Proof of Immortality, the IV league

[caveman1917]

It is Jabba's shorthand for what he otherwise calls OOFLAM (Only One Finite Life At the Most) and therefore a version of the standard scientific understanding of consciousness.

ETA: By "shorthand" I mean it is the symbol within his Bayesian framework, i.e., P(E|H) etc.

Then why wouldn't we be able to reason about potential selves under H? Under the scientific understanding the self is a property of a substrate (brain, but also possibly computer or something else). Then we can reason about the set of potential selves by reasoning about the set of potential substrates which induce a self.

 

[Hokulele]

What's that even supposed to mean? A frequency isn't a "thing" yet it is clearly not meaningless.

As far as we know, the self is a process or emergent property of the brain. Much like typing or moving is a process or property of other systems. The self is not a discrete thing as are documents, cars, or brains. You can count brains (and if you define "self" to mean "person" there is no problem.

However, Jabba is defining "self" to mean something other than that, and then claiming that this something else can be counted. Which is fine in and of itself, but not when what he is arguing against does not include that something else. It is a classic strawman argument where he is disproving his own creation, not what others have posited.

Erm... I, you, anyone else...

But do you mean "anyone" as the physical person, or do you hold that there is something other than the brain doing the observing? This is where Jabba is getting hung up. He keeps trying to insinuate a "something other" that few people (if any) have agreed to.

 

[Hokulele]

Then why wouldn't we be able to reason about potential selves under H? Under the scientific understanding the self is a property of a substrate (brain, but also possibly computer or something else). Then we can reason about the set of potential selves by reasoning about the set of potential substrates which induce a self.

How exactly do you count properties, or worse, potential properties? To me, this is just as meaningless as counting potential "going 60 mph" is to you.

 

[Garrette]

Then why wouldn't we be able to reason about potential selves under H?

Because there is no countable set of potential selves under H, and that is what Jabba is trying to get to, but that's only the beginning of it. The remainder is that he is claiming that selves are separate from the brain and its processes, which he must do in order to make them countable. Hence the analogies, beginning with the "going 60 mphs." He is in essence saying that a car can go 60 mph even without the car.

Under the scientific understanding the self is a property of a substrate (brain, but also possibly computer or something else). Then we can reason about the set of potential selves by reasoning about the set of potential substrates which induce a self.

Jabba won't call it the same thing. He says the induced selves are actually separate from the substrates (I've no idea if your use of "substrate" is accurate or not, but it doesn't matter for my take on this so I'm willing to assume it is). Moreover, he is using that manufactured distinction to sneak in his conclusion that the selves would exist even if the substrates did not.

 

[caveman1917]

As far as we know, the self is a process or emergent property of the brain.

Sure, but something being an emergent property doesn't mean you can't reason about it by itself. Hence the notion of substrate independence, which abstracts away the brain.

 

[caveman1917]

How exactly do you count properties, or worse, potential properties?

Red is a property, yet that doesn't stop you from counting red things, or even potential red things.

 

[caveman1917]

Because there is no countable set of potential selves under H

Why would you think that? To the best of our knowledge, by the ever helpful Bekenstein bound, it's not even countable but finite. And even if it weren't countable, what difference would that make? The real numbers aren't a countable set, yet that doesn't make them meaningless.

The remainder is that he is claiming that selves are separate from the brain and its processes, which he must do in order to make them countable.

This seems garbled. What does it mean for it to be "separate" and why would you need to separate it in order to make the set countable? If anything, when starting with an uncountable set of potential brains, declaring the self to be separate would seem to only enlarge the set of potential selves rather than make it smaller.

 

[jsfisher]

Red is a property, yet that doesn't stop you from counting red things, or even potential red things.

Sure, but can you count red?

We can count things with a sense of self and potential such things. For Jabba's case, that would be counting people, but Jabba does not want to count people; he wants to count souls.

 

[Agatha]

Red is a property, yet that doesn't stop you from counting red things, or even potential red things.

But it's the 'things' you are counting, not the reds.

 

[caveman1917]

Sure, but can you count red?

We can count things with a sense of self and potential such things. For Jabba's case, that would be counting people, but Jabba does not want to count people; he wants to count souls.

But it's the 'things' you are counting, not the reds.

You could count reds by counting the possible ways in which something can be red, such as counting the number of frequencies of EM radiation which we define as "red".

 

[Garrette]

Red is a property, yet that doesn't stop you from counting red things, or even potential red things.

As others have said, you are counting the things, not the red.

Why would you think that? To the best of our knowledge, by the ever helpful Bekenstein bound, it's not even countable but finite.

Just by mentioning Bekenstein you have moved this out of my league except to say that my quick and uninformed Googling indicates it isn't relevant. Bekenstein puts a limit on the information in a limited-energy system. "Potential selves," which is what I mentioned, are beyond that system because they are not within it. If I am misunderstanding or misapplying Bekenstein, I'll withdraw this statement but not my contention that potential selves as Jabba is using the term are not part of H.

And even if it weren't countable, what difference would that make? The real numbers aren't a countable set, yet that doesn't make them meaningless.

As Jabba is using them and as part of H they are meaningless because they do not exist within H. As I have already stated, you can speak of them meaningfully outside of H but not within. They become meaningless within H only if a car can go 60 mph without the car.

This seems garbled. What does it mean for it to be "separate" and why would you need to separate it in order to make the set countable?

Those are questions for Jabba.

If anything, when starting with an uncountable set of potential brains, declaring the self to be separate would seem to only enlarge the set of potential selves rather than make it smaller.

Who said the set of potential brains is uncountable?

 

[Garrette]

You could count reds by counting the possible ways in which something can be red, such as counting the number of frequencies of EM radiation which we define as "red".

This is semantics. You are still counting things that exhibit the property red; you are not counting red. Bear in mind that I do not disagree with what you are saying; Jabba does.

Jabba is saying that there can be red without red things.

 

[Jabba]

When I said I didn't believe in the existence of souls, what did you think I meant?
What did you think I'd been arguing all these years, that a person has a soul that exists distinct from his physical body, but that soul is mortal?
Here's what I - and most monists - believe:
The physical brain is what's doing the observing and experiencing. A whole lot of neurons in the right structures are capable of feeling, thinking, planning, and being aware of that feeling, thinking, and planning.
Is there anything about that that's not clear?

Dave,
- Yes.
- To me, one's self need not be equated with soul. One's self is one's particular, personal, awareness. We are each conscious, and we each have different consciousnesses. If we were able to duplicate your body after death, your particular consciousness/awareness would not return. We would produce a different consciousness/awareness.
- In that respect, your new existence would be different -- and number of selves would not be limited by chemistry.

Because two is more than one.
If you can understand the concept of two identical organisms, then you should be able to understand the concept of two identical "selves".
Neither would the number of bodies. Or the number of anything else. The limit would be the amount of matter in the universe and the ability to rearrange that matter.
How many going 60mph are there?

- IOW, the number of potential particular consciousnesses is infinite if matter can keep being recycled.

As is the number of particular brains, bodies, banana, planets, stars, and literally everything else.
(Not really because of entropy and heat death but we don't need to worry about that for another 100 billion years or so).

Dave,
- In your vocabulary, are consciousness and awareness the same?

I would say awareness is part of consciousness but I don't think it's germane to the discussion.
Your value for P(E|H) depends on H including some kind non-physical self independent of the physical brain. Accepted scientific models don't include anything like that. Very few people participating in this thread believe in such a thing. I suspect most people who believe in the existence of such a thing already believe in some kind of life after death.
No amount of clever wordplay is going to get me to believe in a non-physical "self". If your model H includes such a thing you are wasting your time trying to disprove it to me - I already don't believe that model.

Dave,
- Well at least, you think that my wordplay is clever...
- But, you believe that if we could somehow duplicate your body, your particular, personal, awareness would not return.
- And, if time is infinite, and entropy is not the destiny of reality, the number of potential, particular, awarenesses should be infinite.
- And then, if something came to exist in the first place, would everything disappear/evaporate and never exist again?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- Well at least, you think that my wordplay is clever...
- But, you believe that if we could somehow duplicate your body, your particular, personal, awareness would not return.

I also believe that if I strike a match and let the flame burn out, that particular flame will never return even if I strike an identical match in the same way under the same conditions. Do you?

- And, if time is infinite, and entropy is not the destiny of reality, the number of potential, particular, awarenesses should be infinite.

Also the number of potential bananas and literally everything else, as I said in one of the comments you just quoted.

- And then, if something came to exist in the first place, would everything disappear/evaporate and never exist again?

Correct.

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,
- Well at least, you think that my wordplay is clever...
- But, you believe that if we could somehow duplicate your body, your particular, personal, awareness would not return.
- And, if time is infinite, and entropy is not the destiny of reality, the number of potential, particular, awarenesses should be infinite.
- And then, if something came to exist in the first place, would everything disappear/evaporate and never exist again?

Jabba -

It appears to me that you are intentionally missing the point. AWARENESSES CANNOT BE INFINITE. They are not countable things. Awareness is a process that takes place in a functioning brain. It comes and goes, constantly changing. It is not a thing.

How many "going 60 mph" are there?

 

[Jabba]

I also believe that if I strike a match and let the flame burn out, that particular flame will never return even if I strike an identical match in the same way under the same conditions. Do you?



Also the number of potential bananas and literally everything else, as I said in one of the comments you just quoted.



Correct.

Dave,
- Yes.
- You seem to be accepting "particular awarenesses" as an acceptable definition for "selves." Is that correct?

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

While I do not think Jabba will ever openly concede regardless of the strength of the article Hume the demonstrating his errors (and deceit), your use of the word "version" leads me to think that a more direct analogy is that of software. If I buy Word 2016 and you buy Word 2016, the two programs are, indeed, both identical and the same though they reside on different laptops. The use of them to produce different documents, iow, does not change that.

How many different "typing a document" are there?

Wee can go one further. I use Firefox. I'm sure that I'm not the only person reading this thread who is doing so via Firefox. Assuming that we downloaded our copies of Firefox at roughly the same time, they would have been identical when we first got them.

However, Firefox is very customisable. I have a skin and many add-ons. I would wager that anybody else in this thread using Firefox has also customised their browser, although not in the same way as I have.

Now say there was a transporter accident just before Jabba's mother gave birth to him. Now there are two of them, both of them giving birth to the same person. Each person would immediately start having different experiences and, as time went on, they would come to be quite different - just like our Firefoxes.

So - how many "typing a post" are there?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- Yes.
- You seem to be accepting "particular awarenesses" as an acceptable definition for "selves." Is that correct?

Sure.

Have I just proved that the scientific explanation for how matches work must be wrong? We both agree that striking two identical matches in the same way under the same conditions won't produce the same flame. Does that mean the likelihood of a particular flame existing is virtually zero?

If your answer is "no", then why is the situation different for selves under H?

 

[JayUtah]

You seem to be accepting "particular awarenesses" as an acceptable definition for "selves."

I saw what you did there. No that's not correct. Awareness and sense of self are, in my view, reasonably coincident. But your innocuous-looking "particular" is wrong for H. The sense of self is not particular under H. It's a property. Particularity implies a discrete, countable set. By sneaking it in there, you once again impose something on H that it doesn't contain. You try to avoid making an argument by tricking your critics into "agreeing" with one of your carefully-worded equivocations. Not gonna happen, so quit wasting everyone's time by trying.

 

[Garrette]

I saw what you did there. No that's not correct. Awareness and sense of self are, in my view, reasonably coincident. But your innocuous-looking "particular" is wrong for H. The sense of self is not particular under H. It's a property. Particularity implies a discrete, countable set. By sneaking it in there, you once again impose something on H that it doesn't contain. You try to avoid making an argument by tricking your critics into "agreeing" with one of your carefully-worded equivocations. Not gonna happen, so quit wasting everyone's time by trying.

Exactly, and one proof of it that has escaped mention so far has to do with Jabba's occasional retreat into "this is hard to articulate" excuse. He trots that out when there is disagreement but has never questioned someone's understanding when he can twist their words into agreement.