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Proof of Immortality, the IV league

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* if you want a physical justification, by the earlier-mentioned Bekenstein bound the number of possible physical configurations within the Hubble cosmic event horizon (and hence relevant, with "relevant" being "causally connected to us") is finite.

erratum
 
Dave and Sparrow,
- I see this as equivalent to the Mt Rainier and the Texas Sharpshooter arguments. Do you agree?
- If so, I agree that this issue deserves more consideration. And, for now at least, I also think that it is the weakest part of my argument.

What do you think is the strongest part of your argument? Please don't do yet another fringe reset. We've see it too many times already.
 
Ok, I have decided to answer.

Dave and Sparrow,
- I see this as equivalent to the Mt Rainier and the Texas Sharpshooter arguments. Do you agree?
Yes, I agree you are committing the texas sharpshooter fallacy.


- If so, I agree that this issue deserves more consideration. And, for now at least, I also think that it is the weakest part of my argument.
Not "weak", but "wrong".
 
What do you think is the strongest part of your argument? Please don't do yet another fringe reset. We've see it too many times already.

In his body of work, the answer to this question is invariably an ad hoc citation thrown out without him even checking to make sure it's supportive. He literally has no idea what he's actually presenting. And invariably when someone else actually checks it for him, it does not support his argument at all.

The strongest part of his argument will be something he hasn't read, that does't actually support his argument.
 
In his body of work, the answer to this question is invariably an ad hoc citation thrown out without him even checking to make sure it's supportive. He literally has no idea what he's actually presenting. And invariably when someone else actually checks it for him, it does not support his argument at all.

The strongest part of his argument will be something he hasn't read, that does't actually support his argument.

Jabba, do you have a rejoinder to this? I happen to agree with theprestige. Prove us wrong.
 
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Dave and Sparrow,
- I see this as equivalent to the Mt Rainier and the Texas Sharpshooter arguments. Do you agree?
- If so, I agree that this issue deserves more consideration. And, for now at least, I also think that it is the weakest part of my argument.

Dave,

- Good.
- Sorry this is taking so long, but for me, the issue/reasoning is very complicated and difficult to put together (though, I feel 99% sure I'm right).

- How is my sense of a particular and continuous self different from Mt Rainier, a bucket of sand thrown on a floor and random bullet holes on the side of a barn -- when it comes to the likelihood of my current existence -- given modern science vs the likelihood of Mt Rainier, etc, given modern science? (Sorry about that.)
- Apparently, a personal sense of continuous self is an intrinsic/inherent aspect of (the emergent property of) consciousness, and it cannot be reproduced -- when there is no aspect of the other situations that cannot be reproduced.

- That is a way that it's different -- but, does that difference make my sense of self a legitimate "E" in the Bayes formula for P(H|E), when the existence of Mt Rainier is not? I'll be back.
 
....
- Apparently, a personal sense of continuous self is an intrinsic/inherent aspect of (the emergent property of) consciousness, and it cannot be reproduced -- when there is no aspect of the other situations that cannot be reproduced.

Says who?

(Emphasis mine.)
 
Apparently, a personal sense of continuous self is an intrinsic/inherent aspect of (the emergent property of) consciousness

No, that is the emergent property of consciousness.

...and it cannot be reproduced -- when there is no aspect of the other situations that cannot be reproduced.

Because, as you always do when confronted with this question, you make up yet another "thing" that you claim exists, that has exactly the characteristics you need, that you claim the scientific model cannot produce, but which -- as always -- is entirely made up.

That is a way that it's different --

No, it isn't. You've just attempted once more to redefine what the scientific model says consciousness is.
 
Dave,

- Good.
- Sorry this is taking so long, but for me, the issue/reasoning is very complicated and difficult to put together (though, I feel 99% sure I'm right).

- How is my sense of a particular and continuous self different from Mt Rainier, a bucket of sand thrown on a floor and random bullet holes on the side of a barn -- when it comes to the likelihood of my current existence -- given modern science vs the likelihood of Mt Rainier, etc, given modern science? (Sorry about that.)
- Apparently, a personal sense of continuous self is an intrinsic/inherent aspect of (the emergent property of) consciousness, and it cannot be reproduced -- when there is no aspect of the other situations that cannot be reproduced.

- That is a way that it's different -- but, does that difference make my sense of self a legitimate "E" in the Bayes formula for P(H|E), when the existence of Mt Rainier is not? I'll be back.

How do you know it isn't just the byproduct of an organic brain?
 
Dave,

- Good.
- Sorry this is taking so long, but for me, the issue/reasoning is very complicated and difficult to put together (though, I feel 99% sure I'm right).

- How is my sense of a particular and continuous self different from Mt Rainier, a bucket of sand thrown on a floor and random bullet holes on the side of a barn -- when it comes to the likelihood of my current existence -- given modern science vs the likelihood of Mt Rainier, etc, given modern science? (Sorry about that.)
- Apparently, a personal sense of continuous self is an intrinsic/inherent aspect of (the emergent property of) consciousness, and it cannot be reproduced -- when there is no aspect of the other situations that cannot be reproduced.

Why do you think it can't be reproduced?

Remember that in the scientific model of consciousness, everything about your sense of a continuous self is determined by your brain. If we had an exact copy of your brain, it would feel a sense of a continuous self in exactly the same way the original did, but referring to itself - the copy - instead of the original. There would be no difference between them. Each brain would think of itself as "me".
 
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- How is my sense of a particular and continuous self different from Mt Rainier, a bucket of sand thrown on a floor and random bullet holes on the side of a barn


It isn't. They're all complex systems based on a few simple rules. They're all exceedingly low probability events. And all of them, except the bullet holes I guess, change over time. It is nothing but a linguistic convenience to call them by the same names as before.

Technically, You're Jabba-t0 but the guy who finishes reading this sentence is Jabba t-2. They're different people.
 
I'm 99 and 44/100 percent sure that Jabba is mistaken.

I'm not sure. Are we allowed to make up numbers out of whole cloth for any reason? In that case anyone could prove anything.

For example, 99.99999999 percent of people believe jabba is wrong

I made that up, but hey, making numbers up seems par for the course in the jabbaverse, right?
 
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