Pickett's Charge: why

[simonxlong]

Actually, I would include Hannibal but exclude Alexander. Hannibal might have failed, but he knew exactly what the Romans were and he knew that Carthage's only hope was to wipe out the Roman Empire.

On the other hand, there is the Greekling...Alexander. Alexander did quite well with the Government, Alliances and Army his daddy left him...but he totally lost the plot in Afghanistan and India (places where he should have never gone). In fact, Alexander showed his true colors - the depths of his immaturity - when he savaged Thebes and lost the support of much of the Peloponese. Philip - his father - was by far the better warrior and diplomat, and had Philip lead those Armies, he would have taken out Rome after he dealt with Persia, and Rome should have been nothing but a Historical Footnote.

It's arguable as to whether or not Hannibal completely understood the Romans. He clearly understood the expansionist aims of Rome and the need to destroy it, but I think he never really got down to understanding how the Romans looked at the world. That's why he wandered around Italy for about 15 years, winning battles, but never hitting on what it would take to break the Romans. I think it could be said that he understood Roman armies and how they fought as he clearly mastered their tactics, but I don't think he ever truly grasped the Roman mindset in such a way that he could actually win the war.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

It's arguable as to whether or not Hannibal completely understood the Romans. He clearly understood the expansionist aims of Rome and the need to destroy it, but I think he never really got down to understanding how the Romans looked at the world. That's why he wandered around Italy for about 15 years, winning battles, but never hitting on what it would take to break the Romans. I think it could be said that he understood Roman armies and how they fought as he clearly mastered their tactics, but I don't think he ever truly grasped the Roman mindset in such a way that he could actually win the war.

I tend to agree.

As a military commander, however, Hannibal only lost because he met his equal in the undefeated Scipio. Now there was a general who understood his enemy.

 

[Garrette]

Also agree with simonxlong's assessment of Hannibal and disagree with Jules Galen's assessment of Alexander. The criteria for "great general" used appears both falsely restrictive and conveniently amorphous.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

Hannibal was a master of both tactics and domestic politics, although he definitely seems to have been a bit short in the grand strategy department. I don't think he understood the extent to which the Romans were perfectly content to shut the gates of Rome and just wait until Hannibal got tired of it all. Scipio's gambit and his incredibly meticulous planning to the end of defeating Hannibal (neutralizing the elephants, cutting of Hannibal's cavalry supply, etc) shows a stroke of strategical genius that I'm not sure Hannibal possessed.

As for Alexander I'm not very familiar with him. I have read assessments that he mostly just happened to have a somewhat disciplined force and faced a weak Persia and so on, but I recall that he also faced his most difficult opposition in India.

 

[Meadmaker]

Did a part of Lee STILL not grasp what rifled muskets could do to attacking forces? I know the tactics always lag behind the technology, but by the time Gettysburg rolled around, the generals should have had a good idea of what taking a position defended by men with rifled guns would require.

Longstreet certainly knew. Was Lee still in the mindset of smoothbore warfare when he ordered the charge?

That's what I've read.

I read a book called "Attack and Die" ounce that described the mindset. The generals, especially in the South, were busy fighting the Napoleonic wars which they had studied at West Point. They just didn't realize that the improving technology made such huge assaults impossible. Meanwhile, the rifles manufactured in the North were getting better as the war went on. If the Union soldiers had been equipped as they were at the start of the war, the charge might have made sense. As it was, Lee was fighting the last war, and lost.

By the way, this last week was the 100th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme.

 

[Garrette]

Hannibal was a master of both tactics and domestic politics, although he definitely seems to have been a bit short in the grand strategy department. I don't think he understood the extent to which the Romans were perfectly content to shut the gates of Rome and just wait until Hannibal got tired of it all. Scipio's gambit and his incredibly meticulous planning to the end of defeating Hannibal (neutralizing the elephants, cutting of Hannibal's cavalry supply, etc) shows a stroke of strategical genius that I'm not sure Hannibal possessed.

As for Alexander I'm not very familiar with him. I have read assessments that he mostly just happened to have a somewhat disciplined force and faced a weak Persia and so on, but I recall that he also faced his most difficult opposition in India.

Unfair assessments of Alexander, I think. He did not merely inherit a somewhat disciplined force, he expanded on its discipline and training -- the battlefield maneuvers that the phalanxes could execute by the time of Arbela/Gaugemela were beyond the maneuvers of the phalanxes he used to crush the rebellions spawned by the death of his father. His grasp of the strategic picture was comprehensive and immediate. He knew not only that securing control of the Eastern Mediterranean was paramount but also how to achieve it. When that was complete, he knew that an attempt to defeat Persia by marching down the Euphrates toward Babylon would lead to disaster while facing the massive Persian army was paramount. At that battle, Alexander knew how to minimize the Persian advantages (Darius was not a bad general or soldier; he had picked and prepared his ground carefully so that he had given himself every advantage of terrain) and maximize the Greek strengths. At the Hydaspes, Alexander played a masterful psychological game before winning a tactical duel with a tough and skilled opponent.

Alexander's flaw was not in his abilities but rather his insatiability.

 

[Craig B]

Alexander's flaw was not in his abilities but rather his insatiability.

For both territory and booze.

 

[Jules Galen]

Hannibal was a master of both tactics and domestic politics, although he definitely seems to have been a bit short in the grand strategy department. I don't think he understood the extent to which the Romans were perfectly content to shut the gates of Rome and just wait until Hannibal got tired of it all. Scipio's gambit and his incredibly meticulous planning to the end of defeating Hannibal (neutralizing the elephants, cutting of Hannibal's cavalry supply, etc) shows a stroke of strategical genius that I'm not sure Hannibal possessed.

As for Alexander I'm not very familiar with him. I have read assessments that he mostly just happened to have a somewhat disciplined force and faced a weak Persia and so on, but I recall that he also faced his most difficult opposition in India.

I got to agree with what you say about Hannibal - he was somewhat deficient in the Grand Strategy Department. Hannibal spent way too much time in Rome accomplishing nothing and, as a result, let his opportunity to cripple Rome pass by him. And he paid for that. So...it doesn't look like he was so great after all.

 

[Craig B]

I got to agree with what you say about Hannibal - he was somewhat deficient in the Grand Strategy Department. Hannibal spent way too much time in Rome accomplishing nothing and, as a result, let his opportunity to cripple Rome pass by him. And he paid for that. So...it doesn't look like he was so great after all.

Spent time in Italy, I suppose you mean. I think he had the same problem as Hitler did in the USSR. He inflicted grave defeats on the Roman state. But it held together, both behind the walls of Rome, and through the system of subordinate Italian polities controlled by that city, which didn't all defect to Hannibal as he presumably hoped.

Forced by logistics to stay on the move, could Hannibal have settled down for the long time a siege of Rome would have taken? Also, the Romans behaved intelligently. They boldly ignored Hannibal's Italian peregrinations, and used their assets to open a second front in Spain, putting Carthage under great stress, and finally forcing Hannibal's recall to protect his own home city. He lost.

Once it became clear that the Roman Republic wouldn't collapse, Hannibal was as surely doomed as Hitler was following his failure before Moscow. Neither of these leaders was in any position to win the war of attrition that inevitably resulted from the failure of their opponents to collapse following initial defeats, however severe these may have been.

 

[Jules Galen]

Spent time in Italy, I suppose you mean. I think he had the same problem as Hitler did in the USSR. He inflicted grave defeats on the Roman state. But it held together, both behind the walls of Rome, and through the system of subordinate Italian polities controlled by that city, which didn't all defect to Hannibal as he presumably hoped.

Forced by logistics to stay on the move, could Hannibal have settled down for the long time a siege of Rome would have taken? Also, the Romans behaved intelligently. They boldly ignored Hannibal's Italian peregrinations, and used their assets to open a second front in Spain, putting Carthage under great stress, and finally forcing Hannibal's recall to protect his own home city. He lost.

Once it became clear that the Roman Republic wouldn't collapse, Hannibal was as surely doomed as Hitler was following his failure before Moscow. Neither of these leaders was in any position to win the war of attrition that inevitably resulted from the failure of their opponents to collapse following initial defeats, however severe these may have been.

In a way, I got to agree. In fact, I think the whole Medeterranian World was doomed at this point. I mean, I am no fan of Rome - whose empire I consider a huge and long-term regression in the advance of civilization.

 

[simonxlong]

In a way, I got to agree. In fact, I think the whole Medeterranian World was doomed at this point. I mean, I am no fan of Rome - whose empire I consider a huge and long-term regression in the advance of civilization.

Hannibal was doomed because Hannibal didn't change and adapt, not because Rome couldn't be beaten. He did what he did very well, but he essentially kept doing it the same old way. He kept playing the game of trying force Rome to negotiate or force Rome's Italian allies to abandon Rome in large numbers, thereby defeating Rome indirectly. Neither happened, even after battles like Cannae, where the Romans took huge casualties. This shows Hannibal's failure to understand both Rome and their hold over their Italian allies.

On top of this, Hannibal was unable to secure additional men and material from Carthage or many of his allies. This meant he lacked the resources to directly attack Rome herself. Nonetheless, instead of adapting his policies or even abandoning Italy and trying to defeat Roman expansion elsewhere, which with his tactical genius and the support of local populations under threat from Rome he might have had the ability to do, he instead drags the conflict out in a war of attrition he can't possibly win.

Any sensible political leader would realize that they are going to have to do something fundamentally different in order to achieve their objective, but Hannibal seems completely unable to see any other possibility. The irony is, while he ties vast amounts of Carthage's manpower up in a hopeless struggle in Italy, Rome is actually expanding their empire in other places. I think it shows how a great general can understand battle but not understand war.

 

[Jules Galen]

simonxlong,

Great Post!

Thanks!

 

[Garrette]

Hannibal was doomed because Hannibal didn't change and adapt, not because Rome couldn't be beaten. He did what he did very well, but he essentially kept doing it the same old way. He kept playing the game of trying force Rome to negotiate or force Rome's Italian allies to abandon Rome in large numbers, thereby defeating Rome indirectly. Neither happened, even after battles like Cannae, where the Romans took huge casualties. This shows Hannibal's failure to understand both Rome and their hold over their Italian allies.

On top of this, Hannibal was unable to secure additional men and material from Carthage or many of his allies. This meant he lacked the resources to directly attack Rome herself. Nonetheless, instead of adapting his policies or even abandoning Italy and trying to defeat Roman expansion elsewhere, which with his tactical genius and the support of local populations under threat from Rome he might have had the ability to do, he instead drags the conflict out in a war of attrition he can't possibly win.

Any sensible political leader would realize that they are going to have to do something fundamentally different in order to achieve their objective, but Hannibal seems completely unable to see any other possibility. The irony is, while he ties vast amounts of Carthage's manpower up in a hopeless struggle in Italy, Rome is actually expanding their empire in other places. I think it shows how a great general can understand battle but not understand war.

Have to continue to disagree, I'm afraid. To continue the WWII analogy, this is like blaming the German General Staff for Hitler's refusal to adapt Barbarossa to the realities on the ground, e.g., to make Moscow the primary target and relieve Army Groups North and South from their objectives of Leningrad and the Ukraine in order to achieve that objective.

Hannibal's strategy came perilously close to working, and had Hamilcar not lost at Metaurus, thus providing two active Carthaginian armies in Italy working either in cooperation or as one combine army, more Roman allies would likely have defected and Rome likely have fallen. Even without Hamilcar, had Carthage provide the reinforcements Hannibal requested, such an objective was not out of reach.

 

[simonxlong]

Have to continue to disagree, I'm afraid. To continue the WWII analogy, this is like blaming the German General Staff for Hitler's refusal to adapt Barbarossa to the realities on the ground, e.g., to make Moscow the primary target and relieve Army Groups North and South from their objectives of Leningrad and the Ukraine in order to achieve that objective.

Hannibal's strategy came perilously close to working, and had Hamilcar not lost at Metaurus, thus providing two active Carthaginian armies in Italy working either in cooperation or as one combine army, more Roman allies would likely have defected and Rome likely have fallen. Even without Hamilcar, had Carthage provide the reinforcements Hannibal requested, such an objective was not out of reach.

I don't think the analogy holds. In the case of Hitler, the Generals were bound by Hitler's plan. He was controlling the overall strategy and setting the ultimate strategic objectives, so blaming them for Hitler's failure wouldn't be realistic. In the case of Hannibal, he was in control of his strategy. He set the plan and could change it when Carthage was unable or unwilling to send the reinforcements he requested, meaning that he was in a position to do other things. He didn't have to keep beating his head against the same wall like the German generals had to.

After the battle of Cannae in 216 BCE, he started requesting reinforcements and never got them. As a result, he was unable to attack Rome directly because he lacked the men and siege equipment necessary. He continued to try and turn Italy against Rome, but this had limited success, and Rome refused to give in. By the time his brother's attempt to relieve him ended in defeat in 207 BCE, Rome had been effectively beating Hannibal down systematically for years, making his position in southern Italy more and more untenable. Even after his brother's defeat he still didn't change his principal strategy though he had to realistically know that no help was coming, and still tried to hold out in Italy for 4 more years until he was ultimately recalled to defend Carthage.

Had Hannibal gotten the reinforcements he needed, things might have turned out differently. He did not, and he failed to adapt to the fact that these reinforcements were not coming. He was brilliant tactician and there were many place he could have moved in the Mediterranean world to challenge Roman ascension without fighting a war of attrition in Italy, especially as it became more and more apparent that Rome wasn't going to fall and he wasn't going to get the necessary support. He never changed his plan even as it became obvious his plan wasn't going to work, and that was his flaw.

 

[Garrette]

I understand that thinking, but I still disagree, to a point at least. The expectation of victory given he could join with Hamilcar was a reasonable one; I cannot fault him for remaining in Italy until then particularly given that it was unlikely that Carthage would have allowed him to open other fronts elsewhere (I'm going by what may be faulty memory here). As such, even if a longshot, the stay-in-Italy strategy remained his best option.

Once Hamilcar was beaten and the junction of the two armies thwarted, beating Rome from within Italy became impossible. It is at this point only that I can begin to agree with you, but I would caveat the agreement by saying that Hannibal knew it was pointless for his last years in Italy but could not bring himself to leave. As such, it was a defeat of reason by emotion, not an indication of limited ability.

 

[ddt]

Nitpick: Hannibal's brother was Hasdrubal. Hamilcar was his father.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

Nitpick: Hannibal's brother was Hasdrubal. Hamilcar was his father.

He also inherited the Cognomen "Barca", or "lightning" from said father. It's the same name as "Barack".

Hannibal is similar to the name John (Johannes), meaning "A gift from Baal" compared to "A gift from Yahweh". Hasdrubal means "Helped by Baal", "Hasdru" being the same word as "Azra" in "Azrael".


/random trivia

 

[Garrette]

Nitpick: Hannibal's brother was Hasdrubal. Hamilcar was his father.

Not a nitpick; appreciate you pointing out the typo. I believe I got it right earlier, so you'll accept that this was just a brain freeze.

 

[Garrette]

He also inherited the Cognomen "Barca", or "lightning" from said father. It's the same name as "Barack".

Hannibal is similar to the name John (Johannes), meaning "A gift from Baal" compared to "A gift from Yahweh". Hasdrubal means "Helped by Baal", "Hasdru" being the same word as "Azra" in "Azrael".


/random trivia

Very neat stuff. Thanks.

 

[Craig B]

He also inherited the Cognomen "Barca", or "lightning" from said father. It's the same name as "Barack".

Hannibal is similar to the name John (Johannes), meaning "A gift from Baal" compared to "A gift from Yahweh". Hasdrubal means "Helped by Baal", "Hasdru" being the same word as "Azra" in "Azrael".


/random trivia

Useful list of such "theophoric" names from the Bible to be found here.