Proof of Immortality III

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I am satisfied that this has been done already, at great length and to great depth, innumerable times.

Show me just where you have addressed these many demonstrations according to their merit.
Prestige,
- If you really want me to respond to your criticisms, you'll need to be willing to point me to specific arguments.
 
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Sets have elements. The elements have properties. Yes, the elements of a set can share properties with elements of other sets, but in the context of Jabba's remark, if two sets are disjoint, they have nothing (meaning elements) in common.


The fact that you have to write "meaning elements" shows that the phrase "nothing in common" is ambiguous. How many posts until you just admit it?
 
Prestige,
- If you really want me to respond to your criticisms, you'll need to be willing to point me to specific arguments.

How dare you. Responded to, pointed to, explained to, it never matters you'll ignore it anyway.
 
3216

3216-3220

3220-3221

3220-3222js and prestige,
- Show me just where, and how, I was wrong.

Remember when you said you could prove immortality? That was when you were wrong.

Remember any other thread you started? You were wrong then too.
 
Prestige,
- If you really want me to respond to your criticisms, you'll need to be willing to point me to specific arguments.
You profoundly misrepresent the nature of our relationship. I'm not here to convince you. You're here to convince me.

This thread abounds with specific arguments. Help yourself.
 
Prestige,
- If you really want me to respond to your criticisms, you'll need to be willing to point me to specific arguments.
No. You admit to ignoring many of your critics, and among the reasons you give for ignoring them is that the posts are too challenging. You have absolutely no right to ask your critics to repeat themselves and thereby indulge your laziness. Shame on you.
 
Sets have elements. The elements have properties. Yes, the elements of a set can share properties with elements of other sets, but in the context of Jabba's remark, if two sets are disjoint, they have nothing (meaning elements) in common.
js,
- To what do you refer by "the context of Jabba's remark"?
 
js,
- To what do you refer by "the context of Jabba's remark"?

*Sighs* Jesus tap dancing Christ.

They mean the things you said Jabba in the way you said them.

Look in the dictionary under the word "context" if you need to figure it out anymore.
 
js,
- To what do you refer by "the context of Jabba's remark"?

In the interest of moving forward, not constantly backwards, how about we not worry so much about who may have said what intending what?

The point I was making was that your H, whatever it is, includes all possible realities that meet the requirements set for H. Your ~H, of necessity, includes all the possible realities not included in H, nothing more, and nothing less. No reality is included in both H and ~H, only in one and not the other.

Your current selection for H includes all possible realities wherein OOFLam would apply. A specific physical existence is not a requirement, yet your estimate for P(E|H) assumed a specific physical existence.

You need to recalculate your P(E|H).
 
What I meant (contra jsfisher) is that it is false that two disjoint sets can have "nothing" in common. What I was trying to illustrate with my little poem is that roses and violets are disjoint sets (in, say, the universe of plant species), yet they have a common property: they have leaves.
Somewhat more formally, even though a set A (eg, roses) and a set B (eg, violets) are disjoint, there can be a third set C (eg, plants with leaves) that intersects them both, in which case at least some elements of A and some elements of B would have in common the property represented by C.
What A and B cannot have, if they are disjoint sets, is any common element. If x is an element of A, then x cannot be an element of B. Nonetheless, A and B can have properties (e.g., leaves) in common.
The central question. then, is whether the thing that Jabba claims that H and ~H have in common is a property or an element. I have no idea what this thing he claims they have in common is, although I have tried to go back and figure it out. Having been gone for a week, it's remarkable how, in one sense, I've missed so much; yet in another, so little.
jt,

- I'm having trouble with "disjoint set."

- What we're addressing is whether or not complementary hypotheses have anything in common. It's obvious that complementary hypotheses have to address the same set... Here, both hypotheses address human lives. One hypothesis claims that each of us has only one finite life. The other hypothesis simply claims that such is not true -- and points out various possible realities in which that first hypothesis would not be true.

- I seem to be missing something...
 
In the interest of moving forward, not constantly backwards, how about we not worry so much about who may have said what intending what?

The point I was making was that your H, whatever it is, includes all possible realities that meet the requirements set for H. Your ~H, of necessity, includes all the possible realities not included in H, nothing more, and nothing less. No reality is included in both H and ~H, only in one and not the other.

Your current selection for H includes all possible realities wherein OOFLam would apply. A specific physical existence is not a requirement, yet your estimate for P(E|H) assumed a specific physical existence.

You need to recalculate your P(E|H).
js,

- I think that I understand what you're saying...

- My first calculation was based upon one's existence being determined by the particular ovum and sperm cell involved. But then, I moved on to accepting that even if we created a perfect copy of the biological organism, we probably wouldn't create the same "self" -- i.e. if we created a perfect biological copy of me, my self would not be looking out two sets of eyes.
- At that point, my calculation for P(E|H) became 7 billion over infinity. In that case, each new self would be brand new -- there would be no limited pool of potential selves.
 
js,

- I think that I understand what you're saying...

- My first calculation was based upon one's existence being determined by the particular ovum and sperm cell involved. But then, I moved on to accepting that even if we created a perfect copy of the biological organism, we probably wouldn't create the same "self" -- i.e. if we created a perfect biological copy of me, my self would not be looking out two sets of eyes.
- At that point, my calculation for P(E|H) became 7 billion over infinity. In that case, each new self would be brand new -- there would be no limited pool of potential selves.
You're dividing by infinity and you can't see where you've gone wrong. Show me one other example where division by infinity is used as a proof of anything.
 
Jabba,

In addition to reworking your P(E|H) calculation, you need to more fully define what you mean by E.
 
jt,

- I'm having trouble with "disjoint set."

- What we're addressing is whether or not complementary hypotheses have anything in common.


No, that's what you want to talk about. Others have been pointing out that while it is possible for items in a group to have characteristics in common with items in its complement, a group and its complement cannot have items in common.
 
My first calculation was based upon one's existence being determined by the particular ovum and sperm cell involved.

Texas sharpshooter's fallacy.

But then, I moved on to accepting that even if we created a perfect copy of the biological organism, we probably wouldn't create the same "self" --

You didn't "move on to accept" anything. You simply redefined that day's definition of "self" to be something that would behave a certain way in the thought experiment.
 
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