Proof of Immortality, the IV league

[caveman1917]

It's not a concession, it's essential to my argument.

You were just wrong but now you're contradicting yourself.

 

[marplots]

You were just wrong but now you're contradicting yourself.

How so?

 

[caveman1917]

How so?

You say that the second sample didn't bring new information, but when I say that it did by increasing our certainty of the hypothesis derived from the first sample you agree by saying "exactly".

 

[jsfisher]

Can Charlie say "my existence is evidence for my parents, Alice and Bob, having met"? Yes or no?

Charlie can say anything he wants. As for the truth value of such a statement, you'd need to first be specific about the full hypothetical before we can determine if Charlie's statement about being an offspring of Alice and Bob is new information.

 

[marplots]

You say that the second sample didn't bring new information, but when I say that it did by increasing our certainty of the hypothesis derived from the first sample you agree by saying "exactly".

I was referring to where you said this:
"Yes we have, we've become more certain that the sample does indeed match the population regarding some property, or equivalently, that the hypothesis derived from the sample holds true for the population."

That's the part that is essential for my argument. The hypothesis is created after we already know what the characteristics of the population are. It's created to match them. That's why using the same population doesn't give us any new information.

I think you may have had the idea that the population wasn't already well characterized, or that there was some reason to think the hypothesis we made up (after knowing the answer) was in doubt. It isn't.

I even gave an example where the hypothesis is refreshed whenever the sampling disagrees. It's the same process - we have the right answer and just keep changing our hypothesis to match. As soon as we get another sample, we have more old data to then create a new hypothesis.

So long as the data is selected from the same pool and it's of the same type, all I'm doing is recasting my hypothesis to fit the facts I already know. What I want is a way to test it against the unknown - data of a different type or from a pool unexplored but suggested by my model.

Resampling the same data set that is already well characterized cannot give me any new evidence. That's my assertion.

 

[caveman1917]

Charlie can say anything he wants. As for the truth value of such a statement, you'd need to first be specific about the full hypothetical before we can determine if Charlie's statement about being an offspring of Alice and Bob is new information.

for goodness' sake...

P1: Alice exists
P2: Bob exists
P3: Charlie exists as the child of Alice and Bob

Can Charlie say "my existence (P3) is evidence for Alice and Bob having met". Differently: P(Met | P1, P2, P3) > P(Met | P1, P2).

If you really want a story to go along with it: it was a rainy autumn evening as Charlie was staring out his bedroom window when suddenly it hit him: "I exist, therefor my parents Alice and Bob have likely met".

 

[caveman1917]

I was referring to where you said this:
"Yes we have, we've become more certain that the sample does indeed match the population regarding some property, or equivalently, that the hypothesis derived from the sample holds true for the population."

I think you missed a connection there.

That's the part that is essential for my argument. The hypothesis is created after we already know what the characteristics of the population are.

How do you know what the characteristics of the population are?

 

[Jabba]

Then you're talking about a self that doesn't exist at all under H.
Although I'd be curious what Susan Blackmore has to say about the ineffable self further on in that book.




Because two is more than one. There would be two selves for exactly the same reason that there would be two pairs of eyes.

Dave,
- I'd say that we're all talking about the same concept, just that Susan and others see it as an illusion or process rather than a "thing."
- What I'm trying to show is that the likelihood of a particular sense of self (like YOU, or ME -- and whether illusory or real) to be currently existing is infinitesimal -- there being no preexisting pool of potential (even illusory) selves, there is also no limit on their number. And, the likelihood of your current existence -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 7 billion over infinity.

 

[jsfisher]

for goodness' sake...

P1: Alice exists
P2: Bob exists
P3: Charlie exists as the child of Alice and Bob

Can Charlie say "my existence (P3) is evidence for Alice and Bob having met". Differently: P(Met | P1, P2, P3) > P(Met | P1, P2).

If you really want a story to go along with it: it was a rainy autumn evening as Charlie was staring out his bedroom window when suddenly it hit him: "I exist, therefor my parents Alice and Bob have likely met".

So, not new information.

 

[marplots]

I think you missed a connection there.

Guess so. When you said "equivalently" I thought you meant something like, "saying the same thing."

How do you know what the characteristics of the population are?

Sampling.

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,

- I wasn't very clear...

- It's how the particular self comes about -- not selves in general -- to which I was referring.

- Also, it's that ineffable kind of self, rather than the self identified by his/her characteristics -- the self (perhaps, illusional) described by Susan Blackmore.
Who – or what – am I? Answers such as ‘I am my body’ or ‘I am my brain’ are unsatisfactory because I don’t feel like a body or a brain. I feel like someone who owns this body and brain. But who could it be who feels as though she lives inside this head and looks out through the eyes? Who is it who seems to be living this life and having these experiences?
Blackmore, Susan. Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (Kindle Locations 1064-1067). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

- More about that later.

Dave,
- I'm talking about the same ineffable self as is Susan Blackmore.

Then you're talking about a self that doesn't exist at all under H.

Although I'd be curious what Susan Blackmore has to say about the ineffable self further on in that book.

How about the very next sentence after the bit Jabba quoted:

From the scientific point of view there is no need for an owner; no need for an inner experiencer to observe what the brain is doing; no need for an inner self.

And yet Jabba is trying to foist such an "owner", "experiencer", or "self" on the scientific point of view, and quoting Blackmore as if she supports him.

Naughty Jabba!

 

[caveman1917]

So, not new information.

You did not answer the question, can Charlie conclude that his existence implies that his parents Alice and Bob have likely met?

 

[jond]

Dave,
- I'd say that we're all talking about the same concept, just that Susan and others see it as an illusion or process rather than a "thing."
- What I'm trying to show is that the likelihood of a particular sense of self (like YOU, or ME -- and whether illusory or real) to be currently existing is infinitesimal -- there being no preexisting pool of potential (even illusory) selves, there is also no limit on their number. And, the likelihood of your current existence -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 7 billion over infinity.

And you're very wrong. Because your "self" is a process, the likelihood of you being you is one. The limit on the number of selves is the same as the limit on human bodies. Large but not remotely infinite.

 

[godless dave]

From the scientific point of view there is no need for an owner; no need for an inner experiencer to observe what the brain is doing; no need for an inner self.

I don't understand why it's so hard to believe that that inner self is itself part of or produced by the physical brain.

 

[jsfisher]

You did not answer the question, can Charlie conclude that his existence implies that his parents Alice and Bob have likely met?

I did answer the question. P(H|E) = P(H) for this case.

 

[caveman1917]

I did answer the question. P(H|E) = P(H) for this case.

That is incorrect. Try this:

Let H be "humans exist"
Let ~H be "humans do not exist"
Let E be "I exist"

Let P(E | H) >> P(E | ~H) = 0. Then my existence, as a human, is not evidence for the existence of humans?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- I'd say that we're all talking about the same concept, just that Susan and others see it as an illusion or process rather than a "thing."
- What I'm trying to show is that the likelihood of a particular sense of self (like YOU, or ME -- and whether illusory or real) to be currently existing is infinitesimal -- there being no preexisting pool of potential (even illusory) selves, there is also no limit on their number. And, the likelihood of your current existence -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 7 billion over infinity.

Under H, the likelihood of my self existing is exactly the same as the likelihood of my physical body existing. If you're talking about a different likelihood for my self than for my physical body, you're not talking about H.

 

[caveman1917]

I did answer the question. P(H|E) = P(H) for this case.

Are you sure you're not confusing "new information" as "information which we didn't know yet" rather than "information we didn't account for yet"? I may have known for years that I exist, but that doesn't stop my existence being evidence for my parents having met, when I decide to account for my own existence in the probability of my parents having met.

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

Dave,
- I'd say that we're all talking about the same concept, just that Susan and others see it as an illusion or process rather than a "thing."
- What I'm trying to show is that the likelihood of a particular sense of self (like YOU, or ME -- and whether illusory or real) to be currently existing is infinitesimal -- there being no preexisting pool of potential (even illusory) selves, there is also no limit on their number. And, the likelihood of your current existence -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 7 billion over infinity.

The likelihood of a particular banana existing is also infinitesimal.

 

[aleCcowaN]

The likelihood of a particular banana existing is also infinitesimal.

As there have been much more bananas than people I would add that the likelihood of a particular banana existing is much smaller than the likelihood of Jabba existing ... unless it's a Cavendish!