesn't even parse. What are the chances if you're special? What are the chances if you're not special?

The chances, whatever they are, do not depend on you being in any way special. You can be completely non-special and still correctly estimate a ridiculously low probability of being here to observe things assuming a specific interpretation of reality is true.

You might, however, not be a complete bozo if you subsequently look for another interpretation of reality that doesn't require childlike faith that you've emerged triumphant over ludicrous odds. That belief kind of would mean you think you're a special lucky snowflake. I suppose not being a complete bozo might make you a little special. But nothing serious.
 
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If Jabba doesn't exist, he observes nothing.


Exactly. He's stuck arguing from a conditional universe in which he must exist, so he observing his existence is a foregone conclusion under any hypothesis about how he came to exist. Hence his observing his own existence cannot discriminate between any hypotheses about how he came to exist.
 
Oh

No

It's

Not.


Oh

Yes

It

Is

If Jabba is around to observe the universe, he will find himself. He will never observe a universe in which he doesn't exist. Thus, it is impossible for him to find a universe in which he doesn't exist.

Any backwards-facing probability that he wouldn't exist is hopelessly muddied by the fact that he has no other sample space.
 
Exactly. He's stuck arguing from a conditional universe in which he must exist, so he observing his existence is a foregone conclusion under any hypothesis about how he came to exist. Hence his observing his own existence cannot discriminate between any hypotheses about how he came to exist.

Of course he exists if he uses himself as evidence. Just like any other evidence. All evidence exists in a similar conditional probability space. It has to exist before you can use it.

Not to worry. Jabba can only attempt to use evidence he doesn't have if the evidence is not him. So it all works out nicely.

The following numbered items are foregone conclusions:

1. If H* is true, the prior odds would have been stacked sky high against Jabba ever being around to argue against it.

2. If H is not true, his existence would invariably have him arguing correctly against H. His nonexistence would have him not making any mistakes either. So no way to go wrong here.

3. Jabba would only argue incorrectly if both H is true and Jabba miraculously beats the giganogargantuan odds H stacks against him. Clearly, (3.) needs a lot of help from (2.), probability-wise, to stay in the ball game. (3.) needs to be as likely as (2.) just to break even. I wouldn't bet on it.

*When I say "H", I mean an interpretation of broadly accepted science, not the science itself. As should ~H be, IMO.

None of which requires Jabba to be immortal (though it might help).

But a "fallacy" which might well* have Jabba more likely to argue correctly than incorrectly against H strikes me as an odd kind of fallacy. Give me a fallacy like that, and I'll use it.

Where I think Jabba went wrong is when he tried to advance an alternative to H that was based on nothing but anecdotes. I don't think the formula is the problem.

*And I only say "might well" because I have no intention of going through the hassle of advancing one of the more obvious alternative interpretations of the science which would play better than H + Jabba. Partly because I fear the trademark stubborn, troll-like, mundanity-clutching opposition would quickly get on my last nerve. And partly because it's Jabba's job to advance a playable alternative.

All I'm interested in is studying the pathological denial of probability.
 
All evidence exists in a similar conditional probability space.

No, you flip a coin, and either heads or tails can occur, not just heads. In the universe in which you flip the coin, either outcome can occur. In contrast, in the universe in which Jabba observes himself, Jabba can only exist. Jabba cannot in principle observe the alternative.
 
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If Jabba is around to observe the universe, he will find himself. He will never observe a universe in which he doesn't exist. Thus, it is impossible for him to find a universe in which he doesn't exist.

Jabba doesn't need to observe a universe in which he doesn't exist. Under H, his existence is all but ruled out. All he needs to see is one universe in which he exists to rule out being ruled out.

If Joe Hypothesis says you're not supposed to see something at all, ever, except in the extremely rare case when you see it in a pig's eye, and right away you see that very something you're not ever supposed to see, according to Joe Hypothesis, does your childlike faith in Joe compel you to assume you're looking into a pig's eye?

Do you refuse to doubt Joe because you you can never see anything at all unless you see something Joe says you should never see? Well, don't worry about it. You can safely bet your bottom dollar you won't see anything you shouldn't see if Joe is right.

Any backwards-facing probability that he wouldn't exist is hopelessly muddied by the fact that he has no other sample space.

That's not true either. Nothing prevented Jabba from inferring the sample space in which he doesn't exist. He doesn't have to actually behold it. In fact, infer it is precisely what he did. He said, "Hey, I'm not supposed to be here. According to H, I shouldn't be alive."

You, for another example, will never see yourself when you're dead, but you have inferred the sample space in which you end up dead, haven't you? Even though you've never seen a dead Loss Leader, and never will.
 
No, you flip a coin, and either heads or tails can occur, not just heads. In the universe in which you flip the coin, either outcome can occur. In contrast, in the universe in which Jabba observes himself, Jabba can only exist. Jabba cannot in principle observe the alternative.

Again, Jabba can't directly observe the unobservable. But he can infer the possibility of it.

Say you're flipping a coin in the dark, and the setup is such that a light comes on only if it's heads. You don't have to see the tails to know tails could have happened if the light comes on and you see the heads.

A probability does not cease to exist simply because you do not directly observe it's outcome.
 
Of course he exists if he uses himself as evidence. Just like any other evidence. All evidence exists in a similar conditional probability space. It has to exist before you can use it.

Not to worry. Jabba can only attempt to use evidence he doesn't have if the evidence is not him. So it all works out nicely.

The following numbered items are foregone conclusions:

1. If H* is true, the prior odds would have been stacked sky high against Jabba ever being around to argue against it.

2. If H is not true, his existence would invariably have him arguing correctly against H. His nonexistence would have him not making any mistakes either. So no way to go wrong here.

3. Jabba would only argue incorrectly if both H is true and Jabba miraculously beats the giganogargantuan odds H stacks against him. Clearly, (3.) needs a lot of help from (2.), probability-wise, to stay in the ball game. (3.) needs to be as likely as (2.) just to break even. I wouldn't bet on it.

*When I say "H", I mean an interpretation of broadly accepted science, not the science itself. As should ~H be, IMO.

None of which requires Jabba to be immortal (though it might help).

But a "fallacy" which might well* have Jabba more likely to argue correctly than incorrectly against H strikes me as an odd kind of fallacy. Give me a fallacy like that, and I'll use it.

Where I think Jabba went wrong is when he tried to advance an alternative to H that was based on nothing but anecdotes. I don't think the formula is the problem.

*And I only say "might well" because I have no intention of going through the hassle of advancing one of the more obvious alternative interpretations of the science which would play better than H + Jabba. Partly because I fear the trademark stubborn, troll-like, mundanity-clutching opposition would quickly get on my last nerve. And partly because it's Jabba's job to advance a playable alternative.

All I'm interested in is studying the pathological denial of probability.
#3 appears to be a very obvious fallacy, though not the Texas Sharpshooter one. It is assuming the consequent. You are saying in effect that one proves the impossibility of Jabba given H by assuming Jabba given H is impossible.
 
#3 appears to be a very obvious fallacy, though not the Texas Sharpshooter one. It is assuming the consequent. You are saying in effect that one proves the impossibility of Jabba given H by assuming Jabba given H is impossible.

False on two counts. Read the thread.

1. I've never said Jabba given H is impossible. I've stated the obvious, that the prior odds against Jabba given H were giganogargantuan. You've even conceded this yourself, in what was apparently a previous incarnation.

2. I've assumed nothing. I have numerous posts supporting #3. I do not need or intend to write a book about it every time I point it out.
 
LL, you owe Our Jabba an apology. He can travel through time, space, the universe, and even (I bet) Home Depot and never observe one slightest thing. That's his superpower, fa chrissakes!

Hail Jabba, Cosmic Master of Oblivion!
 
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Dave,
- Unfortunately, I'm still not sure what you're saying, but I think you're saying that there is a "thing," or process, that is exhibited in you that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of you. If I'm right, do you have a name that I can use for that thing or process?

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I'm saying that a perfect copy of me would behave exactly as the original did, and that it would be self-aware in exactly the same away they original was, would be conscious in exactly the same way the original was, and would have subjective experiences in exactly the same way the original did.
It would be separate from the original because two is more than one. All processes it exhibits would be identical to the processes exhibited by the original.
My brain is conscious.
A copy of my brain would be conscious in exactly the same way. It would be impossible to tell them apart.
Everything about the copy would be separate from the original but none of it would be different from the original.
Dave,

- So, I will assume that your answer is, "Yes. There is a 'thing,' or process, that is exhibited in me that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of me." That will be my first premise in arguing for an infinity of potential selves. I'll call this process a "particular self-awareness."

- I will also use this premise to try to explain the difference between you (or me) and Mt Rainier -- the basic idea being that your particular self-awareness is not at all cause and effect traceable and is therefore infinitely unlikely according to Bayesian statistics. Whereas, Mt Rainier is quite traceable.

- In my next post -- with a little bit of luck -- I'll try again to explain why the combining of one of Dad's sperm cells with one of Cleopatra's ova (and numerous other current impossibilities) does represent a potential self.

- After that, I'll try again to effectively lay out my own doubts, and my hoped for resolutions.

- After that, I'll try to focus on each sub-issue long enough to make some headway in promoting my specific conclusions.
 
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331Dave,
- So, I will assume that your answer is, "Yes. There is a 'thing,' or process, that is exhibited in me that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of me." That will be my first premise in arguing for an infinity of potential selves. I'll call this process a "particular self-awareness."
- I will also use this premise to try to explain the difference between you (or me) and Mt Rainier -- the basic idea being that your particular self-awareness is not at all cause and effect traceable and is therefore infinitely unlikely according to Bayesian statistics. Whereas, Mt Rainier is quite traceable.
- In my next post -- with a little bit of luck -- I'll try again to explain why the combining of one of Dad's sperm cells with one of Cleopatra's ova (and numerous other current impossibilities) does represent a potential self.
- After that, I'll try again to effectively lay out my own doubts, and my hoped for resolutions.
- After that, I'll try to focus on each sub-issue long enough to make some headway in promoting my specific conclusions.

You really, REALLY need to learn to read for comprehension. Dave is in NO WAY agreeing with you.
 
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331Dave,

- So, I will assume that your answer is, "Yes. There is a 'thing,' or process, that is exhibited in me that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of me." That will be my first premise in arguing for an infinity of potential selves. I'll call this process a "particular self-awareness."

You assumed wrong. Please read the post that you quoted.

Godless Dave said:
Everything about the copy would be separate from the original but none of it would be different from the original.
 
So, I will assume that your answer is, "Yes.

NO.

His answer was clearly no, as it was for all the rest of us. Specifically, no one is validating your equivocations. As many times as you play word games trying to make it sound as if people are saying what you want them to say, they clearly and unequivocally tell you what their objections are.

You simply don't care.

That will be my first premise...
I will also use this premise...
In my next post -- with a little bit of luck -- I'll try again...
After that, I'll try again...
After that, I'll try to focus on each sub-issue...

Nice try. You failed as usual by begging the question. So now apparently your plan is to cram a foisted agreement into the mouth of the only person you pay attention to and bluster stubbornly ahead with the same argument that has failed time and again over the past four years.

So given this new demonstration that you simply don't care what anyone but you says, my question comes back: Why should anyone with a brain pay the slightest attention to you? That's not a rhetorical question. I really hope you have the wontons to actually answer it. Give someone a reason they should engage with you.
 
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