Proof of Immortality, the IV league

[JesseCuster]

That's correct.




As I have explained, it tells us the amount by which the new evidence should increase our prior odds for the hypothesis. Multiply your prior odds* for wizards helping people out of the desert by magic by 850, and let us know how likely you now think that hypothesis is.

_______________________

*Use the simple odds: P(wizards) / [1 - P(wizards)]

I'm not sure that makes sense. If the prior odds of wizards are greater than 1/850 then the resulting likelihood of that hypothesis will now be greater than 1, which I'm pretty sure is a mathematical likelihood which means there's something wrong with the logic being used or it's somehow impossible for wizards (or any other scenario in this hypothesis) to have prior odds of greater than 1/850.

I've no idea what the prior odds for wizards rescuing stranded explorers are anyway or how such a thing could reasonably possibly be estimated. What are the odds of God rescuing stranded explorers and how was that number arrived at?

I'm also not sure what "it tells us the amount by which the new evidence should increase our prior odds for the hypothesis" means. What is "the new evidence" in this case? Does any new evidence multiply the likelihood of wizards or Gods or whatever rescuing travellers by a factor of 850? That doesn't sound right to me.

Sorry if this has been shown already in the thread, I've read dozens of pages in recent weeks of this thread and have no doubt missed some important points.

 

[Nonpareil]

As I have explained, it tells us the amount by which the new evidence should increase our prior odds for the hypothesis. Multiply your prior odds* for wizards helping people out of the desert by magic by 850, and let us know how likely you now think that hypothesis is.

Which is to say, no. It doesn't tell us the odds that wizards actually rescued them. It only tells us that, if wizards were around to magic them up a drink, they would have had a greater chance of getting one.

Which is not helpful.

 

[jond]

http://www.iflscience.com/health-an...lores-how-often-patients-wake-during-surgery/

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, you can't prove the existence of immaterial souls using an argument that relies on assuming the existence of immaterial souls.

Mojo,
- Why do you think that's what I'm trying to do?

 

[jond]

Mojo,
- Why do you think that's what I'm trying to do?

Because in your OOFLam model, you include an immaterial soul.

 

[JayUtah]

Why do you think that's what I'm trying to do?

Because the enumerable "potential selves" concept in your P(E|H) construct is functionally identical to the notion of an immortal soul. Calling it something else doesn't affect the fact that no such concept -- by any name -- is required in the scientific model. Attempting to disguise it by insisting it is merely an abstract facet of the model does not enliven it; it is a merely a word-game basis for inventing the most crucial quantity in your mode: the infinity by which you can divide any other number away and make your model give the desired answer without any toehold in reality.

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,
- Why do you think that's what I'm trying to do?

Because that's where you get the "infinity" in your "seven billion over infinity".

 

[Mojo]

Seriously, Jabba? Have you really forgotten your own argument?

 

[JayUtah]

Seriously, Jabba? Have you really forgotten your own argument?

I don't think it's a matter of having forgotten it. I think it's a matter of him believing his own hype. I don't think he's willing or capable of understanding that the scientific model has no concept of enumerable things that become selves, such that there can be an "infinite number" of them. He is unwilling or unable to conceive of the self as an emergent property of the brain, not some necessarily separate entity (even as an abstract concept). Yet this is what the self is in the scientific model. It's innumerable in the sense Jabba wants to use it. But the real concept of property seems to be philosophically beyond him. Whether he's just not adept enough to grasp the concept or whether he's ignoring it for his own purposes is anyone's guess.

 

[aleCcowaN]

Whether he's just not adept enough to grasp the concept or whether he's ignoring it for his own purposes is anyone's guess.

The later is very high-end Dunning-Kruger: As you are a keen thinker, then some other people is not certifiable incompetent but they might be ignoring the reasonable steps for unknown reasons (they're intelligent with a plan instead of plain clumsy).

To me is as simple as this one an similar threads can go on for ever just because knowledge has limitations, but ignorance hasn't.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Mojo,
- Why do you think that's what I'm trying to do?

Because, by your own rules, by your continued silence you have admitted that you do not have any evidence of any kind for the existence of a "soul", much less its "immortality"...

 

[Loss Leader]

Mojo,
- Why do you think that's what I'm trying to do?

Currently, I think you're trying to shift attention away from the part of your argument that has most recently come under fire. It would be great for you if we all went back to trying to talk about how you arrived at different givens and what numbers you're multiplying by what.

But you personally asked that we pick one issue and drill down to its very core. We did. We came to a point where you needed to show immaterial souls were at least possible. We discussed what would or would not be evidence of that. You provided no evidence nor any real understanding of what evidence might look like, instead begging the question of "believing" some story about a film about a story by a doctor who gave no specifics whatsoever.

The issue is the lack of evidence that immaterial souls are even possible. Anything you do to deviate from that issue should be, by your own rules, disallowed.

 

[jt512]

I'm not sure that makes sense. If the prior odds of wizards are greater than 1/850 then the resulting likelihood of that hypothesis will now be greater than 1, which I'm pretty sure is a mathematical likelihood which means there's something wrong with the logic being used or it's somehow impossible for wizards (or any other scenario in this hypothesis) to have prior odds of greater than 1/850.

As I wrote in the post you're replying to, the odds of X = P(X) / [1–P(X)], where P(X) means the "probability of X." So, if the prior odds of the wizard hypothesis were, say 2/850, the odds after the new data, ie, the posterior odds, would by 850 × 2/850 = 2, or "2-to-1" in favor of the hypothesis. Odds of 2:1 is equivalent to a probability of 2/3, or about 0.67, which would be the posterior probability of the hypothesis.

I've no idea what the prior odds for wizards rescuing stranded explorers are anyway or how such a thing could reasonably possibly be estimated.

Seriously? You have no idea about the probability that wizards exist and can use magic to save explorers lost in the desert? Seriously? No idea at all?

I'm also not sure what "it tells us the amount by which the new evidence should increase our prior odds for the hypothesis" means.

It means that you multiply the prior odds by 850 to get the posterior odds.

What is "the new evidence" in this case?

The very evidence you suggested: that 2 people came back from the desert and reported they were saved by wizards.

Does any new evidence multiply the likelihood of wizards or Gods or whatever rescuing travellers by a factor of 850? That doesn't sound right to me.

Whether it sounds right to you or not, it is mathematically correct (by Bayes' Theorem). I think if you come up with a reasonable common-sense estimate of the probability that wizards helped our lost explorers using magic, and multiply it by 850, you'll be satisfied with resulting posterior odds.

 

[jt512]

Which is to say, no. It doesn't tell us the odds that wizards actually rescued them. It only tells us that, if wizards were around to magic them up a drink, they would have had a greater chance of getting one.

Not only is it helpful in and of itself, there is a whole school of statistics that thinks all we should do is calculate ratios of likelihoods. It is also a necessary step toward determining the posterior probability of the hypothesis.

 

[jt512]

which is completely subjective and can change from person to person based on the assumptions you're making. which is why it's a trivial argument. you can show that a toaster helped people out of the desert using the exact same assumptions.

OK, calculate the probability that a toaster helped them out of the desert.

 

[Nonpareil]

Not only is it helpful in and of itself, there is a whole school of statistics that thinks all we should do is calculate ratios of likelihoods. It is also a necessary step toward determining the posterior probability of the hypothesis.

I'm sure there is.

That still doesn't make a given royal flush evidence of cheating.

 

[jt512]

That still doesn't make a given royal flush evidence of cheating.

No matter how many times you write that nonsensical statement, it will still be nonsensical.

 

[Nonpareil]

No matter how many times you write that nonsensical statement, it will still be nonsensical.

It's hardly nonsensical. Very straightforward, really.

Your posts thus far have consisted largely of some very basic observations on probability. If God leads you to water in the desert, you are guaranteed to survive and tell others you saw God; on the other hand, if he doesn't, you aren't. The probability of observing survivors claiming to have seen God is therefore very high if they actually did see God, but lower if they did not.

That is, if God saved these people, the probability of them saying that he did is much higher than if he didn't. This is true, and is not in dispute; in the same way, the fact that your chances of drawing a royal flush are much higher if you cheated are higher than if you didn't is not in dispute.

But drawing a royal flush is not evidence that you cheated to do so. The fact that the survivors claimed to be saved by God is not evidence that they actually were. The fact that a given observation is consistent with a hypothetical explanation is not evidence that said explanation is actually the correct one.

To put this in terms of Bayesian calculations:

p(cheating|royal flush) = p(royal flush|cheating) * p(cheating) / p(royal flush)

For those following along at home, the above reads: the probability that I cheated, given that I do have a royal flush, is equal to the odds of me getting a royal flush if I did cheat, times the odds that I cheated, divided by the odds of getting a royal flush fairly.

The probability of me having a royal flush given that I cheat is, for the sake of argument, one hundred percent. And I the odds of me drawing a royal flush without cheating are very low. That fills in two of the three terms on the right-hand side.

But you don't know the probability of me cheating. Or, in the terms of your original argument, you don't know how likely it is that God exists and would help these two. And you do not have enough information to actually establish it.

So yes. For the sake of argument, the probability of surviving and telling that story is very high if God exists and helps you. And it is very low if he doesn't.

But that doesn't mean that the fact that someone survived and told this story is evidence of divine intervention. The probability of that happening is not dependent on or affected by whether or not this story was told. It is entirely independent, and you do not have sufficient information to establish it.

A given royal flush is not evidence of cheating.

 

[Loss Leader]

A given royal flush is not evidence of cheating.

But what if a book of anecdotes cited a film in which a doctor tells a story about having once seen a royal flush and believed it was evidence of cheating?

Surely, that makes the cheating theory unassailable.

 

[jt512]

But drawing a royal flush is not evidence that you cheated to do so.
p(cheating|royal flush) = p(royal flush|cheating) * p(cheating) / p(royal flush)

Really? Fill in the numbers and let's see.