Indyref 2: This time it's personal.

[Archie Gemmill Goal]

In that case why bother with a second Indy ref, why not hold a Scottish Parliament election pre article 50 or certainly by next May and when the SNP and the other Independence parties like the Greens win declare UDI. If Scotland wants to be a sovereign state it should get on and act like a sovereign state. Almost any action that the UK Government takes following such an election from sending in troops (ridiculous) to trying to dissolve the Scottish Parliament and withholding revenue (perhaps probable) will give grounds to go to the UN to seek status.

What Scotland needs now is legitimacy to be at the EU table in its own right and this rather drastic approach may be the fastest route to that.

Plus the election will have the added benefit of showing how out of touch the UK Government is with the needs of the Scotland in terms of immigration and access to the single market and as it would be based on a elected manifesto would be unlike the EU referendum vote legally binding on parliament and not advisory.

Im pretty sure manifestos are not legally binding. My source for this is every government ever.

I think before we start ecploring more drastic options we should definitely give the referendum thing achance. Westminster haven't said they won't accept the result.let's not create unnecessary problems yet.

 

[LondonJohn]

As a bystander, let me ask some questions.

What prevents IndyRef2 being held regardless of anything Westminster may or may not demand? Scotland can hold it anyway.

If Westminster blocks a popular IndyRef success for secession, what then prevents a Scottish appeal to ICJ for UDI?

The actual correct answer to the first question is that the Scottish government cannot, in law, hold a independence referendum without the UK government assenting to it. The UK government has devolved a number of powers to the Scottish government, but this is not one of them. What would have to happen (and what happened for the 2014 referendum) is that the UK government would have to effectively grant the Scottish government the temporary right to hold such a referendum.

Now, of course it's also true to say that the Scottish government could conceivably just go ahead and hold a referendum without getting assent from the UK government to do so. Just as fraud is against the law, but that doesn't stop people from committing fraud. But it's massively unlikely that the Scottish government would ever go down that route - to do so would be to create a constitutional and legal crisis. And in addition, as others have correctly pointed out, it would be a shoot-in-foot tactic for any Scottish government that (if the majority referendum vote was to leave) would have to negotiate terms with the UK government.

So, as anyone who understands both the legality of the situation and the realpolitik of the situation knows well, the Scottish government will never hold a referendum - far less declare UDI following any referendum - without having first gained the assent of the UK government and the legal right/powers to hold a referendum. It's very likely that negotiations to that end are happening right now between representatives of the Scottish and UK governments. And I guarantee you that every single pragmatic, reasonable and intelligent member of the Scottish government (and I strongly suspect everyone in that group meets those criteria) understands and accepts full well that a) the key job of the Scottish government is to persuade the UK government that it is in the best interests of the UK as a whole to grant Scotland the power to hold another referendum, and to recognise the result of any such referendum, and b) there is no way, in reality, that the Scottish government would ever break the law and call a referendum without having first conducted successful negotiations with the UK government and gaining assent from the UK government.


On the second question of the UDI issue, I would say it's moot anyway, since (as I argue above) the Scottish government would never even hold a referendum on independence without having first gained UK government assent to do so, along with an associated pledge that the UK government would honour the result of the referendum. But, hypothetically speaking, if the Scottish government were to go collectively mad and hold a referendum without UK government assent, then declare UDI if the result of that referendum were a majority for Leave, it's unlikely in my view that the ICJ would ratify that process as legal under international law. Previous ICJ judgements on UDI have made it very clear that those countries where it has declared UDI to be legal have had clear justification for UDI on the basis of political, cultural, economic and/or military repression by the parent state. Obviously, in the past few decades, the ICJ has never been tested by a country declaring UDI in the absence of clear evidence of this sort of parent-state repression, so it's impossible to say (in terms of precedent) how the ICJ would react to a UDI claim from a region which was not being repressed in any way politically/culturally/economically/militarily by the parent state. But I'd argue that indications from other ICJ rulings can clearly be read between the lines to indicate that UDI by a region such as Scotland from a nation such as the UK would probably not be deemed legal by the ICJ. That however (of course) is my opinion only, but it's my unbiassed opinion based on my rational understanding of the evidence.

 

[catsmate]

IndyRef was agreed to be a simple majority vote. Same as Brexit. Stop embarrassing yourself.

And yet the Leave supporters were planning to agitate for a repeat if they lost by a few percent...

 

[catsmate]

As a bystander, let me ask some questions.

What prevents IndyRef2 being held regardless of anything Westminster may or may not demand? Scotland can hold it anyway.

Absolutely nothing. And this is looking like the most probably scenario.
May faffs around on Brexit and appeals to the nationalist Tories, pissed off the Scots and Sturgeon announced "IndyRef 2 - Sod off ye Tory scunners". Much hot air is emitted, court cases are initiated et cetera. Meanwhile the abject lack of rUKGov to actually enforce it's desires on Scotland is apparent and companies (being more flexible and less prone to filtered vision) take note of the way the wind is blowing to begin discreet discussions with ScotGov. Which becomes public and further annoys May and co.
Injunctions are sought, and possibly issued, the matter goes (ironically) to Europe. Whatever happens the Scots vote and support independence (probably not hugely, 60/40 at the outside). Westminister refuses to accept this and ScotGov issue a UDI and begin preparations to leave.
Much dithering, cries of "traitors" and similar.

Ten years later ScotGov is building a hard border to keep out the hordes of English economic migrants after the rUK economy tanks post-Brexit.

If Westminster blocks a popular IndyRef success for secession, what then prevents a Scottish appeal to ICJ for UDI?

Not a lot. Frankly I don't think they'd even bother, a plebiscite would provide the moral authority for independence and they'd likely be recognised rapidly by most of Europe and whomever the rUK has pissed off that week.

 

[catsmate]

Of course. What could the U.K. Government do to stop these things? Use force? As I've said: send in the redcoats, or the bluejackets, or the Black and Tans? Declare the Scottish Parliament an illegal assembly? Put Sturgeon's head on a spike at London Bridge? These are fantasies. The power to do such things to rebellious provinces, let alone constituent countries of the UK, has passed away.

Exactly. May appears to be falling into one of the classic mistakes Gustavus Adolphus always advised against; Don't make laws that you cannot enforce.

 

[Archie Gemmill Goal]

The actual correct answer to the first question is that the Scottish government cannot, in law, hold a independence referendum without the UK government assenting to it.

Simply not true. The Scottish government can hold a referendum on any topic it so desires at any time. What it cannot do legally is bind the UK Parliament to accept the result of that referendum.

it's massively unlikely that the Scottish government would ever go down that route - to do so would be to create a constitutional and legal crisis. And in addition, as others have correctly pointed out, it would be a shoot-in-foot tactic for any Scottish government that (if the majority referendum vote was to leave) would have to negotiate terms with the UK government.

It would certainly be a last resort but if the UK government refuses to accept the will of the Scottish people as it has always historically claimed to be willing to do then what are the other options?

So, as anyone who understands both the legality of the situation and the realpolitik of the situation knows well, the Scottish government will never hold a referendum - far less declare UDI following any referendum - without having first gained the assent of the UK government and the legal right/powers to hold a referendum. It's very likely that negotiations to that end are happening right now between representatives of the Scottish and UK governments. And I guarantee you that every single pragmatic, reasonable and intelligent member of the Scottish government (and I strongly suspect everyone in that group meets those criteria) understands and accepts full well that a) the key job of the Scottish government is to persuade the UK government that it is in the best interests of the UK as a whole to grant Scotland the power to hold another referendum, and to recognise the result of any such referendum, and b) there is no way, in reality, that the Scottish government would ever break the law and call a referendum without having first conducted successful negotiations with the UK government and gaining assent from the UK government.

On the second question of the UDI issue, I would say it's moot anyway, since (as I argue above) the Scottish government would never even hold a referendum on independence without having first gained UK government assent to do so, along with an associated pledge that the UK government would honour the result of the referendum. But, hypothetically speaking, if the Scottish government were to go collectively mad and hold a referendum without UK government assent, then declare UDI if the result of that referendum were a majority for Leave, it's unlikely in my view that the ICJ would ratify that process as legal under international law. Previous ICJ judgements on UDI have made it very clear that those countries where it has declared UDI to be legal have had clear justification for UDI on the basis of political, cultural, economic and/or military repression by the parent state. Obviously, in the past few decades, the ICJ has never been tested by a country declaring UDI in the absence of clear evidence of this sort of parent-state repression, so it's impossible to say (in terms of precedent) how the ICJ would react to a UDI claim from a region which was not being repressed in any way politically/culturally/economically/militarily by the parent state. But I'd argue that indications from other ICJ rulings can clearly be read between the lines to indicate that UDI by a region such as Scotland from a nation such as the UK would probably not be deemed legal by the ICJ. That however (of course) is my opinion only, but it's my unbiassed opinion based on my rational understanding of the evidence.

This again is simply untrue as has been shown to you. Which rulings are you referring to?

 

[ceptimus]

Sturgeon seems to be frit to actually invoke the referendum: she'd rather just keep threatening the possibility of it - it's becoming rather repetitive and boring.

 

[LondonJohn]

Simply not true. The Scottish government can hold a referendum on any topic it so desires at any time. What it cannot do legally is bind the UK Parliament to accept the result of that referendum.

I think I'm correct in saying that it cannot (in law) hold a referendum on Scottish independence. It can certainly hold a referendum on matters over which it has jurisdiction. But independence is explicitly not one of those matters - unless and until the UK government devolves this area of jurisdiction to Scotland. Without that, the very act of organising and holding a referendum on independence would be in breach of constitutional law.

It would certainly be a last resort but if the UK government refuses to accept the will of the Scottish people as it has always historically claimed to be willing to do then what are the other options?

See, you continually come at this issue from the PoV of "the UK government refusing to accept the will of the Scottish people", and similar confrontational rhetoric. Firstly, I would argue that the UK government is sufficiently sensible, pragmatic and fair to realise that if it is the true and (reasonably) settled will of the majority in Scotland to become independent, then it would almost de facto be in the best interests of the whole of the UK for that to happen. It is vanishingly unlikely, IMO, that a situation could ever now arise where there was clear and demonstrable support for Scottish independence, where the Scottish government presented that evidence to the UK government and asked for assent to hold an independence referendum with a binding commitment to the outcome, and the UK government just flat-out waved it away. Because...... to do so would almost certainly not be in the best interests of the UK.

It might well be, though, that the UK government might retort with an argument along the following lines: "Look, we granted you a once-in-a-generation independence referendum just a few years ago, and the result of that was majority Remain. We understand that the political landscape has significantly changed following the UK EU referendum, and we also understand that the majority will in Scotland was to remain in the EU. We therefore see some rationale for assenting to another binding referendum, but first of all we want a) the Scottish people to see and understand the outcome of the UK negotiations on Brexit (and thus what they'd be getting if they stayed within the UK) and b) independent verification of a continual trend in favour of independence by the majority over, say, the next three years."


And if the UK were to put that position to the Scottish government, I strongly suggest that the Scottish government would either accept those as reasonable terms, or would try to negotiate within them. What I am extremely confident the Scottish government would NOT do under such a (hypothetical) scenario would be to say anything like: "We reject your conditions outright. The people demand independence right now! You cannot hold back the will of the Scottish people! We're going to hold a referendum right now without your assent, and if it results in majority Leave, then we're going to leave the UK without your assent."

This again is simply untrue as has been shown to you. Which rulings are you referring to?

It most assuredly has not "been shown to me". Each of the recent ICJ rulings on UDI make specific and explicit reference to the background situation, in terms of matters related to repression (freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of representation, freedom to express culture, freedom of press, economic equality, use of force by the parent state, etc) in reaching its verdict. And I'd also argue that the very statement by the ICJ that UDI is not automatically illegal in international law points to the inference that it is legal under certain conditions and circumstances.

 

[Architect]

Yep. Just as Catalonia is a country. Bavaria is a country. New South Wales is a country. North Dakota is a country. Sardinia is a country. Wuhan is a country. All under exactly the same defining criteria.

I'm sorry, but you've completely failed to address the legal tests for statehood in my earlier post.

Catalonia was briefly an independent country in the 20th Century, around the time of the Spanish Civil War, and subsequently integrated into the modern Spanish state. It has a parliament and enjoys a significant degree of autonomy but stopping short of the Scottish model in terms of legislative power. Nevertheless there is obviously a significant independence movement. This comparison therefore brings little to the discussion at hand.

New South Wales is a state within the Federation of Australia, and formerly a seperate British Colony. It was never an independent country in its own right, although -as with most federal states - it enjoys significant self rule and indeed legislative power. There is not, as far as we are aware, and significant secessionist movement and therefore it is of little assistance to the current thread.

North Dakota is a state, formerly an incorporated territory of the United States. It was never an independent country. US states arguably have a greater degree of sovereignty than the Australian model. Again there is no secessionist movement of any note as far as I am aware.

Bavaria is a lander within the Federal Republic of Germany. It was an independent state until the late 19th century when it joined the German Federation and effectively thereafter the German Empire. As anyone who has spent time in Germany will be aware, there are significant cultural differences between Bavaria and much of the rest of that country. All the lander parliaments enjoy significant legislative authority. There is, I believe, a very modest secessionist movement in the form of the Bavarian party and associated groups but they hold only a modest number of seats.

Now this is getting a bit repetitive, but Sardinia. Independent until the 16th century or thereby, then disputed for a considerable period. Unified in the Kingdom of Italy in the mid 19th century. Granted autonimous status in 1946. Culturally distinct from an already diverse mainland Italy (there are, for example, language issues but these are not uncommon in Italy). There was an armed secessionist campaign in the 1970s and 80s, but not on a scale of NI or similar areas, and there is not a strong political support for a move away from italy.

The point I'm making here is that your argument about country status (as opposed the statehood) is an oversimplification in your own given examples (and demonstrably wrong in some cases). None meet the tests for statehood at present, but that is not to say that a democratic movement for same could not arrive at that position in due course. There is no obvious reason why, in international law, that would not be possible.

The 9 blokes down the pub, however, are an entirely different matter or likewise the good burghers of (say) Church Street, Hartlepool. There is no history of sovereignty, there is no clearly identified and permanent population group, there is certainly no parliament of equiavelent, and so on.

 

[Architect]

Sturgeon seems to be frit to actually invoke the referendum: she'd rather just keep threatening the possibility of it - it's becoming rather repetitive and boring.

I'm afraid that this is not accurate.

After IndyRef 1 it was made quite clear by the Scottish Government that a further referendum was unlikely unless there was a significant change in circumstances. The 2015 manifesto reiterated the SNP’s support for Scottish independence but stated “that is not what this election is about” - instead it promised to ensure that the Unionist parties’ pledge of extra powers made during the referendum campaign was honoured whilst pushing for full fiscal autonomy.

Of course Brexit was the unexpected gamechanger we're all so busy discussing and, at the same time, the additional powers (or perhaps influence/consideration, if you want to take it in that direction) were not delivered in the envisaged manner. Inasmuch as the 2015 election manifesto did not place independence front and centre, it is therefore quite reasonable for the Scottish Parliament to take the matter forward as a referendum.

The threats, if that is the right term, which you refer to in actual fact only really apply to the period from Brexit onwards. This is a period in which everyone has been waiting to see which way the dice rolled and any announcement of a definite referendum in that period would arguably have been premature.

 

[LondonJohn]

I'm sorry, but you've completely failed to address the legal tests for statehood in my earlier post.

Catalonia was briefly an independent country in the 20th Century, around the time of the Spanish Civil War, and subsequently integrated into the modern Spanish state. It has a parliament and enjoys a significant degree of autonomy but stopping short of the Scottish model in terms of legislative power. Nevertheless there is obviously a significant independence movement. This comparison therefore brings little to the discussion at hand.

New South Wales is a state within the Federation of Australia, and formerly a seperate British Colony. It was never an independent country in its own right, although -as with most federal states - it enjoys significant self rule and indeed legislative power. There is not, as far as we are aware, and significant secessionist movement and therefore it is of little assistance to the current thread.

North Dakota is a state, formerly an incorporated territory of the United States. It was never an independent country. US states arguably have a greater degree of sovereignty than the Australian model. Again there is no secessionist movement of any note as far as I am aware.

Bavaria is a lander within the Federal Republic of Germany. It was an independent state until the late 19th century when it joined the German Federation and effectively thereafter the German Empire. As anyone who has spent time in Germany will be aware, there are significant cultural differences between Bavaria and much of the rest of that country. All the lander parliaments enjoy significant legislative authority. There is, I believe, a very modest secessionist movement in the form of the Bavarian party and associated groups but they hold only a modest number of seats.

Now this is getting a bit repetitive, but Sardinia. Independent until the 16th century or thereby, then disputed for a considerable period. Unified in the Kingdom of Italy in the mid 19th century. Granted autonimous status in 1946. Culturally distinct from an already diverse mainland Italy (there are, for example, language issues but these are not uncommon in Italy). There was an armed secessionist campaign in the 1970s and 80s, but not on a scale of NI or similar areas, and there is not a strong political support for a move away from italy.

The point I'm making here is that your argument about country status (as opposed the statehood) is an oversimplification in your own given examples (and demonstrably wrong in some cases). None meet the tests for statehood at present, but that is not to say that a democratic movement for same could not arrive at that position in due course. There is no obvious reason why, in international law, that would not be possible.

The 9 blokes down the pub, however, are an entirely different matter or likewise the good burghers of (say) Church Street, Hartlepool. There is no history of sovereignty, there is no clearly identified and permanent population group, there is certainly no parliament of equiavelent, and so on.

Huh? The point is, none of these regions passes any of the accepted tests for statehood in full. And a miss is as good as a mile, as the saying goes. But that's not the issue here. My point is, with that in mind, each and every one of these regions has exactly the same "right" (not the correct term, but anyhow...) to term itself a "country", in purely a colloquial or local sense of that word. The point is that none of those regions (England and Scotland included) has the right to term itself a country under the accepted international definition of the term. Just as, for example, Philip Hammond is the Chancellor of the UK, but he is not a chancellor in the wider international definition of the term (where "chancellor" refers to the head of government), but rather he's the finance minister (under the internationally-accepted definition of the term).

 

[Architect]

I think I'm correct in saying that it cannot (in law) hold a referendum on Scottish independence. It can certainly hold a referendum on matters over which it has jurisdiction. But independence is explicitly not one of those matters - unless and until the UK government devolves this area of jurisdiction to Scotland. Without that, the very act of organising and holding a referendum on independence would be in breach of constitutional law.

That is not entirely correct.

Constitutional matters are reserved to Westminster. Reserved matters as set out in the 1998 and 2012 acts are those where the devolved administration have no legal jurisdiction, i.e. they are unable to enact legislation or administrative instruments arising therefrom.

A binding referendum would therefore require Westminster assent.

As far as I am aware there is, however, no impediment to a non-binding or advisory referendum in order for (say) the Scottish Government to enter into negotiations with the UK administration with a view to obtaining independence.

On the basis that the Scottish parliament would presumably pass a legislative instrument to permit such an advisory referendum, Westminster could attempt an interecept through a number of systems:

- It might repeal the Scotland Act 1998, although in practice that would be political suicide.

- It might pass Westminster legislation effectively forbidding advisory constitutional referenda, but that too plays into nationalist hands and is likely to bolster popular support for the SNP administration.

 

[catsmate]

As far as I am aware there is, however, no impediment to a non-binding or advisory referendum in order for (say) the Scottish Government to enter into negotiations with the UK administration with a view to obtaining independence.

A fascinating point. The parallels with the Brexit referendum are interesting.

On the basis that the Scottish parliament would presumably pass a legislative instrument to permit such an advisory referendum, Westminster could attempt an interecept through a number of systems:

- It might repeal the Scotland Act 1998, although in practice that would be political suicide.

- It might pass Westminster legislation effectively forbidding advisory constitutional referenda, but that too plays into nationalist hands and is likely to bolster popular support for the SNP administration.

I suspect that either would ensure Scottish independence in short order, regardless of Westminster's wishes.

 

[Lothian]

I'm afraid that this is not accurate.

After IndyRef 1 it was made quite clear by the Scottish Government that a further referendum was unlikely unless there was a significant change in circumstances. The 2015 manifesto reiterated the SNP’s support for Scottish independence but stated “that is not what this election is about” - instead it promised to ensure that the Unionist parties’ pledge of extra powers made during the referendum campaign was honoured whilst pushing for full fiscal autonomy.

Of course Brexit was the unexpected gamechanger we're all so busy discussing and, at the same time, the additional powers (or perhaps influence/consideration, if you want to take it in that direction) were not delivered in the envisaged manner. Inasmuch as the 2015 election manifesto did not place independence front and centre, it is therefore quite reasonable for the Scottish Parliament to take the matter forward as a referendum.

The threats, if that is the right term, which you refer to in actual fact only really apply to the period from Brexit onwards. This is a period in which everyone has been waiting to see which way the dice rolled and any announcement of a definite referendum in that period would arguably have been premature.

In the indie ref the Scottish Government outlined in its publications how a vote to remain could take Scotland out of Europe
eg"The advantage of independence is that the people of Scotland
will have the sole and final say. We will not be taken out of the
EU against our wishes as may turn out to be the case if we are
not independent." source

The threat of leaving the EU was a part of the independence debate. The Scottish people aware of that possibility rejected independence. It isn't a game changer. It is an excuse being jumped on by separatists. If it wasn't Brexit it would be the new runway in London or the hazardous materials amendment bill that was the 'reason' the promises not to have another referendum would be reneged upon.

 

[Aepervius]

The actual correct answer to the first question is that the Scottish government cannot, in law, hold a independence referendum without the UK government assenting to it. The UK government has devolved a number of powers to the Scottish government, but this is not one of them. What would have to happen (and what happened for the 2014 referendum) is that the UK government would have to effectively grant the Scottish government the temporary right to hold such a referendum.

They can organize a referendum. And then what is westminster to do "your referendum does not count but ours is the will of the people" ? That would be quite a huge political problem either way.

 

[Aepervius]

I think I'm correct in saying that it cannot (in law) hold a referendum on Scottish independence.

It can make a referendum on whatever it want even the color of the paint on westminster's building.

What it cannot make is force the central gov to accept the result as binding. But if they do not, then it is certain to bring a crisis.

And so much also for "sovereignty" issue of brexit.

 

[Architect]

Huh? The point is, none of these regions passes any of the accepted tests for statehood in full. And a miss is as good as a mile, as the saying goes. But that's not the issue here. My point is, with that in mind, each and every one of these regions has exactly the same "right" (not the correct term, but anyhow...) to term itself a "country", in purely a colloquial or local sense of that word. The point is that none of those regions (England and Scotland included) has the right to term itself a country under the accepted international definition of the term. Just as, for example, Philip Hammond is the Chancellor of the UK, but he is not a chancellor in the wider international definition of the term (where "chancellor" refers to the head of government), but rather he's the finance minister (under the internationally-accepted definition of the term).

Per my earlier, somewhat lengthy post you are framing the question in terms which are not of assistance in taking the discussion forward:

Country is a subjective term which means different things to different people. Statehood, on the other hand, is rather well defined in international law and requires:

a) a permanent population;

b) a defined territory;

c) a government in its own right; and

d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

<snip>

Scotland currently meet (a) and (b), and goes part of the way to meeting (c) through a national parliament with wideranging but not universal powers. In addition it has significant legal jurisdiction through the provisions of the Act of Union, distinct from the other home nations.

The SNP wishes to secure the remaining powers under test (c) and, by definition, (d). It is seeking a democratic mandate to do so as, for that matter, has Catalonia.

Bavaria and Sardinia have a historically similar situation but there is no pronounced popular drive for secession. They are therefore neither relevant or of assistance in discussing the matter at hand. New South Wales and Dakota are of somewhat lesser value inasmuch as neither have ever been sovereign states and hence would have considerably further to travel in support of any secessionist movement.

That is not to say, however, that these four states and former sovereign nations (as appropriate) could not do so. The UN principles of self determination would support such a move if it was the consistent, clear, and settled democratic will of the relevant populations. It just seems very, very unlikely.

As for the reference to Chancellor, I'm afraid I don't see your point. The Westiminster administration uses the term in its historic sense, meaning a senior official. The German term, which I think you are referring to, is Bundeskanzler, kanzler not being a direct cognate of the English term and inferring secretary (in the historic sense) or chairman.

 

[LondonJohn]

They can organize a referendum. And then what is westminster to do "your referendum does not count but ours is the will of the people" ? That would be quite a huge political problem either way.

Sure they can organise a referendum. There's nothing stopping them. Just as there's nothing stopping a man from walking up to a random stranger in the street and punching that stranger into unconsciousness. Both are against the law though, and both would face legal ramifications.

And I would be extremely confident (to the point of near-certainty) that the present Scottish government is not minded in the slightest to break the law and cause a huge problem in the application of remedies. I am as certain as I can be that the Scottish government's aim is to negotiate with the UK government to the point where the UK government agrees to assent to devolving the power to hold an independence referendum to the Scottish government, and where the UK government also agrees to honour the result of that referendum. Furthermore, I cannot conceive of any reasonable scenario where the Scottish government would ever hold a referendum (or, of course, declare UDI following such a referendum) without the assent of the UK government to both the referendum and independence with a Leave majority.

It seriously would be interesting for both "sides" in this debate to understand "from the horse's mouth" what the Scottish government's position is on this matter. I would be astonished if it's not the position I outline above. But it would be interesting - and pretty conclusive - to see it explicitly articulated.

 

[LondonJohn]

Per my earlier, somewhat lengthy post you are framing the question in terms which are not of assistance in taking the discussion forward:



Scotland currently meet (a) and (b), and goes part of the way to meeting (c) through a national parliament with wideranging but not universal powers. In addition it has significant legal jurisdiction through the provisions of the Act of Union, distinct from the other home nations.

The SNP wishes to secure the remaining powers under test (c) and, by definition, (d). It is seeking a democratic mandate to do so as, for that matter, has Catalonia.

Bavaria and Sardinia have a historically similar situation but there is no pronounced popular drive for secession. They are therefore neither relevant or of assistance in discussing the matter at hand. New South Wales and Dakota are of somewhat lesser value inasmuch as neither have ever been sovereign states and hence would have considerably further to travel in support of any secessionist movement.

That is not to say, however, that these four states and former sovereign nations (as appropriate) could not do so. The UN principles of self determination would support such a move if it was the consistent, clear, and settled democratic will of the relevant populations. It just seems very, very unlikely.

As for the reference to Chancellor, I'm afraid I don't see your point. The Westiminster administration uses the term in its historic sense, meaning a senior official. The German term, which I think you are referring to, is Bundeskanzler, kanzler not being a direct cognate of the English term and inferring secretary (in the historic sense) or chairman.

So Scotland is not currently a country under that international definition. That's......my point! Of course Scotland would become a country if it were to secede from the UK. And in exactly the same way, those other regions are not currently countries under the international definition. But - as I'm trying to point out - that absolutely does not preclude these regions calling themselves "countries" if they so desire. Just as many refer to "the Principality of Wales", whereas in 2016 Wales is no such thing in the proper definition of the term.

 

[Architect]

In the indie ref the Scottish Government outlined in its publications how a vote to remain could take Scotland out of Europe
eg"The advantage of independence is that the people of Scotland
will have the sole and final say. We will not be taken out of the
EU against our wishes as may turn out to be the case if we are
not independent." source

The threat of leaving the EU was a part of the independence debate. The Scottish people aware of that possibility rejected independence. It isn't a game changer. It is an excuse being jumped on by separatists. If it wasn't Brexit it would be the new runway in London or the hazardous materials amendment bill that was the 'reason' the promises not to have another referendum would be reneged upon.

Taken in isolation you might have a point, however the position suggested effectively ignores the landscape at the time leading up to IndyRef 1.

During this time opinion polls indicated that the UK electorate supported continuing membership of the EU. It was not until June/July 2015 that opinion polls in England and Wales indicated a finer balance (Panelbase/Sunday Times, 3rd July 2015) - a full year after the Scottish result.

There had, of course, been indications of (predominantly English) support for withdrawal. James Wharton sought to introduce a bill committing to an in/out referendum as far back as July 2013, whilst Cameron made frequent reference to negotiating better terms of membership. Bill Neil's bill did not, however, receive its first reading until late October 2014 - after IndyRef - and I think we would all agree that the eventual 2016 exit vote was a surprise to most people.

Therefore to say that "Scotland was aware it might happen" is, of course, a trueism but overlooks whether the Scottish electorate thought it a likelihood or the extent to which parties addressed it as a major issue. In fact as well all know the Scottish Conservatives, for example, (I mean you Ms. Davidson) made great play of the exonomic impact of expulsion from the EU - temporary or otherwise - of Scotland if it were to become independent and the reasonable inferrence was that remaining within the UK was likely to also mean remaining within the EU.