Proof of Immortality, the IV league

[caveman1917]

Can you define "self" in any manner that distinguishes it from a material body?

Not every material body "has a self" (I'd prefer "is self-aware" personally), so there's one distinction. If you hold that if you simulate, down to the atomic level, the functioning of a self-aware brain that this simulation is self-aware then you've answered your own question. How is this even relevant anyway?

Can you define "self" in any way that remains unchanged throughout a person's entire life?

Of course, given the sequence of states of the physical system that you define as "a peron's entire life" you'd construct a sequence of "self-moments" associated with each state of that system, and you'd call that sequence the "self" of that "person".

I don't mean to force you to take up Jabba's position, but you are arguing that "selves" are countable.

I'm arguing that they're finite, so yes, countable. Besides, why are people so hung up over whether that set is countable or not? I mean, if one is supposed to do Bayesian stuff with this, the codomain of a probability function is the unit interval after all - an uncountable set.

If the "self" doesn't even have a definition, it cannot exist.

It very well can by most notions of "exist".

If it is a process, constantly changing throughout one's life, then it is infinite even within a single person (or, if not infinite, then however many planck units are in a person's life*).

So the problem isn't that it's countable but that it's infinite? If your argument is that there are an uncountable number of moments in a person's life then just change the definition of "self" above from a sequence to a function on an interval. Not sure what the problem is really.

I can tell you that my car has a transaxle. I can't define it, support my statement or even point to a picture of it. But I could still be right.

By your logic it cannot even exist then.

Do you agree that if the "self" is indistinguishable from a living body, then Jabba must be wrong?

Wrong about what exactly?

*The computer says there are 5.85 x 10⁵² planck units in 100 years.

Yes, a finite number. Can you tell me the cardinality of the set of sequences in a finite set with a given finite maximum length? ETA: hint: the answer already appeared 3 times in this paragraph.

 

[caveman1917]

Which does not make everything countable. Limited does not equate to countable set.

Finite definitely implies countable.

You are equivocating brains and selves. If self is not separable from brain then one is counting brains.

And?

If you wish to keep it technical then frequencies are not red

I didn't say that frequencies are red.

they are merely frequencies

A subset of which can be defined as "red". A set which then has a cardinality, uncountable in classical electrodynamics or countable in quantum electrodynamics. Try setbuilder notation to see how to go from a property to a set: { f in R^+ | a thing with peak visual radiation at f is "red"}

It is only the perception of frequencies that makes them red, and not all perceptions of the same band of frequencies end up with red -- color blind people, etc.

Did you just go from "you can't count reds" to "there is more than one way to count reds"?

So now you're at the pointing of counting "those potential perceptions of frequencies which can be equated to red." Define them as an event and perhaps it is possible they are countable in the same way one can count "those potential moments of eating biscuits & gravy," but that is as meaningless as as counting potential perceptions of red when defined as a process.

Wut?

 

[CriticalThanking]

A set is either countable or uncountable. [snip]

No I wasn't counting things that exhibit the property red, I was counting reds. As in: light red, dark red, etc, but more precisely in terms of counting frequencies.

We may define "red" light as any frequency between two arbitrary limits. But can't frequencies take on any positive real number value? Real numbers are uncountable, even between two arbitrary points.

CT

 

[caveman1917]

We may define "red" light as any frequency between two arbitrary limits. But can't frequencies take on any positive real number value? Real numbers are uncountable, even between two arbitrary points.

CT

If it turns out that frequencies[*] are continuous, then sure. I'd argue that they aren't continuous, but even if they are then "reds" is still a well-defined set with a well-defined cardinality.

* ETA: frequencies as in physically possible frequencies for the interaction between a photon and a fermion, not frequencies as in the abstract mathematical notion which is of course defined to be continuous.

 

[Garrette]

Which does not make everything countable. Limited does not equate to countable set.

Finite definitely implies countable.

I do not think that finiteness is either a necessary nor sufficient condition to being countable.

You are equivocating brains and selves. If self is not separable from brain then one is counting brains.

And?

And if you're counting brains, you're counting brains, not selves, at least not selves in the fashion that Jabba requires for his argument.

If you wish to keep it technical then frequencies are not red

I didn't say that frequencies are red.

You did not say they all are, and I am not saying you said that, but you did say this, with which my statement is consistent:

I was counting reds. As in: light red, dark red, etc, but more precisely in terms of counting frequencies.

they are merely frequencies

A subset of which can be defined as "red". A set which then has a cardinality, uncountable in classical electrodynamics or countable in quantum electrodynamics. Try setbuilder notation to see how to go from a property to a set: { f in R^+ | a thing with peak visual radiation at f is "red"}

It is the idea of defining the subset of frequencies as red to which I object in relation to Jabba's argument. He takes that definition of Red-As-Subset-of-Frequency to mean Red-Is-Separate-From-Frequency-And-Can-Therefore-Exist-Without-Frequency.

It is only the perception of frequencies that makes them red, and not all perceptions of the same band of frequencies end up with red -- color blind people, etc.

Did you just go from "you can't count reds" to "there is more than one way to count reds"?

No. I pointed out that you're still not counting reds.

So now you're at the pointing of counting "those potential perceptions of frequencies which can be equated to red." Define them as an event and perhaps it is possible they are countable in the same way one can count "those potential moments of eating biscuits & gravy," but that is as meaningless as as counting potential perceptions of red when defined as a process.

Wut?

Stick with the fact I'm still saying that you can't count reds or potential reds, and it gets more clear.

 

[caveman1917]

Come to think of it, it doesn't even matter whether time is continuous. You can slice it up at 1-second intervals and consider a sphere of 1 lightsecond radius around the person. The person has a finite number of possible states, the sphere without the person has a finite number of possible states, so this entire thing can be modeled by a finite state machine.

 

[JayUtah]

The electromagnetic spectrum is not a set, except in the same sense as the real numbers.

 

[caveman1917]

I do not think that finiteness is either a necessary nor sufficient condition to being countable.

Well that's not my problem, is it?

And if you're counting brains, you're counting brains, not selves, at least not selves in the fashion that Jabba requires for his argument.

{...}

It is the idea of defining the subset of frequencies as red to which I object in relation to Jabba's argument. He takes that definition of Red-As-Subset-of-Frequency to mean Red-Is-Separate-From-Frequency-And-Can-Therefore-Exist-Without-Frequency.

Here we go again with the two-year old thing. If that's going to be your response then don't bother.

You did not say they all are, and I am not saying you said that, but you did say this, with which my statement is consistent:

I meant "in terms of" as in "there exist a bijection with" which implies "has the same cardinality". I'm not saying frequencies are "reds" but saying there's a bijection between a subset of frequencies and "reds".

No. I pointed out that you're still not counting reds.

Then what do color-blind people have to do with anything?

Stick with the fact I'm still saying that you can't count reds or potential reds, and it gets more clear.

You're wrong, and that doesn't make anything clearer.

 

[caveman1917]

The electromagnetic spectrum is not a set

What else would it be?

except in the same sense as the real numbers.

Yes, hence see the R^+ part in post 3262.

 

[Loss Leader]

And if you're counting brains, you're counting brains, not selves, at least not selves in the fashion that Jabba requires for his argument.

I agree. I thought he was expressing something important, but he's just equivocating. Things have properties. "Selves," as Jabba uses the term, are not the same as brains.

 

[JayUtah]

Things have properties. A human organism does not have a "self" so much as a sense of self. It is this sense of self that Jabba is trying so very hard to pneumamorphize into his notion of an individualized soul, existing in infinite "potential" numbers only a lucky few of which get to become the "observer" in a body. Nothing like that whatsoever forms part of H, the scientific hypothesis of consciousness.

 

[caveman1917]

I agree. I thought he was expressing something important, but he's just equivocating.

Oh for crying out loud:

|brains| = |{x | x is brain }|
|selves| = |{x | x is self-aware}|

See the difference?

Things have properties.

And properties have cardinalities, some of them countable. Everything is a set, and every set has a cardinality.

 

[Garrette]

Well that's not my problem, is it?

Yes, it is, since you are the one using finite to demonstrate that selves are countable.

Here we go again with the two-year old thing. If that's going to be your response then don't bother.

I haven't the slightest idea what you mean by the two year old thing, nor am I cowed by your dismissiveness even granted that I recognize your knowledge of sets and statistics and their ilk are superior to mine. And since you were the one who came in dismissing statements without reading context, I find your dismissiveness to be not only unwarranted but trollish. Get over yourself.

I meant "in terms of" as in "there exist a bijection with" which implies "has the same cardinality". I'm not saying frequencies are "reds" but saying there's a bijection between a subset of frequencies and "reds".

Are you saying that red exists separately from frequencies?

Then what do color-blind people have to do with anything?

They demonstrate that (a) frequencies (or a subset of them) are not equivalent to red, which I gather you are now saying was not what you were saying, and (b) even perceptions of that subset of frequencies cannot be defined as red because not all perceptions of the same frequencies are the same.

You're wrong, and that doesn't make anything clearer.

I have been wrong many times, and it is possible I am here, but you have not demonstrated it.

 

[Garrette]

Oh for crying out loud:

|brains| = |{x | x is brain }|
|selves| = |{x | x is self-aware}|

See the difference?



And properties have cardinalities, some of them countable. Everything is a set, and every set has a cardinality.

It boils down to how you answer this question¹:

Can a self-awareness exist without the brain that produces it?

¹Or two questions, adding the word potential in front of self-awareness and brain, above.

 

[Loss Leader]

Oh for crying out loud:

|brains| = |{x | x is brain }|
|selves| = |{x | x is self-aware}|

See the difference?

No, I don't. Please explain how a self can exist separate from a working brain. How are selves, as you are using the term, anything other than a subset of brains.

 

[caveman1917]

Yes, it is, since you are the one using finite to demonstrate that selves are countable.

If a set is finite then it has a bijection with a subset of the natural numbers and is therefor countable. Done.

I haven't the slightest idea what you mean by the two year old thing

The two-year old failing to articulate GR being an argument for there being a problem with GR.

Are you saying that red exists separately from frequencies?

In what way exactly would frequencies "exist"?

They demonstrate that (a) frequencies (or a subset of them) are not equivalent to red, which I gather you are now saying was not what you were saying, and (b) even perceptions of that subset of frequencies cannot be defined as red because not all perceptions of the same frequencies are the same.

They don't demonstrate either of these things. They demonstrate that there isn't a unique subset of frequencies which can be called "red", but then the issue was existence and not uniqueness.

I have been wrong many times, and it is possible I am here, but you have not demonstrated it.

I have. Every property is equivalent to a set, every set has a cardinality. If a self is a property of a brain, and there are finite (potential) brains, then their are finite (potential) selves.

 

[caveman1917]

It boils down to how you answer this question¹:

Can a self-awareness exist without the brain that produces it?

No it boils down this question:

Can a self exist without the brain that produces it or can a brain exist without producing a self?

The answer seems to be yes, therefor the set of brains is not the same as the set of selves.

 

[caveman1917]

No, I don't. Please explain how a self can exist separate from a working brain. How are selves, as you are using the term, anything other than a subset of brains.

First you say "no I don't" to seeing a difference between two sets before then giving an example of how they are different - one being a (strict) subset of the other.

Define "working" without referring to "self-aware".

 

[Slowvehicle]

My Dear Mr. Savage:

How many "going 60 mph" are there?

 

[Garrette]

No it boils down this question:

Can a self exist without the brain that produces it or can a brain exist without producing a self?

The answer seems to be yes, therefor the set of brains is not the same as the set of selves.

Those are two questions and quite distinct from each other. The answer to the first most definitely does not seem to be yes; in fact it quite definitely seems to be no. The answer to the second is not something I feel confident in either way.