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Who killed Meredith Kercher? part 23

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How are you coming along with that evidence of organised crime corruption in the Knox/Sollecito trials, by the way, Vixen?

Or can we start to conclude that you're going to choose the alternative option to "put up" on this matter?
 
Corte Suprema di Cassazione (CSC) – Penale
Supreme Court of Cassation - Criminal Cases Division

Procedimenti definiti con provvedimento: classificazione per esito - 2015

Annullamento con
rinvio: 5.383

Annullamento
senza rinvio: 4.530

Inammissibilità: 33.071

Rigetto: 7.389

Altro: 1.136

Totale: 51.509

Procedures defined by order: classification {disposition} results - 2015

Annulment with
referral: 5,383

Annulment
without referral: 4,530

Inadmissible: 33,071

Rejection: 7,389

Other: 1,136

Total: 51,509

Source: http://www.cortedicassazione.it/cor...ssionid=78BB93A04EA01200023B3F6B29986F0C.jvm1

Link: Statistiche (Statistics); Report for 2015 PDF

Contrary to claims by the PGP that Annulments without referral {8.8% of total} are rare, they are almost as common as Annulments with referral {10.5% of total}, as shown by these statistics for 2015 from the CSC.

Thus, there was nothing unusual about the annulment without referral of the Knox - Sollecito case upon the appeal of the Nencini court judgment to the CSC.

The Knox - Sollecito case was heard and judged by the CSC in March, 2015.

Most appeal submissions to the CSC are ruled inadmissible or rejected.
 
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Vixen scores an own goal by citing a newspaper report from 2010 with Andrea Vogt's byline on it.

Andrea is no longer a friend to guilters, and it would be wonderful if she could be contacted to see if she - in 2017 - stands by her former conspiratorializing about Hellmann's appointment.

Now she "outs" guilters. She accuses them of needlessly extending the Kercher pain, by being amateur detectives of guilt.

Yet back in 2010 there was no tidbit from Mignini too shifty for her to write home about, and keep the nutter websites well stocked with lurid details.

She's also the one who wrote back home that Knox had said, "I was there, making it look like Knox had confessed.

The "I was there" was from a secret prison recording of Knox and her mother, where Knox was plainly telling her mom that she'd been at Raffaele's. So much for Vogt's crack journalism.
 
whoanellie, thanks for your patience in this discussion. I apologize if my responses sometime seem impolite. I should like to indicate that the confusion is in the use of the word "innocent" with differing meanings by many of us, without being clear which meaning is meant in a particular situation.

Here is the definition you cite:

Acquittal
Definition

At the end of a criminal trial, a finding by a judge or jury that a defendant is not guilty. An acquittal signifies that a prosecutor failed to prove his or her case beyond a reasonable doubt, not that a defendant is innocent. Thus, a person may be acquitted of a crime but found civilly liable in a civil case regarding that same crime, e.g. O.J. Simpson, because civil cases have a lower burden of proof than criminal cases.

Here are my comments:

1. The definition is primarily of "acquittal" which is a synonym for "judgment of not guilty" in the US and in Italy.

2. While I do not mean to be unnecessarily argumentative, the word "innocent" is NOT defined in this paragraph; it is used in one of its meanings, which may be rendered as: "did not commit the criminal act". This use of innocent may sometimes be used with a qualifier for clarity, such as "actually innocent" or "factually innocent", for example, in the context of convicted persons who claim to be innocent and seek to be exonerated.

3. The paragraph only applies to US law with respect to the mention of civil cases. As I have posted previously, in Italy, civil cases which run concurrently with criminal proceedings have essentially the same burden of proof, CPP Article 654. That is, the "binding effect" provision means that if there is a final acquittal or a final conviction in the criminal case, that is also the effect on the civil case: acquittal means the accused is not liable, while conviction means the accused is liable.

Italian law (CPP Article 652) also provides that a final criminal judgment of acquittal has binding effect releasing the accused from paying damages, as long as the specification of the acquittal is: the criminal act did not occur, the accused did not commit the criminal act, or the accused carried out the act to perform a duty or the exercise a legal right (for example, self-defense).

So I think that your citation, although an excellent one in relation to US law, actually does not define "innocent" or "innocence" and it certainly does not explain Italian law, which is different from US law in important ways.
Thanks for you considered response Numbers. I believe I mentioned somewhere earlier in the discussion that both Grinder and I were approaching this discussion from an American perspective and I've always assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that you are not American. My main reason for believing so is your vast expertise on European law. If true, that may be the source of some of the confusion between us. Although I would caution you to never underestimate the stupidity of the American public, I think it safe to say that the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is pretty well-ingrained in our culture and generally speaking Americans understand the difference between "She didn't do it" and "She may have of done it, but there wasn't proof beyond a reasonable doubt". Americans understand that a "not guilty" verdict does not mean "factual innocence" and I am confident to say that Americans typically use "innocence" colloquially to mean "factual innocence" not "legal innocence". Again, the statement "OJ was found not guilty of the murder of Nicole Brown but he isn't innocent" would cause little if any confusion in the US. It is frustrating to me that what I perceive to be such a simple concept generated so much blowback from you. I still don't understand if you believe my use of "innocent" is incorrect legally or colloquially or what. As best I can tell you think it is correct legally but wrong colloquially which doesn't make much sense to me.

My understanding is that US courts avoid using "innocent" not because of the many definitions of the word but because "factual innocence" is logically incompatible with the notion of a court deciding a criminal case using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard (which still leaves room for some doubt). Vixen drives me crazy with her reliance on "judicial truths". That concept has no meaning to me. As I've understood your explanation of the history, the same reasoning was behind the addition of paragraph 2 since "the accused did not commit it" (which reads to me as "innocent", i.e. "factual innocence") is not compatible with new adversarial/BARD system. I'm not sure I've made it well, but my point is that the difference in language between paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 and even the rationale behind the addition of paragraph 2 are all consistent with the distinction between "innocent" and "not guilty" that I naturally make. Reading through posts in Continuation Part 14 I have the strong impression that many other posters also made the same connection even if it was the result of a misperception. I'd also note that even back then you tried to correct any misperception.
 
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Thanks for you considered response Numbers. I believe I mentioned somewhere earlier in the discussion that both Grinder and I were approaching this discussion from an American perspective and I've always assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that you are not American. My main reason for believing so is your vast expertise on European law. If true, that may be the source of some of the confusion between us. Although I would caution you to never underestimate the stupidity of the American public, I think it safe to say that the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is pretty well-ingrained in our culture and generally speaking Americans understand the difference between "She didn't do it" and "She may have of done it, but there wasn't proof beyond a reasonable doubt". Americans understand that a "not guilty" verdict does not mean "factual innocence" and I am confident to say that Americans typically use "innocence" colloquially to mean "factual innocence" not "legal innocence". Again, the statement "OJ was found not guilty of the murder of Nicole Brown but he isn't innocent" would cause little if any confusion in the US. It is frustrating to me that what I perceive to be such a simple concept generated so much blowback from you. I still don't understand if you believe my use of "innocent" is incorrect legally or colloquially or what. As best I can tell you think it is correct legally but wrong colloquially which doesn't make much sense to me.

My understanding is that US courts avoid using "innocent" not because of the many definitions of the word but because "factual innocence" is logically incompatible with the notion of a court deciding a criminal case using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard (which still leaves room for some doubt). Vixen drives me crazy with her reliance on "judicial truths". That concept has no meaning to me. As I've understood your explanation of the history, the same reasoning was behind the addition of paragraph 2 since "the accused did not commit it" (which reads to me as "innocent", i.e. "factual innocence") is not compatible with new adversarial/BARD system. I'm not sure I've made it well, but my point is that the difference in language between paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 and even the rationale behind the addition of paragraph 2 are all consistent with the distinction between "innocent" and "not guilty" that I naturally make. Reading through posts in Continuation Part 14 I have the strong impression that many other posters also made the same connection even if it was the result of a misperception. I'd also note that even back then you tried to correct any misperception.

I understand some of the confusion. Remember that in the US (and elsewhere) the term "presumption of innocence" is used to describe the status of a defendant (called an "accused" in Italy) and that it is the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the criminal charge. Thus, if a not guilty verdict is delivered, in a sense the "presumption of innocence" sticks with the defendant, and many would say - in my US experience, and I am an American - that the person was "found innocent".

Trials, however, are human processes, and juries and even judges sometimes wrongfully acquit defendants who have indeed committed the crime; such defendants are thus, as you point out, not really innocent. But unless it is very clear that the acquittal was wrongful, there is no way for an outside observer - one who didn't witness the crime, or have other special knowledge, for example - to know that the acquittal was wrongful.

So that outside observer would, based on the not guilty verdict, and lacking knowledge of the "true" facts, would rightfully assume that the former defendant was indeed innocent. In the US, that wrongfully acquitted person cannot legally be retried on the same criminal charges. However, the acquitted person can be tried in civil court and found liable for damages, if there are facts that can be used to show that with the lesser standard of proof in a civil trial - typically, preponderance of the evidence - that person committed or was responsible for the acts which harmed someone.

It's important to understand, however, that verdicts in criminal trials are generally only of two kinds*, whether in the US or Italy: "Guilty" or "Not Guilty". There are NO verdicts that are "Not Guilty, but somehow Guilty". You are, it seems to me, mistaking the concept of "Guilty only if guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt" with the inquisitional concept of "Guilty unless non-guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt". ____
* Since I made the above broad statement that there are only two verdicts, I must add that there are exceptions:

In Italy, cases often run past the statute of limitations (which in Italy continues to run during the trial), so there is a verdict of dismissal because the charge is extinguished. The dismissal is considered an acquittal in its effects, although the dismissed person may indeed have committed the criminal act. In Italy, many persons charged with crimes that have statutes of limitations (murder does not) seek to have their trial run as long as possible to take advantage of this dismissal being an effective acquittal.

In the US, there is the possible exception with the verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity"; some jurisdictions have changed this verdict to "guilty but mentally ill" to help avoid premature release into society of an individual considered dangerous.
____
I should perhaps add that my alleged expertise in Italian law, the European Convention, and European Court of Human Rights case-law is due solely to reading. In particular, the ECHR publishes extensive summaries of its case-law, and the case judgments are available online in the HUDOC database.
 
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[...]

If I can find it, I'll link to the Umbria News source which presented Chiari's move to the juvenile division as because of his own request.

The only people who believe that Hellmann's appointment to take the first 2nd grade trial was a conspiracy are nutters. Machiavelli called the president of the appeals division, Wladimir De Nunzio, a criminal for the appointment. I wonder if he ever made that allegation in a courtroom?

[...]
I think all one needs to know about Matteini Chiari is the following:
He wasn't angry or has resigned after Hellmann was appointed:
«Processo Mez? Potevo farlo, ma non mi pento di aver scelto i Minori»
According to this one:
Caso Mez, Matteini presidente della Corte, judge Matteini Chiari was only suggested to preside over the Knox/Sollecito appeal, not assigned, before he chose to take the assignment of President of the juvenile section...
And according to his Curricilum Vitae, he never was the president of the criminal section, he was president of the civil section at that time...
 
Corte Suprema di Cassazione (CSC) – Penale
Supreme Court of Cassation - Criminal Cases Division

Procedimenti definiti con provvedimento: classificazione per esito - 2015

Annullamento con
rinvio: 5.383

Annullamento
senza rinvio: 4.530

Inammissibilità: 33.071

Rigetto: 7.389

Altro: 1.136

Totale: 51.509

Procedures defined by order: classification {disposition} results - 2015

Annulment with
referral: 5,383

Annulment
without referral: 4,530

Inadmissible: 33,071

Rejection: 7,389

Other: 1,136

Total: 51,509

Source: http://www.cortedicassazione.it/cor...ssionid=78BB93A04EA01200023B3F6B29986F0C.jvm1

Link: Statistiche (Statistics); Report for 2015 PDF

Contrary to claims by the PGP that Annulments without referral {8.8% of total} are rare, they are almost as common as Annulments with referral {10.5% of total}, as shown by these statistics for 2015 from the CSC.

Thus, there was nothing unusual about the annulment without referral of the Knox - Sollecito case upon the appeal of the Nencini court judgment to the CSC.

The Knox - Sollecito case was heard and judged by the CSC in March, 2015.

Most appeal submissions to the CSC are ruled inadmissible or rejected.


So, nothing to do with 530,1 or 530,2, as you tried to claim.
 
Corte Suprema di Cassazione (CSC) – Penale
Supreme Court of Cassation - Criminal Cases Division

Procedimenti definiti con provvedimento: classificazione per esito - 2015

Annullamento con
rinvio: 5.383

Annullamento
senza rinvio: 4.530

Inammissibilità: 33.071

Rigetto: 7.389

Altro: 1.136

Totale: 51.509

Procedures defined by order: classification {disposition} results - 2015

Annulment with
referral: 5,383

Annulment
without referral: 4,530

Inadmissible: 33,071

Rejection: 7,389

Other: 1,136

Total: 51,509

Source: http://www.cortedicassazione.it/cor...ssionid=78BB93A04EA01200023B3F6B29986F0C.jvm1

Link: Statistiche (Statistics); Report for 2015 PDF

Contrary to claims by the PGP that Annulments without referral {8.8% of total} are rare, they are almost as common as Annulments with referral {10.5% of total}, as shown by these statistics for 2015 from the CSC.

Thus, there was nothing unusual about the annulment without referral of the Knox - Sollecito case upon the appeal of the Nencini court judgment to the CSC.

The Knox - Sollecito case was heard and judged by the CSC in March, 2015.

Most appeal submissions to the CSC are ruled inadmissible or rejected.

Er, annulments 'without referral' are almost certainly those found 'Not Guilty' at trial level and almost certainly referred to crimes other than 'serious crimes' such as aggravated murder and rape.

Please stop your misinformation.
 
Vixen scores an own goal by citing a newspaper report from 2010 with Andrea Vogt's byline on it.

Andrea is no longer a friend to guilters, and it would be wonderful if she could be contacted to see if she - in 2017 - stands by her former conspiratorializing about Hellmann's appointment.

Now she "outs" guilters. She accuses them of needlessly extending the Kercher pain, by being amateur detectives of guilt.

Yet back in 2010 there was no tidbit from Mignini too shifty for her to write home about, and keep the nutter websites well stocked with lurid details.

She's also the one who wrote back home that Knox had said, "I was there, making it look like Knox had confessed.

The "I was there" was from a secret prison recording of Knox and her mother, where Knox was plainly telling her mom that she'd been at Raffaele's. So much for Vogt's crack journalism.


What is this world of 'guilters' and 'nutters'. Isn't it time to expand your vocabulary, instead of parodying an eleven-year smartass.
 
Er, annulments 'without referral' are almost certainly those found 'Not Guilty' at trial level and almost certainly referred to crimes other than 'serious crimes' such as aggravated murder and rape.

Please stop your misinformation.


Evidence? Or is this just yet more of your invented wishful thinking to support an a priori agenda? (I'm over 85,7% sure that it is, but I'm more than willing to be proven wrong by presentation of reliable evidence.)
 
So, nothing to do with 530,1 or 530,2, as you tried to claim.


What? This issue indeed has nothing to do with 530.1 or 530.2, Why did you think it did? This is wholly about showing that. in the Italian criminal justice system. annulments without referral are almost as common as annulments with referral, And that was to illustrate that. contrary to assertions from many pro-guilt commentators. the annulments without referral in the case of Knox and Sollecito were strikingly unusual. and that the near-ubiquitous annulment route involved a referral back to the appeal court level,
 
Er, annulments 'without referral' are almost certainly those found 'Not Guilty' at trial level and almost certainly referred to crimes other than 'serious crimes' such as aggravated murder and rape.

Please stop your misinformation.

This doesn't make sense, how can an acquittal (found 'Not Guilty') be annulled 'without referral'? :confused:
 
This doesn't make sense, how can an acquittal (found 'Not Guilty') be annulled 'without referral'? :confused:

The CSC or any Supreme Court of Cassation (or similar "Supreme Court") which does not hear witnesses, and particularly does not hear the defendant(s), cannot, after annulling an acquittal, pronounce the defendant(s) guilty. It must refer the case back to a court which does hear the defendant(s). This is ECHR case-law. It was discussed at ISF (JREF) extensively some time ago.

Furthermore, Italian law (CPP Article 620) does not allow for annulment without referral by the CSC except for certain cases in the appealed judgment, which limits or excludes the possibility of the CSC ever issuing a verdict of Guilty after annulling without referral an appealed verdict of Acquittal.

Art. 620 - Annullamento senza rinvio
1. Oltre che nei casi particolarmente previsti dalla legge, la corte pronuncia sentenza di annullamento senza rinvio:
a) se il fatto non è previsto dalla legge come reato, se il reato è estinto o se l'azione penale non doveva essere iniziata o proseguita;
b) se il reato non appartiene alla giurisdizione del giudice ordinario;
c) se il provvedimento impugnato contiene disposizioni che eccedono i poteri della giurisdizione, limitatamente alle medesime;
d) se la decisione impugnata consiste in un provvedimento non consentito dalla legge;
e) se la sentenza è nulla a norma e nei limiti dell'articolo 522 in relazione a un reato concorrente;
f) se la sentenza è nulla a norma e nei limiti dell'articolo 522 in relazione a un fatto nuovo;
g) se la condanna è stata pronunciata per errore di persona;
h) se vi è contraddizione fra la sentenza o l'ordinanza impugnata e un'altra anteriore concernente la stessa persona e il medesimo oggetto, pronunciata dallo stesso o da un altro giudice penale;
i) se la sentenza impugnata ha deciso in secondo grado su materia per la quale non è ammesso l'appello;
l) in ogni altro caso in cui la corte ritiene superfluo il rinvio ovvero può essa medesima procedere alla determinazione della pena o dare i provvedimenti necessari.

Source: http://www.leggeonline.info/leggi/procedurapenale/art620/annullamento_senza_rinvio/
 
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ECHR case-law: A conviction by an appeal court (including a Supreme Court of Appeal [= Cassation]) without the presence of the defendant (accused) is not a fair trial, when the appeal court is acting to make a "full assessment" of the guilt or innocence of the defendant (accused).

If the CSC were to annul without referral a verdict of acquittal in an appeal judgment, and then itself issue a verdict of guilt, it would be making a full assessment of the case in the terms of the ECHR. Therefore, it would have had to have the defendant (accused) appear before it, and take all the other measures required of a first-instance court or appeal court in Italy in assessing the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

However, it is the practice of the CSC to only accept written documentation such as appeal briefs, motivation reports, court transcripts, and other literature, and to hear the oral arguments of the lawyers (for the defense and the civil parties) and prosecutor. Therefore, and to conform to CPP Article 620, the CSC does not deliver a verdict of guilt after annulling without referral an appealed verdict of acquittal.

A few specific ECHR cases illustrating the case-law on the requirement of the presence of the defendant at an appeal trial:

ARPS v. CROATIA 23444/12 25/10/2016
24. In the cases of Zahirović v. Croatia (no. 58590/11, § 58-64, 25 April 2013) and Lonić v. Croatia (no. 8067/12, § 94-102, 4 December 2014), the Court found, after a detailed examination of the Croatian system of appeal proceedings, that when an appeal court was called upon to make a full assessment of an applicant’s guilt or innocence regarding the charges against him or her, in view of not only the arguments he or she had adduced before the first-instance court but also the arguments concerning the alleged failures of that court to establish all the relevant facts and to apply the relevant substantive and procedural rules correctly, this − as a matter of fairness − required the applicant’s presence at the session of the appeal panel.

{Note the use of the term "innocence" in the above to indicate the opposite of "guilt".}

CHOPENKO v. UKRAINE 17735/06 15/01/2015

72. In the light of all the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Supreme Court’s rejection of the applicant’s request to take part in the cassation hearing resulted in a disproportionate restriction of his right to defence and, with a view to the presence of a representative of the prosecution, in breach of the principle of equality of arms. It was, thus, incompatible with the guarantees of a fair trial secured by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.

KOZLITIN v. RUSSIA 17092/04 14/11/2013

55. In appeal proceedings reviewing a case as to both facts and law, Article 6 does not always require a right to a public hearing, still less a right to appear in person (see Fejde v. Sweden, judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-C, p. 68, § 33). In order to decide this question, regard must be had, among other considerations, to the specific features of the proceedings in question and to the manner in which the applicant’s interests were actually presented and protected before the appeal court, particularly in the light of the nature of the issues to be decided by it and of their importance to the appellant (see among many other authorities, Kremzow v. Austria, 21 September 1993, § 59, Series A no. 268-B; Belziuk v. Poland, 25 March 1998, § 37, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑II; and Hermi v. Italy [GC], no. 18114/02, § 62, ECHR 2006‑...). For instance, where an appeal court has to make a full assessment of the issue of guilt or innocence, it cannot determine the issue without a direct assessment of the evidence given in person by the accused for the purpose of proving that he did not commit the act allegedly constituting a criminal offence (see Dondarini v. San Marino, no. 50545/99, § 27, 6 July 2004).
 
What is this world of 'guilters' and 'nutters'. Isn't it time to expand your vocabulary, instead of parodying an eleven-year smartass.

TJMK, PMF (the warring .net and .org) and the fake-wiki. You should check them out and quote from them once in a while!

"Eleven year"? What happened in 2006? This makes no sense.
 
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TJMK, PMF (the warring .net and .org) and the fake-wiki. You should check them out and quote from them once in a while!

"Eleven year"? What happened in 2006? This makes no sense.

ETA - the dynamic of those places that makes them easily definable and discernable is the banning of any talk contrary to a nutter-guilter view. The "nutter" tag came about mostly when .net experimented with FOAKer-Tuesdays, were contrary views could be posted, leaving 6 days following not for discussion but ridicule. That was perhaps the nuttiest thing ever to grace the internet.

Then there was the 2011 split of the two PMFs where Peggy and Michael openly warred over who tended to Meredith's memory the best!
 
ECHR case-law: A conviction by an appeal court (including a Supreme Court of Appeal [= Cassation]) without the presence of the defendant (accused) is not a fair trial, when the appeal court is acting to make a "full assessment" of the guilt or innocence of the defendant (accused).

If the CSC were to annul without referral a verdict of acquittal in an appeal judgment, and then itself issue a verdict of guilt, it would be making a full assessment of the case in the terms of the ECHR.

And that's the only reason the Chieffi court didn't outright convict Knox.

I found if fascinating after the M&B acquittal when multiple PGP seemed genuinely surprised by the authority of the Supreme Court to make a ruling that seemed to be based more on evaluating the evidence than judging procedural matters of law, when the CSC already clearly demonstrated their ability to weigh evidence in this very case.

They were genuinely blind to the exact same thing happening with Chieffi, except with the outcomes reversed.

If Chieffi can say Amanda Knox shouldn't be acquitted because Quintavalle recognized her blue eyes in court, then surely M&B can say Amanda Knox shouldn't be convicted because the luminol tested negative for blood. This seems extremely obvious, but to the faithful it's incomprehensible. It's for me one of the most intriguing things about this case and why it fascinated me beyond a fleeting headline of the week of a prosecution run amok.
 
Seems like old times.... here is an excerpt from one of my posts (#3584) on Continuation 11.

If the CSC were to have convicted Knox and Sollecito, they would have been committing a violation because of the way the expert testimony on DNA was handled. Stefanoni's work and testimony about the knife blade and bra clasp alleged DNA evidence had been thoroughly debunked in the Hellmann trial by V&C, and the CSC would have to somehow overcome that by the testimony of real experts. Instead, they wisely used the actual peer-reviewed publications of Professor Gill to support the annulment without referral and final acquittal.

ECHR Case: MATYTSINA v. RUSSIA 58428/10 27/03/20

205. Again, the Court is not well placed to indicate to the national judge the best course of action. Judge M. had several options: for example, he could have obtained a fresh expert examination of the matter, could have allowed the defence to submit a written opinion by one of their “specialists”, or could have examined Dr A.’s written report or his oral submissions. Instead, Judge M. contented himself with relying on the same written opinions by the prosecution’s experts which had earlier been rejected by another judge as inadmissible, unreliable and inconclusive, that is, without any meaningful verification of their credibility.

206. In sum, the Court concludes that, insofar as the handling of expert evidence concerning the nature of the activities of the association was concerned, the defence was placed in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the prosecution and the proceedings were not truly adversarial. That situation is contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

207. The Court is mindful of the fact that Judge M. heard a number of witnesses for the defence, examined several expert opinions and studied various documents. However, the question of whether or not the defence enjoyed “equality of arms” with the prosecution and whether the trial was “adversarial” cannot be addressed solely in quantitative terms. In the present case it was very difficult for the defence to effectively challenge the expert evidence submitted to the court by the prosecution. The Court stresses that the case against the applicant was built upon that expert evidence. In those circumstances, the way in which expert evidence was handled made the applicant’s trial unfair. Therefore, the Court does not need to address the other procedural violations alleged by the applicant. 208. On the strength of the above the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
 
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