Proof of Immortality, the IV league

[Mojo]

Mojo,
- So, every instant my particular self dies and is replaced by a different self. Will it be replaced when my brain dies?

 

[Mojo]

To quote Louis Jordan, "you only live but once, and when you're dead you're done".

 

[The Sparrow]

Mojo,
- So, every instant my particular self dies and is replaced by a different self. Will it be replaced when my brain dies?

What a truly bizarre postulation.

 

[Mojo]

Why not just forget this whole "proof of immortality" thing, and let the good times roll?

 

[JayUtah]

many potential illusional selves might there be?

There is no such thing as "potential selves" that can be enumerated. We've been through this many times. You can't say it's improbable that a certain snowball exists because there was an infinite number of white.

Is there any logical (not physical) limitation on how many different brains could be produced? If not, we have an infinity of potential brains (and, of so-called "selves").

No. You're conflating entities with properties. A brain is an entity. The self is a property exhibited by the brain.

The snow man in my front yard is composed of three large snowballs. There are three snowballs. They are white. There are not three white. There is not an infinite number of white waiting to become snowballs, snowmen, and snow forts.

No matter how many word games you try to play, you will not succeed in equivocating between a property and the concept of a soul in your model. The scientific model contains no concept that resembles your soul in any way. A property is not a soul, not an entity. The difference between entities and properties is elementary philosophy. You won't be able to equivocate your way around it and invent new concepts to help you.

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,
- So, every instant my particular self dies and is replaced by a different self.

Nope, because the "self" doesn't exist. The 'rule of "so"' clearly applies here.

 

[aleCcowaN]

And this is all, again, without addressing the fact that you can substitute literally anything for "cheating", so long as it ends with "so I drew a royal flush" - and, according to jt512, the presence of a royal flush is therefore evidence of this being true.

"An evil wizard wanted to make my opponent lose"? Evidence.

"Incredible luck is my superpower?" Evidence.

"My opponent reverse-cheated in my favor so that no one would suspect him of cheating"? Still evidence. Equally strong evidence, in fact, since the 33,333 doesn't change in any of these equations.

And, funnily enough, this holds all the way up to and including "the dealer happened to, entirely unintentionally, shuffle the deck in such a way that I would draw a royal flush".

Pick your poison, ladies and gents; anything is evidence for anything, and it's all happening today at Mister Bayes' Nonsense Emporium!

Oh, my! That's why it's impossible to trace the problem back to a post where it is well laid out (That 33 1/3 was argued sometimes at 45 and sometimes at 72 in order to conceal the botching)

Jabba's argument that the probability of having an immortal soul wasn't zero just because we couldn't divide was way more keen and honest.

 

[Agatha]

Mojo,
- So, every instant my particular self dies and is replaced by a different self. Will it be replaced when my brain dies?

No. Because your 'self' isn't dying and being replaced, your 'self' is a process.

 

[JayUtah]

- So, every instant my particular self dies and is replaced by a different self. Will it be replaced when my brain dies?

None of this even comes close to making sense in the scientific model.

There is no concept of "replacement" in the scientific model. The development and destruction of an individual brain is independent of any other. (Parentage is not operative in this statement.) No one brain "replaces" another. Replacement suggests some sort of extrinsic earmarking of instances. There is no such concept in the model.

Each sufficiently complex and functional brain exhibits the properties we term the self. It makes no sense to consider this property separately from the brain that manifests it. That's what it means to be a property. It has no meaning outside a manifestation of it. There is no such thing as a "potential property" as anything but an abstract idea, and certainly in no way that can be enumerated. It's an idea. It doesn't come in numbers.

 

[The Norseman]

No. Because your 'self' isn't dying and being replaced, your 'self' is a process.

In other words, after I stop running, what replaces it? Or when I stop laughing, what replaces that?

 

[godless dave]

Mojo,
- But the same brain will never occur again, nor will the same self illusion ever occur again.
- Is there any logical (not physical) limitation on how many different brains could be produced? If not, we have an infinity of potential brains (and, of so-called "selves").

The same banana will never occur again. There is no logical limitation on how many different bananas could be produced. We have an infinity of potential bananas.

And yet, individual bananas do exist. This suggests there is a flaw in the way you're thinking of the probability of an individual banana existing.

 

[sackett]

Hey, Jabba: When my self dies, will my brain still exist?

I really want to read your answer. Really.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Mojo,
- So, every instant my particular self dies and is replaced by a different self. Will it be replaced when my brain dies?

No, it just changes. Like a flowing river is never the same.

No, it will (as far as we know) die with your brain.

Hans

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,
- So, every instant my particular self dies and is replaced by a different self. Will it be replaced when my brain dies?

Jabba,
- will your breathing be replaced when your body dies?

 

[Mojo]

 

[Mojo]

It won't.

 

[Mojo]

When your body dies, you die. End of story.

 

[John Jones]

Mojo,
- So, every instant my particular self dies and is replaced by a different self. Will it be replaced when my brain dies?

Not according to any evidence you've provided. Have you got any of this Big E stuff after 4+ years?

Of course you don't.

 

[Loss Leader]

... and we're back to the Texas sharpshooter fallacy.

We're back much farther than that. Jabba has successfully wriggled out of the corner he was in to completely reboot his entire nonsense from the beginning.

Those who are concerned with logical argumentation shouldn't allow it.

In order for immortality to be even one of the counter hypotheses to materialism, it at least has to be possible. In order for it at least to be possible, immaterial souls have to at least be possible.

Jabba could not provide a working definition of the immaterial soul. So he fell back to trying to show that some sort of immateriality was possible.

He could not provide evidence of that. So he fell back to trying to show that some sort of non-physical perception might occur at death. He never presented any competent evidence of that.

This is the corner in which he should be stuck. To allow him to go back to talking about infinite selves or numerators of seven to seven billion is to let him pretend that he hasn't come to a dead end already.

Jabba, if you cannot provide evidence that immaterial perception is at least possible, then how can you honestly go back to try to fill in any other aspect of your argument?

 

[Mojo]

Jabba has successfully wriggled out of the corner he was in...

Oh no he hasn't!