Proof of Immortality, the IV league

[JayUtah]

So the problem is the interloculor? With the right person, all of your errors will disappear? How ridiculous an end.

If only that were but his end. It also happens to be his beginning and his middle. As was pointed out quite a while ago, he told others he was going to come to JREF (at the time) to give those godless atheists what-for. That doesn't bode well for approaching rational skepticism with an open mind. That's his beginning. His admissions of defeat both here and in the Shroud of Turin thread were always accompanied by assurances that he would have received a better reception elsewhere and that the only reason he couldn't make headway here was because we skeptics were hopelessly entrenched and therefore unable to appreciate his genius. That was his middle. The end is hardly surprising: his proofs only work for people who offer no resistance.

Good luck with your search for the perfect echo chamber. I have a feeling none of the people you named will be interested in the job.

My recollection is that each of those people has, at one time or another, repudiated Jabba's argument. But it doesn't matter. Since each one of these people has, at one time or another, disputed one of his critics, Jabba can now pretend they agree with him, even if he has to equivocate to some degree what they say in order to arrive at that pretext.^[1] And because of it, he can now satisfy the belief he's held in his mind ever since he got here: skeptics who reject his claims do so not because they have cogent arguments, but because they are ideologically blinded to his genius and are unable to withstand his withering "effective debate." After all, if there were cogent arguments against his belief, then how could it be possible for other people to agree with Jabba?

It doesn't matter whether the named members echo his findings. Jabba has his desired "confirmation" that opposition to his arguments can't possibly be a rational position.

[1] The tangent thread, which has been woven back into this one, succeeded in widening the goalposts from "These few NDE anecdotes are evidence of life after death," to "anecdotes are evidence." However that wider scope is rendered academic in my opinion after rejoining the thread.

 

[Jabba]

LL,
- I don't see how you can believe that. Say that 3 different nurses claim that Joe is over 200 lbs because they each claim to have weighed him recently, on 3 different scales -- but Joe is no longer around to defend his claim to you, over the phone, that he was less than 200 lbs. Wouldn't the nurses' claims affect the strength of your belief that Joe was under 200 lbs?
- Should the nurses' claims not be considered anecdotes?

You're still failing to appreciate the problem with anecdotal evidence.

The nurses are providing eyewitness evidence that he weighed over 200lbs. The sort of testimonials that homoeopaths use to advertise their services are evidence that some of their patients improved after treatment. Your NDE anecdotes are evidence that some people have odd experiences associated with NDEs.

The problem arises when you try to use them to establish causal relationships. The homoeopaths' anecdotes don't establish that the recovery was caused by the treatment, and your NDE anecdotes don't establish that consciousness can leave the body.

Mojo,
- Say that a patient claims that he saw something occur in a room down the hall while he was being resuscitated. Actually during the resuscitation, witnesses in the room down the hall reported the (same) incident to a nurse. Prior to telling the nurse what the patient had claimed, staff asked her what had happened. The nurse provided the same story in detail. The particular event was quiet, had nothing to do with the patient and was not something that anyone would expect to occur in a hospital.
- Wouldn't you agree that such would be at least weak evidence for immateriality?

 

[JayUtah]

Say that...

Wouldn't you agree that such would be at least weak evidence for immateriality?

"If I had some evidence, would you agree that it would be evidence?" Stop trying to grovel for agreement over hypothetical scenarios. If you have evidence, present it. Don't just bask in the hypothetical glow of evidence you wish you had.

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

Mojo,
- Say that a patient claims that he saw something occur in a room down the hall while he was being resuscitated. Actually during the resuscitation, witnesses in the room down the hall reported the (same) incident to a nurse. Prior to telling the nurse what the patient had claimed, staff asked her what had happened. The nurse provided the same story in detail. The particular event was quiet, had nothing to do with the patient and was not something that anyone would expect to occur in a hospital.
- Wouldn't you agree that such would be at least weak evidence for immateriality?

No. For all the reasons that have already been laid out for you.

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,
- Say that a patient claims that he saw something occur in a room down the hall while he was being resuscitated. Actually during the resuscitation, witnesses in the room down the hall reported the (same) incident to a nurse. Prior to telling the nurse what the patient had claimed, staff asked her what had happened. The nurse provided the same story in detail. The particular event was quiet, had nothing to do with the patient and was not something that anyone would expect to occur in a hospital.
- Wouldn't you agree that such would be at least weak evidence for immateriality?

1. It's just another anecdote.
2. At this point you don't need to provide "weak evidence" of anything, you need to prove that the immaterial soul is part of the hypothesis you are trying to disprove. Otherwise, if your factor of seven billion over infinity belongs anywhere, your existence is infinitely less likely under your preferred hypothesis than it is under the hypothesis you are trying to disprove.

 

[jt512]

What is the weight of the God-water claims?

I calculated that a couple pages back, but looking back, I noticed that I made a decimal place error, so I'll do it again.

Let's say that we are members of an explorer's club. In the history of the club we have sent exactly two explorers into some particular desert. The expeditions were independent, and the explorers did know each other; in fact, let's assume that the second explorer was completely unaware of the first one (and, importantly, that he had know way of knowing that the first explorer claims to have been guided by God). Both explorers returned, both said they had become lost, and both said that God spoke the them and explained where to find water, and in fact, they found water there, and were saved.

We have two hypotheses about how the explorers found water. H1: God told them where to find it. H2: They just got lucky; that is, they found it by random chance. Our data, D, consists of two out of two explorers returning and reporting that God showed them where water would be. We wish to know how much the data supports H1 compared with H2; that is, we wish to know the weight of the evidence in favor of H1 vs H2. Our calculation requires two numbers: the probability of the data on the assumption that H1 is true, P(D|H1); and the probability of the data on the assumption that H2 is true, P(D|H2).

Assume for the sake of argument, that if God guides you to water, you'll get there and live. Then P(D|H1)=1. To calculate P(D|H2) let's assume that we know (for the sake of argument) from our knowledge of the geography and climate, that once lost, the chances of finding water by random chance is 2%. Since two independent explorers each found water, P(D|H2)=.02^2=.0004. The weight of the evidence for H1 vs H2, called the likelihood ratio, is then

P(D|H1) / P(D|H2) = 1/.0004 = 2500.

This says that the evidence is 2500 times more likely if H1 is true than if H2 is true. Or, the weight of the evidence for H1 vs. H2 is 2500.

There are two related things to realize here. The first is that we were able to calculate the weight of the evidence for H2 vs. H1 without considering the prior probability of either hypothesis. As I said earlier, the weight of the evidence is independent of the prior probabilities. Therefore, no matter how much two people disagree on the prior odds of these hypotheses, they should agree on how much the evidence should change the odds. In this case, no matter what your prior odds of H2 vs H1 are, your posterior odds should be 2500 times greater than your prior. (Note that we're using odds* now, not probabilities.)

The second thing to realize is that, since we haven't taken the prior odds of the hypotheses into account, we haven't yet calculated our updated, or posterior, odds. Your prior odds are your own business and based on whatever background information (or baggage) you bring to the problem. Therefore, your posterior odds are your own business as well. This is why I've said to Jabba that I don't care what his prior probabilities are; he can have whatever prior probabilities he wants. However, he cannot have whatever values he wants for the likelihoods (i.e., the P(D|H_) terms). Rather, for each hypothesis there has to be a model that makes a quantitative prediction of the likelihood of the data given the model, as we had in problem.


____________________

*Odds are ratios of probabilities. For example, the prior odds of H1 vs H2 is P(H1) / P(H2).

 

[Loss Leader]

- Try this. http://biocentrismnews.com/biocentrism-what-happens-when-you-die/?gclid=COnU44b2zdACFZU1aQodEPoFfw

Thanks, Jabba. Here is a video of the musical Legally Blonde starring Laura Bell Bundy. It contains as little evidence of immateriality as your link, but at least it's got Laura Bell Bundy.

Mojo,
- Say that a patient claims that he saw something occur in a room down the hall while he was being resuscitated. Actually during the resuscitation, witnesses in the room down the hall reported the (same) incident to a nurse. Prior to telling the nurse what the patient had claimed, staff asked her what had happened. The nurse provided the same story in detail. The particular event was quiet, had nothing to do with the patient and was not something that anyone would expect to occur in a hospital.
- Wouldn't you agree that such would be at least weak evidence for immateriality?

Who are these people. Do you have the name of the patient? The hospital? The name of the nurse? Her work phone number? A description of the incident written up at the time? The EEG, EKG or other medical files of the patient?

Because otherwise it's just you typing a bunch of words, begging for the least modicum of agreement.

I'd rather watch Legally Blonde.

 

[Nonpareil]

Assume for the sake of argument, that if God guides you to water, you'll get there and live. Then P(D|H1)=1. To calculate P(D|H2) let's assume that we know (for the sake of argument) from our knowledge of the geography and climate, that once lost, the chances of finding water by random chance is 2%. Since two independent explorers each found water, P(D|H2)=.02^2=.0004. The weight of the evidence for H1 vs H2, called the likelihood ratio, is then

P(D|H1) / P(D|H2) = 1/.0004 = 2500.

This says that the evidence is 2500 times more likely if H1 is true than if H2 is true.

This is true (assuming no mathematical errors, which I don't care to check for).

Or, the weight of the evidence for H1 vs. H2 is 2500.

This is not.

Again, saying "if you cheat, the probability of you having a royal flush is one" may be true, but it is not actually evidence that any given royal flush is the result of cheating.

 

[jt512]

Assume for the sake of argument, that if God guides you to water, you'll get there and live. Then P(D|H1)=1. To calculate P(D|H2) let's assume that we know (for the sake of argument) from our knowledge of the geography and climate, that once lost, the chances of finding water by random chance is 2%. Since two independent explorers each found water, P(D|H2)=.02^2=.0004. The weight of the evidence for H1 vs H2, called the likelihood ratio, is then

P(D|H1) / P(D|H2) = 1/.0004 = 2500.

This says that the evidence is 2500 times more likely if H1 is true than if H2 is true.

This is true (assuming no mathematical errors, which I don't care to check for).

Or, the weight of the evidence for H1 vs. H2 is 2500.

This is not.

Yes, it is true. It is true by Bayes' Theorem:

(posterior odds) = (likelihood ratio) × (prior odds) .

The posterior odds of H1 vs H2 is determined entirely by the likelihood ratio and the prior odds, and the new data only appear in the likelihood ratio. The logic or its consequences may be unintuitive, but they are correct nonetheless.

 

[Jedi]

This is true (assuming no mathematical errors, which I don't care to check for).



This is not.

Again, saying "if you cheat, the probability of you having a royal flush is one" may be true, but it is not actually evidence that any given royal flush is the result of cheating.

this is all accurate except that the p(you live|God guides you) is not = 1. it's the same as the p(you live|bigfoot guides you) = p(you live|invisible aliens guide you) = 0. that's cause God, bigfoot and invisible aliens have never been shown to exist, let alone guide anyone. they're anecdotes (unevidenced claims). i would agree that the p(you live|park ranger guides you) = 1 (or close to it) as park rangers exist and can rescue people.
the rest is fine.

 

[jt512]

this is all accurate except that the p(you live|God guides you) is not = 1. it's the same as the p(you live|bigfoot guides you) = p(you live|invisible aliens guide you) = 0. that's cause God, bigfoot and invisible aliens have never been shown to exist, let alone guide anyone. they're anecdotes (unevidenced claims). i would agree that the p(you live|park ranger guides you) = 1 (or close to it) as park rangers exist and can rescue people.
the rest is fine.

Jedi, ya' might want to look up "conditional probability."

 

[Jedi]

Jedi, ya' might want to look up "conditional probability."

are you assuming God exists and can guide people to water in your analogy?

 

[jt512]

are you assuming God exists and can guide people to water in your analogy?

Given data D and hypothesis H, the conditional probability of D given H, denoted P(D|H), is the probability of D assuming that H is the correct hypothesis.

 

[Nonpareil]

Yes, it is true.

No. It isn't.

You are equivocating between the odds of something happening given a hypothetical prior and evidence for that prior actually being true.

Again, the fact that cheating guarantees a royal flush is not evidence that a given royal flush is the result of cheating.

This will not change, no matter how many times you fail to grasp the point.

 

[Jedi]

Given data D and hypothesis H, the conditional probability of D given H, denoted P(D|H), is the probability of D assuming that H is the correct hypothesis.

so, yes. you are conditioning your answer on God existing and His ability to lead people to water.

so if i use the same example but assume big foot exists and he can guide people to water then the P(live|bigfoot exists) is also equal to 1. you're assuming that which you are trying to prove.

 

[jsfisher]

so, yes. you are conditioning your answer on God existing and His ability to lead people to water.

so if i use the same example but assume big foot exists and he can guide people to water then the P(live|bigfoot exists) is also equal to 1. you're assuming that which you are trying to prove.

It all works under Mr. Bayes.

P(D) = 0.02
P(H1) = 0
P(D | H1) = 1 (Sure, why not.)

P(H1 | D) = P(D | H1) x P(H1) / P(D) = 0

There is no damage done by introducing the conditional (albeit impossible).

 

[jt512]

It all works under Mr. Bayes.

P(D) = 0.02
P(H1) = 0
P(D | H1) = 1 (Sure, why not.)

P(H1 | D) = P(D | H1) x P(H1) / P(D) = 0

There is no damage done by introducing the conditional (albeit impossible).

Well, you probably shouldn't give a hypothesis a prior probability of exactly 0 unless the hypothesis is logically impossible...which is not to say you can't give it a really, really small non-zero probability. A serious calculation of whether something supernatural could have occurred should take into account the fact that it is possible, no matter how unlikely, that physics has actually gotten everything wrong.

 

[jt512]

No. It isn't.

You are equivocating between the odds of something happening given a hypothetical prior and evidence for that prior actually being true.

Sorry, but there is just no excuse for making a statement like that at this point in the conversation. I have said, and shown, over and over again, that the weight of the evidence is independent of the prior.

 

[jt512]

so, yes. you are conditioning your answer on God existing and His ability to lead people to water.

As I have repeated and patiently explained, and illustrated using a probability problem that is literally too simple to assign as homework to a high school probability class: To evaluate how an observation affects the relative probabilities of two competing hypotheses, you separately compute the probability of the observation under each hypothesis. The observation increases the probability of the hypothesis (relative to the other hypothesis) under which the observation is more probable. This is really just mathematically formalized common sense.

 

[marplots]

Sorry, but there is just no excuse for making a statement like that at this point in the conversation. I have said, and shown, over and over again, that the weight of the evidence is independent of the prior.

That doesn't help, because what we want to know is what the "weight of the evidence" is. It can be independent and still be assigned a different weight by different people.