Proof of Immortality III

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Are we keeping count of how many fringe resets this has been?

8. That’s because the likelihood of what it is being compared to, weighed against (my existence, given OOFLam) is virtually zero.

Begging the question. Again.

12. The obvious answer is “~OOFLam”…

Only seems obvious because you made it seem obvious by begging the question. Circular arguments always seem obviously correct to the person who's making them.

15. I don’t know what I am -- but, I know I am.

Equivocation. That has nothing to do with whether your "am-ness" existed before your physical birth or will persist after your physical death. Self-awareness is not the same as immortality. Do not simply continue to try to find new ways to express the same fallacious argument. Use a different argument.

24. So, we don’t know what we are, but we do know we are.

Irrelevant. You haven't shown evidence of any aspect of being or self-awareness that is not limited in time to the lifespan of the physical organism. You have identified as a necessary premise that such an aspect would likely be immaterial. And toward that end (or rather, that middle) you have not shown evidence of any aspect of being or self-awareness that is necessarily immaterial.


26. But further, if I didn’t exist it would be as if there were nothing – there might as well be nothing.
27. And, if I never existed, there might as well never be anything.
28. And, what if you never existed?

Pseudo-philosophical twaddle.

32. There’s something wrong here…
33. There’s something “magical” here.
34. Science seems to be missing a serious piece of the puzzle…
35. Again, there’s something magical here…

Frantic question-begging with a side order of your usually otherwise well-veiled dig against science. If you want science to recognize what you propose to be the piece of a puzzle it's missing, you need to be able to express your argument in scientific terms. It has been shown how and why your statistical argument does not hold. You have received confirmation from experts of your own choosing that the demonstration of your error is correct. Simply repeating your pseudo-mathematical claim and insulating it with a pile of woo-ish rhetoric will not endear you to science, nor justify your continued animosity toward those who approach the physical world according to the scientific method.
 
WTF? That's completely wrong.

It is not my fault that Toontown circles around the notion that while he/she refuses point blank to identify what it might be that he/she believes whatever he/she believes, it is somehow everyone else's responsibility to disprove the ideas that Toontown declines to identify.

One is left with guessing alone.
 
I think we should discuss Jabba's item #13 in great detail. It deserved its own number, so it must be important.
 
Re 11 & 12: many posters have pointed out many times that you existing under OOFLam is far more likely than your non physical model. Because you have to start with the unlikelihood of your body existing (same as OOFLam) then you have to add the unlikeliness of a non physical soul existing (which you never managed to come up with any kind of measure for) and then you need to add the altogether more unlikely event of the two connecting. You have, once again, failed.
 
1. Toontown doesn’t agree with me, but I think I, basically, agree with him…

Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn.

2. Why my existence isn’t just dumb luck:

Why does this have a separate number?

3. Whereas, very unlikely things do happen (e.g. winning the lottery), they are unlikely given (based upon) specific hypotheses, or models.

Wrong. Their likeliness is definite, given the actual model.

4. And -- re the lottery -- were it not for the rules, the oversight, the results and the media (including the Internet), we wouldn’t be so sure that luck was the answer.

Wrong. The rules apply, period.

5. If, for instance, we discovered that the winner was secretly the 2nd cousin of the person most in charge of the lottery, we’d have 2nd thoughts…

Perhaps, but entirely irrelevant to the subject at hand.

6. Which is the point -- if we have a reasonable alternative to luck, we don’t have to assume that it's luck…

Given that, your task is to provide a reasonable alternative to luck.

7. And here, what can be counted as “reasonable” doesn’t need to be very probable at all – in fact, it can be extremely improbable.

Depends on what the alternative is.

8. That’s because the likelihood of what it is being compared to, weighed against (my existence, given OOFLam) is virtually zero.

No. The prior probability of you is low, but it is not zero and it is equal to the probability of anybody else.

9. IOW, we have an alternative hypothesis which is much more probable – given my existence – than is OOFLam.

However, you don't have such a hypothesis. AND such a hypothesis still needs evidence.

10. The posterior probability of OOFLam – given me -- is much smaller than the posterior probability of ~OOFLam.

Wrong. Unless you have a concrete hypothesis, with evidence for it, you have nothing.

11. But, the ultimate question is, “In which case am I more likely to be here – OOFLam, or ~OOFLam?”
12. The obvious answer is “~OOFLam”…

Circular argument.

13. And then,
14. I’m the only “thing,” “process” or “illusion” that I know exists.
15. I don’t know what I am -- but, I know I am.
16. Everything else could be my imagination

Irrelevant.

17. We humans take our personal existence (selves) totally for granted.
18. We act as if we had to exist.

Speak for yourself. However, even if true, it proves absolutely nothing except the subjectivity of the human mind.

19. Though scientifically speaking, that’s the very last thing we should take for granted.

Wrong. Since you do exist, you are free to take it for granted.

20. Again, according to modern science, the likelihood of my (and your) current existence is virtually zero.

Wrong. While low, the probability of you exists.

21. Yet, I’m the only thing, process or illusion that I actually know exists.

Yes, you exist, but whatever entity you might be, you would know you existed.

22. And, you’re the only thing, process or illusion that you actually know exists (if you’re not a robot)).

??

23. The rest could be our imagination.

I strongly recommend that you stay away from solipsism.

24. So, we don’t know what we are, but we do know we are.

We both know what we are and (obviously) that we are.

25. And again, we know we are – even though the scientific likelihood of each of our current existences is hardly more than zero…

Wrong. It is definitely more than zero.

26. But further, if I didn’t exist it would be as if there were nothing – there might as well be nothing.

If you didn't exist you would not be posting here. So you exist.

27. And, if I never existed, there might as well never be anything.
28. And, what if you never existed?

SOmeone else would probably exist.

29. And then, if you think about it, nothing really makes sense, anyway.

So what are we discussing?

30. Once there is something, reductive materialism (the basic axiom of science) just doesn’t work…
31. Now, if there were nothing, that would make sense!

Nonsense.

32. There’s something wrong here…
33. There’s something “magical” here.
34. Science seems to be missing a serious piece of the puzzle…
35. Again, there’s something magical here…

Nonsense.

Hans
 
And this, after you've already demonstrated that you are probabilistically challenged by arguing that I'm wrong because it isn't an absolute certainty that the (3) was rolled with the 6 sided die...

While given the option of a 6 sided and a trillion sided die, it is, by far, most likely that a 3 was the result of a six sided die, it isn't a certainty.

Clue: If there is enough information to establish absolute certainty, then you don't need probability.

However, in real life there is rarely enough information for that.

Hint: Think before you post. Read before you think.

Quite, but the motivation to read long, insolent posts like your own is generally low.:rolleyes:

Hans
 
3. Whereas, very unlikely things do happen (e.g. winning the lottery), they are unlikely given (based upon) specific hypotheses, or models.


1. It is extremely unlikely that my parents could have produced me, given the almost impossible odds of genetic combinations combined with congenital conditions.

2. My existence would be much more easily explained if there were a vat in the basement of Dow Pharmaceuticals where I was purpose-grown. Then I would be guaranteed to come out exactly the way I am now.

3. Thus, I was grown in a vat in the basement of Dow Pharmaceuticals.



Jabba - How does my reasoning differ from yours? I can't test your "immaterial" self and you don't have the proper authorizations to get into the basement of Dow Pharmaceuticals.
 
One organization, one place, one time, one universe, one Jabba-brain.
But doesn't this apply to every brain, and indeed every object in the universe?

I've genuinely been trying to follow your argument. I freely admit I'm not a statistics or probability person, but I get lost at this point. I still can't see why this make any brain (or any object) including my own different from any other, or any more or less likely.
 
But doesn't this apply to every brain, and indeed every object in the universe?

I've genuinely been trying to follow your argument. I freely admit I'm not a statistics or probability person, but I get lost at this point. I still can't see why this make any brain (or any object) including my own different from any other, or any more or less likely.
No and yes. His arguments so far boil down to two options, both of which are fatally flawed.

As it stands, the answer to your question is no, because Toontown's argument implicitly requires not only an awareness of self but an awareness that is something separate from self. As such, it is exactly the same "special snowflake" circularity inherent in Jabba's argument.

If Toontown rejects my summary, then he is left with your observation that this would apply to everything, which means that Toontown's argument would boil down to "Since something exists, it's special." In other words, meaningless nothing.
 
Jabba, when you say the original and duplicate Jabba selves would be different, do you mean they would experience differently, or they would feel differently, or think differently, or react to experiences differently?

I understand that each self would have its own subjective perspective. I just don't understand how they are different from each other.
Dave,

- I doubt this will help, but as you know, I'm pretty stubborn.

- To me, that's how they are different -- they have different subjective perspectives. They have different consciousnesses.
- That difference is the result of being physically different entities. Certain physical "things" have consciousness. Maybe, all animals have some sort of consciousness. Maybe plants do also. I guess it's possible that even rocks are somehow conscious. Mt Rainier?
- Whatever, it seems to me that any bit of consciousness would inherently bring with it a "self" of some kind... And different entities will naturally have different selves -- different awarenesses.
- I could go on, but I'll wait for your response to that...
 
Dave,

- I doubt this will help, but as you know, I'm pretty stubborn.

- To me, that's how they are different -- they have different subjective perspectives. They have different consciousnesses.
- That difference is the result of being physically different entities. Certain physical "things" have consciousness. Maybe, all animals have some sort of consciousness. Maybe plants do also. I guess it's possible that even rocks are somehow conscious. Mt Rainier?
- Whatever, it seems to me that any bit of consciousness would inherently bring with it a "self" of some kind... And different entities will naturally have different selves -- different awarenesses.

But what is different about the awarenesses? In what way are they different from each other?
 
No and yes. His arguments so far boil down to two options, both of which are fatally flawed.

As it stands, the answer to your question is no, because Toontown's argument implicitly requires not only an awareness of self but an awareness that is something separate from self. As such, it is exactly the same "special snowflake" circularity inherent in Jabba's argument.


Then If I’m understanding, the reason the answer would be “No, it doesn’t apply to every brain” is this:
And, in a bid to head off the next misunderstanding: Loss Leader may not have been talking about a specific brain. But I was
Toontown is talking about particular brain, and the probability of that particular brain is 1 in a gajillion.

I see your point about the special snowflake. Toontown’s argument still doesn’t seem to make sense unless there is something different about the specific brain. If the point is that everyone with a brain seems to have won the lottery (odds wise) then it seems like Loss Leader’s point about running multiple lotteries every day for a few billion years comes into play. After all, it seems that once you start getting brains, it’s going to be somebody’s brain pretty much every time.

Toontown, I genuinely have been trying to follow your argument. If you can help me see where I’m missing it I really would be interested.
 
[A]s you know, I'm pretty stubborn.

The question is whether it's useful stubbornness. There's one type of persistence toward a laudable goal that's justified against determined opposition. But there's a different type of persistence that is simple entrenchment in an error you don't want to give up because it holds some subjective appeal for you, no matter how much information is shown to you. You're firmly esconced in the latter, as your angst-ridden philoso-babble above demonstrates.

To me, that's how they are different -- they have different subjective perspectives. They have different consciousnesses.

Asked and answered. They are two identical consciousnesses. The two identities will naturally give rise to certain properties. The one identicality will give rise to certain other properties. You have the burden to prove your proposed immortal soul is a product of the identity, not the identicality. Since all the available observations are a product of what arises out of identicality, you cannot simply -- once again -- invent out of whole cloth a new kind of being, endow it with the properties you need in order to support your belief, and use that as the premise of an argument designed to prove the existence of the thing you invented.

That difference is the result of being physically different entities.

The only thing being two different entities gets you is a difference of identity (in the philosophical sense, not the consciousness sense -- look it up if you don't get the difference). Subjective perception is a red herring. Your critics have long stipulated that the original and clone would necessarily begin to diverge as soon as the cloning occurred. Those subsequence differences would not imbue either one with immortality. That the scientific model of consciousness allows consciousness to change over time does not mean it is not a product of entirely natural law.

Certain physical "things" have consciousness. Maybe...

But if you go beyond humans, then you're just speculating. And you probably haven't thought through the implications of the speculation: you're a short distance away from having to show that animals and mountains must also have immortal souls. Stop trying to distract toward irrelevancy and stay on the ball.

Whatever, it seems to me that any bit of consciousness would inherently bring with it a "self" of some kind... And different entities will naturally have different selves -- different awarenesses.

Asked and answered. They are not different in any way aside from identity. You are conflating identity with identicality.
 
Dave,

- I doubt this will help, but as you know, I'm pretty stubborn.

- To me, that's how they are different -- they have different subjective perspectives. They have different consciousnesses.
But if we could somehow exactly duplicate you, then both “yous” would think the same thing. They would both think they were not only the only Jabba, they would both think they were the original Jabba, and they would both think that the other Jabba was wrong.

This means that someone with all your exact same thoughts, exact same feelings, exact same experiences about the soul and immortality, exact same everything, think’s you’re wrong about your soul. They don’t think you have the soul that you think you have because they are every bit as convinced as you are that they have Jabba’s one and only unique soul.

And you think the same thing about them.

Doesn’t that cast doubt about your feeling that you have a unique soul?
 
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