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Proof of Immortality III

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You are allowed to have a subjective belief. You are not allowed to pretend that Bayesian inference lets you convert that subjective belief into a fact. You don't understand how subjective factors apply to Bayesian priors. This has been explained to you at length. If you simply declared your belief and characterized as subjective, most people here would leave you alone. But you have declared a belief and told us you could prove it mathematically to be correct. But you are simply misusing Bayes in a way that it's clear you don't care about. You have ignored a wealth of helpful information showing you how your method won't work. And you have ignored your own experts who have told you that you can't answer your question this way. At this point it has to be your willful self-deception that you're asking your critics to play along with.
 
One of the foundations of rational thought was the idea that getting a more accurate understanding of reality requires one to attempt to conceive of reality from an objective point of view. The catch is that all the information we use to approximate that objective point of view comes from our subjective perceptions. Philosophers have been grappling with this problem as long as philosophy has existed.

Some kinds of thinking respond to the problem by eschewing any attempt to approach an objective point of view. Assumptions are embraced rather than questioned, emotional reactions yielded to rather than examined.
 
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4. P(E|~H): I don't know, and don't want to know, how you came up with .00052. ~H is so incoherent that you cannot reasonably derive a reliable value of P(E|~H) from it.

jt,
- The following is how I calculated the likelihood of E given ~H:

11.3. Re P(E|~H):
11.3.1. The probability (“likelihood”) of E given ~H, involves several specific hypothetical possibilities.
11.3.1.1. That only some of us have but one finite life.
11.3.1.2. That we each have numerous finite lives.
11.3.1.3. That only some of us have numerous finite lives.
11.3.1.4. That we each have an infinity of finite lives.
11.3.1.5. That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives.
11.3.1.6. That we each have an infinite life.
11.3.1.7. That only some of us have an infinite life.
11.3.1.8. That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained).
11.3.1.9. Some other explanation.

11.3.2. Now I must estimate (roughly) the prior probability (rounded off to three decimal places) of each more specific possibility (hypothesis), given ~H.
11.3.2.1. That only some of us have but one finite life: .000
11.3.2.2. That we each have numerous finite lives: .002.
11.3.2.3. That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .000.
11.3.2.4. That we each have an infinity of finite lives; .002
11.3.2.5. That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: 000.
11.3.2.6. That we each have an infinite life: .002
11.3.2.7. That only some of us have an infinite life: .000
11.3.2.8. That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained): .002
11.3.2.9. Some other explanation: .002

11.3.3. And now, I must estimate the likelihood of my own current existence given the different specific hypotheses under ~Hs.
11.3.3.1. That only some of us have but one finite life: .10.
11.3.3.2. That we each have numerous finite lives: .10.
11.3.3.3. That only some of us have numerous finite lives: .25.
11.3.3.4. That we each have an infinity of finite lives; 1.00
11.3.3.5. That only some of us have an infinity of finite lives: .50.
11.3.3.6. That we each have an infinite life: 1.00
11.3.3.7. That only some of us have an infinite life: .50
11.3.3.8. That time isn’t what we think it is (to be explained): .50
11.3.3.9. Some other explanation: .50
11.3.4. And now, I must multiply each of the probabilities of ~H above by the likelihoods of my current existence, given each specific hypothesis, and add up their products. And, the total likelihood of my current existence given ~H:
11.3.4.1. P(E|~H) = (0*.5) + (.002*.10) + (0*.25) + (.002*1.0) + (0*.5) + (1*..002) + (0*.5) + (.002*.5) + (.002*.5), or
11.3.4.2. P(E|~H) = 0 + .0002 + 0 +.002 + 0 + .002 + 0 + .001 + .001, or
11.3.4.3. P(E|~H) = .0052. And,
11.3.5. P(H|E) = 0*.99/(0*.99 + .0052*.01) = (0/.000052) = 0.
11.3.6. P(H|E) = 0.
11.3.7. IOW, given my current existence, the posterior probability that I will have one, finite life is zero…


You could have save a lot of typing by reading the highlighted part of my post.
 
Did you actually read and think about his post? Did you actually grasp what he was saying? He wasn't asking you to repeat your pseudo-mathematical question-begging. He was telling you that you're wrong and giving you the reason. What part of that sounded like a request to repeat your claims all over again for the umpteenth time?


Yeah, this.
 
How can we set a prior probability that the materialistic view of the universe might be wrong in the absence of any evidence whatsoever. Being 99.99% confident in it is nice and all, but there's no reason to put any confidence whatsoever in any dualist view. Once again, we need evidence. Jabba has none.

I suggest as a mere intermediate step towards common ground that we all time travel back to sophomore year, get stoned, and watch "What The [Bleep] Do We Know?"
 
How can we set a prior probability that the materialistic view of the universe might be wrong in the absence of any evidence whatsoever. Being 99.99% confident in it is nice and all, but there's no reason to put any confidence whatsoever in any dualist view. Once again, we need evidence. Jabba has none.

I suggest as a mere intermediate step towards common ground that we all time travel back to sophomore year, get stoned, and watch "What The [Bleep] Do We Know?"


I was supposed to be stoned when I watched What The [Bleep] Do We Know? Now you tell me. That was an hour-and-a-half of my life I'll never get back. It would have seemed less wasted if at least I'd been wasted.

On a slightly more serious note, when the priors are hard to nail down, one can, or should, just compute the likelihood ratio, P(E|H)/P(E|~H), and allow readers to supply their own subjective prior odds, P(H)/P(~H). Multiplying the likelihood ratio by the prior odds yields a subjective posterior odds, P(H|E)/P(~H|E).

That said, as written, Jabba indicates that the likelihood ratio is 0, and so the posterior odds are 0 regardless of the prior odds.
 
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How can we set a prior probability that the materialistic view of the universe might be wrong in the absence of any evidence whatsoever.

That's the wrong question, the question is "why do we even make these assumptions - a materialistic universe - without evidence"?
 
That's the wrong question, the question is "why do we even make these assumptions - a materialistic universe - without evidence"?
You seem to be using the phrase "without evidence" in some new and novel manner with which I am not familiar.
 
Because otherwise we would be making an assumption - that the immaterial exists - without evidence.

But we need to do that either way, in a certain sense. If I were to make an assumption explaining my observations I need to assume the existence of my own subjective experience. Then I can either also assume the existence of an exterior material universe, or I can consider "it" part of my subjective experience which I already assumed.
 
1. P(E|H) = 7000000000/∞ = 0, which implies that P(H|E) = 0, regardless of the evidence or the prior probability.
Jt,
- Correct.
Thus you're not doing Bayesian inference; you're just stating a predetermined conclusion...
- Here, I'm pretty sure you're wrong.
- If an hypothesis excludes the possibility of a particular event, and the event occurs, you can throw out that hypothesis. You don't have to worry about Bayes.
- If an hypothesis almost excludes a particular event, and the event occurs, you can't just throw out that hypothesis -- you need to weigh the likelihood of said event, given the original hypothesis, against the prior probability of the complement of the original hypothesis...
- That's where Bayes comes in. In our case, OOFLam only almost excludes the event -- the zero is the result of rounding off to three digits.
- Though, I probably should have used 1X10-80in the formula instead of ∞.
 
Jt,
- Correct.
- Here, I'm pretty sure you're wrong.
- If an hypothesis excludes the possibility of a particular event, and the event occurs, you can throw out that hypothesis. You don't have to worry about Bayes.
- If an hypothesis almost excludes a particular event, and the event occurs, you can't just throw out that hypothesis -- you need to weigh the likelihood of said event, given the original hypothesis, against the prior probability of the complement of the original hypothesis...
- That's where Bayes comes in. In our case, OOFLam only almost excludes the event -- the zero is the result of rounding off to three digits.
- Though, I probably should have used 1X10-80in the formula instead of ∞.

OOFLam is your strawman argument.
 
...
2. P(~H) is overstated by many orders of magnitude. I would put it at something like 1-in-1-trillion, since it implies that all of physics is wrong, which is extraordinarily unlikely...
jt,

- Remember, if I'm right about 7,000,000,000/∞ (or even 7,000,000,000/1X10-80), I've already won.

- I'd say that ~H does not imply that all of physics is wrong -- it implies that Newtonian Physics and Relativity don't have all the answers. I'd also say that Quantum Mechanics seems to be going in my direction -- i.e., consciousness is becoming a big deal.
 
jt,

- Remember, if I'm right about 7,000,000,000/∞ (or even 7,000,000,000/1X10-80), I've already won.
Won what? You've convinced yourself you are immortal?

- I'd say that ~H does not imply that all of physics is wrong -- it implies that Newtonian Physics and Relativity don't have all the answers. I'd also say that Quantum Mechanics seems to be going in my direction -- i.e., consciousness is becoming a big deal.
hahaha.
Quantum woo - spooky, therefore...........immortal!
 
jt,

- Remember, if I'm right about 7,000,000,000/∞ (or even 7,000,000,000/1X10-80), I've already won.

No. No matter how small the prior likelihood of "you" is, it is not even evidence of an immortal soul.

Hans
 
Remember, if I'm right about 7,000,000,000/∞ (or even 7,000,000,000/1X10-80), I've already won.

That's exactly the point. You made up numbers that would ensure your misuse of Bayes rejects any hypothesis that's thrown at it. This is your schtick -- you try to stack the deck so that you don't actually have to make any argument. This is no different than your shameful ploy in the Shroud thread, where you held all your critics hostage until they agreed ahead of time that your non-evidence was valid.

I'd say that ~H does not imply that all of physics is wrong -- it implies that Newtonian Physics and Relativity don't have all the answers.

No, now you're just shifting goalposts. You started out telling us you could prove immortality mathematically. Then you told us you couldn't, and you'd have to fall back to just proving immateriality. Now, having failed to do that, you've fallen back yet again to the standard woo-peddler's default argument: "Science doesn't have all the answers, therefore it cannot prove that I'm wrong."

Science is not confused on the issue of whether the effects of consciousness continue after death. And you know this. This is why you have to make such desperate, nonsensical patch-up claims as that souls don't have characteristics, or that scientists are in denial about what they have seen.

I'd also say that Quantum Mechanics seems to be going in my direction -- i.e., consciousness is becoming a big deal.

No. Every fringe theorist pretends to understand theoretical physics and argues that it somehow, magically enlivens his claims. Consciousness as you devise it was never part of quantum mechanics, and conscious observers as some early theorists conceived it is relegated to a backwater fringe minority of physics today. You never had a foothold there, and you're not gaining ground.
 
Here, I'm pretty sure you're wrong.

He is not, and he is not the first person to tell you that you're wrong, and he is not the first person to explain exactly in what way you are wrong. Your prior is simply a made-up belief to which you have attached a made-up number. Your misunderstanding of Bayes convinces you that you can do this and that the exercise of iterating Bayes' Theorem somehow creates probative information.

You know this. You've consulted your own choice of experts who have told you that you're wrong to apply this approach. You've been told in substantial detail exactly what is wrong with your formulation. If you won't believe your own expert witnesses, then we have only to conclude that you are so emotionally entrenched in this mode of argumentation that you cannot possibly evaluate it rationally.
 
If an hypothesis almost excludes a particular event, and the event occurs, you can't just throw out that hypothesis -- you need to weigh the likelihood of said event...

You didn't pay the slightest attention to what jt512 cited as the problem with your model. The problem is not with H, but with ~H. As he has noted, ~H in your formulation is a disjunction, therefore there is no such thing as a meaningful probability in this context that it can occur, with or without the event. This is the same false dilemma you employed in the Shroud thread, and the same false dilemma you abstracted in the circumstantial evidence thread where you could never reconcile your frantic equivocation between CAT and ~DOG.

I wonder how many people have to bring this chronic flaw in your thinking to your attention before it will begin to penetrate your smug self-assuredness.

Here, I'm pretty sure you're wrong.

Not only is he right, he's right in the same way all the other people were right when they tried to explain it to you in the above-mentioned situations. He's right in likely the same way the experts you yourself chose to consult were when they told you your approach wasn't valid. ~H has to be a happenable thing. It can't be a collection of disjoint, incompatible happenable things if you want to formulate the problem as {H,~H}. If you want to formulate it as {H1,H2,H3,...} a different formulation applies. This happens all the time in fringe argumentation: the claimants try to shoehorn the problem into their understanding rather than expand their understanding to encompass the true nature of the problem. What was that about "holistic" thinking, Jabba? Please explain again how your critics are so limited in their thinking that they can't see your wisdom.
 
- If an hypothesis excludes the possibility of a particular event, and the event occurs, you can throw out that hypothesis. You don't have to worry about Bayes.

If I say Earth is round and the Jets are going to win the Super Bowl, and then the Jets don't win the big game, you don't get to say that Earth is probably flat.
 
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