Proof of Immortality III

[caveman1917]

A simple analogy is that you thoroughly shuffle a deck of 52 playing cards, examine the sequence that was produced, and note that the probability that the shuffle would have produced that sequence if the shuffle were random is 1 in 8 × 10⁶⁷; whereas, if the deck were rigged to produce that exact sequence, then the probability would be 1. Thus, the probabilities overwhelmingly demonstrate that the deck was rigged. The fallacy is that the shuffle had to produce some sequence, and you would have made the exact same remark no matter what sequence was actually produced. Thus the hypotheses that are actually being compared are (1) whether a random shuffle would produce some sequence vs. (2) whether a rigged shuffle would have produced the sequence that was actually observed. The probability of the observation under each hypothesis is 1, so the likelihood ratio is 1, and thus the observation has no power to discriminate between the hypotheses.

I disagree. Either a result always changes the relative probabilities between hypotheses, including the first time you get it, or it never does. Let S be the sequence produced by the deck, let HR be the hypothesis that the deck is random and HS that it is rigged to produce S. If you keep getting S time and time again then HS increases in probability while HR decreases, therefor if you get S a single time HS and HR also change that way.

 

[Jabba]

It seems to me that Jabba's argument is that the probability that "he" would be created by a random process, where "he" is some exactly identifiable entity (maybe down to the molecular level) is infinitesimal; whereas, if "he" always existed, in some sense, the probability would be 1 (well, .62, anyway). Therefore, the probabilities overwhelmingly favor the latter hypothesis.

The fallacy is that we are living in a Universe that produces things. Even if we assume that these things are produced randomly, and the probability that any specific one of them, defined on a molecule by molecule basis is infinitesimal, no matter what happened to have gotten produced, it would be what we would look at and ask "What are the odds of that?"

A simple analogy is that you thoroughly shuffle a deck of 52 playing cards, examine the sequence that was produced, and note that the probability that the shuffle would have produced that sequence if the shuffle were random is 1 in 8 × 10⁶⁷; whereas, if the deck were rigged to produce that exact sequence, then the probability would be 1. Thus, the probabilities overwhelmingly demonstrate that the deck was rigged. The fallacy is that the shuffle had to produce some sequence, and you would have made the exact same remark no matter what sequence was actually produced. Thus the hypotheses that are actually being compared are (1) whether a random shuffle would produce some sequence vs. (2) whether a rigged shuffle would have produced the sequence that was actually observed. The probability of the observation under each hypothesis is 1, so the likelihood ratio is 1, and thus the observation has no power to discriminate between the hypotheses. Of course, in this case, the priors will speak for themselves.

To bring this back to Jabba, Jabba could point to anything in the Universe and ask, What is the probability of that exact thing if it were produced randomly? He happens to be pointing to himself, but he could just as well point to you, me, Mt. Sinai, or my grandfather's Edsel, and ask the same question. But if that thing wasn't there to be pointed to and asked about, something (or someone) else would be. And so the probability that something (or someone) would be there to point to is 1, whether the thing was produced randomly or purposefully, and so the observation that the thing exists does nothing to discriminate between the two hypotheses.

jt,
- Assuming, for the moment, that you do agree that your explanation above is another way of describing the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy...

- I do think that the target was there before the shooting, and I tried to explain that back in #1898.

- But, I also think that there is no need for a target in this situation. What a pre-existing target does is provide a reasonable alternative to "happenstance" (luck of the draw?). Here, IMO of course, we already have a reasonable alternative(s) to OOFLam. There is a reasonable possibility that OOFLam is not correct. We are not stuck with luck of the draw if there is a reasonable alternative to luck. We use Bayes to figure out which side -- H, or ~H -- scores the most points in the formula.
- Given that I exist, which is more probable -- H or ~H? Which is more likely to produce my current existence?

 

[JayUtah]

I do think that the target was there before the shooting, and I tried to explain that back in #1898.

Narcissism isn't an explanation or proof. Do not simply incorporate your most recent fringe reset by reference, especially when you demonstrate absolutely no interest in the many rebuttals that followed.

But, I also think that there is no need for a target in this situation. What a pre-existing target does is provide a reasonable alternative to "happenstance"...

Changing horses. Your argument has been that the scientific model could produce that precious, unique combination of "you" only by the sheerest of luck. You insist that the probability of you, given only one finite life, is "virtually zero." That is exactly the exercise of identifying a target and claiming it's so hard for science to hit it that we must conclude some other means accomplished it.

We are not stuck with luck of the draw if there is a reasonable alternative to luck.

There is no luck involved in the scientific model. You desperately need there to be so that you can create a false dilemma that props up your half-baked notion of a soul. The "luck" in that formula comes from your preconceived notion of the significance of the outcome that is you. Go back and read jt512's card-deck explanation until you understand it. The odds of drawing a royal flush of spades is exactly the same as drawing any other hand. We only get excited about it because we predetermined that that hand means something important.

We use Bayes to figure out which side -- H, or ~H -- scores the most points in the formula.

Not with made-up numbers. If you just make up all the numbers in your model, you're just spinning your wheels. And you have been told this by multiple people.

 

[godless dave]

- I do think that the target was there before the shooting, and I tried to explain that back in #1898.

You failed.

For reference, here is post #1898: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=11392907&postcount=1898

 

[John Jones]

You failed.

For reference, here is post #1898: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=11392907&postcount=1898

It's nothing but another of his many fringe resets.

 

[turingtest]

The fallacy is that we are living in a Universe that produces things. Even if we assume that these things are produced randomly, and the probability that any specific one of them, defined on a molecule by molecule basis is infinitesimal, no matter what happened to have gotten produced, it would be what we would look at and ask "What are the odds of that?"

A simple analogy is that you thoroughly shuffle a deck of 52 playing cards, examine the sequence that was produced, and note that the probability that the shuffle would have produced that sequence if the shuffle were random is 1 in 8 × 10⁶⁷; whereas, if the deck were rigged to produce that exact sequence, then the probability would be 1. Thus, the probabilities overwhelmingly demonstrate that the deck was rigged. The fallacy is that the shuffle had to produce some sequence, and you would have made the exact same remark no matter what sequence was actually produced. Thus the hypotheses that are actually being compared are (1) whether a random shuffle would produce some sequence vs. (2) whether a rigged shuffle would have produced the sequence that was actually observed. The probability of the observation under each hypothesis is 1, so the likelihood ratio is 1, and thus the observation has no power to discriminate between the hypotheses. Of course, in this case, the priors will speak for themselves.

To bring this back to Jabba, Jabba could point to anything in the Universe and ask, What is the probability of that exact thing if it were produced randomly? He happens to be pointing to himself, but he could just as well point to you, me, Mt. Sinai, or my grandfather's Edsel, and ask the same question. But if that thing wasn't there to be pointed to and asked about, something (or someone) else would be. And so the probability that something (or someone) would be there to point to is 1, whether the thing was produced randomly or purposefully, and so the observation that the thing exists does nothing to discriminate between the two hypotheses.

I've used that same analogy to try to illustrate the difference between intended outcomes and ones that are simply unique. By this analogy, the likelihood of any one intended outcome is, as you say, 1 in 8x10⁶⁷. But if you didn't care how the cards came out, each outcome is still unique, but equally likely- it doesn't matter what the likelihood of any one is if none are intended.

It seems to me that Jabba is confusing (or deliberately conflating) the two things, and using probability where it just doesn't apply- he's treating himself, as a unique outcome, as also a necessarily intended one. The two concepts aren't synonymous.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Oh for Pete's sake can we stop nitpicking the exact probability metaphors being used?

You can't prove immortality with probability. Period end of discussion.

We all (-1) know that. We're just discussing statistics in general while Jabba contemplates his next "move".

Hans

 

[JoeMorgue]

We all (-1) know that. We're just discussing statistics in general while Jabba contemplates his next "move".

Hans

I get it I just think we run too much of a risk of... someone confusing it for agreement.

 

[jt512]

What if you get a single integer between 0 and 1023? Is that a single datapoint or 10 datapoints? There's the obvious identification of integers in [0,1023] with binary sequences of length 10.

That depends on the sampling model.

 

[JayUtah]

I get it I just think we run too much of a risk of... someone confusing it for agreement.

A valid concern. However, in the typical fringe theorist's mind, all roads lead to victory. Whether someone says something that can be styled as agreement or whether his critics are cowed away from thorough and sound rebuttals by that fear makes little difference. We cannot refrain from making the right arguments simply because someone might spin them. We must trust readers to spot the spin.

An argument can have more than one thing wrong with it, and Jabba's has many things wrong with it. Typically we point to egregiously bad arguments as being both wrong in the premises and structurally wrong in their syllogistic forms. It doesn't matter which one you choose to tackle first. Nor does it matter whether the proponent rehabilitates only one of several failings.

Jabba has proposed to prove immortality using the tools of mathematics. You and I have both said -- correctly so -- that statistical probability cannot be used to do that, or any similar thing. Probability tells us what may be the case, not what must be the case.

Using the wrong tool doesn't preclude that he's using it also in the wrong way. You can't cut down a tree with a rake, but you only double your embarrassment by holding it by the tines and swinging madely. Jabba proposes to assign probabilities to the various propositions in his model. He's doing it wrong, and that's pertinent to the discussion. It raises the difficult topic of proper measurement, estimation, and reckoning of probabilty. Lots of people get that topic wrong -- including Jabba. That's not rendered entirely moot by the inapplicability of the method overall.

 

[caveman1917]

That depends on the sampling model.

In what way? Think of it as rolling a 1024-sided die if you want.

 

[Loss Leader]

- But, I also think that there is no need for a target in this situation. What a pre-existing target does is provide a reasonable alternative to "happenstance" (luck of the draw?). Here, IMO of course, we already have a reasonable alternative(s) to OOFLam. There is a reasonable possibility that OOFLam is not correct. We are not stuck with luck of the draw if there is a reasonable alternative to luck. We use Bayes to figure out which side -- H, or ~H -- scores the most points in the formula.
- Given that I exist, which is more probable -- H or ~H? Which is more likely to produce my current existence?

Jabba,

This is what you just said:

"If I'm walking along the street and I see a quarter face up, I can create two hypotheses: a) the quarter landed with a 50% chance of being face-up; or b) this quarter is gimicked by weight or it has two "heads" sides."

You then go on to say, "If the quarter has two heads or is influenced to land on heads, the chance of it showing heads is 100%. If it's a regular quarter, the chance is 50%. Since 100% is so much larger than 50%, I must conclude that this is a rigged quarter."

Do you not notice that your argument fell apart at the word "if"? You've done no testing, no additional flips and no inspection of the quarter. We have no way to calculate the likelihood of your "if" statement. You're holding it in equal likelihood with the idea that the quarter is fair. But you're doing so without evidence. You haven't even shown that producing a two-headed quarter is even possible.

 

[Loss Leader]

Jabba shows up on a foreign planet, Floom. On Floom, they play a game called Roodle. Jabba happens to walk up to a couple in the park at the end of a game of Roodle. He has never seen nor heard of the game before and did not watch the two play it. One Floomian has a salt shaker strapped to his head, three small subway tokens in his right hand, while he stands on a cushion and recites his alphabet backwards. After completing this, the alien shouts, "I won! I won!" The other alien says, "Yes, you won. That is the absolute best any Floomian can do at Roodle."

Jabba immediately interrupts them and hollers, "The game is rigged!"

Other than the rarity of scoring a Full Triple Roodle, what information is Jabba using to determine that?

 

[JayUtah]

You're holding it in equal likelihood with the idea that the quarter is fair.

To which he has already answered, in a way, by claiming that Bayes lets him substitute his fervently held beliefs as the relevant likelihoods.

 

[caveman1917]

Jabba shows up on a foreign planet, Floom. On Floom, they play a game called Roodle. Jabba happens to walk up to a couple in the park at the end of a game of Roodle. He has never seen nor heard of the game before and did not watch the two play it. One Floomian has a salt shaker strapped to his head, three small subway tokens in his right hand, while he stands on a cushion and recites his alphabet backwards. After completing this, the alien shouts, "I won! I won!" The other alien says, "Yes, you won. That is the absolute best any Floomian can do at Roodle."

Jabba immediately interrupts them and hollers, "The game is rigged!"

Other than the rarity of scoring a Full Triple Roodle, what information is Jabba using to determine that?

Jabba is using no information to reach that conclusion, a conclusion which can be made correct if replaced with "the game is likely rigged!" In fact it requires the use of information not to reach that conclusion.

Such information might include things like "if this game can only be won and not lost then it wouldn't be interesting, hence Floomians wouldn't play it. Floomians do play it, therefor it is likely possible to lose as well as win." Or anything else which adjusts priors away from equal between "game is rigged" and "game is fair".

 

[Mojo]

jt,
- Assuming, for the moment, that you do agree that your explanation above is another way of describing the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy...

- I do think that the target was there before the shooting, and I tried to explain that back in #1898.

That's kind of the point of the Texas sharpshooter fallacy, Jabba. The whole side of the barn is there before he takes his shot; after he takes his shot he draws a circle round the bullet hole and calls that his target.

All possible targets are there before the shooting, but none of them is selected as the specific desired target until afterwards. That is precisely what you are doing.

- Given that I exist, which is more probable -- H or ~H? Which is more likely to produce my current existence?

You have defined H as the current scientific model of consciousness, in which your consciousness is an emergent property of your body. Your preferred hypothesis is that in addition to your body you have an independently existing soul.

Since your current existence under H only requires that your body exists, and your existence under your preferred hypothesis requires that your body exists, that your soul exists, and that the two somehow become associated, H is more likely to produce your current existence.

 

[jt512]

What if you get a single integer between 0 and 1023? Is that a single datapoint or 10 datapoints? There's the obvious identification of integers in [0,1023] with binary sequences of length 10.

That depends on the sampling model.

In what way? Think of it as rolling a 1024-sided die if you want.

If the sample space is the set of all possible outcomes of a single roll of a 24-sided, and you roll the die once, you have a single observation.

 

[The Sparrow]

That's kind of the point of the Texas sharpshooter fallacy, Jabba. The whole side of the barn is there before he takes his shot; after he takes his shot he draws a circle round the bullet hole and calls that his target.

Thanks for that. I was too lazy to look it up and this explains it wonderfully.

 

[Loss Leader]

Such information might include things like "if this game can only be won and not lost then it wouldn't be interesting, hence Floomians wouldn't play it. Floomians do play it, therefor it is likely possible to lose as well as win." Or anything else which adjusts priors away from equal between "game is rigged" and "game is fair".

Don't fight the hypo. Jabba has no information about the game, what any possible outcome is, or why any alien race might play it. Nor does the scene that he is witnessing give him any information.

And that's just like ... Jabba's existence. All he knows is that he's here. He has no information about whether the universe necessarily or accidentally produced him. He has no information about what "he" is. And he certainly can't examine additional universes or run this one again from the start. He's seen the very end of the game completely out of any context and he's trying to calculate the odds that it was rigged.


ETA: I see no reason why aliens would have to play a zero-sum game with a winner and loser. My son's camp doesn't even play zero-sum sports games, nor keep track of winners and losers when they do.. And he is almost definitely human.

 

[theprestige]

Jabba shows up on a foreign planet, Floom. On Floom, they play a game called Roodle. Jabba happens to walk up to a couple in the park at the end of a game of Roodle. He has never seen nor heard of the game before and did not watch the two play it. One Floomian has a salt shaker strapped to his head, three small subway tokens in his right hand, while he stands on a cushion and recites his alphabet backwards. After completing this, the alien shouts, "I won! I won!" The other alien says, "Yes, you won. That is the absolute best any Floomian can do at Roodle."

Jabba immediately interrupts them and hollers, "The game is rigged!"

Other than the rarity of scoring a Full Triple Roodle, what information is Jabba using to determine that?

I have no idea, but I think it would work even better as a drinking game.