. . . either explicitly ordering killings, or at the very least authorizing them.
Or protecting Germans who might commit atrocities, including murders, in the occupied East. Thus, to your list we can add the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order (13 May 1941).
This Führer decree made German soldiers immune from legal consequences for mistreatment of civilians: ““Punishable offenses committed against enemy civilians do not, until further notice, come any more under the jurisdiction of the courts-martial and the summary courts-martial.”
The decree was sent on 31 May 1941 to units that would carry out the invasion of USSR. (Romer, in Kay/Rutherford/Stahel p 78)
Some key components of this order were:
Imposition of different rules for the East based on Nazi political-ideological preconceptions and a predetermined view of the enemy as deserving especially harsh measures: “The further extension of the eastern theater of operations, the battle strategy conditioned thereby, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts of the armed forces with problems,” which required, in the Nazis’ view, removing legal consequences for important aspects of troops’ behavior in the East.
A view of civilians that they constituted the enemy, an ironic position in that many of the nationalities in the occupied territories chafed under Soviet rule and under other circumstances might have welcomed a chance at liberation: “the troops defend themselves relentlessly against any threat from the enemy population.”
Permission for officers to take actions against civilians, including the death penalty, based on suspicion alone and without even pretense of a trial or investigation of any sort; granting of power of life and death for civilians to front-line officers: “persons suspected of an offense will be brought immediately before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.” And: “Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.”
Authorization of punitive measures against villagers for attacks with which they were not involved and because those carrying out attacks were not known: “Against localities from which troops have been attacked in or treacherous manner, collective coercive measures be applied immediately upon the order of an officer of the rank of at least battalion etc., commander, if the circumstances do not permit a quick identification of individual perpetrators.”
The actual prohibition of the use of law or courts in most cases of the apprehension of civilians: “It is expressly forbidden to detain suspects in order to transfer them to the courts after the reinstatement of jurisdiction over indigenous population.”
Exemption for troops from obeying law with regard to civilians, who were to be regarded as the enemy: “1. With regard to offenses committed against enemy civilians by members of the armed forces and its employees, prosecution is not obligatory even if the deed is simultaneously a military violation or crime.”
Justification for illegal measures in the East based on a Nazified revision of German history and the presumed need for a war of annihilation against the Soviets on the basis of ideology: “2. When judging such deeds, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse in 1918, the subsequent suffering of the German people and the fight against national socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevist influence and that no German has forgotten this.”
Allowance for troops to commit atrocities against civilians – and reservation of courts-martials only for actions that threatened German military discipline or actions that involved sexual activity or other affronts to German ideas of morality: “In the case of offenses against indigenous inhabitants, the judicial authority will order a court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the troops call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offenses based on lack of sexual restraint, or resulting from a criminal tendency, or indicating that the troops are threatening to become out of hand. As a rule offenses resulting in the senseless destruction of billets, stores or other captured material to the disadvantage of our forces will not be judged more leniently.” A supplemental order reinforced this point (Letter From Defendant Lehmann to Defendant Warlimont's Office, 4/28/1941, Transmitting Lehmann's Draft of Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1951. pp. 1121-1123.): “II: 1. Military law and its enforcement agencies serve primarily the enforcement of discipline.”
According to Felix Romer, “The most consequential innovation of the Jurisdiction Decree remained, however, the introduction of executions without legal proceedings” as we have seen above. (in Kay/Rutherford/Stahel, pp 75-76)
According to Kevin Jon Heller, the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order was held by the court in the NMT Hostage Tribunal to be prima facie illegal because “the order categorized ‘partisans’ in such an overbroad manner. . . . For example, the order authorized the summary execution of ‘[e]very civilian who impedes or incites others to impede the German Wehrmacht,’ a criterion that ‘clearly opens the way for arbitrary and bloody implementation.’” (Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunal and the Origins of International Law, pp 209-210) Romer concurs: “The break with international law [regarding anti-partisan actions] consisted above all in German reprisals from the outset being directed not only against irregulars but also too often toward uninvolved villagers, civilians who had been picked up or dispersed Red Army soldiers, who were declared in arbitrary acts of substitution to be ‘partisan suspects,’ ‘partisan helpers,’ or other ‘suspicious elements’ and called to account for ‘the increasing precariousness’ of the occupied territories.” (Romer, in Kay/Rutherford/Stahel, p 84)